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abstract
The importance of prediction or expectation in the functioning of the mind is appreciated at least
since the birth of psychology as a separate discipline. From minute moment-to-moment predictions of
the movements of a melody or a ball, to the long-term plans of our friends and foes, we continuously
predict the world around us, because we learned the statistical regularities that govern it. It is often only
when predictions go awry —when the sensory input does not match with the predictions we implicitly
formed— that we become conscious of this incessant predictive activity of our brains. In the last decennia,
a computational model called predictive coding emerged that attempts to formalize this matching pro-
cess, hence explaining perceptual inference and learning. The predictive coding scheme describes how
each level in the cortical processing hierarchy predicts inputs from levels below. In this way resources
can be focused on that part of the input that was unpredicted, and therefore signals important changes
in the environment that are still to be explained. In doing so the brain is guided by a single principle
known as the prediction error minimization principle. Its constant effort to reduce uncertainty relative to
its predictions is thought to enable adaptive behavior in a computationally manageable way.
The appeal of this account is clear from the recent surge in studies using it to explain findings across
virtually all subfields of psychology. Indeed, a generalized form of predictive coding has been proposed
as Grand Unified Theory for psychology. Unpacking the prediction error minimization principle in these
disparate fields has led to powerful, integrating insights. But is this just another short-lived fad in psy-
chology? Or are its roots deeper and its branches as far-reaching as its proponents foreshadow? We will
only know if we examine the framework (its assumptions, implementations, implications and limitations)
in full detail. The main mission of this dissertation is to do a small but, so we will argue, important part
of this work. Specifically, we focus on how affective processes can have their place in this theory, since
this has so far remained underexposed, given the mainly cognitive and perceptual character of previous
work. To do so, we start with two elaborate ‘case studies’. The first applies predictive coding to autism
spectrum disorders, a psychiatric syndrome characterized by difficulties in social, cognitive and affective
processing. We argue that the weight (or ‘precision’) attributed to prediction errors in autism is unduly
high and inflexible, rather than determined by context uncertainty. This may explain both their peculiar
behavior in cognitive and perceptual tasks, and their affective-motivational troubles. The second case is
an application of predictive coding to visual art. Here we develop the hypothesis that making predic-
tive progress (i. e., actively reducing prediction errors) is intrinsically pleasurable, which helps to explain
affective experiences in art appreciation. These theoretical studies are followed by two empirical works,
of which the first is an initial step in subjecting the hypothesis of predictive progress and pleasure to
the test, using Gestalt discovery in two-tone images. The second investigates whether perception can be
biased by affective relevance of the top-down priors or predictions applied to interpret a stimulus. It
uses bistable point-light figures and finds some support that this is indeed the case. The closing chapter
attempts to zoom out and build a coherent account of positive and negative affective value within the
confines of the predictive coding framework. The core explanatory factor here is the rate of prediction
error reduction and the (unexpected) changes in these rates. A host of evidence seems consistent with
this idea that affective experience reflects a form of non-conceptual metacognition about prediction error
dynamics.
In sum, this new application of predictive coding in issues of emotional value is worth following
through, because of its parsimony, explanatory power, and the specific, testable research questions that
can be derived from it. Most likely, the theory will be further refined by a joint effort of neurocomputa-
tional modelers and experimental psychologists, for which we set out the tracks in the different chapters.
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samenvatting
Psychologen onderkennen het belang van predicties of verwachtingen in het functioneren van de geest
al sinds het ontstaan van hun discipline. Van de baan van een bal of het verloop van een melodie tot de
plannen van onze partners en tegenstrevers, wij voorspellen voortdurend de wereld rondom ons, omdat
we de statistische relaties die erin van kracht zijn geleerd hebben. Pas wanneer onze predicties mis zijn
—wanneer de sensoriële informatie niet overeenstemt met de predicties die we er impliciet over vormen—
worden we ons bewust van die voortdurende predictieve activiteit van onze hersenen. In de voorbije decennia
ontwikkelden cognitieve neurowetenschappers een computationeel model met de naam predictive coding, dat
dit iteratief matchen van predicties met input probeert te formaliseren, en zo perceptueel leren and inferentie
tracht te verklaren. Het model beschrijft hoe elk niveau in de corticale hierarchie van perceptuele verwerking
de neurale activiteit in een lager niveau voorspelt, zodat verwerkingsmiddelen toegespitst kunnen worden
op het deel van de input dat onverwacht was. Dit deel omvat immers belangrijke veranderingen in de
omgeving die nog niet opgenomen zijn in ons huidig mentaal model. De hersenen volgen hierbij één centraal
principe bekend als het predictiefout-minimaliseringsprincipe. De constante inspanningen van het brein om
de onzekerheid relatief tot zijn predicties te reduceren zouden adaptief gedrag mogelijk maken op een
computationeel beheersbare manier.
Een recente groei in studies die predictive coding aanwenden om bevindingen te verklaren in praktisch
alle subdomeinen van de psychologie, is een bewijs van de aantrekkingskracht van dit model. Meer nog,
een veralgemeende vorm van predictive coding wordt naar voor geschoven als unificerende theorie voor
psychologie en de neurowetenschappen. Het doordenken van het predictiefout-minimaliseringsprincipe in
de uiteenlopende subdomeinen heeft geleid to krachtige, integrerende inzichten. Maar is dit simpelweg de
nieuwe rage in de psychologie, intens maar snel weer vergeten? Of reiken de wortels ervan dieper en de
vertakkingen zo ver als zijn verdedigers ons voorhouden? We weten het pas als we het model kritisch on-
derzocht hebben; zijn vooronderstellingen, implicaties en beperkingen inbegrepen. Het centrale doel van dit
proefschrift is om van dat werk een klein maar, zo zullen we betogen, belangrijk deel te doen. We richten
meer specifiek de aandacht op de plaats die affectieve processen kunnen hebben in dit kader, omdat dit tot
nu toe onderbelicht bleef in het hoofdzakelijk cognitief en perceptueel getinte werk over predictive coding.
We beginnen dit werk met twee uitvoerige ‘gevalsstudies’. In de eerste passen we predictive coding toe op
autismespectrumstoornis, een psychiatrische syndroom gekenmerkt door moeilijkheden in sociale, cogni-
tieve en affectieve verwerking. We beargumenteren dat het gewicht dat toegekend wordt aan predictiefouten
(technisch: de ‘precisie’) in autisme onterecht hoog en inflexibel is, in plaats van aangepast aan onzekerheid
in de context. Vanuit dat gegeven kunnen we zowel ongewoon gedrag in cognitieve en perceptuele taken
begrijpen, als de affectief-motivationele problemen. In de tweede casus passen we predictive coding toe op
visuele kunst. Hier ontwikkelen we de hypothese dat predictieve vooruitgang boeken (d.i., het actief reduce-
ren van predictiefouten) intrinsiek plezierig is, en dat dit onze affectieve beleving van kunst helpt verklaren.
Na deze theoretische studies volgen twee empirische werken, waarvan het eerste poogt de hypothese over
predictieve vooruitgang en positief affect aan de test te onderwerpen. We gebruiken daarbij ontdekking van
Gestalt (voorspelbare structuur) in vervormde afbeeldingen. Het tweede empirische werk bekijkt of perceptie
(van bistabiele puntlichtfiguren) vertekend kan zijn door affectieve relevantie van predicties die we hanteren
om een stimulus te interpreteren. In het afsluitende hoofdstuk zoomen we uit en trachten we een coherente
invulling te geven aan positief en negatief affect binnen het computationeel kader van predictive coding. De
verklarende factor aan de basis hier is verandering in predictiefouten over tijd (technisch: de eerste afgeleide
van predictiefout) en (onverwachte ) veranderingen in die ‘tempo’s’. We bespreken een rist bevindingen
die compatibel lijkt te zijn met het idee dat affectieve ervaring een weerspiegeling is van een vorm van
niet-conceptuele metacognitie over predictiefoutdynamieken.
We besluiten dat deze nieuwe uitwerking van predictive coding in relatie tot kwesties over emotionele
waarde het waard is om verder uitgespit te worden, omwille van haar spaarzaamheid, verklarende kracht,
en de specifieke, toetsbare onderzoeksvragen die eruit voortvloeien. Naar alle waarschijnlijkheid zal de
theorie verder verfijnd worden door de gezamenlijke inzet van neurocomputationele modelleerders en expe-
rimenteel psychologen, waarvoor we krijtlijnen uitzetten in de verschillende hoofdstukken.
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We work in the dark —we do what we can— we give what we have.
Our doubt is our passion, and our passion is our task.
The rest is the madness of art.
— Henry James, 1893
Nature is very exact in the matter. It hurts just as much as it is worth.
— Julian Barnes
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We demand rigidly defined areas of doubt and uncertainty!
— Douglas Adams, 1979
1
Introduction
Our relationship to uncertainty is fraught with contradictions.
We can’t live with or without it. Our resistance to uncertainty is
grounded in our bodily existence, subject to the second law of ther-
modynamics: the law of increasing entropy. Continuous work is nec-
essary to keep the organism in the far-from-equilibrium state that
enables its very existence. In other words, the set of bodily states
the organism can be in is constrained, because only these states are
compatible with continued existence. This constraint on entropy of
bodily states translates into informational constraints —when we
do not know what is where, we cannot prevent the body from ex-
ceeding the viable states. Unexpected events can disturb our phys-
iological integrity, so reducing uncertainty is an essential task for
organisms to survive.
But incomplete knowledge, and hence uncertainty, is a fact of life.
What is more, one could easily make the case that uncertainty is
the spice of life. Indeed, without uncertainty, there is no striving, no
motivation. Key characteristics of what it means to be alive would
be missing. Eliminating uncertainty seems as close to death as to
nirwana. In this work we will closely examine the link between un-
certainty and striving or emotion in the broadest sense. To do so,
we will take an increasingly supported model of perception as a
starting point, because indeed, perception is thought to be about
the mechanics of uncertainty reduction. However, while it is often
considered to be disjointed from the rest of the living organism —
an undirected and disinterested data crunching mechanism— we
will see that this model allows a wider view grounded in our bod-
ily existence. In fact, the model has been proposed as a grand unified
theory of the mind-brain, including action, perception, learning and
(social) cognition. A second main theme of the current work is to
evaluate such claims in relation to issues of affective value and expe-
rience. The key criterion will be whether it allows one to formulate
new, specific and interesting research questions, without losing ex-
planatory power with regard to existing findings in the field(s) we
consider.
1
2 introduction
There is a long-standing debate in perception science on what
principle governs formation of (configural) percepts (Chater, 1996;
J. Feldman, 2009; van der Helm, 2000). On the one side, the ‘sim-
plicity principle’, with roots in the Gestalt tradition, holds that the
organization that is as simple as possible given the inputs, will be
formed by the perceptual system. The ‘likelihood principle’, on the
other hand, states that the most probable organization consistent
with input will be formed. Both positions have important flaws. The
likelihood approach has been taken to imply naive correspondence
between percept and reality (following empiricist epistemology), as
if we can somehow pick the structure in the world that makes the
input most likely. Obviously, we have no independent access to the
structure of the world1. The simplicity approach, on the other hand,
seems to assume an inborn, absolute tendency towards simplicity
(an a priori as found in rationalist epistemology). In practice, how-
ever, the simplest, sparsest representation is the one that captures
(‘explains’) the regularities in the input best. Indeed, Chater (1996)
showed that simplicity and explanatory power (the extent to which
an hypothesis explains inputs) coincide.
Ultimately, neither correspondence to the world, nor simplicity
is likely to be a goal in itself for an evolved, biological perceptual
system. What is then the criterion for such a system? It can only
be what works, i. e.what affords successful behavior in the world.
Specifically, a perceptual system that enables an organism to pick up
the right regularities in the environment to support survival (main-
tenance of homeostasis), will prevail. To accomplish this, the brain
only has its internal states (neural activity) and how they unfold
to go from. It has to learn the structure of these activity patterns,
without an external view on the states of affairs to supervise this
learning (Clark, 2013b).
This forces the brain to take a proactive role —to self-supervise
its learning. The brain constructs the structure it predicts to be out
there and the sensory input can then censor these hypotheses. The
sensory input serves as feedback on the brain’s best guesses. Hence,
even ‘passive’ viewing implies an active, constructive involvement
on the part of the brain. Of course, it can also initiate actual move-
ments and witness how input changes as a consequence. So move-
ments can similarly be defined in terms of expected sensory inputs.
Both perception and action are then predictive.
There is plenty of evidence for predictive processing in the brain
(e. g., Albright, 2012, see also Figure 1). In fact, one might wonder
1 Note that Helmholtz, although considered to be the father of the likelihood
approach, never defended such naive realism (e. g., see his ‘sign theory’ in
Helmholtz, 1878).
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how else it could accomplish efficient, adaptive behavior. However,
the concrete computational scheme the brain uses is still unknown.
One contender that is gaining support is called predictive coding.
This will be at the heart of the current work, so each theoretical
chapter (2, 3, and 6) contains an overview of the predictive coding
model, tailored to the specific needs of the issues at stake in that
chapter. Predictive coding embraces the (subpersonal) intrinsic pre-
dictive activity of every region in the brain, such that a higher-level
region predicts and hence explains away activity in a lower-level
region. The mismatch or prediction error, understood as the input
activity that was not predicted, is used to revise (learn) future pre-
dictions.
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Figure 1: Publications on predictive processing, including predictive cod-
ing (PP, blue), in psychology and neuroscience as indexed by
the Pubmed database per year. Only part of the increase can be
attributed to the success of the related concept of reward predic-
tion error (RPE, green). Landmark publications appeared in 1997
(for RPE, Schultz et al., 1997) and in 1999 (for PP, Rao & Ballard,
1999)
Without going through all mathematical details, we can describe
the model, as specified by Rao and Ballard (1997, 1999), as follows.
Predictive coding reconstructs a measurable, observable input sig-
nal I (e. g., an image) based on a linear model of a generative matrix
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U (e. g., synaptic feedback weights) and an internal (hidden) state
vector r (e. g., neural activity):
I = f (Ur)) + n (1)
where n is a Gaussian stochastic noise process. The f (x) is the
nonlinear neural activation function, typically a sigmoidal. The r
vector itself can in turn be predicted by higher level internal states,
rendering the model hierarchical:
r = rtd + ntd (2)
where rtd = f (Uhrh) is the ‘top-down’ prediction of r, and ntd
is again a stochastic noise process. Uh and rh are, respectively, the
generative weight matrix and internal state vector on the higher
level. The latter can represent more abstract stimulus features than
the lower level r. For example, in visual perception higher levels can
predict (estimate) signal properties at a larger scale by combining
responses of a set of lower level units (i. e., they have large spatial
and/or temporal receptive fields).
Apart from generating the input image using internal states, we
could extend the model to account for how the internal state itself
changes with time t. This transition can be specified by a set of
recurrent weights V that transform current state vector r(t) at time
t into r(t + 1) at time t + 1:
r(t + 1) = f (Vr(t)) +m(t) (3)
Where V is the state transition (or prediction) weight matrix and
m is a stochastic noise process. This would make it a dynamic model
that can represent time-varying input signals (Rao & Ballard, 1997).
For simplicity, we leave this extension out in what follows.
The key then is to estimate and learn U and r from input data
only. Estimating r corresponds to perceptual inference, while learn-
ing U entails adapting synaptic weights (perceptual learning). This
estimation is possible if we specify an optimization function. To il-
lustrate, suppose we already know the values of U and want to find
an optimal estimate for r. Suppose in addition that we already have
a prediction rtd for the current state r based on prior inputs. Then
the optimization function can be specified as:
E1 =
1
σ2
(I− f (Ur))T(I− f (Ur)) + 1
σ2td
(r− rtd)T(r− rtd) (4)
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This is the sum of squared errors of level 0 and level 1 (see Fig-
ure 2), each being weighted by their respective inverse variances.
The larger the noise variance, the smaller the weight of this source
of information. Both terms are prediction errors, but the first can
in this case be described as the input reconstruction error (I− Itd),
while the second is a state prediction error (r− rtd). Hence, the value
for the internal state r that minimizes this function produces the
smallest difference between the reconstructed input Ur and the ac-
tual input signal I and deviates as little as possible from the predic-
tion rtd based on prior data.
Uh
Uh
T
r h r
U
UT
=f(rU)
(I-Itd) 
Itd
I
rtd
(r-rtd)
Figure 2: Predictive coding model from Rao and Ballard (1999). Each level
consists of several kinds of neurons: feedforward neurons con-
veying the reconstruction (or prediction) error and encoding the
synaptic weights UT, neurons whose responses r maintain the
current estimate (prediction) of the input signal, feedback neu-
rons encoding weights U and conveying the prediction f (Ur) to
the lower level, and error-detecting neurons computing the dif-
ference (r− rtd) between the current estimate r and its top-down
prediction rtd from a higher level.
Note that this function is just the least squares criterion and it can
be minimized with respect to r or U with gradient descent methods
(for full specifications, see Rao, 1999; Rao & Ballard, 1997, 1999).
Furthermore, it can be shown (Rao & Ballard, 1997) that minimizing
E (the errors) is exactly the same as finding the minimum descrip-
tion length representation of the input signal (assuming Gaussian
noise):
E = (− log P(I|r)) + (− log P(r)) (5)
Hence, E can also be seen as representing the cost of coding the
errors and parameters in bits. This means that predictive coding
still meets a criterion of simplicity. Note that the right hand side is
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exactly the negative logarithm of Bayes’ theorem for computing the
posterior probability of the state given the input signal (save for the
normalizing constant P(I)):
P(r|I) = P(I|r)P(r)/P(I) (6)
Hence, minimizing E is equivalent to maximizing the posterior
probability as described in (hierarchical) Bayesian accounts of per-
ception (Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Lee & Mumford,
2003). This shows that predictive coding also conforms to the likeli-
hood principle. As in Bayesian accounts of perception, predictions
are based on generative, probabilistic models (predictions or beliefs),
which are updated based on incoming evidence (prediction errors).
Figure 2 gives a schematic overview of the hierarchical predictive
coding model we formally described above. The different levels can
be reiterated upwards and are assumed to map onto the cortical
perceptual (e. g., visual) hierarchy. The scheme highlights a few key
characteristics of the model. First, each level has two populations
of neural units: prediction units that represent the current estimate
of the internal state, and error units that represent the error signal.
Second, feedforward pathways convey the error signals, while feed-
back connections carry the predictions. Third, top-down predictions
inhibit error units one level down, although the model allows for
the possibility that predictive inhibitory feedback also stems from
local recurrent connections. There is a large ongoing discussion on
the biological plausibility of each of these characteristics, but we
will largely take them for granted in the current work (although we
will briefly refer to the neuroscience linked to predictive coding, see
Chapter 2).
In terms of epistemology, then, predictive coding is a clear descen-
dant of pragmatism and its more recent ally, radical constructivism.
For pragmatism, to know something is to envision its practical im-
plications and expected sensations (James, 2000[1907]). The knower
‘negotiates’ a provisional state of affairs with the world, and can
only do so by actively constructing its organization. While construc-
tivism (von Glasersfeld, 1991) does not deny the existence the re-
ality of an external world, it just stresses that this Ding-an-sich is
off-limits for the knower. Still, we can build up knowledge about
it without reference to anything outside of the inputs we receive
from the senses. Only through our constructed ‘schemata’ can we
extract new information from the world. The criterion of a corre-
spondence with the world is replaced by ‘fit’ or coherence (Piaget,
1937; von Glasersfeld, 1995). In predictive coding terms: the fit be-
tween the predictions we generate and the activity caused by the
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world in our senses. Helmholtz (1878) concurs when writing: “Each
movement we make by which we alter the appearance of objects
should be thought of as an experiment designed to test whether we
have understood correctly the invariant relations of the phenomena
before us...". Indeed, we could not know the world if not for these
statistical regularities it generates in our sensory epithelia. Predic-
tions are the very fabric of the mind, but, as von Glasersfeld (1995,
p. 156) beautifully expresses, “organisms may meet reality only in
their failures”.
While the move toward active prediction in perception is man-
dated by the inescapable ‘skull-bound’ perspective of the brain (the
view from inside the black box), it also urges a reconsideration of
the perceptual system in the context of a complete biological organ-
ism (connecting to the Gibsonian theory of perception; J. J. Gibson,
1979). Specifically, it brings up the issue of how to fit in behavioral
relevance and affective value in a theory of perception. As Bialek,
Nemenman, and Tishby (2001, p. 2410) remark:
“... we gather sensory information not for its own sake
but in the hope that this information will guide our ac-
tions (including our verbal actions). But acting takes time,
and sense data can guide us only to the extent that those
data inform us about the state of the world at the time
of our actions, so the only components of the incoming
data that have a chance of being useful are those that are
predictive... isolating the predictive information must go
a long way toward separating out those features of the
sensory world that are relevant for behavior.”
As we will see in Chapter 6, even ‘simple’ single-celled organisms
made the move towards prediction for these reasons: mere reaction
is virtually always less efficient than predictive preparation. Some
of this knowledge (predictions) of what works has been installed
by evolution, organisms that did not tap into useful regularities in
the environment were just eliminated (Rosen, 2012[1985]). Some of
it is learned: new cues that turn out to be predictive of biological
concerns. Crucially, the implication for perception is that its goal be-
comes prediction error reduction, not just any uncertainty reduction.
It is always the uncertainty relative to the predictions that needs to
be reduced. This will form the basis of Chapter 6.
With regard to phenomenal experience, the predictive coding view
entails that we perceive what has provided us with successful pre-
dictions (including behavior, as perceptual prediction) in the past,
given some input cues and context. This could be a rough answer
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to Koffka’s (1935) central question of why things look as they do. Ex-
perimentally, Chopin and Mamassian (2010, 2011) have shown that
short-term behavioral success (‘usefulness’) of a perceptual organi-
zation can indeed bias the percept towards this organization. Use-
fulness was manipulated as task relevance: in a bistable random-dot
kinematogram solving a particular task was facilitated when seeing
one surface in front of the other. Afterwards, the psychometric func-
tion turned out to be shifted in the direction of the interpretation
that was more useful before. Based on the simplicity or the like-
lihood principle, no perceptual bias should be apparent in these
bistable geometric figures. Given the dot pattern inputs, both inter-
pretations had the same simplicity and likelihood.
Humans have a lot of flexibility both in the kind of predictions
we can build but also concerning when to activate which predic-
tions (Marti, Thibault, & Dehaene, 2014). One could say that we
carry around different templates of regularity with which to com-
pare incoming stimuli. Different deviations (prediction errors) will
be highlighted depending on the predictions we activate. For exam-
ple we see a can of soft drink as an object separated from the table
on which it stands, because it allows us to pick it up and drink from
it. But when we want to know whether it contains more sugar than
allowed in our diet, we segregate text columns and words in the la-
bel. The rest of the can becomes part of the broader scene. Without
much argument, Bateson (1979, p. 49) states that “The division of
the perceived universe into parts and wholes is convenient and may
be necessary, but no necessity determines how it shall be done.” If
relevance is a context-dependent measure, we would have to agree
with him. This relates to the difficulties defining what an object re-
ally is (J. Feldman, 2003).
Chapter 2 The way this flexibility in the activation of percep-
tual configurations is implemented in predictive coding is through
what is called precision. This will be the subject of Chapter 2. The
chapter will give us the chance to examine predictive coding in de-
tail, and to hypothesize what may happen if a key element of this
model is absent or inadequately developed. It shows the potential of
predictive coding in providing a new account for a clinical disorder,
autism in this case, that can explain the subtle pattern of reported
evidence in a variety of afflicted mental functions. This is arguably
only possible because predictive coding has validity beyond percep-
tion, where it was first formulated.
Chapter 3 Although we briefly deal with the affective implica-
tions of the proposed aberrant predictive coding in autism in Chap-
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ter 2, the following chapters will go in-depth on this relation be-
tween predictive coding and affect. We start with the specific ex-
ample of visual art and the emotional experiences art works often
elicit. Using well-known art works we look at how predictions are
established by the visual cues sculpted by the artist, how they are
violated, and how a viewer often manages to return to a state of
low prediction errors. We hypothesize that these transitions have
affective correlates that make up a substantial part of the aesthetic
experience.
Chapter 4 This chapter presents an initial effort to experimen-
tally test the hypothesis developed in the context of art. It does
not use art works but a stimulus that allows for a more controlled
transition in predictability. This will spur a discussion on the links
between parsimony of resources (simplicity), Gestalt ideas, and pre-
dictive coding.
Chapter 5 In this chapter we shift gears and ask whether in-
dividuals might activate different (possibly acquired) priors or pre-
dictions that can bias their perception, depending on the socio-emo-
tional relevance of those predictions for them. This question directly
relates to issues in the literature on emotional biases in perception
and attention, but, more importantly for our purposes, it also links
to the above mentioned pragmatic view of perception. Similar to the
studies by Chopin and Mamassian (2010, 2011) we used a bistable
stimulus, of which the two possible percepts were equally likely
and simple. We did not manipulate behavioral (or more specifically
affective) relevance of the two percepts, but used two groups of par-
ticipants for which we assumed different relevance of the percepts
based on personality characteristics. Hence we expected different
perceptual biases.
Chapter 6 Finally, we take a broader perspective and discuss
how affective value or experience can emerge from predictive cod-
ing dynamics. This will require a thorough analysis of the founda-
tions of predictive coding in biology and a broad discussion of how
all of this tallies with existing theories on emotion and motivation.
We hope this work as a whole shows that it seems be possible, in-
deed necessary, to give affective value a place within the predictive
coding framework if it is to become a unified theory of the mind-
brain, but that this may defy some of our intuitions about what
emotions are.

[Funes] was disturbed by the fact that a dog at three-fourteen (seen in
profile) should have the same name as the dog at three-fifteen (seen from
the front). His own face in the mirror, his own hands, surprised him on
every occasion ... He was the solitary and lucid spectator of a multiform
world which was instantaneously and almost intolerably exact ... he was
not very capable of thought. To think is to forget a difference, to generalize,
to abstract. In the overly replete world of Funes there were nothing but
details, almost contiguous details.
— Jorge Luis Borges, 1942
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Precise minds in uncertain worlds
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) refer to a group of neurode-
velopmental conditions with an early onset, and characterized by
socio-communicative impairments and stereotyped, restricted be-
havior patterns and interests (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 2013). Although ASD has a strong polygenetic component with
heritability around 70% (Geschwind, 2011), no biological marker
is available yet and thus, diagnosis mainly relies on behavioral as-
sessment. The prevalence of ASD is estimated to be 1%, with males
being more affected than females (Baird et al., 2006; Pinborough-
Zimmerman et al., 2012). ASD is associated with increased comor-
bidity for other disorders (e. g., ADHD, anxiety disorders, tic dis-
orders, learning disabilities and epilepsy) (J. L. Matson & Nebel-
Schwalm, 2007). In addition, a significant proportion of the ASD
population is intellectually disabled (Elsabbagh et al., 2012).
The neurocognitive frameworks put forward to account for be-
havioral symptoms in ASD can be broken down into two groups, de-
pending on which symptoms they consider to be central and preced-
ing the others. Social first theories put problems with social cogni-
tion or motivation front and center. The most prominent contender
is the Theory of Mind framework (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000) focus
on the social problems and argue that the core deficit lies in the un-
derstanding of the behavior of others in terms of their underlying
mental states. Nonsocial theories, on the other hand, consider gen-
eral cognitive or perceptual problems to be the primary causal fac-
tor. Among them, the Weak Central Coherence (WCC) theory (Frith
& Happé, 1994; Happé & Frith, 2006; Happé & Booth, 2008) and
the Enhanced Perceptual functioning (EPF) theory (Mottron & Bu-
rack, 2001; Mottron, Dawson, Soulières, Hubert, & Burack, 2006)
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focused on the perceptual peculiarities in ASD and argued for a lo-
cally (as opposed to globally) oriented processing style in individu-
als with ASD. Accounts which, prompted by the symptom cluster of
repetitive and inflexible behavior patterns, situate the core deficit in
an executive dysfunction (e. g., E. L. Hill, 2004), also belong in this
group of nonsocial theories.
These theoretical frameworks are not mutually exclusive but fo-
cus on different behavioral symptoms. Each theory was highly in-
fluential in shaping the field, shifting the research and clinical fo-
cus from an exclusively descriptive behavioral approach towards an
enhanced desire to understand the atypical neurocognitive mech-
anisms in ASD. Nevertheless, serious limitations with these frame-
works have become evident over the years. First, whilst local pro-
cessing styles, Theory of Mind difficulties and executive problems
are common in ASD, they are neither specific to the disorder, nor
are they universally apparent in all cases. Second, although they are
called neurocognitive, they do not readily connect to underlying
neural mechanisms, except in terms of broad networks of neural ac-
tivation associated with each domain of function. Part of the prob-
lem is a lack of specificity in the proposed cognitive mechanism. Fi-
nally, while each of these frameworks attempts to incorporate more
than the symptom cluster or behavior on which it is based, this
often seems contrived, precisely because each theory is too closely
intertwined with the cluster of symptoms in question.
We will argue that the way in which individuals with ASD process
and respond to errors (or violations to their predictions) provides an
excellent candidate for a primary dysfunction which, when viewed
in the context of a complex developmental trajectory, provides a
mechanistic explanation for the different symptoms of ASD. This
imbalance in the brain’s handling of prediction errors could result
from different genetic and neurophysiological pathways, thus high-
lighting that different pathogenetic factors could in fact contribute
to a common information processing imbalance (Geschwind, 2011).
We structured the current article as follows. In the first section
(Section 2.1) we briefly introduce the predictive coding framework
as it originated from perception research, but evolved into a uni-
fying theory of brain functioning. In the second part (Section 2.2)
we propose a specific etiological mechanism for ASD, which will
then be applied to the different symptom clusters and clinical ob-
servations in ASD. Because of the developmental nature of the dis-
order, we start with a discussion of exploration and development
(Section 2.3). Next, we discuss how perceptual and cognitive alter-
ations in ASD can originate from our theory (Section 2.4). In the
subsequent sections, sensorimotor and affective consequences will
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be covered (Section 2.5 and Section 2.6). In Section 2.7 core prin-
ciples from earlier sections come together to explain problems in
social functioning in ASD. Then, we briefly consider possible neu-
ral substrates of the proposed cognitive deficit (Section 2.8). Before
reaching our conclusions, we cover a few related approaches of ASD
to discuss commonalities and indicate the added value of our ap-
proach (Section 2.9).
2.1 the anticipating brain
Prediction is central for adaptive, intelligent systems (Hawkins &
Blakeslee, 2004). It allows us to efficiently prepare for impinging cir-
cumstances that may foster or threaten continued subsistence. How-
ever, prediction-based computations can only succeed when there
are in fact reasonably predictable contingencies in the world. Pre-
diction, therefore, depends upon an animal’s sensitivity to statistical
regularities in the environment and in its interaction with it. Some
of this structure is readily available, other parts are accessible only
through higher order correlations. Our understanding of the role
of predictions in shaping information processing has recently taken
a step forward by the development of ‘predictive coding’ models
(Clark, 2013b). This computational scheme is heavily inspired by
perception-as-inference (Helmholtz, 1962 [1910]) or perception-as-
hypothesis (Gregory, 1980) ideas, which assume that the brain con-
tinually generates predictions on what input comes next based on
current input and learned associations. Predictive coding, however,
does not just stipulate that predictions are generated, but that these
predictions are compared (at many levels of the system) to incoming
sensory input, and that the comparison leads to the computation
and representation of an error signal. These prediction errors are
important, because they signal that the current generative model of
the world —the one used to generate the currently best prediction—
is not up to the task of explaining (predicting) the world. Once a
prediction error has been signaled, the system still has to employ
some degree of flexibility in deciding what do to with that error
signal. In an uncertain world, experienced via an inherently noisy
biological processing system, errors will sometimes be spurious and
uninformative. Thus, whilst prediction errors should sometimes be
taken very seriously in updating one’s predictive model, it is also
critical that some prediction errors are essentially ignored. It is in
the imbalance between these options that we think the symptoms
of ASD are to find their cause.
In terms of neural architecture, predictive coding assumes a dual
computational role for every level of processing (Egner, Monti, &
Summerfield, 2010). Representation units compute predictions that
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are fed back, while prediction error units compute the difference
between sensory input and top-down prediction. These prediction
errors then serve as feed-forward input for the next level. The bio-
logical plausibility of this specific architecture is still under investi-
gation, but the importance of prediction errors and predictive pro-
cessing in the brain in general is well-established. Predictive cod-
ing can account for fundamental stages of perceptual processing,
such as the emergence of extra-classical receptive field effects mea-
sured with single cell recordings in the primary visual cortex (Rao
& Ballard, 1999). It can also account for the complex dynamics be-
tween predictions made and input received at very different stages
of the system (den Ouden, Daunizeau, Roiser, Friston, & Stephan,
2010). Furthermore, it can explain neural dynamics such as the ap-
parent adaptation to predictable stimulus contingencies (Summer-
field, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008). Finally, there
is some evidence for the existence of separate representations for
input and error signals in the recent discovery of differential sen-
sitivity to predictable stimuli in separate clusters of voxels in the
Fusiform Face Area (de Gardelle, Waszczuk, Egner, & Summerfield,
2012).
The computational scheme of predictive coding is assumed to re-
peat on every level of the perceptual hierarchy (Diuk, Tsai, Wallis,
Botvinick, & Niv, 2013; Wacongne et al., 2011). Each higher level
can capture a higher order regularity in input, relating events span-
ning more time or space, because it can work on the representational
‘language’ of the previous level. Perceptual inference is guided in a
top-down way through higher-level, conceptual predictions that can
be passed downwards generating a chain of interdependent predic-
tions to match on different levels, from complex features to low-level
stimulus characteristics.
Formally, predictive coding is equivalent to Bayesian inference
with the priors replaced by predictions and sensory evidence re-
placed by prediction errors, reflecting the mismatch between in-
put and predictions. However, the differences between these two
related approaches have important implications. A first distinction
from Bayesian approaches concerns the more specific claims about
the neural implementation of predictive coding. Second, replacing
sensory evidence by prediction errors emphasizes that incoming in-
formation is put in context from the very start. It immediately be-
comes input relative to the organism, its models of the world and
its current state. It also emphasizes that processing does not start
with the onset of a stimulus. Pre-existing, intrinsic activity of the
brain is considered formative as it reflects the continuous predictive
activity of the pro-active mind-brain (Bar, 2009). Another advan-
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tage of predictive coding is that it allows a natural connection to
other neurobehavioral domains, where prediction errors are known
to play a crucial role, like midbrain dopaminergic processing of re-
ward (Schultz et al., 1997), hippocampal processing for contextual
memory (Honey, Watt, & Good, 1998) and amygdalar processing
for fear learning (Boll, Gamer, Gluth, Finsterbusch, & Büchel, 2013).
This suggests we may be a step closer to a general theory of the
brain as a prediction engine in which prediction errors emerge as
the lingua franca of neural information processing (den Ouden, Kok,
& Lange, 2012).
Critically to our theory of ASD, predictive coding operates on two
time scales (Dayan, 2012b; Friston, 2010a). Predictions are used
here-and-now to shape one’s online estimation of the state of the
world (albeit through an iterative process), but the resulting predic-
tion errors also shape plasticity and learning over longer time scales.
In this way, today’s prediction errors shape tomorrow’s predictions
(paraphrasing a famous Bayesian dictum). Because the world is not
static, predictable contingencies that used to hold can change, and
predictive coding has to track these dynamics. No two experiences
are ever completely the same, thus, prediction error will always be
present to some degree. However, the brain has no direct, indepen-
dent means of differentiating mere noise from actual changes in the
world (J. Feldman, 2013). It is, therefore, critical that predictive cod-
ing incorporates a mechanism to flexibly alter the extent to which
the prediction errors generated by online estimation affect future
learning and plasticity.
A solution to this can be found in terms of a flexible adjustment
of what Friston (2010a) describes as the precision of the prediction er-
rors. To explain precision, one can draw the parallel with the means
comparison in a t-test, in which the numerator represents the predic-
tion error, which is weighted by the estimated standard error (preci-
sion or confidence) (Friston, 2009). As in the t-test, precision is not
given in perceptual inference, it has to be estimated as well. In an op-
timal system, precision has to increase when there still are learnable
regularities in the environment, and decrease when it is estimated
that remaining deviations can be attributed to noise that is unlikely
to repeat in next instances or to other irreducible uncertainties in in-
put. Distinguishing between irreducible and reducible uncertainties
is a fallible process, relying on complex meta-predictions for a given
context. The system, therefore, has to attribute a value or weight to
prediction errors in order to determine to what extent they should
induce new learning. The role of precision is conceptually the same
as that of the learning rate parameter in Rescorla-Wagner learning
(see Courville, Daw, & Touretzky, 2006; O’Reilly, 2013, for a full
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discussion on learning in volatile environments). Setting precision
consequently relies on a form of meta-learning: learning what is
learnable (Gottlieb, 2012) or estimating the predictability of new
contingencies. It is clear from all of this that precision should be
a context-sensitive measure, to be flexibly optimized dependent on
the current class of input and the state of an organism. Indeed, preci-
sion is assumed to be the mechanism of attention within predictive
coding. At its core, attention is the process of deciding where to
look next, to allocate resources to that information with the high-
est value, understood precisely as input containing reducible uncer-
tainty (Dayan, Kakade, & Montague, 2000; Gottlieb, 2012). Neu-
rally, precision is assumed to be represented by the gain of bottom-
up neural units representing the prediction errors, probably medi-
ated by neuromodulators (Friston, 2009; see Section 2.8).
     Level n-1      Level n
y’(prediction)
E’ (prediction 
of error)   E-E’
Metamodel
Input
     Level n+1
y’(prediction)
E= y-y’ (error) E= y-y’ (error) E= y-y’ (error)
y’(prediction)
Figure 3: Sketch of the predictive coding scheme. To avoid clutter, we only
depicted a metamodel for one predictive level. Note that the pre-
diction of error is dependent on the prediction that generates the
error (curved dashed arrow). This prediction of error (the preci-
sion) modulates the impact (gain) of the prediction error on the
prediction units (straight dashed arrow).
From this brief overview it should be apparent that predictive
coding provides a framework that allows us to go beyond unidi-
rectional views of information processing. Bottom-up information
streams (predictions errors) are inherently dependent on top-down
influences (predictions), which in their turn are shaped by previ-
ous prediction errors. This complex interplay also means that the
dysfunction of one will automatically have consequences for the
other. Disturbances in the relative contribution of top-down versus
bottom-up information flow have been at the heart of two influential
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cognitive theories of ASD, representing apparently diametrically op-
posing positions (WCC and EPF). A predictive coding approach pro-
vides a principled and refined view on the influence of top-down
versus bottom-up processes and their complex interplay.
2.2 predictive coding in asd
To bring into focus what we believe is the core processing deficit
in ASD, we have to emphasize again the distinction between re-
ducible and irreducible uncertainty (prediction errors). Irreducible
uncertainty is due to the inherent stochastic nature of the world and
the inherently noisy biological apparatus with which we sample
from that world. Differentiating between reducible and irreducible
uncertainty requires an estimation of ‘expected uncertainty’ based
on previous prediction errors (Preuschoff & Bossaerts, 2007; Yu &
Dayan, 2005). If through learning, you estimate the outcomes of a
stochastic process to vary with ± 3 (hypothetical) units, a predic-
tion error of 2 should not surprise you, and therefore should not
urge you to update your model (prediction). When the size of a
prediction error is smaller than the expected variability (based on
past prediction errors) for this event, the current prediction error
should be scaled down. Reducible uncertainty, on the other hand, is
present when associations in the world (or our interaction with it)
are not fully learned yet. The latter is sometimes called unexpected
uncertainty. This is the case when previously predictive cues have
changed and become invalid, so a real update of the model is nec-
essary. More formally, it is about situations in which correlations
between predictions and prediction errors have changed.
In relatively unambiguous situations, people with ASD can suc-
cessfully learn and apply new contingencies (M. Dawson, Mottron,
& Gernsbacher, 2008). Problems arise, however, when the predic-
tive value of learning cues changes (i.e., in volatile environments).
For that reason, we situate impairments in ASD in meta-learning:
learning which cues of all present stimuli are learnable, i.e., can re-
liably predict future situations relevant for the task at hand. This
meta-capacity, estimating for which cues predictive progress can be
made, allows Typically Developing (TD) individuals to distinguish
random variability in input from actual, learnable changes in envi-
ronmental regularities. Here, we advocate that individuals with ASD
overestimate the amount of changes in environmental regularities,
because they give too much weight to their prediction errors.
Another way to conceive of this meta-learning capacity is in terms
of knowing where gains can be made in predicting the world. If
you know where predictive progress can be made, you know which
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prediction errors matter, hence which prediction errors should be
assigned high precision. Precision is the mechanism of attention in
predictive coding because in this way it affects the further sampling
of the sensory world. Atypical attention happens to be among the
earliest signs of ASD, described in terms of the flexible and appropri-
ate assignment of salience to stimuli (Elison et al., 2013; Zwaigen-
baum et al., 2005). In ASD, the atypical distribution of attention
has been attributed to slower encoding, which is consistent with the
thesis that too many resources are invested in sensory processing
because precise prediction errors cannot be discounted and thus at-
tract further processing.
Hence, derived from a general theory of information processing,
predictive coding, and our analysis of what could be the key prob-
lems in ASD, we situate the core deficit in the High, Inflexible Pre-
cision of Prediction Errors in Autism (HIPPEA). Low-level sensory
prediction errors are generally set at a level of precision that is too
high and independent of context (Palmer, Paton, Hohwy, & Enticott,
2013; Van de Cruys, de-Wit, Evers, Boets, & Wagemans, 2013). As
mentioned before, it is useful to consider the consequences with re-
gard to online inference versus those regarding learning separately.
If prediction errors during online inferences get an unduly high pre-
cision, these will urge new learning for every new event. The pre-
dictions that result from this learning will be shaped by noise that is
unlikely to repeat in the future, hence these predictions will almost
never be applicable. In neural network learning studies, overfitting
takes place when errors for the training set are reduced to an ex-
ceedingly low level (Bakouie, Zendehrouh, & Gharibzadeh, 2009).
It is a suboptimal form of learning because new data (acquired with
each new experience) will generate large errors, meaning that there
is little or no generalization. If errors are always deemed important,
every new instance will be handled as an ‘exception’, different from
previous experiences. In the long run, however, those affected by
this dysfunction, may succumb to a sort of learned helplessness:
too much learning with no fruits. This may have an especially de-
motivating effect on particularly ‘noisy’ interactions, such as those
involved in social situations (see Section 2.7).
With regard to the consequences for online inference and behavior
we have to distinguish situations in which an exact match from cue
to prediction exists and is functional from situations in which exact
matches will rarely happen or are even dysfunctional. In the case of
exact matching, it is well-known that people with ASD cope incredi-
bly well (Mottron et al., 2013). They often excel in rigid, exact associ-
ations (rote learning). Here, their overfitted predictions serve them
perfectly well, precisely because they suffer less from interference
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from similar instances. They seem to trade off the ability to general-
ize with a more accurate memory. Hence, according to HIPPEA, the
core processing deficits in ASD become most evident when some
disregard for details and some generalization is needed. General-
ized inferences are required in situations where exact matches are
not present, which is the rule rather than the exception in natural
situations, especially those involving social interactions.
In everyday life, multiple cues impinge simultaneously on an in-
dividual. At first exposure this may cause sensory overload, because
selectivity is lost when the informational (predictive) value of cues
cannot be estimated immediately. Predictions are tested but violated
because they are based on spurious correlations. Individuals with
ASD may cope with perceived repeated changes in contingencies by
executing prepotent, impulsive or ‘model-free’ behaviors, described
as repetitive, stereotyped behaviors in the ASD symptomatology (for
a discussion on the role of precision in arbitrating between model-
free and model-based behavior, see Clark, 2013a; Daw, Niv, &
Dayan, 2005). In a second stage, individuals with ASD may ‘give up’,
and select cues just to evade and cope with prediction errors. On
their own scale, these cues may be highly predictable, even though
they are not functional in the situation at hand. Thus, attention and
behavior become dominated by one or a few cues (cf. stimulus over-
selectivity; Lovaas, Koegel, & Schreibman, 1979), singled out seem-
ingly arbitrarily.
Note that computing prediction errors as such is not impaired in
ASD according to this view. Individuals with ASD can still compare
their predictions with actual input. These prediction errors, however,
have to be weighed in accordance to an estimation of their reliability,
i.e., the extent to which they are caused by learnable (changes in)
regularities. Attesting to the fact that prediction error computations
are intact in people with ASD, their detection and discrimination
performance seems to be similar to typically developing individuals,
if not superior (see Section 2.4.2).
Importantly, one can distinguish between two mechanisms that
both can result in inflexibly high precision of prediction errors. First,
it is possible that the neural mechanism for precision is directly af-
fected in ASD, fixing precision at a high level and preventing meta-
learning (which may take place anyway) to have an effect on per-
ception and learning. Aberrant neuromodulatory mechanisms of
precision, as discussed in Section 2.8, may be responsible here. Sec-
ond, the meta-learning prior to the setting of precision may be de-
ficient in ASD and hence does not provide the needed basis for
proper, context-dependent estimation of precision. Neural regions
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and mechanisms that may be central for this capacity are discussed
in Section 2.8.
In a nutshell, HIPPEA consists of the following basic premises. The
starting point is a high and inflexible estimation of precision of pre-
diction errors in ASD. This indicates meta-learning is deficient or
short-circuited. Indiscriminately high precision will mean that un-
repeated, accidental variations in the input receive disproportionate
weight. This in turn, prevents abstract representations to be formed,
because matching will continue on a more specific level, closer to
the input. Indiscriminately high precision also induces superfluous
learning, leading to narrowly defined, lower-level predictions, and
incomplete hierarchical models. Finally, indiscriminately high preci-
sion entails a loss of autonomous, flexible attentional selection based
on informativeness (deciding what information to sample based on
the different types of uncertainty in input).
HIPPEA thus situates problems in ASD at the intersection of percep-
tion, attention, learning, and executive functioning (adaptive con-
trol). Further key symptoms of ASD may emerge from this impair-
ment, but this will be fleshed out in the sections below. We argue
for an impairment in general information processing rather than in
one single domain (e. g., social cognition), supported by the fact that
problems in ASD are not limited to one such domain, but are perva-
sive. However, this also puts the burden of explanation with us as to
why some domains (specifically the social) would be affected more
than others (see Section 2.7).
2.3 development and exploration
The meta-learning deficit in HIPPEA is very consistent with the de-
velopmental nature of the disorder. The very process of moving
from one ‘simpler’ developmental stage to the next ‘complexer’ one
is impaired when an organism cannot estimate where predictive
progress can be made. If any prediction error is deemed as valuable
as the next, an inappropriate lingering on stimuli is expected to oc-
cur. As a result, the kind of exploration that optimizes learning is
lacking, because estimating where predictive progress can be made
helps an organism to avoid the large regions of input space that can-
not be learned (fully) and those that are too difficult at this stage of
development. In short, this principle gives a rationale for the impor-
tance of intermediate levels of complexity in development (Berlyne,
1966; E. Gibson, 1969; Oudeyer, Baranes, & Kaplan, 2010). If pre-
dictive gain can be properly estimated, exploration can be guided
such that it is aimed at regions with a difficulty just above current
ability, which leads to discernable progressive stages of increasing
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complexity, as modeled in developmental robotics (Oudeyer, Ka-
plan, & Hafner, 2007). Particularly in noisy, variable environments
the mechanism can be expected to realize more efficient learning.
It is easy to see that if this capacity for active exploration is miss-
ing, as we think is the case in ASD, an individual has to rely much
more on the scaffolding provided by caregivers, explicitly guiding
progression from simple to more naturalistic situations. Apart from
prenatal genetic and neural components, differing degrees of this
environmental scaffolding may account for heterogeneity in symp-
tom severity and developmental trajectories in ASD.
The link between prediction violation and exploration is elegantly
illustrated in a study by Legare (2012), investigating how TD chil-
dren explain evidence violating their predictions and illustrates how
this mechanism may shape development. Different shapes were put
on top of boxes that could light up, depending on the shape, and
those shapes that caused the box to light up were subsequently la-
beled as a “blicket”. Children were then confronted with a viola-
tion of the established prediction (no light for a blicket) and Legare
(2012) asked them to explain what had happened. She could dis-
tinguish two main types of explanations; about half of the children
tried to explain why the block did not light up (e. g., no batteries,
block was not placed properly), while a third of the children ex-
plained the situation by referring to the category membership (e. g.,
“It’s not really a blicket; it only looks like one”). Most interestingly,
however, the kind of explanation children gave predicted the way
they played with the objects later on. While children who gave a
causal explanation explored the objects more thoroughly, testing
different combinations and experimenting with the placement and
orientation of objects to find out what would happen, children who
explained inconsistency in terms of the categories primarily went
about sorting the objects in two different categories based on what
had happened when they first placed them on the box. This sort-
ing behavior was a less sophisticated form of exploration, and less
likely to foster deep understanding of the underlying sources of
inconsistencies.
Arguably, the difference hinges on the ability to model uncer-
tainty in associations in the input. This modeled uncertainty be-
comes a handle to dissect underlying causes. The precision of low-
level inconsistency can, with a proper model of uncertainty, be down-
regulated such that the general rule (prediction) is not violated and
so does not have to be abandoned. Rather, modeling uncertainties
in the task opens the door to contextual modulations of the gen-
eral rule, which are always at play in practice. When uncertainty
is not accounted for, and precision is continuously high, every mi-
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nor violation will induce new learning. An inconsistent finding is
categorized anew or considered a ‘special case’ unlike previous in-
stances. The latter is what HIPPEA proposes to be the case in ASD.
Though Legare’s (2012) study only included TD children, the sorting
behavior found in spontaneous play for the subset of children that
gave non-causal explanations, is reminiscent of what is observed in
autistic play. Her results show that whether and how people explain
prediction error is linked to the kind of exploration they will engage
in. In our line of thinking, the difference already emerges in the way
people process perceptual input that runs counter their predictions
and this may have far-reaching consequences for exploration and
further development, notably with regard to finding out about why
the world functions as it does.
Considering this change to the nature of exploration in ASD, it is
informative to revisit the so-called ‘dark room problem’ within pre-
dictive coding (Friston, Thornton, & Clark, 2012; Froese & Ikegami,
2013). This problem arises because if, as the fundamental thesis of
predictive coding has it, an organism acts to minimize the predic-
tion errors it experiences, then the simplest solution would be to
seek out a dark room, devoid of prediction errors. Nevertheless,
most organisms venture out of their black boxes and explore the
world. The most obvious way to counter this is by noting that gen-
eralized predictive coding not only involves learned mental models
and perceptual predictions, but also bodily predictions, predictions
embodied by the very structure of the body, homeostasis, biome-
chanics and the “gross initial neural architecture of the agent” (Fris-
ton, Thornton, & Clark, 2012). Evolution equips organisms with a
limited set of expected states (cf. homeostasis) that is compatible
with their continued existence (survival). A dark room will not re-
main a low prediction error environment, for instance, when food
is not available.
One means of ensuring that organisms venture out to meet their
needs for survival, is to equip them with an ability to tolerate the
prediction errors associated with new unpredictable environments.
Organisms can adjust the precision of prediction errors based on
the expected volatility of their environment. If precision of low-
level prediction errors is overly high, however, the organism may
very well prefer to stay in a dark room-like environment. In fact,
the typical autistic state of stereotypic self-stimulation and indiffer-
ent withdrawal from the world and from others, can be regarded as
“abnormal yet effective ways of reducing prediction errors” (Froese
& Ikegami, 2013, p. 213). By their caregivers, children with ASD are
often decribed as detached from the world, as if they are living in
their own walled world. Not because they are unhappy, or unable
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to move or sense, but because they are satisfied with the current
level of complexity of the environment. The prediction error min-
imization principle says that “we harvest sensory signals that we
can predict” (Friston, Thornton, & Clark, 2012). Hence, it seems
that children with ASD, since they (initially) cannot predict more
complex environments, are perfectly content to stick to the confined
space and motion they know.
2.4 cognitive functioning
In the following sections we review the most relevant literature il-
lustrating the implications of prediction errors with chronically high
precision in cognitive and perceptual domains. At the end, we will
also describe the special perceptual and cognitive skills that some
individuals with ASD have developed (‘savant skills’), which can re-
sult from the potential benefits of high-precision prediction errors
when applied to certain domains. The problems in reasoning about
mental states (‘mentalizing’), which are also a central aspect of cog-
nition in ASD, will be covered in Section 2.7 on social functioning.
2.4.1 Attention and executive functioning
An interesting pattern of findings has emerged from attention stud-
ies in ASD, comprising both superior performance in certain tasks
and severe deficits in others. Below we substantiate that the specific
pattern is largely consistent with HIPPEA. We start considering vi-
sual search tasks, then move to more complex attention tasks with
a larger executive component, and finally make new predictions
based on our account and propose suitable designs to test these.
Visual search studies demonstrate that performance on some at-
tentional tasks can be intact or even enhanced in ASD. Superior vi-
sual search has been found both when the target is defined by a sin-
gle feature and for conjunctive targets (Keehn, Müller, & Townsend,
2013; O’Riordan, Plaisted, Driver, & Baron-Cohen, 2001; Plaisted,
O’Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 1998a). Moreover, performance seems
to correlate with symptom severity (Joseph, Keehn, Connolly, Wolfe,
& Horowitz, 2009). Group differences are especially present in con-
junction search tasks or tasks with higher difficulty. A predictive
coding account of visual search would start from the predictability
within search displays. When every item in a display reinforces a
particular ‘prediction’, an anomaly (the ‘odd one out’) causes an ‘er-
ror’ that becomes salient. Heightened precision of this prediction er-
ror means enhanced salience of this oddball, which facilitates quick
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detection. Thus, individuals with ASD seem to be just as good or
even better at exploiting predictability in a display.
In more complex attentional settings however, performance usu-
ally declines substantially in autism. As we saw, precision (or weight)
of prediction errors should be flexibly adapted based on meta-learn-
ing (learning what the relevant features in a task are). When preci-
sion of prediction errors is uniformly high, the selective force is lost
when processing a context with multiple cues. Hence, difficulties in
allocating attention may be expected. Phenomenally, this may mani-
fest itself as attention to irrelevant features, on the one hand, and as
lack of disengagement or perseverative attention, on the other hand.
Yet, this problem occurs only when multiple cues compete. If only
one cue is present, ensuring that the selection process is clearly im-
posed by the task itself, performance remains intact (Burack, 1994).
An experiment by Pierce, Glad, and Schreibman (1997) confirms
this. When ASD children, TD children and mentally disabled chil-
dren were presented with video fragments of social interactions
containing one or more cues, ASD children did worse than the other
two groups when asked to answer a set of questions right after, but
only in the multiple cue conditions. We argue the problem is one
of autonomous selection; the relevance or redundancy of the cues
is not recognized. Consistent with this, task performance in ASD is
expected to suffer most when it is dependent on autonomous ex-
ploration and efficiently probing of available cues rather than fixed
instruction (clear top-down selection).
Others before us (e. g., Elsabbagh et al., 2009; Keehn et al., 2013)
have situated the origin of problems in ASD in attentional difficul-
ties, more specifically in disengaging attention. However, we con-
sider these disengagement problems not as primary but as an effect
of the lack of adaptive precision of prediction errors. This kind of
overselective (perseverative) attention does not stand in contradic-
tion with what we said before on the lack of autonomous selectivity
in ASD. It is the flexible adapting of selectivity in a task-dependent
way that is lacking in ASD. Uniformly high precision will create a
prolonged processing of all stimuli (and an associated deficit in dis-
engaging). This is also apparent in studies by Sasson and colleagues
(Sasson, Elison, Turner-Brown, Dichter, & Bodfish, 2011; Sasson,
Turner-Brown, Holtzclaw, Lam, & Bodfish, 2008), demonstrating
perseverative attention (longer fixation times per image explored)
and more intensive, detail-oriented exploration of a limited number
of images in ASD. Hohwy and Palmer (2014) note that increased pre-
cision could lead to longer sampling of incoming signal in order to
attain the precise signal people with ASD expect, before making a
decision. If so, such longer sampling may as well help to explain
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larger reaction times for diverse tasks, often reported in ASD. In any
case, we surmise that lacking disengagement is not the core mecha-
nism but rather one of the consequences of HIPPEA. However, often
perseveration and overselectivity may be strategically replaced by
avoidance and underreactivity.
It is clear that the proposed difficulties in autonomous cue selec-
tion will cause broader problems in executive functioning, in partic-
ular with regard to cognitive flexibility or set shifting. According to
the executive functioning theory, the latter functions are impaired
in ASD and this impairment is assumed to underlie the restricted,
repetitive and stereotyped pattern of behavior and interests (Lopez,
Lincoln, Ozonoff, & Lai, 2005). Though problems with flexibility
have clearly been found in daily life (Gioia, Isquith, Kenworthy,
& Barton, 2002; Mackinlay, Charman, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006),
studies measuring cognitive flexibility in a clinical or research set-
ting have yielded less consistent evidence. Overall, studies using the
Wisconsin Card Scoring Task (WCST) report clear deficits, reflected
by a higher number of perseverative responses when a rule switch
should occur, while more controlled task-switching paradigms gen-
erally fail to find cognitive flexibility problems in ASD (Geurts, Cor-
bett, & Solomon, 2009; Van Eylen et al., 2011).
Recently several researchers suggested that these inconsistencies
may be due to differences in the extent to which explicit task instruc-
tions are given, denoted as open-endedness (Van Eylen et al., 2011;
White, 2013). When task instructions contain no explicit indication
of the rules to be applied, nor that a rule switch will occur (as in the
WCST), results show rather consistent cognitive flexibility deficits
in ASD. In this case, participants have to be able to autonomously
filter-out and focus on relevant information in a situation where
multiple cues compete. There is evidence that individuals with ASD
have difficulties doing so and overly focus on irrelevant, often low-
level details (Stoet & López, 2011). In contrast, when a cue explicitly
indicates which rule to apply and when to switch, all studies report
intact performance in ASD. Hence, the act of switching does not
seem to be a problem per se (Poljac & Bekkering, 2012).
All this is very compatible with our interpretation of ASD in terms
of an overweighing of prediction errors. As we saw, the informative-
ness of cues has to be derived from meta-models, which should ad-
just the precision with which errors based on these cues are weighed.
A loss of this capacity would lead to a deficit in the ability to
autonomously select cues that have predictive value in situations
where multiple cues compete. Learning a new unambiguous contin-
gency in itself is not a problem, but individuals with ASD struggle
with spontaneously noticing that the predictive value of particular
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information changed. This leads to cognitive flexibility deficits on
open-ended tasks, but not on tasks were explicit instructions are
provided about what is informative and when. Testing a range of
executive functions in ASD, White, Burgess, and Hill (2009) corrobo-
rated that all open-ended tasks generated group differences, while
none of the more constrained tasks did. Hence, this reasoning might
also explain some of the inconsistencies in studies of other executive
functions (Gioia et al., 2002; White et al., 2009).
Open-ended, generative sorting experiments provide converging
evidence. For example, in a free sorting task with children books
(Ropar & Peebles, 2007), ASD children relied less on category la-
bels (games versus sports) and more on purely perceptual features
(color and size) than TD children. More one-dimensional sorting
was found in free sorting of shapes by children with ASD, espe-
cially in more complex stimulus sets (D. J. Edwards, Perlman, &
Reed, 2012). In a twenty-questions game, children with ASD con-
sistently generated questions (predictions in our context) of lower
quality, especially more concrete ones that eliminated fewer items
at a time (Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers, 2011). Analyses
indicated that difficulties in managing relevant and irrelevant infor-
mation were likely sources of the problems of children with ASD.
This cognitive control problem, which is at the heart of HIPPEA, also
explains why individuals with ASD are particularly slower in early
blocks of categorization learning, when flexibly switching the focus
of attention from one dimension to another dimension is needed
(e. g., Soulieres, Mottron, Giguere, & Larochelle, 2011).
To clearly summarize our hypothesis: When real environmental
changes go together with random changes, disentangling the two is
particularly difficult for people with ASD. They seem to be able to
learn changes in contingencies, when they are clearly indicated, as
in some set shifting tasks. Similarly, they can learn fixed contingen-
cies, even in probabilistic environments and without explicit instruc-
tions, as implicit learning studies show (J. Brown, Aczel, Jiménez,
Kaufman, & Grant, 2010; Nemeth et al., 2010; Pruett et al., 2011).
However, these two combined create the clearest deficits. Therefore,
we hypothesize that adding noise by using a probabilistic switch-
ing task, would increase their flexibility impairments. This has in-
deed been observed by D’Cruz et al. (2013) in a reversal learning
task with intermittent non-reinforcement. Moreover, these switch-
ing problems correlated with severity of repetitive and restrictive
behaviors. From our perspective, this kind of task will be most sen-
sitive in picking up deficits in executive functioning for ASD.
Although these findings are largely compatible with the predic-
tion derived from HIPPEA, future attentional studies should test our
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hypothesis more directly. A modified version of Posner’s attention
cueing task as developed previously (Vossel et al., 2014; Yu &
Dayan, 2005) could contribute to this. In the typical Posner cue-
ing task, a simple cue (a briefly presented flash) only indicates the
actual (valid) location of the target in a certain percentage of trials
(e. g., 75%). Typically participants will learn to use the cue infor-
mation to improve their detection speed to the extent that the cue
is reliable. This improvement may also be present for individuals
with ASD, but we predict that things will go awry in ASD when the
probabilistic structure changes unexpectedly during the experiment,
for instance, when the predictability of a cue changes across blocks.
In such a volatile environment, the validity of the cue (the extent
to which it predicts the target location) varies over the course of
the experiment. Prediction errors usually lead to the updating of
beliefs (predictions) about the environment, but the impact of these
prediction errors should be tuned to whether additional learning is
expected to be still possible. In a fully learned stable phase, new
prediction errors are probabilistic noise that should lead to little or
no update of predictions. However, when new learning is estimated
to be possible, for example when probability structure changed, re-
cent prediction errors should significantly update current predic-
tions. This task shows the importance of contextual, flexible setting
of precision.
Another variation of the Posner task that could provide a useful
test of our theory has been developed by Yu and Dayan (2005). In
this version, a set of cues (e. g., differently colored arrows pointing
left or right) precede the target. For any one trial, one particular
cue (color) from the set predicts the target location with a certain
probability (e. g., >.5). This cue type and validity remain active for
a considerable amount of time, creating a stable environment. Then,
unbeknownst to the participant, this context is suddenly changed:
A different cue now predicts the target location with a different
cue validity. Note the similarity with traditional set switching tasks,
although the rules there usually are deterministic, rather than prob-
abilistic. Participants with ASD will have distinct problems with this
task, again because two forms of uncertainty are pitted against each
other, as described above. An added benefit of these tasks is that a
hierarchical Bayesian model can be used to quantify precision (or
learning rate) on a trial-by-trial basis (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, &
Rushworth, 2007; Yu & Dayan, 2005), and on a subject-dependent
basis (Mathys, Daunizeau, Friston, & Stephan, 2011; Vossel et al.,
2014), pin-pointing exactly whether and how the learning style of
ASD subjects differs from that of TD individuals.
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From the above it should be clear that HIPPEA has a natural way
of explaining the discrepancy between the experimental data in con-
trived laboratory contexts and the clinical observations in daily life.
As most ASD researchers know, it is surprisingly difficult to find sta-
tistically significant group differences in the lab that should occur
according to everyone’s expectations based on the major problems
that people with ASD experience every day (J. L. Amaral, Collins,
Bohache, & Kloos, 2012). Natural circumstances are often much
more unpredictable and open-ended with lots of accidental vari-
ability, and hence lead to clear deficits in ASD (Kenworthy, Yerys,
Anthony, & Wallace, 2008). The lab, in contrast, usually provides
a well-controlled environment, in which it is made very clear what
is expected (explicit instruction, practice trials) and with multiple
instances of the same (often simple) task (repeated trials). Little au-
tonomous control is needed here. Where many TD children easily
get bored in such a context and start talking to the experimenter,
kids with ASD usually like these repetitive, computerized tasks, and
they are motivated to do well in them.
2.4.2 Perceptual processing
Research on visual processing in ASD has been dominated by two
related theoretical frameworks that each emphasized a different
side of the coin: WCC theory emphasized reduced global process-
ing (Frith & Happé, 1994), while EPF theory emphasized enhanced
local processing (Mottron & Burack, 2001). More recent accounts de-
scribe the peculiar aspects of visual processing in ASD more in terms
of a bias or perceptual style, a disinclination for global or a prefer-
ence for local processing (Happé & Frith, 2006; Happé & Booth,
2008; Mottron et al., 2006). Despite a vast amount of research on
visual perception in ASD, the atypical profile of visual processing is
only partly understood, and the empirical evidence for the original
ideas is mixed (for recent reviews, see Behrmann, Peterson, Moscov-
itch, & Suzuki, 2006; Dakin & Frith, 2005; Simmons et al., 2009).
HIPPEA is compatible with both EPF and WCC, but it offers a more
specific foundation, describes dynamics in learning and inference,
and hence has different implications. According to HIPPEA, preci-
sion of bottom-up information is uniformly amplified, an idea that
is consistent with EPF, but we can better specify how and why per-
ception is enhanced. The detectable size of prediction errors is not
smaller, but rather the weights (precision) these errors receive are
higher. HIPPEA does not reduce problems to a purely bottom-up way
of perceptual processing. Because it is embedded in the inherently
bidirectional predictive coding framework, the mutual, constructive
2.4 cognitive functioning 29
interaction of bottom-up and top-down information flows is central.
Specifically, increased precision of prediction errors will have impor-
tant consequences with regard to the kind of predictions that will
be formed based on prediction errors with unusually high precision.
Perceptual inference and learning will not progress to higher-level,
more abstract representations because of the emphasis given to vi-
olations to those higher-level representations at lower levels of pro-
cessing. Learning will result in predictions tuned sharply to exact
perceptual input cues. As a result, primarily low-level predictions
will be formed, which will have limited applicability, while higher-
level predictions will be triggered less automatically by incoming
information, an idea that is consistent with WCC.
In ASD, stimuli are treated in an idiosyncratic manner, because
slight deviations are perceived as informative and all experiences
are thus more readily treated as new instead of as belonging to
a known category. More concretely, the focus on prediction errors
at lower levels causes individuals with ASD to focus on concrete
but irrelevant changes in viewpoint or illumination, which impede
the ability to progress to the more relevant, abstract levels of de-
scription in terms of shape or object identity. Note however, that
the predictive machinery in ASD is not deficient in our view: Pre-
dictions are still formed and prediction error is computed correctly.
Hence, global interpretations are not necessarily lost in ASD; they
just require more experience and they will appear only under more
constrained conditions. So, while a familiar representation may not
pop-up automatically when a related stimulus appears, top-down
activation of holistic, Gestalt-like templates and global processing
are often still possible, but as a conscious strategy, when task in-
structions require it and enough time is available. For individuals
with ASD, it is not the default, automatic processing mode. This ac-
cords nicely with the recent move in the field towards differences
in default preference or bias (often measured by initial choice re-
sponses or reaction times) rather than in distinct inabilities (mea-
sured by error rates). This interpretation receives support from a
recent meta-analysis of the mixed evidence from a variety of local-
global perceptual processing tasks, which demonstrates that global
processing takes time in individuals with ASD (Van der Hallen, Ev-
ers, Brewaeys, Van den Noortgate, & Wagemans, 2014). Moreover,
the inconsistencies in the literature also make sense in this perspec-
tive. Laboratory tasks mostly use standardized stimuli, and often
do not incorporate the noise that is usually present in real-life stim-
uli. In these constrained circumstances, individuals with ASD can
actually perform on a typical level.
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2.4.2.1 Low-level perception
According to HIPPEA, low-level differences will get boosted and sent
upwards influencing behavior and learning. Setting precision high
by default may give an advantage for lower-level processing (but
impedes building and using of a hierarchy of predictions for gener-
alization). In the auditory domain this is reflected in the frequently
reported enhanced pitch perception in children and in a subgroup
of adolescents and adults with ASD, especially those with early de-
velopmental language delay and language-related difficulties (for
reviews, see Haesen, Boets, & Wagemans, 2011; O’Connor, 2012).
Superior pitch processing has been established regardless of stimu-
lus complexity (i.e., pure tones, complex tones, speech sounds, non-
words, words) using a variety of psychophysical tasks (e. g., iden-
tification, discrimination, memory) (e. g., Bonnel et al., 2010, 2003;
Jones et al., 2009). Relevant in this context is also the increased
prevalence of absolute pitch and musical savants in the ASD popula-
tion (e. g., Heaton, Williams, Cummins, & Happe, 2008).
In visual perception, findings are more mixed. Most studies have
found little or no group differences for visual acuity (Simmons et al.,
2009). One study observed a small group difference indicating supe-
rior contrast sensitivity in individuals with ASD (Bertone, Mottron,
Jelenic, & Faubert, 2005). Another study found evidence for supe-
rior visual acuity (Ashwin, Ashwin, Rhydderch, Howells, & Baron-
Cohen, 2009), but has been disputed on methodological grounds
(M. Bach & Dakin, 2009) and replication attempts have failed (Bölte
et al., 2012; Keita, Mottron, & Bertone, 2010). Based on HIPPEA,
however, there is still potential for well-controlled studies to find
detection differences. In particular, it may be relevant to look at clas-
sic effects of perceptual gain control (Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998)
in ASD, because precision is thought to rely on gain control of the
output of neural units representing the perceptual prediction errors
(Friston, 2009). Foss-Feig, Tadin, Schauder, and Cascio (2013) very
recently found that detection of motion direction of a single clearly
visible grating can be done based on significantly shorter presenta-
tion times in ASD compared to controls. The improvement was not
present for low contrast gratings, for which gain control is negligi-
ble. Hence, it seems it is caused by reduced contrast saturation of
high contrast gratings in ASD, consistent with a deficient gain con-
trol.
2.4.2.2 Local versus global perception
A common paradigm to study a more locally focused processing
style in ASD is to examine their susceptibility to visual illusions.
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Overall, these studies yielded mixed to positive effects. While some
authors did not find a difference in performance for ASD (C. Brown,
Gruber, Boucher, Rippon, & Brock, 2005; Rouse, Donnelly, Had-
win, & Brown, 2004), most others showed a diminished illusion
susceptibility in ASD (e. g., Bölte, Holtmann, Poustka, Scheurich, &
Schmidt, 2007; Mitchell, Mottron, Soulieres, & Ropar, 2010). This
diminished susceptibility has been taken to imply that individuals
with ASD are, in general, less influenced by contextual or prior in-
formation, remaining closer to the actual sensory input, an idea that
is perfectly consistent with HIPPEA. For instance, when Ropar and
Mitchell (2002) asked participants to estimate the shape of an illumi-
nated disc presented at a slanted angle in a darkened room, control
participants reported a more circular shape (closer to the inferred
distal stimulus, discounting the slant), while participants with ASD
reported a more elliptic shape (closer to the proximal stimulus, not
discounting the slant).
The global-local processing issue is standardly studied using the
block design task and the embedded figures task. The first study
showed enhanced performance in both of these tasks in individuals
with ASD (Shah & Frith, 1993), which was interpreted as evidence
for reduced interference by the automatic processing of the global
level. Later studies, however, yielded mixed results (e. g., Bölte, Hubl,
Dierks, Holtmann, & Poustka, 2008; Ropar & Mitchell, 2001). Col-
lectively, these results point to a difference in degree of efficiency
or ease with which the task is performed, rather than a discrete
performance difference (Van der Hallen et al., 2014).
Another much researched area of visual abilities in ASD is the per-
ception of motion. A study by Bertone, Mottron, Jelenic, and Faubert
(2003) revealed intact first-order (luminance-defined) motion pro-
cessing but a deficit in second-order (texture-defined) motion pro-
cessing. Motion coherence studies, in which observers have to track
the presence or direction of coherently moving (luminance-defined)
dots among differing proportions of randomly moving dots, gener-
ally yielded higher motion coherence thresholds in individuals with
ASD (e. g., Milne et al., 2002; Pellicano, Gibson, Maybery, Durkin,
& Badcock, 2005; Spencer et al., 2000), although there are also
exceptions (de Jonge et al., 2007; Del Viva, Igliozzi, Tancredi, &
Brizzolara, 2006; Saygin, Cook, & Blakemore, 2010). A recent
study may explain this inconsistency (Robertson, Martin, Baker, &
Baron-Cohen, 2012) by reporting a deficit in perception of motion
coherence at short exposure durations which reduces with increas-
ing exposure durations.
The finding that added noise is especially detrimental for global
motion perception in ASD is one that follows directly from HIPPEA.
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Distinguishing noise and signal is particularly important in these
paradigms. As explained before, people with ASD attribute unduly
high value to noise that is unlikely to repeat, in an attempt to prop-
erly fit the input. Global motion will more readily ‘break’ down for
them, because they end up with errors that are too important to fit
with an abstracted, global pattern. When the noise is absent, as in
the plaid motion stimuli in Vandenbroucke, Scholte, van Engeland,
Lamme, and Kemner (2008), global motion perception seems to be
intact in ASD.
Research with bistable figures suggests that people with ASD can
generate and maintain top-down predictions, because when guided
to do so, they easily succeed in making the different interpretations
of ambiguous figures (Ropar, Mitchell, & Ackroyd, 2003). How-
ever, we would advise to use binocular rivalry in future studies
(rather than the pen-and-paper type face-vase or duck-rabbit tests
used so far) because it has been proposed to be explained by pre-
dictive coding (Hohwy, Roepstorff, & Friston, 2008). Indeed input
related to the suppressed image in binocular rivalry can be con-
sidered prediction error, because it is unexplained by the currently
dominant percept. Only two studies have been performed so far
with one showing unaltered binocular rivalry in ASD (Said, Egan,
Minshew, Behrmann, & Heeger, 2013) and the other finding lower
switch rates and more mixed percepts (Robertson, Kravitz, Frey-
berg, Baron-Cohen, & Baker, 2013). Mixed percepts could be the
preferred way to minimize prediction errors in ASD, i.e. less explain-
ing away through higher level constructs and hence staying ‘closer
to the input’. Note that care should be put into finding the right
stimuli for use in autism, since availability of top-down templates
evidently also influences rivalry. For example, the first study uses
gratings while the second uses familiar objects. The less familiar (or
semantically high-level) the better for use in ASD probably, at least
when the focus is really on switching dynamics. Future binocular
rivalry studies in ASD should specifically look at mixed percepts
and fusion, because this the expected result according to predictive
coding if precise prediction errors are present for both ‘hypothe-
ses’ (Hohwy et al., 2008). Another yet to be tested prediction from
HIPPEA would be that adding noise (prediction error) to the input
has a stronger effect on the breaking of one percept (and possibly
inducing a switch) in ASD compared to controls.
2.4.2.3 Face and speech perception
Face and speech perception are crucial for smooth and successful
social interactions, and therefore prominent targets of ASD research.
Deep difficulties here can go a long way in explaining communi-
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cation problems so central in ASD. Interestingly, face and speech
perception are also prime examples of the hierarchical ‘analysis by
synthesis’ approach inherent to predictive coding. Normally this
would provide inferences on high-level semantic sources of incom-
ing sensory information (a generative model) that can cascade into
multiple levels of predictions for activity in regions below, suppress-
ing or explaining away new input, as long as it is sufficiently well-
predicted. Yet, what is sufficient has to be learned as well (meta-
learning), given the requirements of speech or face understanding.
If precision of prediction errors is invariably high, individuals with
ASD will have more difficulties in ‘abstracting away’ the short-term,
contingent, low-level features of the stimuli. Behaviorally, this is ex-
pressed in individuals with ASD as a superior access to the underly-
ing low-level visual or acoustic representations. On the other hand,
they cannot fully exploit the higher-level predictions. This disadvan-
tage is particularly felt in naturalistic face or speech-in-noise percep-
tion. The problem of which variations to encode in a given situation
and which to disregard, comes to the forefront in both speech and
faces, which is exactly one of the problems for individuals with ASD,
according to HIPPEA. The brain does not only have to pick up and
learn small auditory or visual differences, it also has to learn which
ones are informative, in the sense of predictive for different kinds
of social goals, and which differences to discard.
In speech, invariant phonetic cues are embedded within a vari-
ety of acoustic cues (e. g., fundamental frequency, accent, intona-
tion, timbre, etc.) and can only be extracted by integrating and in-
terpolating information, a process which is supported by higher-
level linguistic guidance through phonotactic, semantic and syntac-
tic constraints (predictions). During development very young TD
children learn to generalize consonants, vowels and words across
voices (e. g., of different gender), disregarding irrelevant absolute
pitch cues in favor of more complex relative distances. However,
in ASD we see increased access to fine-grained acoustic features
of complex sounds in ASD (e. g., disembedding tones from musi-
cal chords; Heaton, 2003; Mottron, Peretz, & Menard, 2000) and
superior perceptual processing of acoustic features of speech (e. g.,
Heaton, Hudry, Ludlow, & Hill, 2008; Jarvinen-Pasley, Wallace, Ra-
mus, Happe, & Heaton, 2008). Consistent with HIPPEA, it has been
suggested that these individuals generate overly specific categories
of sounds that impedes learning of higher-level abstract patterns
(Crespi, 2013) needed for speech development. Early developmen-
tal language delays as well as broader linguistic impairments later
in life are indeed prevalent in the individuals who show superior
acoustic processing of pitch (Bonnel et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2009).
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Additionally, noise with similar characteristics as the signal (speech),
substantially hinders performance in ASD (E. G. Smith & Bennetto,
2007), because these ‘errors’ are not easily ignored.
A similar challenge is posed by faces, characterized by a very
high intra-class similarity, with small and rather subtle differences
amongst many dimensions distinguishing two human faces from
each other. Countless transformations of an individual face amongst
several dimensions should be ignored. A face has to be recognized
despite variability in, for instance, lighting conditions, face orien-
tation, changeable facial features (e. g., facial hair, spots, wrinkles,
freckles), and extra-facial features (e. g., hair style, hats). Due to their
meta-learning problems, individuals with ASD may fail to make this
distinction between relevant and irrelevant variability, and hence get
lost in non-functional characteristics. This may explain their poorer
face memory and their face identity recognition problems (Weigelt,
Koldewyn, & Kanwisher, 2012).
Paralleling evidence on global-local processing in general, there is
no strong evidence for a reduced global or enhanced local face pro-
cessing style in ASD. For example, no reduced face inversion effect,
no attenuated composite face illusion, no diminished part-whole ef-
fect, and no decreased susceptibility to the Thatcher illusion was
found in ASD (for a review, see Weigelt et al., 2012). More implicit
measures, which are less prone to compensatory strategies, do find
differences in face processing, contrary to most behavioral studies.
For example, children with ASD fail to show the typical longer look-
ing times (van der Geest, Kemner, Camfferman, Verbaten, & van
Engeland, 2002) and the typical larger pupil dilation (Falck-Ytter,
2008) for upright than for inverted faces. Moreover, ERP studies
demonstrated that the typical differential response to upright ver-
sus inverted faces is not present in adults with ASD (McPartland,
Dawson, Webb, Panagiotides, & Carver, 2004; Webb et al., 2012).
These findings all point to less efficient face processing, because
selection and emphasis of predictive cues is missing, throwing face
perception back to processes similar to those used for inverted faces.
It also fits with HIPPEA that when global face processing deficits are
found, they will disappear if participants with ASD are explicitly
cued (e. g., “look at the eyes”), as shown by López, Donnelly, Had-
win, and Leekam (2004).
Studies finding disturbed formation of face prototypes in ASD
may also confirm our account (Gastgeb, Rump, Best, Minshew, &
Strauss, 2009; Gastgeb, Wilkinson, Minshew, & Strauss, 2011). Typ-
ically, forming a face prototype requires the use of the central ten-
dency in all encountered exemplar-faces to arrive at an implicit, av-
erage representation ignoring the within-category variability (Valen-
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tine, 1991). In ASD, however, the emergence of a familiar, broad face
prototype will not occur automatically. For categorization to work,
new instances have to be recognized as similar to previously experi-
enced examples. The chronically high precision of prediction errors
hinders this ability by over-emphasizing the extent to which new
input deviates from previous examples or learned templates. Con-
sistently, Plaisted, O’Riordan, and Baron-Cohen (1998b) found that
high-functioning adults with ASD learned to discriminate between
configurations of colored disks to higher levels of accuracy than con-
trols. However, when tested with slightly different exemplars of the
same overall configurations, normal controls showed transfer from
the learned exemplars to the novel ones, while individuals with
ASD did not. As a result, individuals with ASD may be slower at
categorization learning (e. g., Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Soulieres
et al., 2011) and they may be less spontaneously extracting a proto-
type from a series of exemplars (e. g., Gastgeb, Dundas, Minshew, &
Strauss, 2012; Vladusich, Olu-Lafe, Kim, Tager-Flusberg, & Gross-
berg, 2010).
Finally, impaired formation of a familiar, broad face prototype can
also be seen in the reduced face adaption aftereffects (Pellicano, Jef-
fery, Burr, & Rhodes, 2007; Rutherford, Troubridge, & Walsh, 2012,
e. g.,). Though these findings may mean that perception is less influ-
enced by prior knowledge (in this case the shifted prototype) (Pelli-
cano & Burr, 2012), we would propose that it is the consequence of
an abnormal updating of representations (prototypes). An adapting
exemplar may not update the main prototype, because it contains
important enough differences for individuals with ASD, to deserve
creation of a novel, narrow prototype. Future studies of lower-level
feature adaptation, currently lacking in ASD, may be able to resolve
this debate.
2.4.2.4 Mismatch negativity
While the predictive coding account has originally been conceptu-
alized in the visual domain, a growing number of studies has also
investigated predictive coding phenomena in the auditory modal-
ity (Arnal & Giraud, 2012; Winkler, Denham, & Nelken, 2009). In
this regard, auditory mismatch negativity (MMN) research has been
particularly informative. Here, presentation of an unexpected odd-
ball stimulus within a sequence of repeated predictable stimuli, elic-
its a novelty response in the event-related potential. Originally, the
MMN was interpreted as reflecting change detection on the basis
of a passive bottom-up process of adaptation to the repeated stim-
uli (May & Tiitinen, 2010). Recent evidence, however, has shown
that the MMN does not reflect release of repetition suppression, but
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is the result of a violated prediction rather than a physical stim-
ulus change (e. g., Todorovic, van Ede, Maris, & de Lange, 2011;
Wacongne, Changeux, & Dehaene, 2012). A series of studies fur-
ther made plausible that the perceptual cortex indeed implements
a hierarchy of predictions and prediction errors, with repetition
suppression attenuating neural responses in a very early time win-
dow (40-60 ms), stimulus expectation on the basis of unconscious
local predictions attenuating the intermediate stage of processing
(100-200 ms, i.e., the typical MMN which originates in sensory ar-
eas), and stimulus expectations on the basis of more global, inte-
grative and conscious predictions modulating the later P3b novelty
response (300-600 ms, originating from a broader frontoparietal pre-
dictive network) (Todorovic & de Lange, 2012; Wacongne et al.,
2011). Regarding the MMN, a number of studies observed larger
amplitudes and/or earlier latencies to infrequent pitch changes in
tones and vowels in ASD relative to TD controls, thus suggestive
of hypersensitivity and superior recognition of pitch change (e. g.,
Ferri et al., 2003; Gomot, Giard, Adrien, Barthelemy, & Bruneau,
2002; Lepisto et al., 2005 but see Dunn, Gomes, & Gravel, 2008). In-
terestingly, Gomot et al. (2011) showed that these electrophysiolog-
ical abnormalities were significantly more pronounced in children
who displayed greater difficulties in tolerating change. The MMN
response to infrequent phonemic changes in vowels or consonants,
however, is typically smaller and/or delayed in ASD, thus sugges-
tive of impaired recognition of the more global phonetic character-
istics of speech (e. g., Kujala, Lepisto, Nieminen-von Wendt, Naata-
nen, & Naatanen, 2005; Lepisto et al., 2006). Finally, the later
P3b component, presumably characterizing more global and inte-
grative violations of expectations, exhibits smaller amplitudes in
ASD relative to controls (e. g., G. Dawson, Finley, Phillips, Galpert, &
Lewy, 1988; Kemner, Verbaten, Cuperus, Camfferman, & van Enge-
land, 1995). Comparing neurophysiological findings pertaining to
MMN versus P3b processing suggests that the brains of individuals
with ASD are tuned to register low-level local changes in transition
probabilities (cf. enhanced and earlier MMN sensory responses to-
wards simple stimuli), but have difficulty picking up changes in the
broader fronto-parietal predictive system which is tuned towards
more global, higher-level patterns. This is at least compatible with
the view that increased low-level precision hinders the formation of
appropriate predictions higher up.
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2.4.3 Savant skills
‘Autistic savants’ are individuals with ASD with co-occurring excel-
lence in an isolated skill, i.e., an ‘island of genius’ which contrasts
with the individual’s general lower-than-average abilities. Savan-
tism has been identified in a wide range of neurological and neu-
rodevelopmental disorders, but is most frequently reported in ASD.
Savant skills are estimated to be present in one out of 10 autistic in-
dividuals, with males outnumbering females (approx. 6:1) (Howlin,
Goode, Hutton, & Rutter, 2009; Treffert, 2009). Savant skills usually
fall within one of five general categories, i.e, musical abilities, calen-
dar calculating, mathematics, art and mechanical or spatial skills (Tr-
effert, 2009). Although the savant skill of an individual may evolve
over the years, the skill should not fade or disappear over time, but
remain a peak in performance.
Several scholars attempted to explain the mechanism behind the
savant skills. Plaisted (2001) suggested a reduced ability to process
similarity at the perceptual and attentional level which results in
a reduced tendency to generalize information. Baron-Cohen (2006)
postulated an increased drive to construct or analyze, which he
referred to as ‘hyper-systemizing’. The alleged adaptive function
of the systemizing mechanism is to serve as a law-detector and
a change-predicting mechanism. He argues that people with ASD
prefer either no change, or systems which change in highly lawful
or predictable ways (i.e, systems with rule-bound change, such as
mathematics, physics, objects that spin or recur, music, machines,
collections), and why they become disabled or ‘change-resistant’
when faced with systems characterized by ‘complex’ change (such
as social interaction). Mottron et al. (2006) and Mottron et al. (2013)
emphasized the putative role of enhanced feed-forward low-level
perception and suggested that individuals with ASD have a devel-
opmental predisposition to ‘veridical mapping’ of data and infor-
mation. Although these accounts provide insight into the origin of
such a skill, HIPPEA makes more specific claims about the underly-
ing mechanisms.
Our predictive coding approach explains why similarity is not
processed in the same way in ASD, consistent with Plaisted (2001). It
also elucidates why complex change is challenging (Baron-Cohen,
2006): this is where meta-learning should lead to distinguishing
mere noise from actual environmental changes. Finally, the veridi-
cal mapping can also be seen as a consequence of the constant drive
to reduce even irrelevant prediction errors (Mottron et al., 2013).
While predictions shaped by noise and irrelevant details will often
result in impaired or slow processing, doing this for a specific, lim-
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ited topic of interest can be quite possible and, above all, reward-
ing. Developing such a skill becomes extrinsically motivating (e. g.,
getting praise and attention) but also intrinsically, as making suc-
cessful predictions in this particular domain will result in feelings
of reward, and the notion that the generally unpredictable world is
more controllable. For example, phone numbers have an exact but
arbitrary mapping (Mottron et al., 2013). All known examples of
savant skills, for instance, 3D drawings or musical play from mem-
ory, combine two factors: an exquisite discriminative sensory ability
and an exceptional (rote) memory capacity (A. L. Hill, 1978; Tre-
ffert, 2009). The first is a general feature of ASD, we would argue,
originating from high precision low-level prediction errors. A lack
of abstraction is actually an advantage here. Clearly, this discrimina-
tive ability can only fully be put to use in the case of high memory
capacity. This may be the feature that is specific to savants, but even
then resource constraints may seriously limit the savant domain.
2.5 sensorimotor abilities and a sense of self
Within the predictive coding theory, actions also entail predictions,
namely of their proprioceptive and exteroceptive consequences. Ac-
cording to M. J. Edwards, Adams, Brown, Pareés, and Friston (2012,
p. 3498), movement is defined by “what we want to see (or feel),
rather than what we want to do”. In this view, actions can be re-
garded as being aimed at fulfilling predictions (reducing prediction
errors) of perceptual input. Several ASD symptoms can be read-
ily interpreted from this perspective. Given that actions generate
prediction errors, those actions that reduce these prediction errors
to extreme minima should be preferred. Accordingly, some of the
most characterizing symptoms in ASD are the stereotypical, repeti-
tive (predictable) behavior patterns (Turner, 1999). These patterns
establish controllable and thus very predictable proprioceptive (kin-
esthetic) feedback, that helps individuals with ASD to better cope
with their environment (Ornitz, 1974). In a similar vein, the repet-
itive handling of lighting and spinning objects, and the repetitive
tactile self-stimulation can be regarded as manners of creating a
predictive environment to reduce and cope with prediction error.
Especially unpredictable surroundings may be expected to elicit
this kind of behavior, with the aim of reestablishing predictability
and reducing stress (see Section 2.6). Ornitz (1974, p. 204) observes
that “In their spontaneous activity autistic children are continually
spirting, twirling, flicking, tapping, or rubbing objects. Furthermore,
they repetitively flap, writhe, wiggle, or oscillate their extremities
while regarding them intently.” This latter part is significant because
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it indicates that while TD children might progress to more complex
kinds of ‘play’ (learning), children with ASD continue to be engaged
in and learn from these simpler patterns.
According to HIPPEA, atypical behavior has the aim of regulat-
ing excessive amounts of prediction errors. At first sight, this seems
very similar to the explanation invoked by the EPF theory, namely
reducing excessive perceptual input (Mottron et al., 2006). How-
ever, in our view, individuals with ASD only aim to reduce that part
of the perceptual input that cannot be predicted, and moreover ac-
tively attempt to create predictability to compensate. Interestingly,
reports of autistic children screaming all day, despite being hyper-
sensitive to noise themselves, might be understood as a way of deal-
ing with prediction errors by making the sensory environment more
predictable. The active desire for predictable sensory experience is
brought even more clearly into light by Temple Grandin, an autis-
tic woman who built a mechanic body squeeze machine, because
she liked the feeling of being touched and hugged, but wanted it
to be perfectly controlled (i.e., predictable) instead of the unpre-
dictable overstimulating human touch (Edelson, Edelson, Kerr, &
Grandin, 1999; Grandin, 1992). In a similar vein, the ‘high system-
izing’ concept used by Baron-Cohen, Ashwin, Ashwin, Tavassoli,
and Chakrabarti (2009) to characterize the cognitive style of individ-
uals with ASD can underscore that predictable patterns are formed
and are important in their minds. The obsession with regularity can
be seen as borne of an overweighing of deviations.
The sense of self and of agency has also been related to (intero-
ceptive) predictive coding (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014; Seth, Suzuki, &
Critchley, 2012). It is through the tightly cross-modally correlated
proprioceptive, tactile and visual input of self-induced movements
that we construct the sense of a self that acts in the world. The high-
level concept of the self is the most plausible prediction explaining
low-level regularities in cross-modal input. This view of the emer-
gence of the self via the observed correlations between propriocep-
tive, tactile and visual modalities can also explain why artificially
created correlations can create the illusion that extra-corporeal ob-
jects are part of our own body (e. g., rubber hand illusion; Apps &
Tsakiris, 2014; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Awareness of self and
body as distinct from the world is thus dependent upon a certain
degree of tolerance derived from the active, successful suppression
of interoceptive prediction errors (Seth et al., 2012). The presence
of repetitive, stereotyped movements in ASD during early develop-
ment suggests that an abnormally large amount of correlated input
is needed to establish a sense of self as separated from the surround-
ings (see also Brincker & Torres, 2013).
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Two recent studies using the rubber hand illusion, an illusion of
perceived arm position induced by correlated (synchronized) stim-
ulation (Palmer et al., 2013; Paton, Hohwy, & Enticott, 2012), sup-
port this view. Both in individuals with ASD and in those with high
but nonclinical ASD traits, the consequences of experiencing the il-
lusion (on drift and movement) were reduced. A higher estimated
precision of prediction errors may indeed lead to a reduced illusory
percept, requiring more tightly correlated input (than is usually pro-
vided in this rubber hand procedures) for the illusory percept to
fully establish itself. More generally, motor coordination problems,
often noted in ASD (Fournier, Hass, Naik, Lodha, & Cauraugh, 2010;
M. L. Matson, Matson, & Beighley, 2011), may be another conse-
quence of over-precision of movement prediction errors in contexts
that actually have a considerable amount of uncertainty (Palmer et
al., 2013).
The finding that the repetitive, self-focused behaviors often de-
crease during development (Richler, Huerta, Bishop, & Lord, 2010)
suggests that extensive exposure may eventually lead to a more sta-
ble sense of self. However, the typical insistence on sameness (Kan-
ner, 1943) remains or increases with age, indicating that exterocep-
tive prediction errors generally remain precise. This insistence on
routine or rituals, and resistance to trivial changes in the surround-
ings, again demonstrate that children with ASD do develop clear
predictions on what should happen next in the current situation, in
contrast to theories positing a uniformly weaker application of pre-
dictions in ASD (Pellicano & Burr, 2012). Therefore, insistence on
sameness may be considered a hallmark of HIPPEA: It signals a clear
grasp (prediction) on how the world should behave, while assigning
too much importance to incidental changes.
2.6 chronic unpredictability and its affective conse-
quences
One of the most prominent clinical observations in individuals with
ASD is their unusual reactivity to sensory stimuli. Numerous clini-
cal and personal reports describe the presence of both hyper- and
hyposensitivity to sensory stimulation. Hypersensitivity has been
described in various modalities (Blakemore et al., 2006; Kern et
al., 2006; Khalfa et al., 2004). Enhanced sensitivity to loud and un-
expected sounds is particularly evident in children with ASD (e. g.,
Grandin, 1995; Tomchek & Dunn, 2007), and appears to decrease
with age, with adults with ASD becoming more similar to TD adults
(Kern et al., 2006). Yet, feelings of stimulus overload and hypersen-
sitivity to noise are also common in adults on the autistic spectrum
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(in particular in social situations, like receptions or parties), and can
cause great distress and anxiety. Enhanced sensitivity to visual stim-
uli is less common in ASD, but does occur, e. g., under the form of
enhanced discomfort to bright light (Kern et al., 2001). When the
gain of the neural units representing the prediction errors is fixed
at a high level, it is easy to see that hyper-sensitivity becomes very
likely, especially for unexpected input, as is the case in ASD. Over-
weighting of irrelevant prediction errors causes sensory overload.
Seeing that unpredictability is at the core of the sensory overload,
we can also attempt to explain its negative affective impact. Uncer-
tainty has long been identified as a factor that intensifies stress and
anxiety (Herry et al., 2007; Miller, 1981). In addition to leading
to increased stress and anxiety, persistent significant prediction er-
rors may actually by themselves generate negative affect (Huron,
2006; Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011b). When predictions are
invoked, there is actually something at stake, namely the success of
current internal models of the environment. When prediction errors
signal the need for extra resources, aimed at updating the internal
model, they may have negative affective value. For example, sup-
posedly neutral perceptual prediction errors activate the habenula,
a region known to code prediction errors of negative valence (Schif-
fer, Ahlheim, Wurm, & Schubotz, 2012; Schiffer & Schubotz, 2011).
Originating from the cognitive dissonance tradition, recent frame-
works in social psychology center precisely on the link between ex-
pectation violation (or uncertainty) and anxiety, with much of hu-
man cognition and behavior interpreted as efforts to reestablish a
coherent, predictable world model (Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 2012;
Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012).
The taxing, negative experience described in ASD as sensory over-
load or oversensitivity is, according to HIPPEA, a logical consequence
of a brain continuously signaling that prediction errors merit the
recruitment of more resources for learning. The proactive (predic-
tive) investment of the system makes this a particularly aversive
experience. Conversely, making progress in predicting the world (re-
ducing prediction errors) may genuinely feel rewarding. Note that
not the static state of low prediction error but rather the transition
(change) from a state of high prediction errors to a state of low er-
rors may induce positive affect (Joffily & Coricelli, 2013; Oudeyer et
al., 2010; Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011b). This kind of reward
arguably is the driving force for further exploration and learning
(cf. Section 2.3). However, difficulties in estimating where predictive
progress can be made could largely rob a person from experiencing
this type of reward, with detrimental implications for intrinsic moti-
vation. Indeed, problems in general motivation and exploration are
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reported in ASD (Koegel & Mentis, 1985; Ozonoff et al., 2008), from
very early on in development (Zwaigenbaum et al., 2005).
The combination of increased uncertainty-related anxiety and de-
creased reward of exploration may have particularly incapacitating
and far-reaching effects in the longer term. We already referred to
learned helplessness to indicate the anxious avoidance and lack of
motivation caused by repeated frustration in predicting one’s sur-
roundings. By caregivers this may be interpreted as hypo-reactivity
(Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Tomchek & Dunn, 2007). Social inter-
actions arguably suffer most from this lack of motivation (Cheval-
lier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012), with obvious conse-
quences with regard to the willingness to engage in social relations.
We do not consider social motivation problems to be the origin of
ASD, but our account agrees with social motivation theories (Cheval-
lier et al., 2012) that this is an important aggravating factor in the
syndrome. Indeed, social interactions are not perceived that enjoy-
able or rewarding in individuals with ASD (Chevallier et al., 2012).
Unsurprisingly, a lot of interventions focus on increasing the reward
of social interactions. If social situations are avoided from early on
in life, the number of social learning experiences decreases, and so,
in a vicious circle, even more social impairments ensue.
Taken together, these factors arguably make individuals with ASD
more vulnerable to mood and anxiety problems, which are indeed
overrepresented in ASD (Kim, Szatmari, Bryson, Streiner, & Wil-
son, 2000). Hence, mood problems, anxiety and anxious avoidance
should in our view be considered as secondary symptoms, origi-
nating from accumulated experience with (irreducible) prediction
errors, and from repeated frustration in learning. Consistent with
this, anxiety and mood problems seem to increase during childhood
in ASD (Kim et al., 2000).
2.7 social functioning
Social interaction problems are amongst the first described symp-
toms of ASD (Asperger, 1944; Kanner, 1943) and are crucial pieces
in the DSM-classification (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Social impairments stand out strongly in the clinical phenotype
(demonstrated by the existence of ASD questionnaires focusing only
on the social symptoms; e. g., Constantino, 2002), and retrospec-
tive studies often report early signals in the social domain (Volkmar,
Chawarska, & Klin, 2005). The phenomenal and clinical prominence
of social deficits spurred a wealth of evidence on social impairments.
Therefore, a central challenge for core information processing dys-
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function theories of ASD is to explain why abnormalities manifest
themselves most clearly in the social domain.
What sets social situations apart from non-social situations? Or
better: what distinguishes social tasks in the lab from the tasks used
for other (lower-level) domains? Like Simmons et al. (2009), we won-
der whether social may just be a synonym of complex here. However,
our approach allows us to pinpoint exactly what this complexity
may entail with regard to the difficulties in ASD. Most ingredients
have been provided in the previous sections, but in the social do-
main they come together and are expressed to the fullest.
2.7.1 Social complexity
Our brief overview of face and speech processing impairments in
ASD did not strongly speak for a special status of faces or speech as
such. Here too, we do not want to treat social judgements differently
from other processing. It is more fitting, we argue, to view them as
just another kind of inference, in this case inference about other peo-
ple’s emotions or intentions from their facial expressions, gaze, bod-
ily postures, etc. (Hohwy & Palmer, 2014; Zaki, 2013). Therefore,
the same mix of accidental uncertainty and informative changes de-
termines the social problems in ASD. No two social scenarios are
identical. Numerous accidental properties in the rich social envi-
ronment are mostly uninformative and should be ignored. This is
ideally what tuning down precision should accomplish. Individu-
als should (meta-)learn which aspects are informative and which
are irrelevant to the social rules governing the current situation.
This is particularly difficult when these noisy social contingencies
are changing and context-bound, which they mostly are (Barrett,
Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011). There is rarely a one-to-one mapping
between social signals and their meaning. For example, happiness
can be expressed with an obvious loud laughter, but an enigmatic
Mona Lisa smile is possible too. A similar laugh can signify consent
(humor) or rejection (irony). Subcultures (e. g., youth culture) invent
new meanings for old signals (e. g., words) or new signals for old
meanings. In addition, low-level input can be dramatically differ-
ent while the same social rules apply. Instead of flexibly adjusting
the precision of prediction errors based on previous and current ex-
periences, individuals with ASD will get flooded by the wealth of
available information in a social situation.
Generalizing what we said about face perception, people with
ASD fail to discriminate between informative and irrelevant prop-
erties when making social judgments (cf. the lack of autonomous
selection in attention). The result is that social information does not
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seem to be particularly salient for them, or at least not more so
than non-social stimuli. This deficit is most clearly illustrated by
eye-movement studies. Individuals with ASD show a reduced atten-
tion to faces, but more attention towards bodies and objects in the
background of a social scene (e. g., Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, &
Cohen, 2002; Rice, Moriuchi, Jones, & Klin, 2012). Within faces too,
differences in information selection are noticeable. They also do not
seem to have learned the typical informativeness of the eyes region,
crucial for face and emotion recognition. Instead, studies reveal a
bias for the mouth region and scanning patterns towards the outer
face characteristics (such as hair; Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 2010).
From early childhood on, children with ASD do not show the usual
preference for social stimuli (Klin, 1991, 1992). Two year old chil-
dren with ASD rather attend to non-social physical contingencies
instead of socially relevant biological motion (Klin, Lin, Gorrindo,
Ramsay, & Jones, 2009). We think this should be explained by the
steadier, lower-level predictability of the former.
The fact that the atypical viewing patterns and the emotion recog-
nition deficits are most apparent when using complex stimulus ma-
terial (Chevallier et al., 2012; Harms et al., 2010) also speaks for
our hypothesis. While the distinction between relevant and irrele-
vant information may be rather clear-cut in simple social stimuli
(e. g., isolated, well-controlled and re-used faces), using ecologically
valid stimuli (e. g., noisy, dynamic social scenes) implies more com-
petition from distracting (irrelevant) information.
Gradually, TD children form ‘social scripts’: abstracted and broadly
applicable knowledge structures, representing an ordered sequence
of actions, causes and consequences within a certain social context
(e. g., making friends). In children with ASD this capacity to gener-
ate adequate social scripts is found to be impaired (Loth, Happe, &
Gomez, 2010). It is easy to see that indiscriminate precision of so-
cial and non-social cues results in narrow and specific social scripts
(e. g., making friends when I’m playing soccer), wrought with spuri-
ous, concrete features. Interventions that try to remedy social script
deficits, select and describe the relevant cues for a given script, link-
ing it with possible appropriate responses (for a meta-analysis, see
Reynhout & Carter, 2011).
2.7.2 Multisensory integration
Adequate social understanding heavily relies on integration of mul-
tiple sources of information, both within modality and across mo-
dalities. The same facial expressions can receive completely oppo-
site meanings depending on the bodily context in which they ap-
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pear (Aviezer, Trope, & Todorov, 2012). In other situations different
modalities provide complementary information, to be used to fig-
ure out emotions and intentions from face-to-face-communication.
In such cases, additional information of another modality helps
the interpretation. For instance, visual articulatory information aids
speech perception, especially under noisy circumstances. Again we
note that uncertainty of the different sources has to be taken into
account in order to determine which information should have more
saying in the eventual social judgment. Indeed, this can be formal-
ized using Bayes’ theorem (Zaki, 2013), which is already widely
used in (non-social) perceptual cue integration studies. For opti-
mal inference, the expected uncertainty (precision) of the different
sensory sources should determine differential reliance (weight) on
those sources.
Individuals with ASD are known to have difficulties with such
multisensory integration (Iarocci, Burack, Shore, Mottron, & Enns,
2006), for instance with the detection of inter-modal correspondence
of facial and vocal affect (e. g., Loveland et al., 1995). If precision is
fixed at a similarly high level for all sources, as HIPPEA maintains,
optimal integration will not take place, because all cues, even re-
dundant or very uncertain ones, will be weighed equally. Moreover,
the spatiotemporal contiguity of two inputs required to perceive
them as belonging to the same distal cause would be more strictly
defined for people with high precision. Any minor spatiotempo-
ral mismatch between two cues (e. g.visual-auditory in the ventrilo-
quist effect or visual-haptic in the rubber hand illusion) will render
it more likely that these will be experienced as distinct unimodal
events rather than an integrated, multimodal event (Palmer et al.,
2013). The attenuated McGurk effect found in ASD could similarly
be explained (Mongillo et al., 2008; Taylor, Isaac, & Milne, 2010).
2.7.3 Mentalizing
‘Theory of Mind’ or ‘mentalizing’ refers to the ability to read the
(facial) expressions of other people, to understand their feelings, in-
tentions, wishes and thoughts, and to use this —mostly implicit—
knowledge to understand another individual’s actions and guide
one’s own actions (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). A vast amount of
research in ASD has focused on the Theory-of-Mind problems in in-
dividuals with ASD, arguing that individuals with ASD have difficul-
ties in placing themselves into the mental world of others and them-
selves, and sometimes described as ‘mindblindness’ (e. g., Baron-
Cohen, 2001; Frith, 2003). The discovery of mirror neurons (in
monkeys) that are active both during the action observation or imag-
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ination (offline processing), but also during the online execution of
an action (e. g., Kohler et al., 2002), led to the conjecture that action-
understanding and even mentalizing crucially rely on this class of
neurons. All discussions on the precise role and distribution of mir-
ror neurons in the brain aside, this finding conclusively showed that
action execution and action perception are closely intertwined. Pre-
dictive coding offers a new perspective on the implementation of
goal and intention inference in the mirror system (e. g., Friston, Law-
son, & Frith, 2013; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007; Koster-Hale &
Saxe, 2013). As mentioned before, actions could be conceived of
as a series of hierarchical predictions (Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith,
2007), going from longer-term intentions and goals (e. g., to splash
water in your friends’ face) over short-term goals (e. g., to grasp a
glass of water) and motor plans (movement sequences), down to
the muscle commands and kinesthetics. At all levels, predictions
will be matched with input, resulting in prediction errors that drive
and guide proper action execution. Importantly, in predictive cod-
ing this same hierarchical model that is used for forward action
generation also serves inverse inference: figuring out goals from
observed actions (Kilner et al., 2007). Observed actions will both
automatically generate expectations on the kinematics and muscle
activation linked to it, and create discrepancies that can only be ex-
plained away by inferring an appropriate intention on the highest
levels. How can this system distinguish then between own actions
and another’s actions? Put differently, observed action creates pre-
diction errors because motor plans and goals are generated, while
muscle and kinesthetics are inactive. How does the brain avoid au-
tomatically executing (mimicking) observed actions to reduce those
low-level prediction errors?
The assumed mechanism is, again, precision (Clark, 2013a). The
prediction errors have a high expected precision, which makes sure
actions you initiate yourself are properly executed. These prediction
errors will be suppressed by your own accurate predictions (goals),
often inciting a sense of confidence or agency (see Section 2.5). For
action observation however, estimated precision of motor prediction
errors should be tuned down, such that they receive low weight and
the thrust of processing moves to higher-level inference of goals and
intentions. In this way, precision becomes the mechanism that al-
lows organisms to exploit the learned hierarchical models for action
execution, also for mentalizing and offline planning (Clark, 2013a).
Following this reasoning, a deficit in the flexible tuning of preci-
sion of prediction errors, resulting in an overly high estimation of
precision, as HIPPEA assumes to be the case in ASD, may give rise to
a couple of related problems. First, it may contribute to offline (mo-
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tor) planning problems (Booth, Charlton, Hughes, & Happe, 2003;
Hughes, 1996), with high precision preventing individuals to tran-
scend the immediate input, as noted earlier. Second, failure to lower
the precision of low-level prediction errors during action observa-
tion, may automatically lead to precise proprioceptive prediction
errors, because the action is not executed. A possible strategy to re-
duce these errors is the mimicking of (formal aspects of) others’ be-
havior. Indeed, hyper-imitation of formal aspects of behavior (Bird,
Leighton, Press, & Heyes, 2007; Spengler, Bird, & Brass, 2010), and
echolalia and echopraxia, the automatic copying of others’ speech or
behavior occur more frequently in the ASD population. We are cau-
tious in pointing to this possibility, because precision of motor er-
rors may be determined by a different neurotransmitter (dopamine)
than perceptual errors (see Section 2.8) and not every child with ASD
shows this automatic mimicking.
A third possible problem of inflexible tuning of precision, links
back to our discussion on visual and auditory perception. We noted
there that top-levels of hierarchical models may not get properly
build (learned), because processing is stuck in low-level matching
due to the high precision of low-level prediction errors. If for mo-
tor execution and planning too, individuals with ASD end up with
incomplete hierarchical models, they may be unable to reach the
higher levels of conceptual inferences of goal and intention. Conse-
quentially, these individuals will experience difficulties in inferring
emotions from their own bodily states and expressions (Seth et al.,
2012). Indeed, alexithymia is often found in ASD, and has recently
been shown to better predict poor recognition of emotional expres-
sions than ASD as such (Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013). From
the predictive coding standpoint, where one model is used for both
emotion recognition and inferring own emotion, this makes a lot of
sense. Brain responses related to empathy are also modulated by
alexithymia rather than ASD (Bird et al., 2010). If these findings are
corroborated, it may turn out the empathy and emotion recognition
problems in ASD (see Harms et al., 2010; Uljarevic & Hamilton,
2013, for a meta-analysis and literature review, resp.) are not pri-
mary symptoms, but are inherently linked to alexithymia. The pro-
cessing profile of ASD as we sketched may predispose patients to
alexithymia, because high precision interoceptive prediction errors
prevents adequate emotional inferences (Seth et al., 2012).
2.8 neurobiological underpinnings
In the current paper we primarily wanted to articulate the cogni-
tive, computational foundation of our account and its behavioral
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consequences. We do want to briefly survey plausible neurobiolog-
ical underpinnings of the proposed mechanism as well, without
giving an exhaustive review of the neurobiology of ASD (e. g., see
D. G. Amaral, Schumann, & Nordahl, 2008; Bauman & Kemper,
2005). Clearly, a more systematic, extensive discussion of ASD neu-
robiology in light of HIPPEA will be needed in the future.
Using HIPPEA, we can tentatively divide neurobiological findings
in three parts: first, studies directly targeting the neural regulation
of precision, second, studies on the neural basis of models of uncer-
tainty and meta-learning that feed into regulation of precision, and
third, downstream consequences of high precision for neural plas-
ticity and connectivity. We will only consider the first two here and
leave the last part for later work.
2.8.0.1 Precision regulation
In Friston’s predictive coding model, precision is regulated by neu-
romodulators that control the gain of the units representing pre-
diction errors (Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner, & Kiebel, 2010). This
gain determines the impact of prediction errors on units that en-
code the predictions. Neuromodulators such as acetylcholine (ACh)
and norepinephrine (NE) are long known to influence attention and
learning, so they are likely candidates for this role. In particular, the
neuromodulator ACh is assumed to enhance precision of percep-
tual prediction errors (Friston et al., 2010). Indeed, a pharmacolog-
ical agent that increases ACh availability in cholinergic synapses
increases the event-related response to deviations of predictions
(Moran et al., 2013) and attenuates the decrease in activity with re-
peated stimulation (repetition suppression). However, Yu and Dayan
(2005) proposed a different, complementary role of ACh and NE, in
which only expected uncertainty, linked to the known stochasticity
(lack of reliability) of a predictive relationship, is coded by ACh. NE,
on the other hand, tracks unexpected uncertainty, that is, the actual,
important changes in the regularities governing the relationships
in the world (Duzel & Guitart-Masip, 2013; Payzan-LeNestour,
Dunne, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2013). A context-dependent mod-
ulation of the balance between these two must ensure that learning
is enabled when learning is due (for actual changes).
The findings on (nicotinic) cholinergic signaling in ASD are very
inconclusive at this stage, but a few studies report abnormalities
(Lam, Aman, & Arnold, 2006), including in the main source of
ACh, the basal forebrain (Bauman & Kemper, 1994; Perry et al.,
2001). Raised NE signalling in ASD is suggested by elevated blood
plasma levels (Lam et al., 2006) and by a tonically high arousal sys-
tem as shown by a tonically elevated heart rate in autistic children,
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with reduced phasic response (Kootz & Cohen, 1981). For pupil size
the same pattern has been reported: increased tonic pupil size, and
increased latency, smaller constriction amplitude and lower constric-
tion velocity for the pupillary light reflex, compared to TD children
(Anderson & Colombo, 2009; Fan, Miles, Takahashi, & Yao, 2009).
This is noteworthy, because of the known coupling of pupil size
with the NE system, more specifically with activity in the principal
source of NE projections, the locus coeruleus (Rajkowski, Kubiak,
& Aston-Jones, 1993). Finally, prenatal overstimulation of the β2-
adrenergic receptor by an agonist is associated with increased risk
of ASD (Connors et al., 2005).
Hence, available evidence already seems to point to some loss
in the dynamic range of ACh and NE neuromodulation, but di-
rect tests await. Pharmacological studies applying an agent that in-
creases central cholinergic signaling should verify whether the ERP
or behavioral response to expectation violation is modulated simi-
larly in individuals with and without ASD (cf. Moran et al., 2013). If
cholinergic signaling is already at ceiling in ASD, an additional boost
of this system may not make a difference. Alternatively, a choliner-
gic antagonist may, in ASD, lead to ‘normal’ performance on tasks
that benefit from disregarding smaller differences (on which ASD
subjects are usually worse). With regard to NE, there may be con-
siderable potential in measuring pupil dynamics in ASD. Nassar et
al. (2012) demonstrated that learning dynamics can be tracked by
pupil size measurements, suggesting that NE arousal systems in-
deed can regulate learning. Their predictive inference task required
adjusting of precision (learning rate), because predictive relation-
ships changed at certain points (‘change points’) in the course of
the task, as explained before (see Section 2.4.1). Apparently, pupil
diameter change is monotonically related to change point probabil-
ity, where prediction errors should indeed receive high weight. Ad-
ditionally, average pupil size reflects “uncertainty that arises after
change points and signals the need for rapid learning” (Nassar et
al., 2012, p. 1043). Recall that this uncertainty was called reducible.
If ASD is linked to increased precision of prediction errors across the
board, as HIPPEA maintains, this should be apparent both in average
learning rate and pupil metrics in this sort of task.
Finally, there is evidence that these neuromodulators can act as
metaplastic signals regulating the potential of synapses to undergo
activity-dependent long-term potentiation (e. g., Inoue et al., 2013).
This provides another link with precision as a meta-learning sig-
nal, that needs to be explored more. Indeed, several of the genetic
mutations linked to ASD have an important role in the regulation
of plasticity (e. g., Delorme et al., 2013; Ebert & Greenberg, 2013;
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Hutsler & Zhang, 2010). Relatedly, the valproic acid rat model of
ASD shows twice the amount of long term potentiation of controls
(Markram & Markram, 2010).
2.8.0.2 Models of uncertainty
We emphasized before that precision of prediction errors does not
appear out of the blue. The brain builds meta-models, predictions
of prediction errors, to estimate precision. These meta-models are
formally not that different from regular predictive models assumed
to take place across the perceptual hierarchy. Arguably then, these
meta-models may be represented also in a distributed manner across
the cortex. However, there is evidence that some regions are more
involved than others in the processing of uncertainty.
Two regions that are good candidates for this and that have re-
cently attracted researchers’ interest in ASD are the insula and the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Both are thought to be central parts
of the so-called salience network, the circuit involved in responding
to behaviorally important stimuli and in cognitive control. Indeed,
we could replace the somewhat vague term ‘salience’ with ‘preci-
sion’, because in se they have similar intent, namely determining
value or relevance of input for behavior and learning. The salience
network is closely connected to the motor system, suggesting a role
in generating exploratory actions (Rushworth, Behrens, Rudebeck,
& Walton, 2007), as we discussed in Section 2.3 on exploration in
ASD. Also, it is deemed to be crucial in judging whether to persist
in or switch the current attentional set (Dosenbach et al., 2006). Ev-
idently, models of uncertainty in input are vital in such decisions.
Finally, the ACC innervates the locus coeruleus-NE system (Aston-
Jones & Cohen, 2005), perhaps allowing it to modulate gain (preci-
sion) of prediction errors in the (sensory) cortex.
A recent study found hyperactivation in dorsal ACC in response
to visual oddbal stimuli in ASD (i.e., infrequently presented, deviant
stimulus) (Dichter, Felder, & Bodfish, 2009), consistent with the
idea that expectation violations are more salient. Healthy subjects
show ACC activity for behaviorally relevant prediction errors (Ide,
Shenoy, Yu, & Li, 2013; Metereau & Dreher, 2013). Others have
found evidence that the cingulate cortex not only represents the
prediction errors, but also performs the computations underlying
the adaptive regulation of precision (D. R. Bach, Hulme, Penny, &
Dolan, 2011; Behrens et al., 2007).
The insula too is known to be involved in prediction under un-
certainty. Activity in ACC and insula is strongly coupled, and crit-
ically, this coupling is modulated by prediction errors (Limongi,
Sutherland, Zhu, Young, & Habib, 2013). Using a gambling game,
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Preuschoff, Quartz, and Bossaerts (2008) showed that activity in the
anterior insula can code that part of uncertainty that cannot be re-
duced, due to the stochasticity of the associations at hand, also
called known or expected uncertainty. There is evidence from dy-
namic causal modeling analyses that anterior insula is the entry
point of the salience network and drives ACC activity (Ham, Leff,
Boissezon, Joffe, & Sharp, 2013; Limongi et al., 2013). If true, a
possible hypothesis is that the insula corrects incoming prediction
errors for known stochasticity and thereby helps ACC and further
regions to properly attribute salience (precision) of the prediction
errors. In any case, insula, ACC and possibly neighboring frontal
regions may cooperate to dissect uncertainty, with the aim of esti-
mating where predictive progress can be made and setting precision
accordingly (attending to the right aspects of input) (see also Karls-
son, Tervo, & Karpova, 2012). When, as is the case for ASD, there is
abnormal connectivity and activity of ACC and insula (Di Martino
et al., 2009; Uddin & Menon, 2009), this estimation process may
go awry, leading to unadaptive and possibly chronically high pre-
cision. Much more work is needed because existing neuroimaging
work in ASD mostly uses task contrasts (often using faces or other
complex stimuli) that are hardly informative in relation to our pro-
posal. Fortunately, the needed paradigms have already been applied
in nonclinical participants.
2.9 related approaches
Several important theoretical frameworks of ASD can be usefully
compared to ours. Some have been emphasized in previous sections,
but here we more closely look at those that were not discussed
before and that are most akin to our theorizing, in postulating a
broader information-processing account. In the second part of this
section, we will address the question whether a unified account is
possible at all, in view of the heterogeneous nature of ASD. We will
close this section with a discussion of a recent theory of schizophre-
nia, which is closely related to our theory of ASD.
2.9.1 Other information processing accounts of ASD
A straightforward, Bayesian way to conceptualize problems in ASD
could be to assume broader (high uncertainty) priors or predictions
that therefore have a weaker influence on the outcome of perceptual
inference. Indeed, this road has recently been taken by Pellicano and
Burr (2012) in a thought-provoking article (for a related approach,
see Gomot & Wicker, 2012). These authors argued that this may
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cause perceptual outcomes to remain closer to the perceptual input,
minimally biased by top-down, prior knowledge, an idea that is
consistent with the WCC theory. Hence, this account explains why
individuals with ASD may be less susceptible to visual illusions that
are caused by prior knowledge or contextual interactions (see Sec-
tion 2.4.2 on perception). In other words it would, according to the
authors, result in a more accurate or ‘real’ perception.
In addition to spurring an interesting discussion (Brock, 2012;
Friston, Lawson, & Frith, 2013; Teufel, Subramaniam, & Fletcher,
2013; Van de Cruys et al., 2013; van Boxtel & Lu, 2013), this stance
has been criticized on theoretical and empirical grounds. Teufel et
al. (2013) remind us that “a perceptual system that refines sensory
information by prior knowledge provides a better estimate of real
but hidden causes than perception that is based on the ambiguous
sensory information on its own, because the former system exploits
all the relevant information available.” In this regard, broader priors
would lead to less accurate perception because the actual input is al-
ways noisy and ambiguous. Even in the case of visual illusions, it is
not “priors per se [that] render perception less accurate; rather, it is
the application of the wrong prior that leads to the illusory percept”
(Teufel et al., 2013). Furthermore, Brock (2012) notes that percep-
tion (the posterior) can move closer to perceptual input (likelihood)
for two different reasons: either, as Pellicano and Burr (2012) argue,
the prior is broader (higher uncertainty, lower precision) or the like-
lihood is sharper (lower uncertainty, higher precision). It should be
clear that the proposal in HIPPEA is more akin the second option.
Finally, there is evidence that individuals with ASD are very well
capable of building precise expectations from experience (see Sec-
tion 2.4.1). Indeed that may be the reason why they are so perturbed
by information that deviates from this information. The problems,
we argue, arise because these deviations receive too much salience.
Instead of a lack of precision in predictions, there may be a height-
ened precision of prediction errors in ASD.
It is also interesting to distinguish the our view from approaches
locating the core problem in ASD in a reduced signal to noise ra-
tio in neural processing (Belmonte et al., 2004; Simmons et al.,
2009). While increasing noise usually impairs psychophysical perfor-
mance, it can improve detection under restricted conditions, a phe-
nomenon called ‘stochastic resonance’ (Goris, Wagemans, & Wich-
mann, 2008). Though speculative at this stage, increased internal
noise in neural communication may in this way be able to explain
both improved performance in a limited number of tasks and im-
paired performance on more complex, high-level tasks (Simmons et
al., 2009). HIPPEA in contrast, does not necessarily assume increased
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internal noise in neural signaling, but rather a higher weighing of
external and internal ‘noise’ (accidental features), causing the sys-
tem to attempt to capture this irrelevant, non-repeating noise. We
believe that this view is more readily compatible with the broad
range of behavioral peculiarities in ASD.
2.9.2 Unifying theories of ASD, in the face of its genetic and phenotypic
heterogeneity
Several scholars have lamented the overgrowth of unifying theories
on ASD, seeing that they fail to deliver a convincing account for
every ASD symptom cluster. Heterogeneity in underlying genetics
similarly seems to suggest that there is not one but rather a mul-
titude of deficits underlying the ASD pathology (Happe & Ronald,
2008). Finally, and most importantly, phenotypic variability is no-
torious in ASD (Rommelse, Geurts, Franke, Buitelaar, & Hartman,
2011). This causes, but may also be caused by, difficulties in diag-
nosing ASD. Questioning the view of ASD as singular entity even
further is the fact that “virtually every symptom characteristic of
ASD can be observed in children who do not fit this diagnostic cat-
egory” (Bishop, 1989). This of course, does not necessarily imply
that these symptoms when they appear together in ASD are just
the result of the “worst of luck”. Still, these observations have led
Happe and Ronald (2008) to describe ASD as a fractionable triad,
with three independent components (communication problems, so-
cial interaction deficits, and repetitive and restricted behaviors and
interests) coincidentally co-occurring. Only when the three conspire,
subclinical signs become clinical symptoms meriting a diagnosis.
Naturally, we agree with Happe and Ronald (2008) that a better
characterization of the subcomponents of ASD is much needed, but
an intrinsic coherence of the components may only shine through
when the appropriate level of description has been found. As we
progress towards more realistic models of the mind-brain, we may
be able to formulate more fitting explanations of ASD within these
broader models. HIPPEA can be considered a first step in that direc-
tion.
Furthermore, there may be more coherence in the ASD symptom
clusters than these critical authors assume. For example, while exec-
utive functioning and attentional deficits may not be specific to ASD
(cf. ADHD), the specific pattern of executive capacities impaired
and intact may be distinguishable from other disorders, and may
have a privileged relationship with social or emotional symptoms
of ASD. It is no doubt a challenge to connect social and commu-
nicative symptoms to more basic processing differences, due to di-
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vergence in the pathways leading to such high-level dysfunctions
and to possible compensatory mechanisms saving these capacities
for others. Indeed, a truly developmental account like HIPPEA will
predict quite some variability in the unfolding of clinical symptoms
depending on interactions with the environment.
Finally, heterogeneity in underlying (epi-)genetic and molecular
paths towards the syndrome does not preclude the possibility that
one main cognitive mechanism is impaired. There is little reason to
expect a one-to-one mapping from cognitive processing to neurobi-
ology. The previous section provided possible ways HIPPEA links up
with neurobiological evidence.
2.9.3 ASD in relation to schizophrenia
Increasing evidence suggests ASD has common genetic risk factors
and neuroanatomical overlap with schizophrenia (Carroll & Owen,
2009; Cheung et al., 2010; Serretti & Fabbri, 2013). Intriguingly,
a recent theory of schizophrenia (Adams, Stephan, Brown, & Fris-
ton, 2013; Fletcher & Frith, 2009) invoked undue high precision
of prediction errors to explain positive symptoms in schizophrenia
(hallucinations and delusions). The authors proposed that high pre-
cision prediction errors cannot be reduced and are propagated to
higher levels, where they induce radical updates of beliefs to some-
how make sense of them. Hence, they result in the strange world
views and delusions.
Briefly, it seems to us that inflexible, high precision prediction
errors are a better fitting explanation for ASD than for schizophre-
nia. Overprecise prediction errors as a fundamental, indeed devel-
opmental, characteristic would be present from very early on in life.
Hence, the relatively late onset of schizophrenia needs explaining.
In addition, overly high precise prediction errors arguably do not
sufficiently explain the specific, improbable and utterly bizarre con-
tents of delusional beliefs (Silverstein, 2013). Other things that may
be important to consider are the specific level of origin of the pre-
diction errors (conceptual or action vs perceptual prediction errors,
Adams et al., 2013; Fletcher & Frith, 2009) and the subjective confi-
dence level (precision) that top-down beliefs can take on (to explain
their fervor).
While the cognitive commonality of schizophrenia and ASD may
match their genetic and neuroanatomical overlap, it also highlights
a central challenge for predictive coding theories of mental illnesses:
if they want to provide more than over-accommodating just-so sto-
ries for mental disorders, these theories should be able to give good,
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constraining explanations for the cognitive and neural specificities
of each disorder. Clearly more work is needed in this respect.
2.10 conclusions
While one core deficit is unlikely to explain all heterogeneity in ASD,
it is quite remarkable that our approach can accommodate a broad
range of reported deficits and peculiarities. This also makes sense
since meta-learning is central in development across domains. Meta-
cognition, conceptualized as the ability to monitor and adaptively
use uncertainty, is generally fragile, costly and only conclusively
demonstrated in a few, cognitively higher developed species (Car-
ruthers, 2008; J. D. Smith, 2009; J. D. Smith, Coutinho, Church, &
Beran, 2013). Dysfunction of this capacity may impact higher-level
functions such as emotion processing and social cognition, but it
also has a pervasive effect on attention, cognitive control, perception
and learning. Hence, HIPPEA is broader than earlier single-deficit ac-
counts of ASD, because it is not linked to a certain symptom cluster.
At the same time however, HIPPEA is more specific than those ac-
counts, homing in on the disturbed mechanism.
Every existing neurocognitive theory is criticized for not being
universal and not being specific for ASD. How does how HIPPEA
fare on those accounts? First, does HIPPEA maintain that every indi-
vidual with ASD shows inflexibly high precision of prediction errors
(universality)? We argue that this is indeed the case, but leave room
for two ways to arrive at this high precision: A direct, possibly neu-
romodulatory deficit in the precision mechanism, or a deficit in the
extraction from experience of information that should be used to
estimate precision (meta-learning). Second, does every individual
with chronically high precision prediction errors suffer from ASD
(specificity)? Again, we answer positively, but with the important
qualification that HIPPEA is consistent with the existence of a spec-
trum of ASD traits. It distinguishes different perceptual, cognitive,
emotional, and social processes according to the extent to which
they can be affected by chronically high precision errors. This nat-
urally leads to the notion of a ‘spectrum’. Just how high and how
fixed precision is, determines whether normal functioning is still
possible. Indeed, some people may be able to turn their ‘deficit’ into
an asset in tasks that benefit greatly from their specific processing
style (Gonzalez, Martin, Minshew, & Behrmann, 2013).
Evidence-based treatments and psycho-education for ASD that fo-
cus on early learning (such as applied behavioral analysis, Lovaas,
1987; Rogers & Vismara, 2008), could take inspiration from HIPPEA
that also has learning at its core but demarcates the circumstances
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under which problems in ASD arise. Animal models of ASD-related
diseases show that environmental enrichment can reduce risk of de-
velopmental disorders (G. Dawson, 2008). We also remarked that
people with ASD may be able to learn and use high-level predictions,
given extensive exposure to more and different situations. How-
ever, most of all, our approach reaffirms the importance of more
scaffolding during learning (e. g., Bellon, Ogletree, & Harn, 2000;
Odom et al., 2003). Our Section 2.3 on exploration made it clear
that children with ASD need more support with the gradual pro-
gression from simple to naturalistic stimuli (e. g., using virtual en-
vironments), taking into account uncertainty and its causes. Finally,
and slightly counter-intuitively, reducing intense concentration on
learning experiences, preventing subjects from trying to match all
details (‘early stopping’), has also been proposed to be beneficial
(Bakouie et al., 2009).
Although we consider HIPPEA a rich and promising theory, much
of what we have offered here is post-hoc. The specific theory of
ASD we proposed in this paper is based on predictive coding in nor-
mal functioning, but so far most of the explanatory power is in our
selective (albeit broad) synthesis of the literature on ASD. Future re-
search will have to corroborate its unique predictive power. In the
preceding sections, we have often added comments about shortcom-
ings in the current literature as well as specific hypotheses derived
from our theory that remain to be tested. With a very general the-
ory like predictive coding, there is always a risk of non-falsifiability
(see also the extensive discussion sparked by Clark, 2013b), but
we are convinced that our theory of predictive coding in ASD is
specific enough to be testable. Although we mainly addressed the
functional (psychological) level in this paper, we are optimistic that
HIPPEA is at least compatible with an explanation at the neural level.
We hope the progress that is currently being made in filling in the
neural mechanisms behind predictive coding will help answer the
question of precisely why individuals with ASD end up with high,
inflexible precision.
In sum, our intent with this paper was to sketch the breadth of
implications of HIPPEA with regard to aberrant development, and to
point to new empirical questions for ASD research flowing from this
view. Ultimately this will give us a better handle on ASD, connect-
ing clinical to neurobiological descriptions and providing a firmer
foundation for treatment.
The purpose of art is to force us to notice. Since perception is usually too
automatic, art develops a variety of techniques to impede perception or to
call attention to itself. . . Thus, it not only bears meaning, it forces an
awareness of its meaning upon the viewer.
— Lemo & Reis, 1965
3
Putting reward in art
It was the Gestalt psychologist Koffka who stated that violations
of the law of the good Gestalt “hurt our sense of beauty” (Koffka,
1935, p. 174). If we take ‘good Gestalt’ (Prägnanz) to mean having
regular, clear, symmetrical and simple forms, as it is conventionally
defined, this seems to exclude an abundance of artworks (ranging
from traditional to modern) from ever being beautiful to human
eyes. Why is it that artworks, the prime instances of beauty, often
contain precisely these violations which are supposed to “hurt our
sense of beauty”?
We will suggest a way out of this conundrum, based on a view
on visual art that is firmly rooted in cognitive neuroscience. It will
be less reductionistic than other proposals in that art will not be
explained by piecemeal activations in separate visual areas on a
specific level of visual processing, but by taking into account the
bidirectional, hierarchical nature of the visual system as it is imple-
mented in the predictive coding approach. The former approach is
doomed to fail for at least two reasons. Firstly, an activation, how-
ever strong, of one or more of the visual processing areas is clearly
not sufficient for an object or event to pass as a work of art (Hyman,
2010). Melcher and Bacci (2008, p. 357) rightly remark: “A particu-
lar artwork may indeed activate area V5/MT, but a passing bicycle
would activate those motion-processing areas even more strongly
and would not be considered a work of art”. Secondly, we are in-
deed never confronted with the isolated raw visual input, rather
our visual system (and the brain as a whole) actively but effort-
lessly organizes it into surfaces, motions, three-dimensional objects
and concepts. Our proposal will center on these processes of per-
ceptual organization (rather than the representational or symbolic
meaning of their ‘end-products’). The rationale for this is found in
Redies (2007, p. 3) who calls for a broadly applicable theory (from
cave art to Kandinsky), “as universal as aesthetic judgment itself.”
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He notes that since almost any (visual) stimulus can be used to com-
pose aesthetically pleasing objects, aesthetic perception may rely on
general aspects of information processing that are implemented in
all visual channels and regions. Redies adds that aesthetic percep-
tion requires the processing of global features encompassing inter-
actions between large amounts of receptive fields. By grounding
our proposal in the formal, organizational characteristics of visual
information processing as hypothesized by the predictive coding
framework, we will attempt to meet these requirements.
Perceptual processes alone would hardly give us aesthetic experi-
ences though. Together with anthropologist Dissanayake we claim
that “much is overlooked when aesthetic cognition is conceptual-
ized simply as ‘sensory’ or ‘perceptual’...” (Dissanayake, 2009, p.
163). A one-sided emphasis on perception neglects the emotional
aspects that are the motivating drives for creating and enjoying art
in the first place. Artistic expressions attract and hold attention and
stir and shape emotion. Consequently, any theory of art must explic-
itly elucidate the crucial interactions between perceptual and emo-
tional processes. Luckily for our purposes, recent data suggests vi-
sion may be intrinsically affective (Barrett & Bar, 2009), in the sense
that the processing of emotional relevance and value is not an af-
terthought in the visual processing hierarchy, but can actually drive
object formation and recognition. Our challenge will be to specify
the emotional consequences of the formal, organizational mecha-
nisms of the predictive coding view, bracketing the emotional or
symbolic content of the representations involved.
3.1 predictive coding
The predictive coding approach of perception holds that the brain
actively anticipates upcoming sensory input rather than passively
registering it. On the basis of prior experience, the brain actively
makes predictions about what visual input to expect in the current
context of stimulation. At every level of the visual hierarchy pre-
dictions are generated and propagated (top-down) to lower levels,
where they are checked against incoming (bottom-up) evidence. The
idea is that these predictions suppress or explain away the activity
in lower areas that agrees with them (de-Wit, Machilsen, & Putzeys,
2010), while what remains and is sent upward are the mismatches
between these predictions and the current input, also called the pre-
diction errors. This way the processing resources (attention) can be
directed to that part of the stimuli that has not been sufficiently
explained (predicted), and thus still has to be learnt. Through con-
stantly fine-tuning predictions using the mismatches, the brain be-
comes tuned to statistical regularities of our natural visual environ-
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ment. These predictions structure the perceptual input in patterns
that allow for predictability both within and across visual displays.
Thus, the classic concept of Gestalt, traditionally defined as a (expe-
riential) whole that is different from the parts, can be recast in terms
of predictive coding (Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011a).
This framework is fruitfully adopted to explain several findings
on visual processing (but also auditory perception, cf. Kumar et al.,
2011; Winkler et al., 2009). It can account for extra-classical re-
ceptive field effects measured with single cell recordings in the pri-
mary visual cortex (Rao & Ballard, 1999) but also for fMRI patterns
of activation across the visual hierarchy. For example, S. O. Mur-
ray, Kersten, Olshausen, Schrater, and Woods (2002) observed that
perceptual grouping is accompanied by an increase in activity in
higher tier object-sensitive areas (LOC) and concomitant decreases
of activity in lower visual areas (V1), as predicted by a predictive
coding view. Furthermore, the well-known phenomenon of repeti-
tion suppression can be explained by a reduction of neural activity
for predictable stimuli (Summerfield et al., 2008). Similarly, Alink,
Schwiedrzik, Kohler, Singer, and Muckli (2010) cleverly used a ap-
parent motion path to generate strong predictions about when and
where a visual stimulus will be, demonstrating that stimuli evoke
smaller responses in V1 when they have an onset time that matches
these predictions. The more traditional theory of (neural activity
in) perception as the piecemeal accumulation of evidence with vi-
sual neurons functioning primarily as feature detectors, would have
great difficulties in explaining this series of evidence. In contrast,
in predictive coding, perception is an iterative matching process of
top-down predictions checked against bottom-up evidence along
the visual hierarchy. Consequently, each level in the visual corti-
cal hierarchy has a twofold computational role: firstly, it provides
predictions (the conditional probability of a stimulus) regarding ex-
pected inputs to the next lower level and secondly, it encodes the
mismatch between predictions and bottom-up evidence (the pre-
diction error or ‘surprise’). Egner et al. (2010) explicitly set out to
compare performance of a predictive coding model with the tradi-
tional model. They found that when subjects strongly expected to
see a face, fMRI activity in the face-selective fusiform area was in-
distinguishable when actually viewing a face versus a house, while
maximally differentiated when the expectation of seeing a face was
low. Using computational modeling the authors conclude that this
pattern of results can only be accounted for by the predictive coding
model, which says that the total neural activity in category-selective
areas represents the sum of activity related to prediction (‘face ex-
pectation’) and that related to prediction error (‘face surprise’).
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At the heart of predictive coding is the concern for ease (effi-
ciency) of processing. As described earlier, neural resources needed
for processing predictable stimuli are minimized, as our system
gradually becomes optimized to the statistics of our natural percep-
tual environment. In addition to that, the predictive coding strategy
is parsimonious because different levels of the processing stream do
not need to keep duplicates of information, maintained in higher re-
gions (de-Wit et al., 2010). In light of evolution, being able to encode
and process sensory information in an efficient way is vital for the
costly organ the brain is.
Being able to successfully predict is another obvious evolution-
ary advantage, as it allows animals not only to react after the fact to
stimuli that change the internal milieu (homeostasis) but also to pre-
pare (anticipate and compensate) for those that are very likely to en-
sue. Thus, homeostasis urges organisms that can walk around and
manipulate their environment to take a predictive stance. Friston’s
(2010a) generalization of the predictive coding framework starts
from homeostasis, or the realization that only a limited set of all
the states an organism can be in, is compatible with its continued
existence. The long term goal of reducing the time spent in ‘surpris-
ing’ states translates into the short term goal of reducing prediction
errors.
This holds for single-celled organisms as well as for complex
mammals, like humans, who evidently can rely on a greatly en-
hanced predictive capacity (Cerra & Bingham, 1998). Based on sta-
tistical regularities in the environment, organisms form predictions
on the where, when and what of resources in the future, compensat-
ing for the inherent variability in the availability of these resources.
Complete predictability implies that any disturbances of internal mi-
lieu are fully compensated for (by plasticity or action). Propagated
prediction errors tell our system whether our current cognitive re-
sources are up to the task of interpreting of and coping with incom-
ing stimuli or whether extra effort is needed. This effort can take
the form of learning, when changing the predictions (our internal
generative model of our environment) but it can also be behavioural
effort when actions are executed to change the things predicted or
our sampling of it (Friston, 2010a).
If we acknowledge that predictive coding is ultimately founded
on homeostasis and the vital maintenance functions of the body, it
should not surprise that we can link this view to emotions. Indeed,
to understand aesthetic emotion (appreciation), we need to make
this link explicit.
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3.2 prediction and emotion
Emotions can be seen as motivational amplifiers (Huron, 2006).
They motivate organisms to pursue behaviours that are normally
adaptive and to avoid behaviours that are normally maladaptive.
When they form accurate predictions, organisms can efficiently re-
act to upcoming events, thereby increasing the likelihood of future
positive outcomes. Hence, it would be wise for evolution to reward
cases in which predictions are confirmed in actual circumstances.
Meanwhile, our failures in predicting situations may be character-
ized by negative emotion, because they signal that there is some-
thing wrong with the mental model we use to generate the predic-
tions. It follows that prediction errors are always to some extent
negative in affective valence. In a better-safe-than-sorry strategy, na-
ture tends to assume the worst, because the cost of a false negative
(type II error) is potentially much larger than that of a false alarm
(type I error). In a conservative reflex, the first, quick reaction to
prediction violation or error is negative (Huron, 2006). This is also
reflected by the so-called conflict theories of emotion (for a historical
review see Mandler, 2003, which claim that emotions arise from in-
terruptions or discrepancies between expected and actual situations.
Hebb (1949) and Mandler (2003) are the most well-known advocates
of this view.
By studying the continuous intrinsic activity of the brain, Hebb re-
alized that the brain was proactively involved in processing incom-
ing stimuli, rather than just passively responding to them. Accord-
ing to him, thought consists of so-called phase sequences: sequential
activations of neural structures (cell assemblies) that are built up as
a result of previous experience and learning. Each assembly activa-
tion may be aroused by a preceding assembly, by a sensory event,
or by both. Negative emotions arise then from the interference with
(obstruction of) such an established phase sequence. Although the
terms used may seem quite peculiar to modern ears, Hebb’s view is
consistent with the approach described earlier of implicit formation
of predictions and their confirmation or obstruction.
Mandler (2003) elaborated on this theory, arguing that interrup-
tions of ongoing response tendencies and conflicts between expec-
tations and actual circumstances create arousal because they sig-
nal important changes in the environment which have to be acted
upon. Depending on the cognitive context and the situation the
arousal is subsequently evaluated as positive or negative. Two im-
portant differences must be noted between Mandler’s theory and
ours. Firstly, the basis for the generated expectations in Mandler’s
view are cognitive schemata. We choose the broader term ‘predic-
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tions’ because it can be used for both sensory predictions (in predic-
tive coding) and conceptual (high-level) predictions based on cogni-
tive schemata. Consequently the term prediction is also more neu-
tral with regard to the conscious access to the predictions. Secondly,
we described any discrepancy (prediction error) as negatively va-
lenced, while for Mandler discrepancies generate undifferentiated
arousal which is later interpreted as either positive or negative. The
same discrepancy may produce differently valenced emotions de-
pending on the circumstances and the cognitive context. Instead,
we argue that any discrepancy (surprise) is initially experienced as
negative, even when a situation is not accurately predicted but in
fact better than expected. Instantly afterwards, a reappraisal will
take place, converting this into a positive experience and actually
more positive than when it would not have been preceded by a
negative one. This contrast effect will be made more explicit in our
discussions of visual art.
In general, the pleasure linked to visual configurations seems to
be dependent on the perceptual and emotional dynamics involved.
In a similar view, Kubovy (1999) defines the pleasures of the mind as
“collections of emotions distributed over time whose global evalua-
tion depends on the intensity of the peak emotion and favorability
of the end”. Transitions rather than static states of stimulation are
needed for these kind of pleasures. Applied to our context of predic-
tions, positive emotions are experienced when we have succeeded
in reinstating predictability (solving the prediction error). In slightly
provocative terms we could say that resistance (of prediction errors)
breeds liking.
Another way of thinking about this is that gains in efficiency, the
sparing use of resources, are rewarded. If the visual system man-
ages to find a sparse explanation of previously unpredictable stim-
uli this genuinely appears to feel good. Similar thoughts have been
expressed in the literature on processing fluency (Reber, Schwarz,
& Winkielman, 2004). According to these authors, stimuli are pre-
ferred more if they are processed more easily. Because of this, fa-
miliar, symmetrical, clear-cut (high-contrast) or prototypical (aver-
age) stimuli are thought to be liked most. The mere exposure effect
(Zajonc, 1968) is cited as evidence for this position, seeing that im-
proved processing of a stimulus because of repeated presentations
leads to increased preference for this stimulus. At least in case of
simple stimuli and subliminal exposures, the mere exposure effect
has ample empirical support (Bornstein, 1989). Translating this to
the terms of the predictive coding framework, an increase in pro-
cessing fluency amounts to an increase in predictability (reduced
prediction error), but the fluency account has largely disregarded
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the dynamics of fluency. Recently however, some processing fluency
theorists acknowledged the importance of this in the context of the
research on the insight experience (the Aha-Erlebnis). Topolinski
and Reber (2010) report that a surprising gain in fluency increases
positive affect and the judged truth of the solution found. Since
this positive affect sets in before any (conscious) assessment of the
‘insightful’ solution has taken place, they argue this positive effect
cannot be solely due to the positive feeling of pride.
Interestingly, discovering the solution of a neutral two-tone image
(cf. Gregory’s camouflaged dalmatian) is accompanied by amygdala
activity and the strength of this activity predicts long-term memory
for the organized stimulus (Ludmer, Dudai, & Rubin, 2011). Al-
though the study referred to did not directly probe possible associ-
ated (positive) affect, it is well established that the amygdala inter-
venes in reward processing just as well as in fear processing (Baxter
& Murray, 2002; Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003). Here, the amyg-
dala might signal the goodness of the solution found in terms of
representational efficiency, and phenomenologically this may be ex-
perienced as positive. A reduction of uncertainty, or equivalently, a
gain in predictability might account for the positive experience of
the Aha-Erlebnis. That perceptual insight, irrespective of the emo-
tionality of stimuli involved as such, is processed by the same neu-
ral structures as those responding to the beneficial biological value
of stimuli (Baxter & Murray, 2002) is intriguing. It points to the
importance of this kind of perceptual and neural (re)organizations
in economizing representations.
So far, we infer that a (temporary) state of unpredictability (pre-
diction error) can be as important for the emergence of perceptual
pleasure as is the predictability. This might particularly be the case
for artworks, in which the presence of discrepancies would other-
wise be difficult to explain. Earlier (Van de Cruys & Wagemans,
2011a) we used the example of earworms: the melodies that keep
haunting us. They may be great Gestalts (extreme predictability)
but they are rarely described as beautiful. We will delve deeper into
the role of (un)predictability later on, using artworks as examples.
More neural evidence that (un)predictability is an important fac-
tor in emotion has been accumulating. For example, a recent study
found sustained activity in the amygdala for temporally unpredict-
able tones in humans and mice in comparison with rhythmic (pre-
dictable) tones (Herry et al., 2007). Moreover, both humans and
mice show increased anxiety-related responses in a standard anxi-
ety test when these unpredictable (versus predictable) tones were
played in the background. Other subcortical areas also seem to be
involved in processing of prediction errors. In research on reward
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processing it is found that dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmen-
tal area encode the deviations between actual received rewards and
the expected reward. The reward prediction errors may be crucial
signals for learning about rewards (Schultz et al., 1997). Another
region implicated in reward processing, the putamen, was reported
to be more active whenever a tone was not followed by the stimu-
lus type it predicted in an experiment only using entirely neutral,
unrewarded stimuli (den Ouden et al., 2010). Similarly, plasticity in
the amygdala in the context of fear learning, seems to be driven by
prediction errors originating in the peri-aquaductal gray (McNally,
Johansen, & Blair, 2011). Kapp, Whalen, Supple, and Pascoe (1992)
show that amygdala responses wane once contingencies have been
fully learned, in other words once stimuli are perfectly predicted,
and are only reinstated when external associations change (when
predictions fail).
The studies reviewed so far point to an interesting stance, namely
that predictions and prediction errors are omnipresent in the brain
as has been argued by several scholars (Bar, 2007; Friston, 2010a).
We have come across predictions in perception, in reward and fear
processing and in cognitive schemata. In social and developmental
psychology we encounter a long tradition of theorizing about cogni-
tive schemata giving rise to expectations and about the general ten-
dency to reduce dissonance (see for example Kagan, 2002; Proulx,
Heine, & Vohs, 2010), which can also be reconceptualized in terms
of predictions and errors. Although a rigorous comparison of these
concepts still awaits to be done, we can discern a common theme
in all of these studies. It is that the brain’s main trade is to pre-
dict impending circumstances based on prior, similar experiences.
Cases in which this goes awry are significant and therefore empha-
sized by emotion. The organism has to deal with these mismatches
by action (assimilation) or by updating its mental model (accommo-
dation through learning). To show that predictive coding is a perva-
sive mechanism of mental function might seem of lesser importance
for the current purposes. Yet, as an explanation for emotion in art,
which evidently works on different perceptual and non-perceptual
levels, a theory that encompasses more than purely perceptual prin-
ciples has substantial appeal.
Finally, this line of reasoning provides a way for visual process-
ing to influence (and be influenced by) emotion. Duncan and Bar-
rett (2007) already remarked that in brain anatomy the boundaries
between emotion and cognition seem to dissolve. Conceiving per-
ception in terms of predictions and mismatches opens up a path
for perceptual configurations to induce different sequences of affect,
partly independent of the particular contents of perception. It is this
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link we want to explore with aesthetic appreciation of visual art as
a concrete application.
Note that in what follows, we do not aim to explain all possible
emotions in art (if indeed such would ever be possible). We focus
on perceptual features of art and only briefly touch upon content
which can of course induce a whole range of emotions, from very
straightforward ones (as for example in paintings of nudes) to very
complex ones (as in paintings portraying social settings). Here, we
are not interested in intrinsic or associative affective value of the
content as such, although we agree that real impressive and expres-
sive art embodies an important interaction between stylistic aspects
(perceptual) and thematic ones (see below). Some other affects that
we will not talk about but that can show up when contemplating
works of art have been listed by Jackendoff and Lerdahl (2006), for
example the admiration of craftsmanship, emotions linked to nos-
talgic memories associated with a particular work, social emotions
of belonging to (or differentiating oneself from) a group, etc. These
different affects probably interact when viewing art and in the pro-
cess the sources may be lost, which means that affect caused by one
factor can enhance or diminish affect caused by another. Granting
that these different emotions are difficult to disentangle in our ac-
tual experiences with art, here we are only concerned with the ways
in which the perceptual or cognitive organization can provoke emo-
tions.
3.3 an application to visual art
Visual art is in many ways different from the visual input we ordi-
narily receive from our natural environment. We want to focus on
the prediction errors, more often called incongruities, ubiquitous in
art. When we talk of incongruities in the context of art, surrealis-
tic paintings spring to mind. Or perhaps Duchamps’ La Fontaine, a
porcelain urinal, an object one would never have expected to be-
long in an art exhibition, let alone to be called ‘beautiful’. How-
ever, much more subtle kinds of incongruities play in many other
styles as well. As a first example, take the painting Natura Morta
(Figure 4) by Morandi. In his still lifes he often used subtle differ-
ences in hues or texture for figure and background, which makes
the perception very unstable. The prediction error resides in those
dissolving boundaries, and more generally in the fact that Morandi
twists expectations of how still-life paintings are defined tradition-
ally.
Why do painters repeatedly and deliberately create such obstacles
for us? As we saw, current theories of predictive coding in visual
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Figure 4: Natura Morta (1960), Giorgio Morandi
perception assume that our brain aims at reducing prediction errors.
In art, however, even though we (or rather, the artists) fully control
the stimuli, we intentionally create prediction errors that may not
even be possible in the natural visual environment. So in art we
do not always manipulate stimuli in ways that reduce prediction
errors. Why so? And why does this not imply that we experience
most art as unpleasant, as would be the case if all prediction error
is negative? The common answer is that in going to a museum, we
expect the unexpected. In this limited domain and time span, we
can tolerate and even enjoy unpredictability because we expect to
be surprised in every new exhibition hall. Furthermore, in these
settings there is no need for urgent actions. Prediction errors in art
do not need to be acted upon as in real life. This playful and safe as-
if-context of art, where our guards can be lowered and our actions
suspended, allows for the usually negative prediction errors to be
enjoyed. Hence, a positive reappraisal can immediately follow the
negative gut reaction. But why take this detour? The frequent use of
prediction errors in art and their relation to appreciation deserves
to be explicated more thoroughly.
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3.3.1 From auditory to visual pleasures
We propose that while prediction error is always annoying or un-
pleasant initially and confirmed predictions are pleasurable as such
(mostly independent of their content), prediction errors or delayed
prediction confirmation can be an important tool for artists to am-
plify the subsequent positive affect of prediction confirmation, in
a sort of contrast effect (Huron, 2006). For developing the current
view we are much indebted to Leonard Meyer and his treatment of
emotion in music (Meyer, 1961). He already invoked expectancy vi-
olations to explain emotion expressed in music. Tensions are created
in music by first establishing a strong pattern in rhythm and melody
(a scale based on the tonic) and subsequently deviating from it. The
role of expectancy violations might have been realized in music first
because musical patterns are spread out in time, so the dynamics
of predictions and deviations thereof are easier to notice. However,
they also play in visual perception, albeit on a millisecond time scale.
For example in Day and Night (Figure 5) by Escher, every new bird-
like form the visual system encounters, confirms and strengthens
the (later destroyed) parsimonious prediction.
Figure 5: Day and Night (1938), M.C. Escher
An experience of deep aesthetic appreciation is not so easily repro-
duced in the lab. One more reason music might be more tractable
in the lab than visual art, is that music happens to be the art form
in which an aesthetic experience can be best elicited in an intense,
more or less controlled and reliable (repeatable) fashion. These ex-
periences known as music ‘chills’ or ‘shivers-down-the-spine’ have
been successfully used to explore the neural and cognitive underpin-
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nings of music appreciation (Blood & Zatorre, 2001; Huron, 2006).
Cognitively, (Sloboda, 1991) found that these chills are strongly cor-
related with marked violations of expectation. Neurally, Blood and
Zatorre (2001) reported that they are associated by increases in cere-
bral blood flow in regions involved in reward processing (ventral
striatum) and decreases in amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex. Similar to the study by Ludmer et al. (2011) discussed earlier,
changes in predictability of stimuli elicit a pattern of activity charac-
teristic of processing biologically relevant, survival-related stimuli.
While musicians use uncertainty on the when (rhythm) and the
what (melody, volume) to evoke emotions in their listeners (Huron,
2006), visual artists utilize uncertainty on the where (spatial) and the
what (object indeterminacy, see below) with the same intent. Below
we will discuss a series of examples, elucidating the workings of
this artistic ‘tool’.
In Separation by Munch, there is a (mild) violation of grouping by
similarity of color and form, however we have no problems finding
out what the objects are. Artists seem to like using strong predic-
tions, either by building them themselves through repetition as in
the Escher painting above, or by using a well-known conceptual do-
main in their painting and thereby relying on existing strong predic-
tions. In Munch’s Separation (Figure 6), we find this combination of
a familiar pattern (strong predictions) together with a minimal de-
viation of default expectations, which makes the painting attention-
grabbing and memorable. Of course there is more to the paintings
we discuss than the aspects we zoom in on. We just want to draw at-
tention to a possible commonality in these pieces, which can appeal
to laymen and experts alike.
In his Weeping Woman (Figure 7), Picasso arguably counts on our
specialized face processing systems (fusiform face area) to project its
guesses on what belongs where in a face based only on some frag-
mentary cues. The viewer quickly runs into incongruencies which
presumably generate arousal aimed at reducing the prediction er-
rors. This style-induced arousal could add up to the emotionality
of the contents, because despite the ‘errors’ we can still recognize
the emotional expression portrayed. We can contrast this with Ra-
machandran and Hirstein’s (1999) explanation invoking the peak
shift phenomenon. In this account, Picasso’s face derives its emo-
tionality from being a superstimulus, activating visual face process-
ing systems very strongly because inputs from multiple viewpoints
are merged into one image. This explanation for art is refuted by
Hyman (2010), who observes that artistic depictions often deviate
too far from the norm to be examples of peak shift (which is, as
Hyman reviews, a very specific phenomenon in animal behaviour).
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Figure 6: Separation (1896), Edvard Munch
In our view it is precisely the incompatibility (prediction error) that
causes part of the emotionality in this (and other) paintings.
Predictive coding is an intrinsically hierarchical, multi-level model
(Lee & Mumford, 2003) in the sense that implicit predictions are
generated and checked on every level in the visual system, from low-
level feature-related to mid-level configurational predictions, up to
high-level concrete and abstract semantic predictions. Importantly,
predictions on every level are partly encapsulated (Jackendoff & Ler-
dahl, 2006), such that even when we are very familiar with a paint-
ing (e. g.Blanc Seing by Magritte, Figure 8), and the visual input is
in fact not unexpected any more, we are subject to these dynamics.
That is, our visual system unconsciously computes its moment-to-
moment predictions and errors regardless of the viewer’s conscious
memory.
3.3.2 Art movements
Vincent van Gogh in The Olive Trees (Figure 9) plays with percep-
tual grouping by similarity (parallel waves) breaching the borders
of the objects as defined by color and by our top-down knowledge
of what the objects are in the scene (trees, fields, sky). In this light,
differences between art movements and artists might also be inter-
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Figure 7: Weeping Woman (1937), Pablo Picasso
preted in terms of differences in the amount and kind of prediction
errors primarily used. The evolution of movements can be under-
stood within our framework, recalling that predictions are depen-
dent on the specific history of stimulation, and therefore on cultural
and personal experience. Recall that van Gogh (and numerous other
great artists) did not enjoy any recognition from his contemporaries.
He was mocked and died in obscurity. Predictions evolve and what
was a prediction error once can now be the canonical form of ex-
pression and thus fully predictable. These shifts partly explain why
artistic taste varies widely in different eras and within the same era,
between experts and laymen. In the predictive coding approach all
perception is a form of expert perception (Clark, 2011), in the sense
that it is always determined by an individual’s expectations built up
through a lifetime of implicit statistical learning.
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Figure 8: Blanc Seing (1965), René Magritte
A certain kind or amount of prediction error can be upgraded
intentionally or unintentionally to being the norm, the predictable
standard, only for those who have developed the allegedly exquisite
sensitivities and expertise needed to appreciate or grasp these art-
works (ie seeing the underlying predictable structure). This role of
aesthetic taste in creating social distinction and status is defended
by the sociologist Bourdieu (1984) who argues that by openly declar-
ing oneself an aficionado of difficult and inaccessible artworks peo-
ple reassert their membership of society’s upper classes. It also fig-
ures in current theories on the evolutionary role of art as an expen-
sive and time-consuming status symbol, not unlike the peacock’s
tail (Pinker, 2003).
3.3.3 Inter-individual differences and the optimum of (un)predictability
We can derive two important hypotheses from the previous. First,
it follows that individuals are likely to have an optimal amount of
unpredictability that they most appreciate. Too much prediction er-
ror is too unpleasant or even disturbing, none or too little is boring
(neither positive nor negative). This relates to psychological or sub-
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Figure 9: The Olive Trees (1889), Vincent van Gogh
jective complexity, an important determinant of people’s aesthetic
evaluations (Gaver & Mandler, 1987). The psychological complexity
is a function of both actual stimulus complexity and personal expe-
rience with the class of stimuli involved. The predictability of the
work of art increases with the observer’s knowledge of the correla-
tional structure built up through exposure. An optimum of mild vi-
olation of predictions will be experienced as most pleasant, because
the experiencer manages to return to a familiar mental schema.
Therefore, for a given piece of art, we will also see an evolution
of liking through repeated exposure, with initially an increase of
preference and motivation to enjoy the piece time and again, but as
predictability further increases appreciation will diminish again. A
similar evolution of preference has been reported by Berlyne (1970)
relating complexity and novelty to arousal. He hypothesized that
stimuli of moderate complexity engender a moderate amount of
arousal, which is optimally pleasing. Berlyne does not further ad-
dress the question of whether this mild arousal can be pleasant in
itself or, alternatively, whether the moderate complexity still allows
a resolution to a predictable, recognized configuration which only
then is experienced as positive. We will return to this issue later on.
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Reliable inter-individual differences in appreciation should thus
be present, which will be dependent on personal experience, which
is especially obvious when comparing aesthetic evaluations by ex-
perts with those of laymen (Lindell & Mueller, 2011). Additionally,
we speculate that these inter-individual differences in preference
also depend on the strength of top-down predictions the viewer gen-
erates (irrespective of the particular perceptual predictions). This
factor may determine how much prediction error a particular per-
son can ‘tolerate’ and appreciate, but whether this is the case is
still an open, empirical question. Related to that, one may won-
der whether personality factors such as personal need for structure
(Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001), field depen-
dency (Witkin & Goodenough, 1981) or the systemizing quotient
from autism research (Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan,
& Wheelwright, 2003) relate to this strength of top-down predic-
tions. At least for the personal need for structure construct a corre-
lation has already been found with art appreciation (Landau, Green-
berg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Martens, 2006).
The second hypothesis derived from our theorizing is that artists
attempt to strike this optimal balance between predictability and
surprise in their works. This way their viewers have to make an
effort and initially experience minor negative affect, only to experi-
ence a much intenser positive affect by contrast, once they actually
mentally ‘resolved’ the prediction error. The effort or mental work
one has to do to cope with the prediction error is a conditio sine
qua non for receiving perceptual pleasure of a Gestalt formation
(prediction error reduction). Before arriving at a clear, coherent in-
terpretation of the jumble of lines in Klimt’s Reclining Woman (Fig-
ure 10), our visual system is embroiled in a small struggle. Only
with some mental work is the familiar silhouette discovered. But the
aesthetic pleasure is larger as a result. Sometimes this Aha-Erlebnis
only emerges after a glance at the title for some contextual informa-
tion, as for Picasso’s Guernica.
The hypothesis that aesthetic pleasure lies in forcing the brain to
do some work has also been put forward by (Dodgson, 2009). His
research starts from the computer generated geometric patterns in-
spired by the early work of the English Op artist Bridget Riley (Fig-
ure 11). In a psychophysical test using different degrees of distortion
he shows that there is a range in which a pattern is not immediately
recognized but can be recognized given some extra effort. Since Ri-
ley’s works precisely lie in this region where a pattern is hinted at
but not made obvious, Dodgson suggests that this might be a com-
mon mechanism in all art. In line with our account above, he argues
that finding an aesthetic optimum is not a matter of depicting the
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Figure 10: Reclining Woman (1914/17), Gustav Klimt
best Gestalt, but rather of providing just enough information that
the viewer can reconstruct the pattern but not so much information
that the pattern is plainly obvious. Hence Dodgson’s research is a
nice illustration of the idea that artworks embody a right balance of
the expected and the surprising. It also helps to clarify discussions
on the relative importance of familiarity and novelty in art appreci-
ation where it is often concluded that: “It is not extreme novelty but
‘optimal’ innovation —novelty that allows for the recoverability of
the familiar— that is most pleasurable.” (Giora (2003, p.176) quoted
in Lindell & Mueller, 2011).
3.3.4 The valence of prediction error
An central assumption of our theory is that prediction errors are
always to some extent emotional, more specifically negative in va-
lence. We are currently setting up experiments to test this, but so far
we only have indirect evidence to support it. For example, we note
that the expression of surprise, the emotional reaction to violation
of predictions, is very close to (and often indistinguishable from) a
fearful expression. Neuroimaging studies lend support for this sim-
ilarity since the amygdala responds equally strongly to surprised as
to fearful faces and much less to angry or happy emotions (Whalen,
1998). Moreover, a very recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging stud-
ies on aesthetic appreciation (across modalities) found a consistent
activation of the anterior insula (S. Brown, Gao, Tisdelle, Eickhoff,
& Liotti, 2011). This structure is known to be involved in the con-
scious, bodily emotional experience (Craig, 2009), in particular for
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Figure 11: Computer rendition of Fragment 6/9, by Bridget Riley (from
Dodgson (2009) with permission from the author)
unpleasant emotions such as disgust and pain. The authors were
puzzled that this region systematically pops up in studies on aes-
thetics, and assumed it attests to the visceral impact of artworks. In
the light of our theory, the insula activity might point to the unpleas-
antness of prediction errors which are an important stage in the aes-
thetic experience. The limited temporal resolution of fMRI might
not allow to make the distinction between stages which quickly fol-
low each other. However, we should tread carefully in interpreting
the anterior insula activity, because, as (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols,
Van Essen, & Wager, 2011) report in their large-scale meta-analysis,
the insula is one of the regions found to be active in a large per-
centage of neuroimaging studies, a lot of which do not even study
emotion. Still, it is interesting to see that the anterior insula is not
only involved in negative emotions, but that more specifically (spa-
tially and temporally) separable signals can be found reflecting risk
prediction and risk prediction errors in the insula (Preuschoff et al.,
2008). This role of the insula in uncertainty and anticipation, which
has been noted before (Elliott, Friston, & Dolan, 2000), is in line
with our reasoning that prediction errors in art cause uncertainty
(risk of not being rewarded in the end) the computations of which
will determine whether to look away or to go on exploring the piece.
Moreover, the anterior cingulate cortex, a region often jointly active
with the insula (Craig, 2009), has been found to be involved in sig-
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nalling visual prediction errors (Noyce & Sekuler, 2011) analogous
to its role in signalling motor mistakes (which we can reasonably
assume are experienced as negative). All this being said, whether
our hypothesis of the negatively valenced prediction errors stands
the empirical test, remains to be seen.
While traditionally the aesthetic experience is equated with at-
taining harmony and successful insights, we are not the first to em-
phasize negative affect, discrepancy and disruption as important
components in aesthetic appreciation. Vygotsky (1971) used Aris-
toteles’ concept of catharsis to describe that in aesthetic experiences
we go through a transformation from a negatively valenced obstruc-
tion to a positively experienced resolution, in full awareness that
the positive catharsis would not be possible without first having
experienced its contrast. More recently the artist Pepperell (2011)
characterized his aesthetic experience as a moment in which his
“usual conceptual grip on the world failed.” This was accompanied
by mild anxiety and “active struggle to make sense of what I was
seeing.” Artists use the compulsive interpretative (predictive) mode
of the visual system to leave out parts of, or blatantly contradict the
suggested content of their works.
Pelowski and Akiba (2011) also highlight disruptions and breaches
as vehicles for the kinds of self-transformation described in accounts
of rich aesthetic experiences. When artworks forcefully challenge
the conceptual classifications and personal self-understandings of
the perceiver they can lead him or her to question, change or expand
these, with possible existential ramifications. This is a precarious
balance to strike because the perceiver might prematurely break off
perception. Overcoming initial negative experience requires courage
and inventiveness to modify the existing (self-)schema (Pelowski &
Akiba, 2011; Vygotsky, 1971) but is constitutive for the full aes-
thetic experience. It is encouraging to see that, starting from differ-
ent inspiration, namely the full, rich aesthetic experience and several
social-psychological findings, the authors arrive at an understand-
ing of the aesthetic experience that is consistent with ours. While
their view explores the existential and meta-cognitive implications
of the conflicts present in art, ours starts from a substantiated theory
of visual perception, in a rather ‘bottom-up’ way.
3.3.5 No pain, no gain?
What evidence do we have to argue that a reduction in unpredictabil-
ity (prediction error) is experienced as positive? Put differently, do
we have reason to assume that the degree of our mental efforts to
compensate for this unpredictability (to resolve the picture) is di-
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rectly related to the reward we experience? A common finding in
animal learning tasks is that random intermittent rewards (there is
a pattern but it is disrupted) or non-reward (during initial extinction
trials: there was a clear pattern, but now it is interrupted) provoke
most vigorous responding. In those cases motivation is highest. For
example, a variable interval reinforcement schedule, in which the
animal is rewarded on average every nth amount of time, provokes
the highest response rates, presumably because from the point of
view of the animal, there remains something to be learnt. Neurally,
unexpected compared to expected rewards, are associated with in-
creased dopamine peaks. Johnson and Gallagher (2010) specifically
asked whether it might be the effort required for getting a reward
that is the determining factor for the reward value. They reported
that the positive affective quality of taste can be boosted by increas-
ing the amount of effort required to obtain it. In their study mice
learned to press a lever A for a reward and lever B for a another, dif-
ferent tasting, reward. Next, they gradually increased the number
of operant lever presses needed to obtain one of the two rewards.
When tested afterwards outside of the training environment, the
mice showed a clear preference for the reinforcer for which they had
to work the hardest in the learning phase. In accordance with our
speculations on art, they concluded that pleasure (hedonic value) is
increased by effort. In humans something similar has very recently
been reported as the IKEA effect: participants value the products of
their own labour similar to creations of experts, but only when they
successfully completed them (Norton, Mochon, & Ariely, 2012).
The view outlined here is bound to learn a lot more from ad-
vances in (animal) learning studies on the link between uncertainty
versus predictability and reward value. They might help to explain
why we can derive pleasures from mildly deviant stimuli, as in
an addict who experiences pleasures from almost winning (near-
misses). In a set-up mimicking a gambling machine, almost winning
is shown to induce heightened reward expectancies in rats, medi-
ated by dopamine and analogous to the near-miss effect in addic-
tion (Winstanley, Cocker, & Rogers, 2011). It seems that part of the
reward lies in the anticipation instead of the consumption (Lauw-
ereyns, 2010), with a little unpredictability adding to the reward.
One must note that this is in agreement with the idea that biolog-
ical organisms are characterized by striving: It would have made
little sense for evolution to reward static states of stimulation. Pre-
diction errors introduce uncertainty that will stimulate further pro-
cessing (mental effort), the outcome of which is also uncertain, thus
unexpected when successful. Phenomenally, this kind of perceptual
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problem solving is not only rewarding but also gives the viewer a
sense of mastery (Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & Augustin, 2004).
In the context of art perception, Ishai, Fairhall, and Pepperell
(2007) find a positive correlation between the time needed to com-
prehend a picture and its aesthetic value (measured as the judged
degree of ‘powerfulness’ of a presented painting), leading (Pep-
perell, 2011) to suggest that the effort people have to invest to
recognize the contents has a positive influence on aesthetic value.
Reports that the better the viewer’s understanding of an artwork,
the more he or she experiences pleasure, should thus at least be
re-examined (Leder et al., 2004). No doubt individual differences
determine a large part of the variability here (as described earlier)
but in addition to that, experiment designs may not always allow
the tracking of these dynamics and the presence of moments of mis-
conception. It may be true that understanding facilitates liking but
this pleasure may be potentiated by preceding mismatches. Like-
wise, when going to a scary film, we endure cruel tensions because
their resolution is so good. Note however, that when we say we like
a painting, there is a kind of misattribution taking place: the pleasur-
able experience associated with a processing characteristic, namely
the reduction of prediction error in the stimulus, is ascribed to the
stimulus itself (Huron, 2006).
Our fundamental thesis is that the progression from a state of
more unpredictability to a state of less uncertainty is pleasurable.
Again, animal studies support this hypothesis. In an elegant experi-
ment Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka (2011) showed that monkeys
have a preference for cues that indicate that advance information
on the presence or absence of a forthcoming reward will be avail-
able over cues that signal such information will not be available,
even if their choice has no influence whatsoever on the actual ap-
pearance of the reward. Moreover, the monkeys more consistently
chose this advance information over the no information cue, than
they choose a more probable reward over a less probable reward
(Niv & Chan, 2011) In other words, information or reduction of un-
certainty is rewarding as such, consistent with our account. In fact,
when Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka (2011) examined the neural
underpinnings of the value of information, they concluded that it
is encoded by the same habenula and dopaminergic neurons that
also encode primary rewards. To be clear, these dopamine and habe-
nula neurons are known to signal a change in reward contingencies
(reward prediction errors), and this is also what they found with
regard to information: these neurons do not encode the value of
predicted information per se but only the changes in predicted in-
formation (Niv & Chan, 2011). The signals related to information
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change were simply added up to signals related to reward changes,
indicating that the value of reward and that of information use a in-
terchangeable neural currency (Niv & Chan, 2011). In keeping with
this, we contend that decreases of (information) prediction error are
pleasurable and constitute part of the aesthetic pleasure. Cues that
signify a reduction of uncertainty also seem to have greater value
for humans. Ogawa and Watanabe (2011) asked people to perform
a contextual cuing task in which targets are surrounded either by a
repeated (and thus predictive) configuration of distractors or, in the
other half of the trials, by a novel display of distractors. When sub-
jects had to evaluate the goodness of the displays afterwards, pre-
dictive displays were judged more positively than non-predictive or
novel configurations. Since people did not see predictive displays
more frequently (nor did they recognize them significantly more in
a final phase of the experiment), this increased liking could not be
caused by mere exposure. The authors conclude that predictability
promotes preference (Ogawa & Watanabe, 2011). In the context of
an effortful search task, with a large degree of uncertainty on the
position of the target, predictable configurations will become asso-
ciated with a higher value than configurations that do not reduce
uncertainty.
To sum up, dealing with unpredictability requires effort from the
viewer. But when successful, it leads to positive appreciation. The
idea that the viewer’s personal efforts and ‘accomplishments’ mat-
ter in art appreciation is also recognized by Mamassian (2008, p.
2152): “not all ambiguities in paintings are re-solved, and artists
probably strive to leave the right amount of ambiguities to let the
observer contribute to his experience in a personal way.” However,
only by using minimal prediction errors painters can ensure that
viewers will obtain their reward(s) and not give up prematurely. Fi-
nal gratification may be further postponed as long as the artist has
hidden enough ‘micro-rewards’ in the painting which the viewer
can discover along the way.
3.3.6 Dynamics in art
Our view emphasizes the role of the dynamics of perceptual pro-
cessing in art appreciation. This emphasis is not particularly new,
but has been foreshadowed by Arnheim although arguably in a less
articulate way. In his seminal work, Arnheim (1974) asserts that vi-
sual experience is dynamically governed by ‘attractions’ and ‘forces’
or ‘tensions’. Even though these terms are kept rather vague in his
writings, our prediction error account could be seen as an effort to
give his concept of ‘tension’ new substance. Arnheim realized that
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these tensions are inherent in any percept as with our concept of pre-
diction (error), even acknowledging the active role of the observer
and his past experience in (automatically) generating these tensions.
Analogously to our view, Arnheim contends that psychological, as
physical, systems “exhibit a very general tendency to change in the
direction of the lowest attainable tension level” (Arnheim, 1974, p.
14). A crucial difference between Arnheim’s view and ours is that
the ultimate goal for Arnheim is balance or stability, while for us it is
the reduction of prediction error (or maximization of predictability).
In general, once he acknowledged the dynamic nature of percep-
tion, he remains overly focused on balance and stability as the static
pinnacle of beauty, largely ignoring the emotional dynamics of the
transitions going from ‘tensed’ to ‘relaxed’ interpretations of visual
input that, according to our view, may cause positive appreciations.
Because it is inspired by predictive coding, our view also shares
with Arnheim’s the concern for parsimony (efficiency of representa-
tion, cf. supra), which he in turn inherits from the Gestalt tradition,
with its emphasis on simplicity and Prägnanz. Predictability im-
plies more efficient, higher level representations, freeing up expen-
sive processing resources. That there is positive affect (appreciation)
associated with this progression has been anticipated by Eysenck
(1942, p. 358) in his law of aesthetic appreciation: “The pleasure
derived from a percept as such is directly proportional to the de-
crease of energy capable of doing work in the total nervous system,
as compared with the original state of the whole system”. Thus, a
change towards a more efficient state of the dynamic perceptual net-
works given the current constraints of stimulation, tantamount to a
decrease in prediction error (surprise), is pleasurable as such, as we
described for the Klimt sketch above.
3.3.7 From traditional to modern art
Melcher and Bacci (2008) draw attention to the fact that artists of-
ten use very familiar perceptual domains like faces or animals, but
apply their ‘artistry’ on them. Since prehistoric times, artists exploit
very familiar patterns, for which we developed exquisite, special-
ized systems through evolution and experience. Melcher and Bacci
(2008, p. 352) observe that “the ability to recognize certain stimuli
quickly and easily makes it easier, then, for artists to add decorative
elements, accurate details and artistic style.” For example in prehis-
toric cave art (Figure 12), the patterns portrayed are not ‘just’ depic-
tions of animals or humans, but they incorporate counter-intuitive
or unusual deformations (see examples).
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Figure 12: Examples of Prehistoric cave art (elongated human figures in
aboriginal art in Kukadu National Park, Australia)
The cultural anthropologist Dissanayake (2009) calls this special
treatment artification or ‘making special’ which, according to her, en-
compasses formalization, exaggeration, elaboration, repetition, and
manipulation of expectation. Note that most (if not all) of these
terms relate to either confirmation and strengthening of predictions
or violation and disruption of predictions (prediction errors). Dis-
sanayake agrees that this process is most obvious in the temporal,
performing and traditional arts, but claims that these are univer-
sal characteristics common to all art forms. This particular shaping
of stimuli is meant to set these objects or practices apart from and
make them more than the ordinary (traditionally in the context of
religious rituals).
In the context of their discussion of surprise in art, Melcher and
Bacci (2008) provide some other fine examples of prediction error
in art. About the Sleeping Hermaphrodite they write: “Displayed with
the back to the viewer, it offers a sensual pose that flatters the femi-
ninity of the figure, in accordance with the tradition of the reclining
Hellenistic nude. Enticed by the sensual nature of this work, the
viewer who will then walk around the sculpture to see it from the
front will encounter the surprise of the figure’s androgynous nature,
which provides a moment of astonishment in which sensory infor-
mation does not coincide with expectation.” (Melcher & Bacci, 2008,
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p. 354). On the powerful, realistic evocation of biological motion in
Caravaggio’s The Death of the Virgin they hypothesize: “Thus, percep-
tion of motion in static art involves a form of perceptual ambiguity,
in which complex motion areas such as MT/MST are activated but
‘early’ vision detectors in V1 are silent” (Melcher & Bacci, 2008, p.
357).
Several theorists and art critics have argued that (post-)modern
artists, with their explicit abandonment of any representational as-
pirations and their blunt refusal to provide any familiar reference
point whatsoever to their spectators, have taken things too far (Lan-
dau et al., 2006; Pinker, 2003). They are said to leave the viewers
of their works completely in chaos, bombarding them with colours
and fragmented shapes with no structure or meaning. In our terms:
an overload of prediction errors, that despite our best efforts, can-
not be reduced to a more predictable, sparser explanation. As a
consequence modern abstract art, as compared to other styles, is
least preferred by the general public (Landau et al., 2006; Lindell
& Mueller, 2011). We suggested earlier that artists will attempt to
find an optimum, but their success in doing so depends on their
intended audience and its broader cultural context. Works of art
will survive through time if they manage to be at such an optimum
(and thereby appeal) across cultures and periods (Melcher & Bacci,
2008). Of all abstract art our theory predicts that we will be most
impressed by paintings in which we can, with some labour, distin-
guish recognizable, predictable forms. Excavation (Figure 13) by de
Koonig shown below can serve as a good example, as can the paint-
ings of Pepperell that also show this kind of object indeterminacy,
investigated by Fairhall and Ishai (2008).
Clearly our approach can be applied to art belonging to a broad
range of styles and eras. In fact, it has most difficulties in explain-
ing the attraction of hyper-realistic art. In this case we can speculate
that it has more to do with the admiration of craftsmanship, the
emotional content of the painting, or possibly an ultimate predic-
tion error in all visual artworks: this work provokes strong feelings
in me, as if the particular object depicted is really in front of me,
while in fact it isn’t. What we could call the ‘ceci n’est pas une pipe’
experience. Alternatively, we might be bemused by the fact that we
see a nearly photo-realistic image while we expected a painting. But
evidently these are just ad hoc explanations.
3.3.8 The fate of prediction errors
The examples so far might have made it clear that often we do not
end up with a coherent, predictable Gestalt. Still, we want to draw
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Figure 13: Excavation (1950), Willem de Koonig
attention to the fact that prediction errors at the level of style (per-
ceptual ones), sometimes can be resolved on the level of meaning
(see also Pinna, 2010). The deserting lady in Munch’s Separation
dissolves in the road and the air and Picasso’s Weeping Woman
can be ‘broken’ because she is sad. A clear congruency in meaning
unexpectedly saves the coherence of the paintings and so the pre-
diction error is reinterpreted. With these symbolic explanations we
enter a more speculative realm, but it would be foolish to expect
that something as complex as art appreciation can be understood
by only looking at the low-level, perceptual features. Art is about
the interaction of style and content, not a simple addition of these
components. As we reviewed in the introduction, a predictive cod-
ing view can, similar to schema theory (Proulx et al., 2010), provide
a way for high-level expectations to be involved in our experience
with art.
What about those paintings in which we can not even remotely
and mentally come to a form of closure? Paintings are static art
forms, so prediction errors often cannot be resolved, except in our
minds. In their artistic endeavours people seem to deliberately seek
prediction errors. Prediction errors intrigue us, especially when they
violate strong default expectations. Even if we are not sure there is
an actual clue to them, we cannot remain indifferent to them (they
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cause arousal) and we keep coming back to examine them (atten-
tional resources are recruited). We might still experience positive
emotions from these ‘unsolvable’ paintings though. By reappraisal
of the negative prediction error in a safe context, the resulting emo-
tion is still very positive because of the contrast effect (cf supra). A
related, but more implicit mechanism, namely misattribution, could
turn a negative arousal into something of positive affective valence.
This mechanism shows people often have very little insight in the
sources of their experienced emotions or arousal, as exemplified by
the classic Capilano suspension bridge experiment (Dutton & Aron,
1974). In this experiment passers-by on a scary rope bridge or a solid
wood bridge are asked some sham questions by an attractive female
researcher and told that they can always call for more information
on the research afterwards. The authors found that if participants
were questioned on the foot-bridge, they were much more likely to
call the researcher afterwards to ask her out. The authors assumed
that those participants misinterpreted their arousal from the fright
of walking on a high, shaky bridge as feelings of attraction. The spe-
cific experiment has been criticized but the phenomenon of misat-
tribution has been replicated since and is well-established. It might
thus partly explain why we misinterpret for example the mildly neg-
ative color mismatch in a Matisse painting (Figure 14) as affectively
positive.
The question of whether prediction errors can be experienced as
positive also relates to the conceptual confusion on what exactly an
aesthetic experience entails. We can safely assume that art has to be
rewarding in one way or another, otherwise we would not be mo-
tivated to engage with it. But people might label some artworks as
‘fascinating’ or ‘special’, rather than ‘beautiful’ (Augustin, Carbon,
& Wagemans, 2012). Finally, a particular painting might also be dif-
ferently appreciated depending on the context of stimulation, as we
will briefly discuss in the next section.
3.3.9 Inferentially rich, attention-grabbing meaning threats
Because of the prediction errors, we feel impelled to question our
perception and to linger on its contents. These visual or cognitive
challenges urge us to, implicitly or explicitly, go through multi-
ple cycles, exploring different predictions and the corresponding
errors (Leder et al., 2004). They grant acces to different layers of
meaning, which we so much like to discover. They create the multi-
interpretability and ambiguity that has been invoked by others to
explain our enjoyment of art (Biederman & Vessel, 2006; Mamas-
sian, 2008; van Leeuwen, 2007; Zeki, 2004). In the context of cre-
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Figure 14: Blue Nude (1952), Henri Matisse
ative discovery, Verstijnen, van Leeuwen, Goldschmidt, Hamel, and
Hennessey (1998) have coined the term surplus structure to denote
that through externalizing their ideas in sketches, artists themselves
discover new, unanticipated features and interpretations of the raw
ideas. Might this be true, not so much because in sketches they can
more lucidly represent their ideas, but rather because sketches al-
low them to depart more easily from ordinary ideas and exaggerate,
restructure and deform more freely, in other words amplify what
would normally be prediction errors?
Biederman and Vessel’s (2006) idea is basically that inferentially
rich stimuli will be preferred because they are accompanied by more
activity in regions higher up in the ventral visual stream, which
possess higher amounts of mu-opioid receptors. This hypothesis is
not at all incompatible with our account. Our optimally deviant ex-
pected patterns with a limited violation of intuitions, combine the
rich inferences (of a predictable pattern) with the high saliency (of
the discrepancies) which conspire to make a very emotional and
memorable stimulus (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004). Discrepancies
are attention-grabbing and stimulate further processing, but only
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when strong predictions are first built up (clear organization). This
optimum makes for a highly relevant stimulus according to Sper-
ber’s (2005) theory because it guarantees the richest cognitive infer-
ences for the least cognitive effort.
Our account also bears a clear resemblance to the Freudian no-
tion of the uncanny (das Unheimliche). Freud observed that we
are disturbed and aroused by unfamiliar experiences in an other-
wise completely familiar setting (Proulx et al., 2010). For example,
in absurdist or surrealist art we often find an unfamiliar juxtapo-
sition of very familiar objects. Thus, strong expectations have to
be present before such an experience can ensue. In a completely
unfamiliar situation no strong predictions are formed so no viola-
tions will be encountered. Incongruency or expectancy violation
will result in negatively valenced arousal aimed at reducing the
inconsistency if at all possible, as in our account. Some authors
have even reported that this arousal can lead to an affirmation of
any other meaning framework to which one is committed. For ex-
ample, after exposure to an absurd Kafka parable, subjects more
strongly affirmed their cultural identity than after reading one of
Aesop’s meaningful parables (Proulx et al., 2010). The meaning
maintenance model, as this theory is called, has been developed
to counter the terror management theory, which assumes that only
mortality threat (salience) will cause people to defend their cultural
world-view. In a study by Landau et al. (2006) terror management
theory has also been applied to art appreciation. Apparently, mortal-
ity salience (having people to imagine what will physically happen
when they die and which emotions they have with that) decreases
their liking for ‘meaningless’, abstract art, while leaving their appre-
ciation of representational paintings untouched. In further studies
the authors find that this effect is limited to individuals with a high
personal need for structure, and diminished when the abstract art-
works were given meaning (e. g.by giving a title). This research goes
to show that next to stable traits of the viewer and stable character-
istics of the piece of art, aesthetic appreciation can also be influ-
enced by the context-dependent cognitive and emotional mindset
the viewer is in. We could speculate that any contextual uncertainty
(prediction error or, in terms of the theories discussed, threat of
meaninglessness) could add up to the uncertainty in a painting and
thus influence its appreciation. For instance, against a background
of unpredictable (vs rhythmic, cf supra) tones a representational
painting may be liked more, while an abstract painting might be
liked less. Related to this, Mueller et al (in press) recently probed
implicit and explicit attitudes towards creativity after inducing a
sense of uncertainty in half of their volunteers. These people were
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told they might receive additional payment based on a random lot-
tery or, in a second experiment, they were primed to be intolerant of
ambiguity. While explicit attitudes towards creativity were similar
in the experimental and the controls, people in the high uncertainty
condition had an unconscious bias against creativity, and judged a
highly creative idea less favorably.
Ultimately, maintaining (or returning to) predictability is about
survival and maintaining the body through homeostasis (Cerra &
Bingham, 1998; Friston, 2010a; Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011a).
Predictive coding is about reinstating predictability and therefore
about affirming one’s own existence. So within a predictive coding
framework, we do not need to assign a special status to the existen-
tial threat of mortality. We further assumed that making progress in
this prediction project of life genuinely feels good or, in the case of
art, is beautiful. In his Ethics, Spinoza (2001, p. 40) writes “[I]f the
motion by which the nerves are affected by means of objects repre-
sented to the eye conduces to well-being, the objects by which it is
caused are called beautiful; while those exciting a contrary motion
are called deformed.” When a successful, sublime aesthetic experi-
ence is described as a selfless state of harmony between the viewer
and the world (Pelowski & Akiba, 2011) we might take this quite
literally: the beholder has advanced in tuning the self to the world.
3.4 remaining questions and concluding remarks
We hope to have shown that the predictive coding approach can
summarize and throw a new light on existing concepts in the flour-
ishing field on aesthetic appreciation, such as familiarity, complex-
ity, novelty, prototypicality, interpretability, fluency, incongruency,
ambiguity and so. Further research will have to make clear what
the added value is of thinking in terms of predictions and predic-
tion errors in comparison with these concepts. We want to end our
overview by discussing some of the limitations and advantages of
our approach.
First of all, we do not want to reduce aesthetic experience to the
formal mechanisms discussed. For instance, we are not saying we
experience a full-blown aesthetic reaction when discovering the ac-
tual content or organization of 2-tone images, but our hypothesis
is that a significant part of the aesthetic appreciation comes from
discovering the organization after struggle.
Second, we are being too vague when we claim that art is about
optimally or minimally unpredictable stimuli. The amount but also
the kind of prediction errors seems important. Some prediction er-
rors are more potent than others. For example we saw that artists
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either induce strong predictions themselves in their viewer, or rely
on strong existing predictions of the domain used in the painting, to
subsequently violate them. Also, different artists may have different
preferences for the kind of prediction errors they use, as reflected
in their style. For instance, some artists play with classical grouping
principles and their competition.
Third, one might object that our focus on prediction errors is born
out of cultural myopia. In Western art there is a strong impetus to
be original and novel, and even to defy established traditions. In
traditional, non-western cultures however, originality is often dis-
couraged and artists are expected to closely follow and endlessly re-
peat the same set of patterns, passed on for centuries (Dissanayake,
2008). As we mentioned earlier, this repetitive art also involves a
modulation of predictability but it seems to lack any prediction er-
rors. However, Dissanayake also notes that these forms of art origi-
nally take place in the context of ritual ceremonies in times of transi-
tion or uncertainty. These rituals nearly always concern biologically
important things, such as “assuring or restoring subsistence, safety,
fecundity, health, prosperity, and victory or successfully dealing
with the bodily changes and emotional and social concomitants of
sexual maturity, pregnancy, birth, and death.” (Dissanayake, 2008,
p.19). Hence, she sees stress reduction or coping with uncertainty
as an important adaptive function of art. If we assume that, at least
in these particular ceremonial situations, people in traditional soci-
eties experienced more life-threatening uncertainties than we do in
our modern, Western society, our hypothesis of a general preferred
optimum of unpredictability could still hold. In traditional commu-
nities, art could primarily function as a vehicle for re-establishing
predictability. In Western culture, on the other hand, we artificially
create obstacles for predictability (in art, disaster movies etc) to be
able to experience the joys of their resolution (while we often still
use predictable patterns for our wallpapers and decorations). The
proximate cause for making and consuming art would then be emo-
tion regulation, not ‘just’ uncertainty reduction. Also according to
Dissanayake, art can be traced back to the simplified, repeated and
stereotyped interactions between adults and children, which assist
the development of emotional self-regulation, attention and learn-
ing. Indeed, the dynamics of prediction and emotion seem to be
protracted in children, where, for instance in the in the peek-a-boo
game, the contrast effect (positive emotion following a negative one
is more intense) is easily observed.
While art may therefore be a form of training of our exploratory
learning capacities in a safe, playful context —information foraging
is after all a vital human capacity (Vessel, 2004)— it didn’t neces-
3.4 remaining questions and concluding remarks 89
sarily evolve for that reason. Rather our approach connects to the
neural recycling hypothesis (Dehaene & Cohen, 2007), which as-
sumes that art (similar to for example writing) didn’t evolve for any
particular adaptive function, but is the result of cultural inventions
exploiting evolutionarily older brain circuits and inheriting many
of their structural constraints. Indeed, there is no art module in
the brain that needed to evolve. Artistic abilities are piggy-backing
on our perceptual and emotional information processing capacities.
Once in place, art may or may not have become a criterion by itself
for selective forces to work on (co-optation), for example in mate se-
lection (Pinker, 2003) or as a way to promote belonging to a social
group.
Fourth, unpredictability and its resolution are important in other
human activities. For instance, games are most rewarding when
they have just the right amount of difficulty, of unpredictability. Sim-
ilarly in humour we build up expectations and create discrepancies
(Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011). Even in science we are most
astonished when a scholar discovers (and manages to explain or
make predictable) a counter-intuitive discrepancy in a very familiar
domain. One might wonder what, if anything, is special about art.
But does art need such an essence? Could we not suffice by stating
that it is a human activity involving the full emotional and cog-
nitive abilities of human beings but with no immediate biological
purpose? A quasi-necessary result of a greatly expanded predictive
capacity and an extended ability to delay gratification?
Finally, how do we explain within the predictive coding frame-
work that humans —while ultimately aimed at maximizing pre-
dictability, or equivalently: minimizing prediction errors— still ex-
plore unpredictable stimuli, and even intentionally create them as in
the case of art. This is a matter of current debate (Fiorillo, 2010; Fris-
ton, 2010a, 2010b). The immediate motivation of seeking prediction
errors may, in our view, be obtaining a larger reward (by contrast)
later. Friston explains that this complicated exploratory (itinerant)
behaviour does not violate the general tenet of minimization of sur-
prise, provided that the agent “revisits a small set of states, called
a global random attractor that are compatible with survival” (Fris-
ton, 2010a, p.2). His generalization of predictive coding in the free
energy principle optimizes this motion through sensory state-space.
Turning to the advantages of our approach, artists and art critics
will approve of the importance of the active, albeit largely implicit,
role of the subject (the viewer) in the predictive coding approach.
Even a static painting becomes a dynamic experience, as (Dewey,
2005, p. 222) writes: “The product of art — temple, painting, statue,
poem — is not the work of art. The work takes place when a human
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being cooperates with the product so that the outcome is an experi-
ence that is enjoyed because of its liberating and ordered properties.”
Our proposal also repeats another adage of artists: learn the rules
well, so you can break them effectively.
Thus, predictive coding seems to agree with how artists them-
selves think about what they do. The painter Henri Matisse famously
said when interviewed: “C’est une création par les rapports: Je ne
peins pas les choses, je ne peins que des différences entre les choses.”
(Aragon, 1971, p. 140). We may not read too much into it if we say
that he intuitively appreciated that our brain works contextually, by
figuring out the differences (prediction errors), not the absolute val-
ues (Nikolic´, 2010; Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999). Any outline
sketch is a sketch of the differences that the visual system would
pick up when viewing the real scene. In fact scene category can be
decoded from fMRI activity in the visual system during the viewing
of line drawings of scenes, just as well as from brain activity while
viewing colour photographs of the scenes (Walther, Chai, Caddigan,
Beck, & Fei-Fei, 2011).
Second, honoring Occam’s razor, we may not need a special, sep-
arate psychological theory for aesthetics by using predictive cod-
ing. This is consistent with the idea that general-purpose motiva-
tions and capacities are involved in art, even though their partic-
ular combination might be special to art. In this case, we can rely
on the cognitive and neural evidence for predictive coding, which
is broader than visual perception (Friston, 2010b; Winkler et al.,
2009). The latter is particularly appealing because art obviously con-
sists of more than visual perception alone. Predicting is the default-
mode of the brain, encompassing perceptual and semantic levels.
And even though the emotional implications of the predictive cod-
ing approach have not been thoroughly explored, its potential to
connect perception, learning and emotion, may be clear from this
proposal.
Lastly, our view may open new avenues for the empirical study
of aesthetic appreciation. Prediction error and confirmation may be
tractable in the lab, and thus may allow us to isolate one mecha-
nism involved in aesthetic appreciation. For instance, we can induce
strong short-term predictions in subjects and subsequently violate
or confirm them. Also, it may help to have physiological markers of
prediction violation, for example in the event-related brain poten-
tial visual mismatch negativity (Kimura, Schröger, & Czigler, 2011).
Here we can expect that temporal aspects and expertise will criti-
cally influence the outcomes in perception and emotion.
In this paper we have outlined a theory of art starting from the
hierarchical, bidirectional dynamics of vision. We concluded that it
3.4 remaining questions and concluding remarks 91
is not the most predictable stimulus that is most pleasurable (the
easiest Gestalt formation, cf perceptual fluency) but the Gestalt that
appears unexpectedly after a fair amount of ‘obstinate obstruction’.
The positive affective evaluations result from a transition rather than
a certain state of stimulation. But because our cognitive system ul-
timately aims to return to predictability, an optimal amount of pre-
diction error exists. Eventually understanding art implies fully un-
derstanding our brain (not just the visual system) and its embodied
embeddedness in the natural, social and cultural environment. We
are far from such an understanding so any theorizing on art is nec-
essarily preliminary and speculative. Our theory on art is really a
theory about perception and emotion and their interplay because
we believe that only by understanding this interaction we will come
to comprehend human artistic behaviour.

The pleasure derived from a percept as such is directly proportional to the
decrease of energy capable of doing work in the total nervous system, as
compared with the original state of the whole system.
— H. Eysenck, 1942
4
Is Gestalt discovery intrinsically pleasurable?
People love to find structure everywhere. The success of mundane
games like Tetris relies on this, but artists also exploit it. Just think
of the sketches by Klimt or Picasso that, with a few well-placed lines,
evoke vivid subjects or complete scenes (Koenderink, van Doorn, &
Wagemans, 2012; Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011b). Or consider
ambiguous figures like Figure 15. However, once this predictable
structure is found (even if it is only imagined), we quickly lose in-
terest. Yes, when explicitly asked, we will often report we like the
predictable, well-structured or symmetric stimulus more, but that
is presumably only because we generally confuse end-product with
the process followed to get there. As we sorely know, it is very hard
to repeat positive experiences just by revisiting the now familiar,
predictable end-structure. The original pleasure quickly fades away,
because the situation has become fully predictable.
This volatile character of (perceptual) pleasures arguably explains
the mixed evidence on liking of very familiar, regular or prototyp-
ical stimuli (e. g., Bornstein, 1989). These stimuli are quickly con-
sidered boring (Bornstein, Kale, & Cornell, 1990) and more impor-
tantly, highly attractive stimuli rarely conform to the principle (cf.
art). Then Berlyne’s (1970) notion of an optimum level of complex-
ity appeals more, and has also been supported by some evidence
(e. g., Krupinski & Locher, 1988). However, this idea that there is
a moderate amount of novelty, unpredictability or complexity that
is most pleasing is still descriptive, similar to the related law of
Yerkes and Dodson (1908) on optimal arousal. This line of thinking
stagnated because it did not provide many clues as to the why and
how of people’s appreciations for intermediate levels of complexity.
Berlyne and his followers still interpreted a pleasurable situation or
stimulus as too static a thing.
Such static accounts were presumably inherited from the Gestalt
psychologists, who of course were the first to stress the salient and
positive qualities of the ‘goodness of form’ or Prägnanz, i. e., orderly,
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balanced and coherent configuration (Wagemans, Elder, et al., 2012;
Wertheimer, 1923). In their writings there was, however, a clear will-
ingness to look at the dynamics of Gestalt formation (and self-orga-
nization; Wagemans, Feldman, et al., 2012). A lack of adequate theo-
ries incorporating dynamics stifled their progress, and experimental
work similarly remained focused on static stimuli. In psychoaesthet-
ics, the Gestaltist Rudolf Arnheim made an influential contribution
with his idea of ‘forces’ in artworks, which was meant to be intrin-
sically dynamic, as tendencies towards a balance (Arnheim, 1974).
However, his account remained mired in vagueness. In fact, he ack-
owledged that: “At which stages of this complex process the physio-
logical counterpart of our perceptual forces originates, and by what
particular mechanisms it comes about, is beyond our present knowl-
edge.” (Arnheim, 1974, p. 17). He further only referred to Köhler’s
(1940) discredited field theory to explain the ‘pushes’ and ‘pulls’ in
visual patterns.
Figure 15: “Two-face” from Hebb (1949)
Nevertheless, these authors put the issue of possible pleasure at-
tached to Gestalt discovery on the agenda. Indeed, ‘discovery’ en-
tails an active, dynamic contribution of the viewer. Current increas-
ingly popular theories of the predictive mind (Clark, 2013b; Fris-
ton, 2010b; Hohwy, 2013) allow for the dynamic reinterpretation
that was foreshadowed by Gestaltists. Given the constant, intrinsic
predictive activity of the brain at the core of these theories, viola-
tions of these predictions (called ‘prediction errors’) can take on the
role of what was previously, rather metaphorically described as ten-
sions or forces. Indeed, these ‘predictive coding’ theories assume
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that prediction error minimization is the main guiding principle for
perception (and beyond), where a balance or equilibrium can be at-
tained if top-down predictions match the input, at every level of the
perceptual hierarchy (Friston, 2010b). Based on these developments,
we proposed an account of perceptual pleasures that focuses on the
processing dynamics (Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011b).
In a nutshell, we argue that (initial) prediction errors are essential
to the pleasure, because the latter depends on predictive progress. In
other words, a change in predictions errors (i. e., the first derivative
over time) from higher to lower. These transitions are very clear in
music where predictable patterns are established, deliberately bro-
ken, and returned to (Huron, 2006). If one considers the iterative
predictive matching and settling, one can understand that the pro-
cessing of static (e.g., visual) is never really static, especially since it
is often supported by saccades-as-hypotheses (Friston, Adams, Per-
rinet, & Breakspear, 2012). Prediction errors emerge and are re-
duced in time. This can happen very quickly, but it can also take
quite some time before the right predictions (reinterpretations) are
found to explain away the errors. The key thing is that active re-
duction of prediction errors is required for a pleasurable experience.
A common way to do this, seems to be by first increasing the pre-
diction errors, such that larger predictive progress (error reduction)
can be made. Or to put it in simple Tetris terms, if there were no
annoying protruding blocks, there would not be any pleasure to the
‘evening out’ with fitting blocks.
Basically, our hypothesis requires three stages, although, as men-
tioned, these may succeed each other very quickly. In the first stage
a regularity is established to induce the corresponding prediction(s)
in the observer. If a domain is used for which strong, default predic-
tions already exist in a given observer, this step could be skipped.
The second step is the violation(s) of the prediction(s). These can
be substantial but the structure has to be recoverable (Dodgson,
2009) for a given observer. The third stage is the ‘repair’ or reestab-
lishment of the prediction(s), but note that this new pattern is not
necessarily the same as the original pattern. Take for example this
sequence of stimulus presentations: ABC-ABC-ABC-ABA-B-AB-AB.
After the prediction error (italic A), the participant has to repartition
or reorganize the inputs (here: groups of two instead of three stim-
uli). The ‘violation’ turned out just to introduce a new predictability.
Two-tone images (also called Mooney images; Mooney, 1957, for
an example see Figure 16) are often used to investigate perceptual
(re)organization and perceptual ‘insight’ (Aha-Erlebnis). In their best
instances they are a form of one-shot learning (cf. Richard Gregory’s
Dalmatian): once you solved it (or it has been solved for you) you
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can never go back to the phenomenal sense of the ‘disorganized
state’. If one has fitted the pieces together once, one immediately
perceives the correct interpretation on the next confrontation with
the degraded image. This phenomenal switch forms some of the
strongest proof for a substantial top-down, constructive influence
in perception (Gorlin et al., 2012; Hsieh, Vul, & Kanwisher, 2010).
Prior predictions, learned through exposure with the solution, will
define the percept, reinterpreting the black and white blobs that are
given. Hence, two-tone images make up strong examples of phe-
nomenal Gestalts, in the sense of that they highlight the contribution
of the perceiver in going beyond actual sensory inputs. Interestingly,
because traditional Gestaltists maintained that past experience has
negligible influence on perceptual organization (Wagemans, Elder,
et al., 2012), they would probably downplay the importance of these
particular examples.
For our purposes too, two-tone images are interesting stimuli.
Two-tones clearly have plenty of suggestion of meaning, so we can
assume they sufficiently spur automatic predictive activity in the
viewer’s visual system. Hence, when given the time, people will
come up with all kinds of (often incorrect) candidate solutions. How-
ever, any temporary solution considered by the system, will gener-
ally have substantial prediction errors. Of course, once the actual
gray-scale solution has been given (or sometimes found indepen-
dently), all these inconsistencies dissolve: the prediction errors are
explained away by the activation of the right prediction. Clearly, ob-
servers progress from a state of higher prediction errors to a state
quasi-complete predictability: all inputs ‘fit’. This transition should,
according to our account above, be accompanied by positive affect.
Anyone who has experienced the ‘insight’ moment of a two-tone
image has some introspective evidence that this indeed feels plea-
surable, but only recently has the question been subjected to em-
pirical research (Chetverikov & Filippova, 2014; Muth & Carbon,
2013). Both studies found that correct identification of the two-tone
image was associated with increased liking of these images. There
were two methodological commonalities that are worth highlight-
ing to distinguish them from our own approach. Both relied on in-
dependent solving of the two-tone images, and the solutions were
never shown (nor was other feedback provided). In both these ex-
periments, solving the two-tone was the explicit task for the par-
ticipants. They also had to explicitly report through rating scales
how much they liked the two-tone images, either immediately after
the identification question (Chetverikov & Filippova, 2014) or in a
subsequent, separate ‘appreciation’ block (Muth & Carbon, 2013).
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Figure 16: An example of a two-tone image and the grayscale image it is
based on.
To avoid demand effects, we chose not to explicitly ask people
about their appreciation of stimuli. Therefore, we modified an in-
direct measure of affect, known as affective priming (reviewed in
Fazio, 2001). Affective priming studies find that activating an af-
fective state by showing people positively or negatively valenced
words or pictures, called primes, will lead to faster reaction times
to stimulus materials (words or pictures; called targets) that are af-
fectively congruent with the priming stimulus. For example, we are
faster to judge the valence of the target word love when this is pre-
ceded by an affectively congruent prime word (e. g., dolphin) rather
than an affectively incongruent one (e. g., ugly). This effect seems
even present for subliminally presented primes (Hermans, Spruyt,
De Houwer, & Eelen, 2003), but is short-lived, with most robust
effects found for short stimulus onset asynchronies well below 300
ms (Klauer & Musch, 2003).
We reasoned that if indeed solving a two-tone image is intrinsi-
cally positively valenced then we might be able to pick up their
priming effect on response times for subsequent word evaluation.
Faster responses to positive (relative to negative) word targets af-
ter presentation with solved two-tone images would imply a more
positive valence of these stimuli. Importantly, solving the two-tone
images was no explicit part of the task, only the rapid affective cate-
gorization was. This reduced the likelihood that any affect we might
find is attributable to performance affect of doing the task well (such
as pride).
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4.1 method
4.1.1 Participants
44 students (14 men) at the University of Leuven participated in the
experiment, after we obtained their informed consent. They all had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were native speakers of
Dutch. They were either paid or received course credits for their
participation.
Positive target words:
plezier, zomer, liefde, verjaardag, eerlijk,
blij, moeder, vlinder, vrede, zon, boeket,
humor, wens, bloesem, kus, lente, vogel,
eendje, katje, hert, panda, dolfijn, vriend,
zwaan, peuter, broer, genie, moeder,
optimist, meisje, held, expert, poesje,
baby, bruid, dolfijn, kerstboom, teddy-
beer, bloem, pup, zwaluw
Negative target words:
lelijk, kanker, geweld, moord, plaag,
afval, vijandig, ziekte, vuilnis, angst,
paniek, dood, ongeluk, puist, vet, ver-
driet, pijn, ratten, gier, slang, muis,
mug, kakkerlak, worm, tiran, gangster,
bruut, snob, egoist, beul, dief, sadist,
hoer, vijand, wormen, lijk, spin, explosie,
schedels, pistool, hitler
Table 1: All positive and negative target words used in the experiment.
Selected from Hermans and De Houwer (1994)
4.1.2 Stimuli
The two-tone stimuli are created by smoothing (low-pass filtering)
and thresholding grayscale images such that brightness values be-
low a certain threshold are plain white, and those above are black.
We used a set of two-tone images with accompanying gray-scale
solutions from Imamoglu, Kahnt, Koch, and Haynes (2012). Based
on a pretest with 20 participants (different from those in the actual
experiment), we selected 85 (from a set of 122 two-tone images in to-
tal) by removing those that were immediately recognized and those
that, even after providing the grayscale solution, were not clear. We
generally wanted to avoid that participants could solve the two-tone
images on their own. Note, however that this cannot be objectively
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determined for a given image, because of large individual differ-
ences (Ludmer et al., 2011). The prime pictures all portrayed single
identifiable objects in the foreground, but we took care not to in-
clude ones that comprised clearly emotional objects.
The positive and negative word stimuli that served as targets
were taken from a normative study using affective ratings for Dutch
words (Hermans & De Houwer, 1994) and have been successfully
used in several affective priming studies (e. g., De Houwer, Her-
mans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002; Spruyt, De Houwer, Her-
mans, & Eelen, 2007). Table 1 provides a complete list of all words
used (41 positive and 41 negative). In each trial, a word was ran-
domly chosen (without replacement) from the list of possible words,
depending on the condition. A Python program (using the Psychopy
library; Peirce, 2007) controlled stimulus presentation and response
collection.
4.1.3 Procedure
Participants were seated in a dimly lit room, with their heads placed
on a chin rest to keep a constant distance to the screen. The exper-
iment consisted of two phases, though crucially, participants were
not informed about the second phase beforehand. In the first phase
(affective priming test) participants had to categorize positive or
negative words after being briefly presented with the solution of
a two-tone image. All participants first received ten practice trials
(with images that were different from those in the actual experi-
ment) to familiarize them with the trial structure. The procedure of
phase 1 is depicted in Figure 17. Participants were first presented
with a two-tone image for 3.5 s, subsequently they briefly saw the
corresponding solution (500 ms), and then the two-tone again (200
ms). Returning to the two-tone image after the solution served to
enhance the aha-experience because it made clear how the back-
and-white surfaces actually fitted together. After 200 ms, a positive
or negative word appeared in red on a white rectangle, superposi-
tioned on the center of the two-tone image. Participants were in-
structed to respond as quickly as possible with the left or right
mouse button. We counterbalanced the mapping of left and right
buttons to positive and negative evaluation between participants.
An empty screen remained on until the participant responded, after
which a new trial sequence started (randomized order).
Based on introspection, we assume the predictive progress and
hence the positive affect when viewing two-tone images is largest
for the first presentation. Indeed, the big insight moment can hardly
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be repeated (‘one-shot’ learning). Hence, we did not repeat the im-
ages. This meant we could use only 85 trials per participant.
In the second, unannounced phase (recognition test), participants
were asked to try and solve the two-tone images that were used in
the first phase. Here, each two-tone stimulus was again shown (for
2 s) in a random order and participants were instructed to type in
one word that describes what they thought was the actual content
of the two-tone image. They were encouraged to guess, but could
just continue if they were unable to recognize anything.
Peace
3500 ms
200 ms
500 ms
Target: e.g., “plague” or “peace”
+
Response: + or - ?
500 ms
400 ms
Figure 17: Procedure of the affective priming phase.
4.2 results
We used the recognition performance of phase two (a binary vari-
able, henceforth ‘recognition’) as a measure of whether participants
actually solved the two tone image during the first phase (i. e., saw
the link between the two-tone image and the grayscale solution). If
they were able to do so, we predicted they would respond faster to
positive than to negative target words. Hence, our main interest is
the interaction effect of valence and recognition on reaction times
for the valence categorization task. But before we get to that, we
discuss a few complementary statistics of the data. Four subjects
had to be removed from all analyses because of errors in the data
collection (1), extremely long reaction times (2) or non-compliance
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to instructions (1). All analyses were executed in R (R Core Team,
2014) with the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, & Bolker, 2012).
We first fitted a mixed logistic regression model on categorization
performance (of word valence) with participant as random effect,
and word valence and recognition (in phase 2) as fixed effects. Both
the main effect of recognition (z=-2.1, p= 0.04) and the interaction of
valence with recognition (z=2.56, p= 0.01) were significant, while the
main effect of valence was not significant (z= 0.79, p= 0.43). Looking
at Figure 18, we can see that only for negative words categorization
accuracy seems somewhat better if the preceding image later was
not recognized, than when it was recognized. This may indicate
that evaluating negative words, while not significantly more diffi-
cult than positive words, is more affected by processing of the pre-
vious images: the more attention stays on those images, the worse
categorization of negative words. Note that this happens without
an instructed task on the two-tone images and that the solution
was never present simultaneously with the word to be categorized.
More generally, an error rate of 5-10% on categorization responses
possibly indicates that the some of words were not unambiguously
positive or negative for all participants.
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Figure 18: Accuracy of categorization responses for positive and negative
target words, by recognition. Error bars are corrected, within-
subjects 95 % confidence intervals (not standard error) as de-
scribed by (Morey, 2008).
For the remaining analyses we only included correct word cate-
gorizations (93 %). Reaction times of the affective priming test that
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were below 200 or above 2000 ms were considered lapses or invalid
responses and hence removed from analyses. Subsequently, reaction
times further than three times the standard deviation away from the
mean of this individual were removed as outliers (in total 1.6%). We
also verified whether we have approximately the same accuracy of
recognition in phase 2 (so equal number of data points) for pos-
itive and negative words (phase 1). Mean recognition rate in the
second phase was 49%, and did not significantly differ depending
whether it was followed by positive or negative target word in the
first phase (t(3082.35)=-0.78, p= 0.44). Hence we have a practically
equal amount of recognized and unrecognized trials, for both the
positive and negative words.
Next, we quantified the degree of consistency in recognition for
subjects regarding the different two-tone images with Fleiss’ Kappa
(Fleiss, 1971; Gamer, Lemon, Fellows, & Singh, 2012), which was
low (κ = 0.13), signifying only slight ‘agreement’. This means that
the set of images that were correctly recognized (i. e., elicited ‘in-
sight’), differed between subjects, consistent with earlier reports
(Ludmer et al., 2011) and with our intuition that not all solved two-
tone images are equally compelling to everyone. The ‘goodness’ of
a solution very much varies across images and across individuals.
Finally, we fitted a mixed linear model on the reaction times
(phase 1) with word valence and recognition as fixed effects, and
participant as random effect. Figure 19 depicts these comparisons.
At first sight, people seem to be generally quicker to respond to
positive than to negative words, but this seems primarily the case
when primed with subsequently recognized images, consistent with
our hypothesis. However, the full fitted model suggests otherwise.
First, the random participant effect is highly significant (χ2(1)= 1320,
p<0.0001) as one might expect. Second, neither valence (t(3043.3)=
-1.66, p= 0.097), nor recognition (t(3049.2)= -0.27, p= 0.78), nor the
interaction of valence and recognition (t(3043.9) = -1.57, p= 0.12)
reaches significance. We decided to split the dataset in two, fitting
a mixed linear model for primes that were recognized and one for
unrecognized primes separately. For primes that were later recog-
nized there was a significantly faster response to positive words
than to negative words, consistent with our hypothesis (estimated
difference=-32.22, t(1481.7)= -3.96, p<0.001; Mnegative=801.7, 95% con-
fidence interval= [754,850]; Mpositive=769.4, 95% confidence interval=
[722,817]). However, for primes that were not recognized the effect
of word valence on reaction times did not reach significance (esti-
mated difference=-12.137, t(1526.7)= -1.33, p=0.18). This way of sub-
dividing data and comparing significance levels of separate tests is
a very common practice, but, as Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, and Wa-
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genmakers (2011) point out, it does not actually give a valid answer
if one is interested in the interaction, as we are here. Simply put,
“the difference between significant and not significant need not it-
self be significant” (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011, p. 1105). Hence, we
only have suggestive, no conclusive evidence for the difference we
were getting at.
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Figure 19: Reaction times for positive and negative target words, by recog-
nition accuracy. Error bars are corrected, within-subjects 95 %
confidence intervals (not standard error) as described by Morey
(2008).
4.3 discussion
Our findings provide some evidence for the hypothesis that reorga-
nization of perceptual input is marked by positive affect. We sug-
gest that this positive experience, often called perceptual insight, is
specifically linked to the progression from unpredictable to famil-
iar and organized percepts, which we incorporated in our study by
using two-tone images and their solutions.
One neuroimaging study also provides some indirect but sugges-
tive evidence for the affective nature of solving a two-tone image.
Ludmer et al. (2011) found that amygdala activity during the ‘in-
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sight moment’ reliably predicted memory for the specific content of
the image (given only the degraded image) a week later. The insight
moment was elicited by presenting people briefly with the full gray-
scale solution of the two-tone. The higher amygdala activity during
one of these moments, the more likely the corresponding solution
was correctly remembered a week later. No behavioral measure of
affect was used in this study, so amygdala activity could in princi-
ple represent negative or positive emotion or even a neutral kind
of ‘relevance’ signal (Sander et al., 2003). Importantly, the amyg-
dala is known to be also involved in reward and positive emotions
(E. A. Murray, 2007). Our findings indeed suggest that specifically
positive affect is elicited in these instances.
With regard to the relation between uncertainty (prediction er-
ror) and positive affect, three studies that are conceptually related
to ours, deserve mentioning. In the first (Jepma, Verdonschot, van
Steenbergen, Rombouts, & Nieuwenhuis, 2012), participants pas-
sively view drawings of everyday objects that were preceded by
a heavily blurred, irrecognizable version of either the same object
or another, unrelated one. The idea is that if the first image por-
trayed the same but blurred object, there is a clear reduction in un-
certainty when the second (well recognizable) image come on, so a
more positive appreciation. Indeed, higher fMRI activity was found
in striatal areas usually associated with reward processing for this
condition (compared to the nonmatching condition). Winkielman
and Cacioppo (2001), on the other hand, briefly primed everyday
objects with their own outline (internal details removed) or those
from a different object and found more zygomaticus activity (‘smil-
ing muscle’) for the congruent primes. This is similarly consistent
with the uncertainty reduction hypothesis.
A last relevant study (Schouppe et al., 2014) first replicates find-
ings from Dreisbach and Fischer (2012). The latter demonstrated fa-
cilitation of categorization responses to negative (vs. positive) stim-
uli after presentation of incongruent (vs congruent) Stroop stimuli,
implying that cognitive conflict or prediction error in these stimuli
is negatively valenced. Importantly, the Stroop stimuli were not part
of the task (note the parallel with our study), and so did not need
to be solved. Schouppe et al. (2014) corroborated these findings in
their first experiment, but in the second they did ask participants to
respond to the Stroop stimuli. What they found was that incongru-
ent, solved primes induced faster responding to positive (relative
to negative) targets, presumably because the conflict was resolved,
i. e., initial prediction errors reduced. Clearly, this is consistent with
our hypothesis, although positive affect associated with good per-
formance for difficult trials (e. g., pride) cannot be excluded here.
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Still, the fast time scale of these effect suggests an automatic rather
than a reflectively mediated mechanism, possibly indicating that
this affect is more fundamental than a complex, social emotion like
pride. In our study, we tried to de-emphasize solving two-tone as a
task, to allow for as pure as possible a measure of intrinsic affect of
the perceptual transition, but it is entirely possible that participants
made this into a task. Future studies may experiment with using a
main task with a higher cognitive load than our reaction time task
to avoid this, but this may have the danger that background two-
tone and solution are not processed at all. Another variation would
be to explicitly ask subjects to solve the two-tones (i. e., a true dual
task setting), and inform them in advance about the recognition
phase, to see if positive affect is indeed intensified (compared to the
no two-tone task condition) for correctly recognized images, as we
presumed.
We should be attentive to other potential limitations and alterna-
tive interpretations of our findings. Particularly, our findings may
be compatible with the perceptual fluency account of (aesthetic) ap-
preciation. Perceptual fluency denotes the ease with which stimu-
lus material is processed (Reber et al., 2004; Reber, Winkielman,
& Schwarz, 1998). Although it could favorably be interpreted to
be about processing dynamics analogous to our idea of predictive
progress (see Chapter 6), its operationalizations so far have been
rather static, namely in terms of prototypicality, familiarity, symme-
try, clarity, etc. The success of the fluency concept is also its biggest
limitation: it is atheoretical in the sense it is not grounded in a plau-
sible theory of general cognitive processing. It is about processing
fluency without looking at how this processing actually happens.
Hence, it relies on our intuition of what is ‘fluent’, and this vague-
ness opened the way to a wealth of studies manipulating different
alleged forms of fluency. Most, if not all, of them can be reinter-
preted in terms of predictability, but rarely dynamics are explicitly
considered. We have tried to build the dynamics into our experi-
mental paradigm, but our results are still consistent with the fluency
account if fluency is taken to mean the experience of rapidly reduc-
ing uncertainty (prediction errors). However, in our view the high
unpredictability of the starting point (two-tone) is instrumental for
the later positive affect. We plan to empirically draw this distinction
more clearly either by using non-matching (inverted) two-tone im-
ages before the solutions or by using “multiple-tone” images. The
former has the drawback that it may induce negative affect related
to the inconsistency (prediction error). The multiple-tone images
may be better controls, because they are distorted but still immedi-
ately recognizable without solution (no transition).
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One could construct one other alternative explanation for the cur-
rent findings, by inverting the causality we assumed in our expla-
nation. It is possible that positive words are easier to process and
hence detract less resources from the processing of the solutions of
the two-tone images that came just before (though it disappeared
before the word came on). The easier the word is processed (ac-
cording to the reaction times), the better the image is later remem-
bered. Equal recognition scores for images that previously preceded
positively valenced words versus negatively valenced words speak
against this explanation, but strictly we cannot exclude it.
Finally, our pilots suggest that timing is crucial, indicating that
these effects are short-lived. This is known for conventional affec-
tive priming, where time course (stimulus onset asynchrony) was
already systematically investigated (Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen,
2001). Our study, however, provides evidence for a form of ‘affec-
tive’ priming using (semantically) neutral primes, which probably
means the effects are even subtler. An additional complication in
our setting is whether positive affect is strongest from the moment
the solution is presented or only after, when the two-tone is back on
and its pieces fit together with the newly gained knowledge. Based
on introspection we opted for the latter in the current experiment,
but this should be more systematically examined.
These timing issues, together with the individual differences in
(image-dependent) compellingness, and the fact that we could not
repeat trials (images) leads to very noisy measurements for already
subtle effects (less than 20 ms), which likely explains the non-signif-
icance of the interaction in the full model.
Although adequate, quantitative measures of economy of repre-
sentations are still lacking, we could plausibly attribute the positive
affect we found to the internal progress made in representing the in-
put in a sparse and efficient way (see also Ludmer et al., 2011). The
newly found structure can summarize the disparate inputs best and
accurately predicts the spatial configuration of black and white sur-
faces in the two-tone image. Indeed, it can be shown that minimiz-
ing prediction errors as described by the predictive coding model,
is equivalent to finding the so-called minimum description length
(given Gaussian noise; Huang & Rao, 2011). The more predictable
patterns can be found in input data, the more compressible it is
(Schmidhuber, 2010). In this sense, predictive coding converges on
sparse, simple representations given the inputs to be explained. Set-
tling on a model —learned by prior experience, in this case: the solu-
tion of the two-tone image— that allows sudden predictive progress
seems marked by positive affect. Moreover, the suddenness or unex-
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pectedness of this reduction of prediction errors seems to intensify
the pleasure (for a possible explanation, see Chapter 6).
That aesthetic pleasure has much to do with frugal use of en-
ergetic resources, was also clear to Eysenck when he formulated
his prescient ‘law of aesthetic appreciation’: “The pleasure derived
from a percept as such is directly proportional to the decrease of
energy capable of doing work in the total nervous system, as com-
pared with the original state of the whole system.” (Eysenck, 1942,
p. 358). In turn, Eysenck acknowledged his indebtedness to Köhler
and Koffka. The former writes: "in all processes which terminate in
time-independent states, the distribution shifts towards a minimum
of energy" (Köhler, 1920, p. 250).
Three things stand out in Eysenck’s law. First, it emphasizes that
pleasure is proportional to a change (‘decrease’), consistent with our
hypothesis. Second, it remains vague on how to relate ‘energy’ to
cognitive variables. One page earlier, Eysenck writes: “those exter-
nal stimuli will be judged the most beautiful which are most in
agreement with the internal forces of perception.” (Eysenck, 1942,
p. 357). Again, what those internal forces are is not well specified.
We can make an attempt to fill this in using predictive coding. These
internal forces would then be equated with the models (priors or
predictions) one’s perceptual system has about the world. If the in-
puts match these predictions, positive appreciation results. Impor-
tantly, when predictions (models) can be varied and hierarchical,
‘objectively’ complex stimuli can become pleasing. However, so far
this is a static view, omitting the decrease that is crucial according
to the law. Clearly, to align our hypothesis with Eysenck’s, the ‘en-
ergy capable of doing work’ should be proportional to prediction
error, such that a decrease in energy capable of doing work is equiv-
alent to a decrease in prediction errors. The energy capable of doing
work is also called Helmholtz free energy. Note that prediction error
minimization can be generalized into the free energy minimization
principle (free energy is an upper bound on surprisal or negative log
probability of sensory data given a model; Friston, 2010b). However,
this free energy is an information-theoretic quantity first used in sta-
tistical physics, only called free energy because of its formal similar-
ity (common probabilistic basis) with Helmholtz free energy. Still, as
Sengupta, Stemmler, and Friston (2013) prove, there is a close link
between the two. The full argument is rather technical, but the ba-
sic conclusion is that “commonly occurring representational states
—that are a priori most probable— are the least [metabolically]
costly” (Sengupta et al., 2013, p. 9). This implies that unlikely or
unpredicted (surprising) inputs, i. e., with lots of prediction errors,
have high metabolic cost. Helmholtz free energy and information-
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theoretic free energy share the same minimum (equilibrium). An
interesting re-evaluation awaits here of old Gestalt ideas (e. g., the
minimum energy idea, isomorphism, etc.) in the light of these new
developments linking thermodynamics to informational concepts
of order (predictability) and complexity. Although the details dif-
fer from what Gestaltists proposed, the basic intuition about the
connection between Gestalt formation and thermodynamic, bioen-
ergetic processes may still be validated. Such understanding would
also make the equivalence more explicit of Eysenck’s law and our
hypothesis on positive affect and prediction error decrease.
Just reasoning from predictive coding also provides an intuitive
answer with regard to reduced processing demands. If, as the pre-
dictive coding scheme prescribes, a) the brain explicitly represents
prediction errors as activity of separable neural units, b) it works
by minimizing prediction errors, then neural activity (and hence
metabolic work) decreases as the brain gets better at predicting its
environment (reducing prediction errors; FitzGerald, Dolan, & Fris-
ton, 2014). Increased predictive power directly implies decreased
metabolic use. However, for the net result to be a decrease in cost,
improved predictions, that also need to be represented, have to be
more efficient than the input activity they can suppress. This is a rea-
sonable assumption because the generative model (predictions) can
be coded by changes in synaptic efficiency (Friston, 2003). Studies
have shown that grouping or the formation of a Gestalt is linked to
reductions in fMRI activity in the early visual cortex (Fang, Kersten,
& Murray, 2008; S. O. Murray et al., 2002), suggesting that in-
deed top-down predictions can explain away matching inputs (but
see de-Wit, Kubilius, Wagemans, & Beeck, 2012), hence reducing
processing demands. However, both of these studies also report
concurrent activity increases higher up in the visual hierarchy, in
object-sensitive regions. This seems to go against a more efficient
representation, because it suggests processing resources are just re-
distributed upwards (not reduced). Still, predictive coding hypothe-
sizes that across the full hierarchy of models in the brain, including
the two purported levels considered by these studies, prediction er-
rors (and hence metabolic cost) are minimized during perception.
This brings us seamlessly to the third important thing in Eysenck’s
law: it talks about a decrease relative to the original state of the
‘total nervous system’. Considering prediction errors (metabolic de-
mands) in the whole system, seems indeed important in the con-
text of (art) appreciation. Situation and context, to the extent they
shape pre-stimulus brain activity, could determine (dis)likings of art
or other perceptual stimuli, although this is a challenging proposi-
tion to investigate systematically. It might explain why people often
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like simple, stereotypical stimuli in certain settings (e. g., unfamiliar
ones), but more complex, challenging stimuli in other settings. In
any case, Eysenck’s law combined with predictive coding seems a
promising starting point to further examine the link between liking
and thriftiness in the brain.
In conclusion, manipulating processing dynamics in terms of pre-
diction errors present in the (perceptual) system is challenging at
this stage, because we lack the means to directly probe them. Neu-
ral measures would not provide much solace, until we can verify
that, as predictive coding holds, dissociable neural units encode
predictions and prediction errors at different levels of the percep-
tual hierarchy (de Gardelle et al., 2012). In the meantime, our study
suggests that dynamics in predictability can be used in the lab and
may have intrinsic affective consequences. Specifically, we have gath-
ered some support for the idea that insight in two-tone images as
measured by later recognition is linked to positive affect, i. e., faster
categorization responses on positive relative to negative words. We
interpret this in terms of the predictive progress viewers make go-
ing from two-tone images to their solutions. However, given that
the statistics were not unequivocal, this effect needs to be replicated
first, preferably including the indicated controls.

We do not see things as they are but as we are.
— Anaïs Nin, 1961
5
Can affective relevance bias bistable perception?
For scientists, the question of whether the quote above could lit-
erally be true is a fascinating, albeit a thorny one. Surely percep-
tion unchecked by external reality (i.e. hallucination) would serve
us poorly. But when allowed only a glimpse, a perception biased
by our own fears or hopes might enable faster or more appropriate
responses. Theoretically, a role of emotion in perception has become
more plausible since it has become clear that seeing relies heavily on
top-down information flows, which include affective context (Bar-
rett & Bar, 2009). Empirically, two opposing patterns of results have
emerged. On the one hand, several studies find a negativity bias: a
bias towards negative or threatening emotional stimuli, including
the large body of work on attentional bias for negative facial ex-
pressions (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, &
van IJzendoorn, 2007) and on better detection of negative stimuli
(e. g., Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003). Reports by Stefanucci, Proffitt,
Clore, and Parekh (2008) that acrophobic volunteers estimated ver-
tical distances to be greater also fit within this negativity bias. Fi-
nally, negative emotional faces seem to break through more easily
in continuous flash suppression (Yang, Zald, & Blake, 2007) and
in binocular rivalry (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007), although for the lat-
ter a general emotional enhancement, irrespective of valence, is also
reported.
By contrast, a second line of studies reports a positivity bias, also
called wishful seeing. This line dates back to the 1940s, when it was
found that observers tended to perceive the interpretation of an am-
biguous figure that was previously rewarded (e. g., Schafer & Mur-
phy, 1943). This tradition has received renewed attention recently
with two studies confirming a role for motivation in perception. One
used distance estimation and a throwing task to find that desired ob-
jects are seen to be closer (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010), while another
showed that the first percept we experience for a bistable figure
(e. g., 13 vs. B) can be influenced by what we currently prefer to see
(Dunning & Balcetis, 2013). Finally, Voss, Rothermund, and Brandt-
städter (2008) rewarded or punished ambiguous color patches dif-
ferently and found that positive or non-negative stimuli required
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less information to be classified and were processed faster. Hence,
the enhanced perception of positive perceptual alternatives seems
to be more than just a post-perceptual decision bias.
Apparently, it can be hard to predict what type of bias (positive
or negative), if any, will emerge in a particular perceptual situation
involving emotional stimuli. Indeed, task context and even person-
ality traits may play a crucial role. For example, trait emotion could
be an important modulating factor, but most studies only looked
at stimulus-emotion or short-term induced emotion. Gray, Adams,
and Garner (2009) did look at trait anxiety in relation to binocular
rivalry with faces and found that highly anxious individuals tend
to perceive angry and fearful faces as more dominant, consistent
with a negativity bias. Additionally, methodological concerns ham-
per the evaluation of the available evidence. The studies using dis-
tance estimation are prone to post-perceptual decision biases, while
in the binocular rivalry studies there is the additional problem of
low-level differences between neutral and emotional stimuli (e. g.,
faces) which could cause the observed differences in perception. We
used a different bistable stimulus, an ambiguous point-light walker,
to accommodate for these shortcomings.
Vision scientists have embraced biological motion stimuli, because
of the balance they strike between fine manipulability and immedi-
ate social and ecological relevance. Although these figures are con-
structed from only a handful of moving dots placed on the joints
of a moving actor, viewers easily recognize their gender, emotions
and intentions based on gait dynamics (for a review, see Blake &
Shiffrar, 2007). Fewer studies explored their potential bistability,
first noticed by Vanrie, Dekeyser, and Verfaillie (2004). When pro-
jected without perspective information (orthographic projection), a
walking figure facing the viewer can just as well be seen as fac-
ing away from the viewer, a categorically different percept (Fig-
ure 20). Both interpretations are anatomically plausible and in prin-
ciple equally likely. Importantly, low-level input characteristics re-
main exactly the same for both percepts. It turns out, however, that
people perceive the walker in about 80% of the cases as facing them
(Vanrie et al., 2004). The social or biological relevance of a person
facing you is considered to be at least partly responsible for this so-
called facing bias (Brooks et al., 2008; Vanrie et al., 2004). Indeed,
the cost of not detecting an approaching person is potentially much
higher than that of a false alarm.
Although social anxiety disorder (social phobia) only appeared in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III)
in 1980, it is today one of the most common psychiatric disorders.
The 12 month prevalence in the general population is 15.6%, but
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signs of social anxiety as a personality trait (shyness, fear of public
speaking, social avoidance) are widespread in healthy populations
(Furmark et al., 1999). Assuming that for people with high social
anxiety the difference in relevance of the two percepts of the bio-
logical walker is even more pronounced, we conjectured that this
would be reflected in how these people perceive the walkers. In the
real world, a person walking up to you implies an imminent social
interaction with this agent. Note, however, that the body is reduced
to a few dots in these stimuli, and the face is completely absent (one
dot). Hence, these walkers are objectively neutral and any bias will
be in the eye of the beholder. Since no fear-inducing cues (e. g.a fac-
ing face) are present, they can be considered to be the cleanest test
for a fear of approach as such.
Based on the studies finding a stronger attentional and interpreta-
tional bias in phobics towards objects of their fears (Bar-Haim et al.,
2007), and one report of increased dominance of negative faces in
binocular rivalry for anxious people (Gray et al., 2009), we deemed
it likely that a similar tendency would hold for our bistable stimuli.
Namely, that people with high social anxiety would perceive the
walker in its more threatening, approaching configuration and thus
would report more facing towards viewer percepts, compared to
non-anxious subjects. Still, we acknowledged from the outset that
our stimuli were in several ways quite different from those previ-
ously used, most importantly that there was no explicit emotional
manipulation within them. We were also aware of the studies find-
ing a positivity bias, which led to the formulation an alternative
hypothesis that predicts what one could call a self-serving bias in
perception: a tendency to perceive the safer configuration of a per-
son walking away from you. The latter bias could come about by an
active enhancement of the more positive percept signaling no social
interaction, or by an active avoidance of the more negative percept
signaling a future social interaction, consistent with what is found
for social stimuli in daily life in social anxiety.
5.1 method
5.1.1 Participants
On the basis of a validated, reliable questionnaire for social anxi-
ety (Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale; Fresco et al., 2001; Liebowitz,
1987) we selected high and low socially anxious participants from a
pool of 450 first bachelor psychology students. People with low anx-
iety had a total score lower than 25 (percentile .25, n = 19, M = 15.3,
SD = 4.53, all females), while those with high social anxiety had a
score higher than 65 (percentile .88, n = 18, M = 76.8, SD = 8.02, all
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Figure 20: Point-light stimulus (middle) flanked by overlays illustrating
the two possible interpretations.
females). The cutoffs were chosen to closely match the normative
study of Fresco et al. (2001), in which non-anxious controls had a
mean score of 14.5, while the patients diagnosed with social anxiety
disorder had a mean score of 74.5 on the questionnaire. To avoid ar-
tifacts and to exclude clinical anxiety, people with very low (<5) and
very high (>85) scores were excluded. A brief questionnaire after the
actual experiment confirmed that none of the participants were di-
agnosed with a clinical mental disorder. They received course credit
for their participation. All the participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. The study was approved by the Ethical Committee
of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of the Uni-
versity of Leuven. Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
5.1.2 Stimuli and procedure
Following a procedure developed by Schouten and Verfaillie (2010),
we parametrically varied the amount of perspective information
in the point-light walkers to systematically measure the bias for
each participant. In practice, this boils down to disambiguating the
walker by adding small amounts of perspective information of a
walker that either approaches or walks away. In perspective projec-
tion a change in the distance between the collection of dots and the
projection plane (or equivalently the field of view angle) causes a
5.1 method 115
change in the relative locations of the 2-D projections of the dots on
the display (for more details, see Schouten & Verfaillie, 2010). A pe-
riod of two to four months separated the screening from the actual
experiment, which made the link less obvious. Participants were
not informed about their social anxiety score, and the experimenter
was blind to the social anxiety group the participants belonged to.
In a dimly lit, soundproof room the participants were randomly
presented with a point-light walker (15 dots placed on coordinates
from Troje, 2002; 8°of visual angle) of one out of 13 different levels
of perspective information, for a total of 520 trials (40 repetitions per
level). Observers had to respond with the up and down arrows of
the keyboard to indicate whether they saw the walker as facing to-
wards or away from them (2-alternative forced choice). The walker
remained (moving) on screen till the subject responded (no time
limit). We instructed participants to focus on the center of the stim-
ulus throughout the presentation and to respond according to their
first impression.
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Figure 21: Mean proportion of facing towards viewer responses by amount
of perspective information for the high social anxiety group
(green) and low social anxiety group (blue). Curves represent
local regression fits (LOESS). Shaded area is standard error of
mean.
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5.2 results
As already mentioned, people generally have a strong facing bias,
with some individuals showing no variation at all in their expe-
rience even when presented with walkers with different amounts
of perspective information. Participants that reported seeing the
walker in more than 90% of the cases as coming towards them for all
levels of perspective information were excluded from the dataset (5
in total, 3 of the high social anxiety group). However, analysis of the
full set did not influence the main conclusions. We applied a two-
way ANOVA on the probit transformed proportions of facing to-
wards viewer responses with anxiety group (between-subjects) and
perspective information (within-subjects) as factors. As expected,
the amount of perspective information greatly influenced perceived
orientation (F(1,414) = 451.4, p<.001), confirming the effectiveness of
the parametrical perspective manipulation. The main effect of group
was also significant (F(1,414) = 11.4, p<.001), with high social anx-
iety observers systematically showing lower proportions of facing
towards viewer responses compared to low social anxiety observers
(Figure 21).
Though it was not of primary interest, we also performed a re-
peated measures ANOVA on the reaction times (Figure 22). Here
the influence of perspective information was significant too (F(1,30)
= 21.8, p<.001), indicating that less perspective information creates
longer reaction times. This may be related to increased processing
necessary to settle on a stable percept for more ambiguous figures.
No main effect of group (F(1,30) = 0.6, p = 0.45) was present, but
there was a significant interaction of group and perspective infor-
mation (F(1,30) = 7.8, p<0.005), apparently due to higher reaction
times of the low social anxiety group on the first three levels of per-
spective information. This overlaps but does not coincide with the
clearest discrepancies between groups on the facing responses.
5.3 discussion
Our findings confirm that trait anxiety has an effect on the perceived
in-depth orientation of point-light figures. Contrary to our original
hypothesis, we found that higher social anxiety is associated with
higher proportions of facing away percepts. We did not observe a
greater dominance of the more negative (threatening) interpretation,
but rather a suppression of the negatively valenced percept, an en-
hancement of the more positive configuration, or a combination of
both. However, as discussed in the introduction, such a positivity
bias has been reported earlier in studies of motivational effects on
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Figure 22: Mean reaction times for the high social anxiety group (green)
and low social anxiety group (blue). Error bars represent stan-
dard error of mean.
perception (Dunning & Balcetis, 2013; Voss et al., 2008), but not yet
for socially anxious participants. Similarly to Voss et al. (2008), our
highly anxious participants may have processed the non-negative
‘facing away’ interpretation more quickly, giving it the necessary
edge over the competing facing-towards representation in the race
for awareness. Alternatively, an active avoidance of the more neg-
ative percept signaling social interaction could lead to a similar
outcome. Avoidance of threatening stimuli is frequently reported
in the behavioral literature on social anxiety (Bögels & Mansell,
2004). Even attention studies often report an avoidance of emotional
stimuli immediately following the increased capture of attention,
prompting researchers to propose the vigilance-avoidance model
of attention in social anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). In daily life,
avoidance of social interaction is a major impairing factor for peo-
ple with social anxiety and in the screening questionnaire we used,
half of the questions concerns avoidance of social situations. In our
experiment there was always a possible interpretation avoiding the
approaching figure, and this may have been implicitly prioritized
by people with social anxiety.
Both explanations imply that top-down information in the form
of trait can bias perceptual organization. This is consistent with ear-
lier findings that the meaning of a perceptual organization can in-
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fluence the formation of this organization in a top-down manner
(e. g., Peterson, 1994). Additionally, our study suggests that the
facing-towards-viewer-bias in the general (non-anxious) population
(Vanrie et al., 2004) is not due to anxiety elicited by the facing inter-
pretation of these stimuli. Indeed, if this would be the case, selecting
people with higher anxiety would produce an even stronger facing
bias (the inverse of our findings). Assuming that the biological rele-
vance of the facing percept causes the facing bias, this effect is prob-
ably not mediated by anxiety (i. e.the threat value of an approaching
percept).
Nonetheless, some caution is needed when interpreting the cur-
rent data, since most previous studies in clinically anxious groups
found a negativity bias, both in attention for threat-relevant stimuli
and in the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli. Why did we not ob-
serve such a negativity bias? First, it is important to realize that our
task is not strictly speaking an attentional one. There was no right
or wrong in our task, so little or no performance context, which may
influence people with high and low anxiety differently. Also, most
reports of an attentional bias towards negative, fear-relevant stimuli
used clinically anxious groups (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) while we only
had nonclinical highly anxious participants. The perceptual and at-
tentional strategies of clinical groups could be special in their focus
on negative stimuli. Additionally, most research reporting a bias to-
wards social threat in high social anxiety uses faces, the competing
alternative being another, neutral face. According to some studies,
these neutral faces are experienced as negative in high social anxi-
ety (e. g., Cooney, Atlas, Joormann, Eugène, & Gotlib, 2006). Hence
there is no real ‘safe’ alternative. This is different in our dynamic
full-body stimuli: a person walking away can be considered an un-
mistakably safe situation.
Of course, more differences exist between biological motion stim-
uli and faces, hence the processes of social cognition involved in in-
terpreting those two stimulus classes may not be comparable. Still,
some neural regions seem to be engaged by both, most notably the
superior temporal sulcus (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000). Inci-
dentally, this region has also been found to be more active in social
phobic patients than in healthy controls when viewing neutral and
emotional faces (Gentili et al., 2008).
Another difference between faces and biological motion stimuli
as we used them lies in their potential to induce distinct emotion.
Evidently, any emotional relevance attributed to either of the biolog-
ical motion percepts would be much more subtle than in the explic-
itly emotional faces used most frequently to investigate this kind of
questions. In that context, a recent study that used continuous flash
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suppression to render faces invisibly may provide more clues (Stew-
art et al., 2012). These authors measured the time it took for faces
that subtly varied in dominance and trustworthiness to emerge into
awareness and found that dominant and untrustworthy faces took
significantly longer to break through from suppression than neutral
faces. Stewart et al. (2012) recognized that their results were counter
to the negativity bias (or vigilance theory), but argued that they
may reflect a suppression of a threat-related stimulus, flowing from
a passive (avoidant) fear response (analogous to freezing). Interest-
ingly, in a second experiment they asked people to rate their trait
submissiveness and propensity to trust using two surveys. Individ-
ual personality differences correlated nicely with breaking times in
continuous flash suppression. Specifically, for people high in trait
submissiveness the breaking times for dominant faces (compared to
neutral) was even longer, suggesting more avoidance. People with
a high propensity to trust, on the other hand, showed less avoid-
ance of untrustworthy faces (shorter breaking times), compared to
neutral faces. Apart from highlighting the importance of individual
differences in personality traits for these perceptual biases, these
results nicely align with stronger suppression of an approaching
percept for people with high anxiety in the current study.
Though Voss et al. (2008) already demonstrated that effects of
emotion on perception cannot solely be attributed to response bias,
we have a few other reasons to argue that post-perceptual decision
bias is unlikely to explain our findings. First, the time gap between
screening and the (blind) experimental tests obscured the link be-
tween anxiety and the visual task. Debriefings indicated that par-
ticipants were not aware of the research question, let alone the ex-
pected direction of the effect. Second, we had to exclude a similar
number of participants from both groups for a lack of variability in
responses, suggesting that in both groups participants responded
according to their percepts and did not feel obliged to vary their
response criterion if their percepts did not change. We cannot com-
pletely rule out that other non-specific factors such as general in-
telligence played a role, but no evidence is available to substantiate
such a role. Despite these arguments, future studies should investi-
gate bias in a similar stimulus but lacking the social relevance of our
point-light walkers, in order to completely rule out decision bias.
Altered perceptual abilities have been documented before in so-
cially anxious viewers (e. g.better exogenous attention for neutral
stimuli, Moriya & Tanno, 2009). This may be at least partially due
to their lack of habituation, even to neutral stimuli, as measured by
the amygdala and hippocampus activities (Blackford, Allen, Cowan,
& Avery, 2012). Further experiments have to clarify to what extent
120 can affective relevance bias bistable perception?
these more bottom-up processing differences have contributed to
our finding. The shorter reaction times in the high social anxiety
group for certain levels of perspective information may support this
explanation. For example, the strong facing bias in the general popu-
lation implies that quite a lot of perspective information of a walker
facing away from the viewer has to be added for people to actually
perceive it so. Highly anxious people seem to pick up these physi-
cal perspective cues earlier, perhaps because they are more tuned to
these personally relevant situations. In the light of recent evidence
that oxytocin administration can improve the detection of biologi-
cal motion (but not mechanical motion) in noise (Kéri & Benedek,
2009), it is tempting to speculate on a role for this neuromodulator
here. It is thought that oxytocin exerts its influence on social be-
havior through its role in increasing salience of social cues (Bartz,
Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2011). Because levels of endogenous oxy-
tocin increase with symptom severity in social phobia (Hoge, Pol-
lack, Kaufman, Zak, & Simon, 2008), higher oxytocin in our high
anxiety group may help them to better process the perspective cues.
A few studies found that looming stimuli (in the visual or the au-
ditory domain) lead to shorter reaction times in (non-anxious) mon-
keys and humans (e. g., Maier, Neuhoff, Logothetis, & Ghazanfar,
2004; Schiff, Caviness, & Gibson, 1962; Wuerger, Crocker-Buque, &
Meyer, 2012), presumably because they are ecologically important
signals (analogous to our facing percept). We, on the other hand,
found that high anxiety is associated with more receding percepts
and shorter reaction times, though only for the lower perspective
values (see Fig. 3). Note however, that earlier looming studies mostly
used simple expanding disks (or increasing intensity of sounds in
the auditory case). In our task, the size of the dots and the full size
of the walker remained constant irrespective of perspective level.
Whether the stimulus was ‘looming’ or ‘receding’ had to be de-
cided based on the more subtle structural dynamics of dot relations.
When comparing reaction times for the two different percepts, we
found no clear differences, suggesting that both percepts (looming
and receding) were formed faster in the high social anxiety group.
If, as we proposed earlier, people with high social anxiety are more
attuned to the cues in the walkers that distinguish in-depth orien-
tation then that may have caused faster processing and responding.
This would mean that the low social anxiety group literally needed
more time to settle on an unambiguous percept. Unfortunately, we
cannot exclude the possibility that this group did not comply with
the instruction (to report initial percept) as well as the high anxious
group and hence did not report their actual first percept, explain-
ing the longer reaction times. However, since we did not explicitly
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instruct our participants to respond as fast as possible, we do not
want to read too much into the reaction time data.
In recent years biological motion stimuli have been fruitfully used
to better characterize information processing in people with altered
configural or social cognition, such as autism (Nackaerts et al., 2012;
Pavlova, 2012). Up till now the conventional task in these experi-
ments is detection of point-light figures in noise. We have shown
that processing differences can also be demonstrated in a task prob-
ing bistable walking direction. Future research may take advantage
of this task and stimuli in two complementary ways. Instead of our
emotionally neutral walkers, explicitly threatening body language
can be used to elucidate the role of top-down semantic relevance
(van Boxtel & Lu, 2012). Structural and kinematic features that are
known to influence in-depth orientation can be manipulated to limit
the availability of certain bottom-up information (Schouten, Troje, &
Verfaillie, 2011).
We explored the role of social anxiety on the perception of a
bistable, threat-relevant stimulus and have demonstrated the useful-
ness of this paradigm for studies investigating differences in social
anxiety and more generally influences of (trait) emotion on social
perception. Our results indicate that trait social anxiety can bias per-
ception in a way that counters this anxiety. This self-protective bias
might be specific to our bistable task with the point-light stimuli, be-
cause it opposes the attentional bias towards threat usually found
in anxious groups. Future studies will have to incorporate a broader
range of social anxiety scores to see if this explanation holds ground
and to accommodate the discussed limitations of these findings. The
decreased amount of threatening conscious percepts in highly anx-
ious people suggests that trait emotion of the observer and emo-
tional relevance of stimulus material interact in ways unexplainable
with traditional models of the perceptual system as disjointed from
emotional processes. Our results extend the literature on the influ-
ence of emotion on perception, showing that not only emotional
states but also traits can bias perception, though not necessarily in
a detrimental way.

Happiness is neither virtue nor pleasure nor this thing nor that, but
simply growth. We are happy when we are growing.
— W.B. Yeats
6
The place of value in the predictive brain
From 1932 to 1934 Wolfgang Köhler, one of the great Gestalt psy-
chologists, gave a series of lectures with the title “The place of value
in a world of facts” (later turned into a book, Köhler, 1938). In it
he discusses the alienation people often feel when confronted with
science, which casts a world indifferent to the rich meanings and
values they ineluctably experience it through. How could they ever
feel at home in a universe that only has room for blind facts and
forces? Although their answers left a lot to be desired, Gestaltists
always had a knack for posing fascinating and important questions.
Somewhat updated to the current day, the issue becomes how value
and meanings enter a world of matter and information. Since Köh-
ler’s lectures, Shannon’s theory of information and Turing’s theory
of computation have revolutionized psychology, because their pio-
neering work suggested one could talk about information process-
ing in the mind in a well-specified and quantifiable manner. Still,
the gap that Köhler described is not bridged; Shannon’s informa-
tion is not meaning —it does not have intrinsic relevance or value.
Maybe the information processing paradigm, inspired by the com-
puter metaphor, was bound to find its limits when confronting is-
sues of value and emotional relevance, that seem so grounded in our
existence as biological creatures. However, the perceptual system, as
the interface between organism and world, is a good starting point
for an inquiry into these matters, as Gestalt psychologist also real-
ized. The perceptual system is where tractable differences picked
up from the world will need to be turned into relevant meaning for
the organism. However, we will need a theory that is not limited to
perception, but has the potential to capture the key characteristics
of emotional value.
More than 130 years after psychology’s secession from philoso-
phy, we do not have a standard model of cognition (including emo-
tion; the dissociation has always been contrived). This may very
well be one of the reasons for the current methodological crisis in
psychology. Newell (1973) lamented that we as psychologists never
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put things together, we just juxtapose intricate but disparate experi-
ments. This problem has only deepened since, due to the crave for
flashy, ad hoc and counter-intuitive findings in the current publica-
tion climate. On top of that, unification and exchange of knowledge
is hampered by brand names in psychology (Taatgen & Anderson,
2010). Research groups try to hegemonically push their terminol-
ogy, obscuring much of the fruitful commonalities among them, and
sometimes resulting in duplicate work. To be fair, this is not neces-
sarily an intentional strategy: with booming publication numbers, it
is becoming increasingly difficult for psychologists to find the time
to read and critically evaluate the work of others outside their spe-
cialized field, let alone integrate it in their own work.
One attempt at unification that has in recent years been shown
to hold a lot of promise is predictive coding and its core principle
of Prediction Error Minimization (PEM). It is likely the first theory
that naturally blends perception, action and cognitive beliefs into
a coherent, well-founded framework, pleasingly taking down the
walls between these subfields. Although plenty of fundamental is-
sues concerning its computational articulation and biological imple-
mentation remain (see commentaries on Clark, 2013b), as a unified
theory of cognition it arguably fares better than any other alterna-
tive we have. But it is an ambitious approach, proposing that PEM
is all the brain does. And of course, if it is to become an overarch-
ing framework of the mind-brain, emotions somehow have to fit in.
After all, a general theory of the mind-brain that does not address
emotion, so central to existence and survival, is painfully incom-
plete, even if the experiential aspects of emotion would turn out to
be purely epiphenomenal for the account. So far, there is very lit-
tle work on affective relevance and experience in predictive coding.
One main reason for this is that the unifying logic of predictive cod-
ing (a single computational principle for the whole brain) is directly
opposed to the popular notion in emotion theorizing that emotions
are a bricolage of modules adapted to very specific challenges in our
ancestral environment. Rather than built around a single neat, opti-
mal logic, emotions are assumed to be a messy, ad hoc bag-of-tricks.
However, in practice, it has proven difficult to distinguish different
emotion ‘modules’ in the brain, even at the subcortical level, which
has led some emotion theorists to abandon this route in favor of
a view that assumes fewer fundamental affective ‘building blocks’.
The aim of the current chapter is to show that this movement may
afford new ways to integrate emotion in predictive coding. Much of
this is, as we will see, thanks to the clear evolutionary rationale that
is at the core of predictive coding and its PEM.
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At first blush, this may seem to lead to a concept of value or
emotion that seems rather alien or counter-intuitive to how we usu-
ally think about emotions. However, it will turn out to have much
in common with existing theories of emotions, such as the meta-
monitoring account of emotion and Carver & Scheier’s (1990) con-
trol theoretic model of emotion, appraisal theory and conceptual act
theory. Most importantly, perception (information processing) and
emotion will be shown to be entangled from the start.
6.1 generalized predictive coding
That expectation is inextricably bound to perception, often only be-
comes apparent when expectations go wrong. A colleague changed
her haircut. Someone took away the office plant. These instances
show that expectations are constantly there coloring our perception,
whether we are explicitly aware of this —as in a melody, where ex-
pectations extend perception beyond the given note— or not. This
predictive transcendence of given input is what furnishes Gestalts,
whether it be temporal prediction in melodies or spatial prediction
in faces, where one location reliably predicts input in another.
It might therefore seem somewhat surprising that it took till re-
cent years for models of perception to appear in which prediction
takes front and center. To be fair, the importance of expectation in
perception was acknowledged as far back as Saint Augustine and
William James. But the idea of a passive —and ‘objective’!- perceiver
that could absorb raw sense data just remained very appealing in
perception science. With Bayesian accounts of perception, gradually
prior knowledge was given an important, biasing role but arguably
only with predictive coding, the active, constructive role of the per-
ceiving organism is starting to be fully recognized.
Predictive coding holds that an organism is constantly, proactively
predicting the inputs from its environment. Since it has no inde-
pendent access to objective features in the world, all an organism
can do is learn patterns in its input generated by statistical regu-
larities in the environment and by its own actions (Clark, 2013b).
While in principle there may be different ways in which prediction
could modulate perceptual processing, predictive coding proposes
a well-defined computational scheme and a single guiding princi-
ple. The scheme describes that every level of the perceptual hierar-
chy predicts activity in the level below, in effect explaining away
input that is consistent with it such that only mismatches remain.
These mismatches, called prediction errors, are sent upwards to up-
date future top-down predictions. Predictive coding is not in the
first place a theory about temporal anticipation (the colloquial sense
of prediction) but rather about signal prediction: one region of the
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brain “predicts” what quasi-simultaneously happens in another re-
gion. As Niels Bohr reportedly remarked, prediction is very difficult,
especially if it is about the future. Hence, much of the brain’s predic-
tive activity has a limited time frame. However, the higher up in the
hierarchy, the more time and space predictions can span, because
they can work with regularities defined on lower levels. In this way
lower level predictions model the faster changing dynamics, while
those higher up track and recreate slower changing dynamics.
Predictive coding thus completely inverts the classical bottom-up
view of the perceptual hierarchy. Top-down influences do not modu-
late the main bottom-up stream. Rather, in line with the ‘controlled
hallucination’ view of perception (Horn, 1980), the brain actively
generates the perceptual world (predictions are based on generative
models, i. e., models that can generate the input), and perceptual
input is in fact the feedback on how good these constructed models
are. As such, it is more appropriate to say that bottom-up informa-
tion modulates the intrinsic dynamics of the organism. Although
anatomically prediction errors are conveyed by feedforward connec-
tions, functionally they are the feedback, sanctioning the models we
construct of the outside world.
The fundamental underlying principle guiding this process of it-
erative, hierarchical matching of predictions with inputs is that of
prediction error minimization (PEM). Perception is inference to the
best prediction, the one that minimizes prediction errors. Simulta-
neously, learning will use remaining prediction errors to home in
on the best predictions for the current context, thereby reducing fu-
ture prediction errors. Hence, we perceive what led to successful
predictions in the past (see also Purves, Wojtach, & Lotto, 2011).
There is one other, complementary way of minimizing prediction
errors, which does not focus on improving predictions, but rather
on modifying the things predicted. We are of course talking about
action here. In this framework, movements serve to bring the input
closer to our prior expectations. More specifically, they are induced
by their expected exteroceptive and proprioceptive consequences
(Friston et al., 2010), much in line with James’ “anticipatory image”
(James, 1890) and with the ideomotor principle (Hoffmann, 2003).
Like object-level, conceptual predictions (“an apple”) unpack to a
myriad of lower-level featural predictions (“green”, “curved”,. . . ),
so can high-level expected states (“goals”) be unpacked in specific
component predictions and eventually in expected proprioceptive
states (acting as motor commands). When the latter are compared to
afferent signals of muscle spindles at the spinal level, they generate
sensory prediction errors to be reduced by motor neuron activation,
in a classical reflex arc. Hence, motor commands are replaced by
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expectations about the state of proprioceptive sensors. At a higher
level these ‘commands’ stem from beliefs about state transitions. A
certain perceptual stimulus may be predictive of a state transition
through the agent’s intervention (an affordance, if you will), that can
be actualized by unpacking this prediction to proprioceptive states.
Bear in mind that, from this inference system’s perspective, there
is no intrinsic difference between the external and the internal mi-
lieu. With the same predictive machinery, generative models can
be learned about changes in interoception, based on input from so-
matovisceral sensors (Seth, 2013). Likewise, internal ‘actions’, such
as autonomic responses, are brought about by similar principles as
‘external’ actions. They consist of changing a bodily set-point or ex-
pectation (e. g., temperature) so autonomic reflexes (e. g., shivering)
can be elicited. As a concrete example, a stimulus that is predictive
of an imminent drop in temperature, may induce such anticipatory
shivering by changing the expected body temperature, in order for
the ultimate prediction error, when the actual cold sets in, to be
smaller or short-lived (more on the link with homeostasis below).
In sum, this is how perception and action can be subsumed under
a common principle of surprise minimization. But note that all this
concerns surprise (prediction error) in the informational sense, also
called surprisal, which is different from agent-level surprise (in the
common experiential sense). A very surprising interpretation for
an agent (“an elephant on a stage”) can still be the prediction that
best explains current input (reduces surprisal), however unlikely the
occurrence of such an event (Clark, 2013b).
So far we have not covered the whole predictive coding story. To
see why it is still incomplete, notice that an agent has no indepen-
dent way to disentangle noise, i. e., variation that is unlikely to re-
peat in next instances, from signal, i. e., actual learnable changes
in the regularities in the environment (J. Feldman, 2013). In other
words, not all prediction errors are created equal. To properly up-
date models only when needed, errors at every level have to be
weighted according to their expected precisions (inverse variance).
Predictive coding without precision is as problematic as compar-
ing means (prediction error) without considering variance (inverse
precision) in statistics. Precision makes sure reliable differences are
learned, while noisy differences can be ignored, to avoid loss of
future predictive power (cf. overfitting). Notice that expected preci-
sions are also a form of predictions (meta- or second-order predic-
tions, predictions about prediction errors) that have to be learned
from the same input as the ‘first-order’ predictions, using the same
error minimization mechanisms. Indeed, levels of noise also vary
predictably across different contexts, and these regularities should
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be learned to differentially weight prediction errors. This is partic-
ularly crucial in volatile environments where reducible (learnable)
uncertainty linked to actual fluctuations in the predictive structure
of the environment, coincides with irreducible uncertainty due to
probabilistic noise. The precision mechanism of predictive coding
should therefore be conceived as a meta-learning mechanism, for
learning what is learnable (Gottlieb, 2012), or equivalently, deter-
mining the informative value of prediction errors (Behrens et al.,
2007). This suggests that what is commonly understood as atten-
tion should be considered as the result of precision tuning. Turning
up the precision (high weight) of prediction errors at a certain level
means that top-down predictions higher up will not be successful
in explaining input (i. e., will not survive), so matching will “zoom
in” on the level in question. This seems a plausible way in which
attention is deployed, at the same time regulating the relative in-
fluence of bottom-up information flows (prediction errors) versus
top-down predictions in perceptual inference. In a related way, pre-
cision is also involved in action. To initiate an action, be it internal
or external, prediction errors concerning the current state have to
be attenuated. If not, they will update predictions higher up, rather
than induce action (Adams et al., 2013; Seth, 2013). By lowering
their precision, their impact is transiently reduced to enable action.
The neural mechanism thought to be responsible for precision set-
ting is gain modulation (by neuromodulators) on the output of units
communicating the prediction errors (H. Feldman & Friston, 2010;
Vossel et al., 2014). Finally, note that precision constitutes another
way of PEM, namely by effectively silencing remaining prediction
errors —making them powerless by reducing their gain.
We limit ourselves to this brief sketch of predictive coding and
refer to the many in-depth resources for more details about its com-
putational mechanisms and how these map onto neural circuits and
their plasticity (e. g., Bastos et al., 2012; Friston, 2003, 2010a). Fur-
ther implications of the framework will be discussed to the extent
that they connect to value and emotional relevance.
6.1.1 Re(de)fining information
Although the cognitive sciences intend to formulate information
processing theories of the mind (or one of its faculties), the con-
cept of information itself is insufficiently questioned. One of the
reasons is a tacit assumption that Shannon adequately and suffi-
ciently described information. It is beyond doubt that Shannon’s
theory of information was of tremendous importance for cognitive
science (not to mention technological advancement). Arguably the
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success is in large part due to the fact that he was able to reduce
information to a concept that could be fully formalized (Deacon,
2010). The big accomplishment of Shannon is that he realized that
any physical difference could be information, so that this capac-
ity was independent from the material carrier. However, Shannon’s
information is not about something, so it may be better character-
ized as information-bearing capacity rather than actual information
(Deacon, 2010). Meaning (plainly ‘information’ as commonly under-
stood) does not come into it. There are receivers but no interpreters.
So what else is needed to approach the full sense of information
as meaningful content? Gregory Bateson (1979), one of the fathers
of cybernetics, gives an important clue. He described information
as a difference that makes a difference. To create a difference, he
reasoned, one needs at least two versions of something. Bateson’s
example is binocular vision: two eyes hold two versions of input
that, when compared, provide new information on depth. In line
with predictive coding, one can say that the brain also has two ver-
sions, one that it generated itself (the prediction), and one that is
provided by the sensory input. The difference (or prediction error)
that is made possible by these two versions, may become new in-
formation. Note that this explains why an absence or non-occurring
of something can be information, when the other version predicts
something that does not happen.
However, the second part of Bateson’s definition required this dif-
ference to matter or “make a difference”. In perception theories this
point is rarely acknowledged. They often assume that any physi-
cal difference (within the range and resolution of the sensors) is
captured and thus is information for the visual system. This is
grounded in a naive correspondence theory of perception, which
says that properties in the world have simple mappings to percep-
tual experience. The crucial insight of the more recent interface the-
ory of perception was that a difference might not make a difference
at all (Hoffman, 2009; Koenderink, 2010). The interface theory ar-
gues that perception, as an evolved capacity, does not need to be
literally truthful to allow adaptively efficient functioning. Indeed, a
non-veridical perceptual system may be more cost-efficient. Percep-
tion has to provide a kind of user interface, similar to the desktop-
with-icons interface that enables easy interaction with a computer
without being a veridical representation of its underlying workings.
Since efficient interaction with the environment (for survival) is
the criterion for evolutionary selection, agents with a good user in-
terface may actually drive agents with veridical perception to extinc-
tion, provided that perceptual processing has some non-negligible
cost (Mark, Marion, & Hoffman, 2010). Encoding all physical (veridi-
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cal) differences is wasteful, because some of them do not make a
difference in guiding adaptive behavior. As a very simple example,
say there are three different signals (s1, s2, s3) but only two relevant
actions, a1 for s1, a2 for s2 and s3. It would be wasteful for the agent
with only this signal-action repertoire to be able to distinguish be-
tween s2 and s3 (see simulations in Mark et al., 2010 for more
elaborate examples). The implications of this with regard to animal
perception are easily accepted (and described with von Uexküll’s
concept of Umwelt) but that human perception might be subject to
similar constraints is often dismissed. Bateson appreciated that the
usefulness of a representation of reality does not necessarily require
exact veridicality, but only some preserved relations with regard to
the purpose at hand. More recently Bitbol (2007) emphasizes: “Suc-
cess of an action does not demonstrate the truth of the assumptions
under which this action is performed; it only demonstrates [. . . ]
their efficiency as guiding principles.”
In the above we have relied on your intuitive grasp of what it
means to ‘make a difference’. We used concepts such as ‘relevant’
action, usefulness, purpose, disregarding more mundane types of
making a difference. Moving a stone in a river is a difference that
changes (makes a difference for) the course of the water, but we
would not call that information. Arguably, making a difference im-
plies more than having this kind of consequences. The challenge is
to describe “making a difference” without recourse to a kind of tele-
ological homunculus. It seems that we can only truly speak of infor-
mation in the context of a system that actively picks up differences
that can impact on its own functioning. Information seems to be
bound to systems that are somehow prepared for this information.
This can be illustrated with Koenderink’s (2010) ‘Sherlock model’
of perception. A particular question will make some difference into
information. The mud on the shoes will suddenly become informa-
tion, relative to Sherlock’s plot (prediction). Under a given predic-
tion, a difference can emerge that makes a difference in the sense
that it confirms or disproves the prediction. Perception means prob-
ing input with predictions, forms of regularities already present in
the perceptual apparatus.
So, it appears that predictive coding is all about finding differ-
ences that make a difference —about creating information as rele-
vant differences. Relevant prediction errors are those prediction er-
rors that lead to different conclusions within the current context,
namely, require an update of existing predictions. In a minimal
sense this is “making a difference”. A central instrument to accom-
plish this is precision estimation. It makes sure that any difference
(prediction error) is not taken at face value but weighted by ex-
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pected noise of the situation. This is an estimation of whether it
should make a difference on the system’s predictions. Although it
is easier to conceptualize precision estimation on lower levels than
higher up (i. e., it is clearer what noise is), it is assumed to work on
every level of the perceptual hierarchy. Hence, what is irrelevant dif-
ference is also relative to the level. A typing error is an irrelevant dif-
ference when figuring out the meaning of a text, but it can become
information when judging personality of the writer, e. g., diligence
(Deacon, 2010).
Importantly, as in interface theory, relevance or usefulness has to
take into account both costs and benefits (Sperber, 2005). Predictive
coding indeed constitutes a form of sparseness of representational
resources. For one thing, predictability implies compressibility. Pre-
cision estimation further aims to dampen differences that do not
matter, saving resources for those prediction errors that likely need
to update the predictions (i. e., are more than just noise with regard
to the question asked). This is a continuous, fallible optimization
problem, which may imply that in case of low system resources,
prediction errors might be ignored that otherwise could actually
have had important implications. Alternatively, in case one subsys-
tem has high expected precisions (demands resources), differences
in different subsystem may be ignored, leading to a form of inatten-
tional blindness.
6.1.2 Prediction and homeostasis
We described predictive information as “making a difference” in a
minimal sense, without referring to the organism that uses this pre-
dictive sensory system. It is clear that non-predictive information is
useless to the organism (Bialek et al., 2001). This does not mean that
all predictive information is useful (~makes a difference), but pre-
dictiveness is at least a lower bound on relevance. What is relevance
in the context of an organism?
Organisms have to ‘pay’ for their own organization (order) by in-
creasing the entropy of the wider system in which they are embed-
ded (cf. second law of thermodynamics). Bioenergetic regulation by
homeostasis is how they accomplish this and hence it is the most
fundamental goal of any organism. Of course, this is not an inten-
tional goal. It is just a result of the fact that organisms that do not
tend to homeostasis will lose existence as a unit. One should view
homeostasis as a set of expected states installed by evolution, be-
cause they have proven to enable continued existence.
Importantly, homeostasis is not actually static. Organisms do more
than reflexively respond to perturbations with compensatory ac-
132 the place of value in the predictive brain
tions (e. g., expressing those genes that will facilitate continued ex-
istence in the new circumstances). If reliable predictive information
is present, it is more effective to anticipate changes with compen-
satory action. Indeed, this is precisely what even simple organisms
do (Freddolino & Tavazoie, 2012). For example, when the single-
celled gut bacterium E. coli is ingested by mammals it will respond
to the temperature shift by not only upregulating heat shock genes
(to compensate for temperature) but also by downregulating genes
for aerobic respiration. They use the temperature information (when
entering the mouth) to predict that they will end up in a low oxy-
gen environment (gastrointestinal tract). This is quite an astonish-
ing feature for a micro-organism. As Freddolino and Tavazoie (2012,
p. 369, our emphasis) describes: “microbial behaviors are as much
responses to the meaning of a specific environmental perturbation
(viewed in the context of their evolved habitat) as they are responses
to the direct consequences of that perturbation”.
Clearly, prediction emerges from the fundamental need to com-
pensate for environmental influences disturbing the internal milieu
and therefore threatening further subsistence of the organism (Ster-
ling, 2012). Predictive processing subsumes reflexive homeostatic
regulation, because the latter is a prediction that a certain environ-
mental property is stable enough to merit an immediate response
(Freddolino & Tavazoie, 2012). In general, however, reactive com-
pensations will be less efficient than predictive ones (Heylighen &
Joslyn, 2001).
Predictive homeostatic regulation requires reliable spatiotempo-
ral regularities in the environment. For E. Coli the predictive “learn-
ing” of these regularities does not take place within the organism
but within populations. These populations respond to milieus with
more uncertainty by diversifying (gene expression noise). Those or-
ganisms that then capture a new (stable) regularity gain fitness (in-
creased reproduction). The predictive environmental relation is now
embodied in the molecular regulatory networks of the cell (Fred-
dolino & Tavazoie, 2012). Environmental regularities left their im-
print on the organism’s constitution, just because a constitution em-
bodying these regularities increases fitness in a Darwinian sense.
In analogy to predictive coding, evolution can be considered as an
error-correcting code, except that the errors are not represented on
the level of a single organism. However, a good match between
the organism’s predictions and its environment will lead to bet-
ter survival. Still, the normative character (the value or relevance)
originates in the organism, not in the process of evolution (Dea-
con, 2011). Certain predictions support the continued existence of
the organism. This applies to plants, that, for example, embody sea-
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sonal shifts, as well as to animals that by their physical constitution
are adapted to their environmental regularities (Rosen, 2012[1985]).
In animals, “the gross bodily form, biomechanics, and gross initial
neural architecture of the agent all form part of the (initial) ‘model’
and [. . . ] this model is further tuned by learning and experience”
(Friston, Thornton, & Clark, 2012).
What distinguishes simpler organisms from more complex ones
is then the plasticity (flexibility) to build new predictive relations
within the lifetime of an organism (a.k.a. learning). For example,
fixed action patterns described in ethology are predictions that set
in motion stereotyped behaviors given some innate releaser stim-
ulus (a more elaborate version of we saw in E. Coli). Little if any
flexibility is possible here, as is almost comically clear from the
ethologists’ examples (e. g., the egg-retrieval behavior of the Graylag
Goose that works as good or even better on vaguely similar objects,
like door knobs; Tinbergen, 1951). On the other hand, conditioning
can be conceptualized as flexible learning of predictions (McNally et
al., 2011; Sutton & Barto, 1981); Pavlov’s salivating dog predicts
that food will follow ringing of the bell. Or when the autonomic
nervous system predicts and anticipates the energetic demand of
upcoming exercise based on environmental or internal cues.
Let us, as an example, briefly consider a prediction of intermedi-
ate flexibility, as it appears in the circadian clock system. The day-
night rhythm is a steady regularity that the bodily clock system
is tuned to, mainly coordinated by the subcortical suprachiasmatic
nucleus. The problems associated with jet lag and shift work, show
that this system is not prepared to deal with large, abrupt shifts
in light-dark cycles. It evolved at a time in which only slow shifts,
specifically the seasonal changes in light exposure, were present
(Karatsoreos & McEwen, 2011). Although the clock system can be
resynced by exteroceptive light cues (and other interoceptive “Zeit-
gebers”), it maintains a strong endogenously powered prediction,
even without any light cues (Reinberg & Smolensky, 1983). Errors
with regard to this prediction (unpredicted light levels), seem un-
able to efficiently update the regularity generator (i. e., the predic-
tion), as assumed in predictive coding. It shows that even in the
(subcortical) brain of complex mammals inflexible expectations ex-
ist, albeit close to the bodily systems (the clock coordinates energy
regulation in the body; Sterling, 2012).
To exist, a system has to constrain the number of states it can be in.
This innate, homeostatic set of expected states is honed by evolution,
through its contribution to survival. Specifically, the system has to
keep values of a number of so-called essential variables in check, by
error-correcting. These are the variables that evolution ‘discovered’
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to be important to monitor (Phillips, 2012). When adaptive, this
will be expanded to monitoring ‘auxiliary’, non-essential variables,
that are predictive of disturbances of essential variables (Heylighen
& Joslyn, 2001). As we see in higher mammals, and especially hu-
mans, this may ultimately lead to complex hierarchies of learned
predictions (generative models), to account for a changeable envi-
ronment. The evolution of long-range, high acuity visual capacity
in mammals presumably had a major contribution to the expanded
predictive capacities of the mammal brain. It literally created room
for elaborate prediction and planning, rather than merely reactive
behavior (MacIver, 2009). But most importantly, the fact that the
relevance of environmental features is very changeable within an
organism’s lifetime1, means that evolution fell short in tracking reg-
ularities and flexible predictive capacity had to compensate. PEM
will make sure that the agent will capture the statistical regularities
in its environment and hence become a model of this environment,
in line with Ashby’s Good Regulator theorem: “every Good Regula-
tor of a system must be a model of that system.” (Conant & Ashby,
1970).
Predictive coding can be such an encompassing theory because
it is rooted in control theory from cybernetics (e. g., Powers, 1973).
Control systems make adaptive behavior possible through an open
interaction with their environment. They invariably accomplish this
by setting an expected state and feeding back the input-induced
deviance to correct the internal dynamics. Any living organism con-
sists of multiple hierarchical predictive control layers. Bechtel (2009)
explains:
“When we conceptualize control, we often think hierar-
chically and situate all decision making at the top of the
hierarchy. This, however, works poorly both in biology
and social institutions. As a result, biological systems
usually have multiple layers of control arranged such
that higher-level control systems can bias the function-
ing of lower-level ones (often by affecting the conditions
under which more local control systems operate), but do
not directly determine the behavior of the lower level
systems. This can be appreciated by focusing on organ-
isms in which cortical level control systems have been
removed —in such cases many functions continue unim-
paired but cannot be (directly) coordinated in the service
of higher level objectives.” (Bechtel, 2009, p. 13)
1 Part of this may have had to do with the social world.
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Built-in prediction or priors of organisms can go beyond homeo-
static reference values or other constraints imposed by bodily con-
stitution (Scholl, 2005). For example, the frog’s nervous system
comes prepared to see moving blobs of a certain size (to catch flies)
(Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch, & Pitts, 1959). It expects to see these
blobs, because if it wouldn’t it would dramatically jeopardize its sur-
vival chances. Similarly, a fish expecting to sense dry land is head-
ing for a certain death. In short, organisms come equipped with sets
of constraints: priors or predictions about states that the organism
needs to frequent to be viable. Survival “depends upon avoiding
surprising encounters and physiological states that are uncharacter-
istic of a given phenotype” (Friston, 2009).
Although it clearly evolved for its survival benefits (making sure
that the agent revisits a limited set of states), the predictive cod-
ing scheme can discover and recreate any statistical structure, given
the necessary resources, such as provided by a great cortical expan-
sion. Just specify the relevant variables and a scheme such as PEM
can be used to mine inputs for new variables that predictively re-
late to them (Phillips, 2012). This explains why it is particularly
powerful and versatile in humans, where it is harnessed to support
an endless variety of goals, concerns, expectations and predictions.
But although it gains some independence from evolved variables,
it is important to keep in mind that, even in humans, it is still
ultimately grounded in and bounded by homeostatic, bodily con-
straints. Hence all distinctions we can make originate in those con-
straints. These are constraints (predictions) that allow the creation
of new constraints (predictions) (Deacon, 2011). We use prediction
errors to differentiate and build multiple levels of predictions. Cru-
cially, the boundedness in the homeostatic set also gives the whole
predictive endeavor its normativity (the ‘mother-value of all values’;
Weber & Varela, 2002). Once the organism engages itself to make
a prediction, however insignificant, there is something at stake, be-
cause of the link from the quality of predictions to basic organismic
functioning. There is a vested interest for the prediction to mate-
rialize. Mental models are attached to bodily existence. Reducing
prediction error can be a proxy for fitness, but this by no means
implies that only predictions that improve fitness can be formed.
For example, even though some perceptual predictions may seem
not to be consistent with expected states, it is all the more impor-
tant to make them accurately (and not hallucinate more agreeable
alternatives).
Importantly, if high-level objects or concepts (e. g., about social
relations) are more predictive of the essential variables than lower
level input characteristics, then the capacity to form these will evolve.
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As such, Gestalts originated as functional, high-level representa-
tions that are actually most predictive of fluctuations in homeostasis.
But once the predictive machinery is in place, these (Gestalt) predic-
tions have independence from the concerns the predictive capacity
itself evolved for, because the PEM principle is a purely informa-
tional criterion.
Aside from the differences in abstraction (and those in flexibility
described earlier), there are several important transitions to discern
in evolution regarding the kinds of predictions that can be gener-
ated. Phillips (2012) outlines: “from predictions only of things that
are directly observable to estimates of things not directly observable;
from generative models averaged over various contexts to those that
are context specific [. . . ] from hypothesis testing to pure hypothesiz-
ing freed from testing.” (Phillips, 2012, p. 12). The latter of course
opens the way to a form of “offline”, simulated predictive coding
(see below) necessary for complex planning and thought. Each of
these transitions deserves to be spelt out in more detail, but that is
beyond the current objectives.
We can envision a historical path dependence (similar to evolu-
tion) for PEM within a human’s lifetime. Any human brain will con-
struct a complex predictive mental edifice, unique in its intricate
branches. This is in a very real sense you, more so than the ma-
terial you. The different expected sensorimotor regions that act as
attractors, will vary dramatically within and between individuals,
provided that on the whole a small set of physiological states will
be frequently revisited. PEM is the proximal, local mechanism that
makes sure that in the long run organisms stay within physiological
bounds (Friston, 2010a).
By explicating these links between homeostasis and generalized
predictive coding, we have set the stage for emotional value to be
introduced.
6.2 drives , rewards , and affective valence
The important insight, entailed by generalized predictive coding, is
that any “drive” one can describe for an organism, is better speci-
fied as error reduction relative to an expected reference state (pre-
diction) (Keramati & Gutkin, 2011). A drive or motivation is then
determined by the discrepancy between current and expected state.
An organism will mobilize resources to reduce this prediction error,
but because these predictions are often less flexible than learned
perceptual predictions, the errors are mostly reduced, not by revis-
ing predictions, but by behavior, i. e., performing actions to change
sampling of the world (see above).
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In this scheme, rewards are just expected or familiar sensory states
(Friston, Shiner, et al., 2012). Intuitively we feel that we avoid pun-
ishment or seek reward and therefore visit these states less or more
frequently, respectively. Predictive coding turns this intuition up-
side down, describing frequently visited states as rewards because
they are expected. Rewards do not ‘attract behavior’, but attainment
of rewards is the result of prediction error minimization, exactly as
described for perception and action in general.
As we saw, the repertoire of innate expected states is specified and
extended by learning throughout an animal’s life. In fact, within
this view, there are no distinct reward or punishment stimuli (Fris-
ton, Daunizeau, & Kiebel, 2009; Wörgötter & Porr, 2005). Any
sensory signal has a cost, namely the prediction error. It tells some-
thing about the success (failure) of the generative model we used
for predicting the input. Given that only relevant predictions are
learned, the short-term, moment-to-moment effort to reduce predic-
tion errors translates into long-term goal of survival.
This implies that habits or ‘rituals’, i. e., predictable sequences of
behavior, are in fact rewards. Animals, including humans, are in-
deed creatures of habit (James, 1890; Darwin, 2011). There is usu-
ally no tremendous pleasurable experience to habits (we will get
back to this point later on), but not performing habits when elicit-
ing context is present seems to produce some negative affect, indica-
tive of some error (drive). It speaks to the self-sustaining nature of
habits (Egbert & Barandiaran, 2014; Egbert & Canamero, 2014).
Indeed, for over-learned fixed behavioral patterns, devaluation of
the reinforcer that was originally used to establish the behavior will
not lead to reduction in behavior (Wood & Neal, 2007). The wider
implication is that organisms do not only preserve their life (home-
ostatic predictions) but also their way of life, as a set of expected
(preferred) behaviors (Di Paolo, 2003).
This conception of reward fully supports the idea that rewards
and punishments are always subjective and intrinsic, meaning they
“are constructions of the subject rather than products of the envi-
ronment” (Dayan, 2012a, p. 1089). They are dependent on the drive
state or the position relative to other expected states. Reward is not
something in the environment, much less an external critic such as
often assumed in computational reinforcement learning (see a sim-
ilar critique in Singh, Lewis, & Barto, 2009). But psychological the-
ories too, often incorporate a semi-hidden homunculus. Here, the
value (or cost) function applied to perceptual or cognitive output
hides an ‘evaluator’, an unanalyzed ‘agent’ that can assign the val-
ues, within an allegedly objective, quantifiable construct. Misled by
our intuition that rewards are self-evident, these homunculus rem-
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nants too often go unquestioned. Another reason why we might
want to revise the concept of reward, is to circumvent its inherent
circularity. Reward is often defined as a stimulus that elicits (reward
seeking) behavior (Schultz, 2007). Evidently, one cannot invoke re-
wards to explain that same behavior later on (Friston, Shiner, et al.,
2012).
As a rule, it is possible to reproduce any reward/cost function
with appropriate predictions (Friston, Shiner, et al., 2012). So, rather
than running the outcome of perceptual inference through a re-
ward/cost function in an additional step, inference and value are
always entangled in generalized predictive coding. This is an ap-
pealing property, from the point of view that emotion is inextrica-
bly bound with perception and action (Barrett & Bar, 2009). The
quality of our interaction with our environment is evaluated con-
tinuously, using predictive testing of our mental (and bodily) mod-
els in perception and action. Hence, predictive processing incorpo-
rates cost/benefit computations —prediction errors directly inform
us about our success in dealing with the world.
This different framing of reward does not mean that learning or
behavior is not as constrained as in conventional models of reward
and punishment. To take the extreme example, even if at the agent-
level a pain stimulus is perfectly expected, across all levels of predic-
tions this will never become an expected state. Tissue damage can
be seen as a violation of a bodily expected state (bodily integrity)
that is not compatible with continued existence. On the other hand,
this approach has no difficulty explaining why humans seem to find
reward in endlessly varying individual “niches”, based on the wide
flexibility in predictions they can generate. Humans can derive re-
wards from arbitrary, idiosyncratic stimuli, and probably evolved
this way because utility of stimuli was very changeable (often so-
cially defined, internalized expectations). Other animals are more
tied to particular ingrained expected states, but also show species-
specific innate ‘reward-niches’.
Two other developments started eating away at the concept of
value as absolute, stable representation of utility, guiding decision
making. First, Chater and Vlaev (2011) convincingly argue that, sim-
ilar to sensory judgment in psychophysics, value is a not repre-
sented as an absolute magnitude but rather as a comparison, relative
to the local context. They garner a wealth of evidence showing that
value judgments are extremely context sensitive and malleable (e. g.,
through the set of options, preceding items, etc.). Neural data as
well do not support the idea of value as a stable, common currency,
but rather point to a relative encoding dependent on the local, mo-
mentary perceptual and cognitive context. Such a comparative view,
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where rewards are not defined independent of the specific stimuli
and the perceptual-cognitive context, is much more consistent with
generalized predictive coding. Chater & Vlaev conclude that “to the
extent that people have a grasp of their own, more global, values,
this must be inferred from sampling their own past choices and
other memories, thus revealing their preferences” (Chater & Vlaev,
2011, p. 96). In other words, humans can easily infer the reward
value based on experience sampling, but these values are constructed
predictions that best explain the sampled experiences. We are able
to develop abstract representations (predictions) of reward that may
start to play a role at another, possibly conscious, level of reducing
prediction errors. Generally however, these representations are not
necessary to enable adaptive behavior.
The second development exemplifying the move away from a
value-based approach is the road taken by Solway and Botvinick
(2012) and Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Mathys, Dolan, and Friston
(2014). These researchers reframe goal-directed decision making as
Bayesian inference instead of reinforcement learning. Rather than
finding the policy that maximizes expected reward, this approach
assumes reward attainment and finds the policy (state-action pair)
that best explains or causes that effect (abductive inference, same
as perceptual inference). If one redescribes utility of outcomes as
prior beliefs about states one will end up in, one can use the same
predictive coding machinery to minimize errors along the road to
the expected state. This boils down to building a generative model
of reward. Importantly, it requires that we have prior beliefs about
what the world will be like and about expected final states (goals)
(Moutoussis, Fearon, El-Deredy, Dolan, & Friston, 2014). The latter
are the alternative outcomes that we expect to be reachable with
policies we can apply. The key is to reduce the discrepancy between
the likely and the expected outcomes. Hence, we can use the infer-
ential scheme of predictive coding for goal-directed learning and
decision making, instead of the computationally intractable tradi-
tional reinforcement learning schemes (Solway & Botvinick, 2012).
Based on these developments, we conclude, together with Gersh-
man and Daw (2012), that the strict segregation of probabilities (per-
ceptual processing) and utilities (reward processing) is untenable.
For one thing, “increasing sensory uncertainty in a rewarded sen-
sory decision-making task decreases expected reward” (D. R. Bach
& Dolan, 2012, p. 583). Indeed, reward-modulated activity is found
throughout the visual hierarchy, including the primary visual cor-
tex and the lateral geniculate nucleus (Gershman & Daw, 2012;
Serences, 2008). Additionally, the entanglement of cost-reward and
perceptual processing is clear, if one wants to take into account the
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cost of processing or representation. There is an obvious trade-off
between the utility of being more accurate, and the cost of computa-
tion and representation of those more elaborate models (Gershman
& Daw, 2012). Such optimizations are at the core of predictive cod-
ing, with expected uncertainties (precisions) determining whether
it is useful to capture more differences in input (by more specific
predictions).
Intuitively, the identification of prior probabilities (predictions)
with utilities seems wrong-headed, for example, Gershman and Daw
(2012, p.306) ask: “Should a person immersed in the ‘statistical bath’
of poverty her entire life refuse a winning lottery ticket, as this
would necessitate transitioning from a state of high equilibrium
probability to a rare one?” To start to defuse this argument, one
has to acknowledge that in such complex cases there is not just one
prediction (e. g., of poverty) at play, but rather a complete predictive
hierarchy (most of them not even conscious). This person growing
up in poverty does not lose his or her expectation to be well-fed
and to provide for kin. On top of that, there might be interiorized
social expectations, that could also urge the person to accept the
winning lot. That said, once accepted, the new situation (the new
inputs) may create quite some prediction errors (i. e., unrewarding)
given a predictive system unadapted to that new state of affairs (in-
deed, most lottery winners like to continue their life, including job,
as before; H. R. Kaplan, 1987).
Later sections will hopefully shed a different light on these forms
of ‘upward mobility’ (Gershman & Daw, 2012). In general, more
work is needed on how we distinguish likely and desired states
if both are ultimately predictions. In the end, however, the answer
seems to be in the hierarchy, with likely states being about what
happens when I see (or do) this. In contrast, desired states are about
what I can, more abstractly, expect given my experience and (senso-
rimotor) capacities (i. e., predictions). At least in humans this seems
to have an important social comparative component as well: our pre-
dictions are formed based on what people that one considers to be
similar to oneself, could attain. The lower level, likely states mostly
pertain to faster changing dynamics in inputs (regularities in shorter
time frames). The higher level desired states link to slower chang-
ing dynamics (e. g., ‘I am a good person’). If evidence mounts that
undermines such predictions, a full-blown existential crisis may oc-
cur. Luckily, there are ways to shield such prediction errors, i. e., to
explain them away with ‘auxiliary predictions’.
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6.2.1 Conflict theories of emotion
At first glance, a prediction error account of emotion seems to have
much in common with a classical group of emotion theories, called
conflict or discrepancy theories (Festinger, 1962; Hebb, 1946; Man-
dler, 2003), more recently defended by Phaf and Rotteveel (2012).
These hold that emotions are caused by a conflict (dissonance) or
match (consonance) between goals or other representations and ac-
tions or percepts. Negative emotions are often assumed to originate
from expectancy violation, which could be constructed as a kind of
prediction error. However, remember that predictions are broader
than expectations as commonly understood (e. g., see temporal pre-
dictions vs. signal predictions), but the idea of dissonance as it per-
tains to two concepts held simultaneously in mind is broader and
seems more akin to prediction errors: one thought has implications
that run counter (implications of) other cognitive or action represen-
tations.
In these theories, the expectations generally concern high-level
conceptual states of affairs or goals. While prediction errors are lo-
cal, ubiquitous computational products, the violations in these the-
ories are more abstract and conceptual. Alternatively, they concern
actions that do not have the specific expected effects. Note that a
prediction error on a higher level (“it’s not a plane, it’s batman”)
likely has more widespread implications for interpretations and er-
rors in lower levels. But there is another thing that distinguishes
these expectations from predictions (in PEM). We only speak of ex-
pectation violations when our brain actually made a notable pre-
diction, i. e., with high precision or confidence. Indeed, predictions
differ in strength. Compare, for instance, predictions we have with
regard to human beings about the fact that they cannot fly, that they
do not have feathers (strongest predictions sound most silly if one
actually articulates them), versus predictions about incidental fea-
tures (those that do not define membership of the category) such as
the fact that they generally do not have purple hair.
An obvious counter-argument to the thesis that prediction er-
rors or violations are always negatively valenced is the existence
of ‘pleasant surprise’, e. g. when one receives an offer that is better
than expected. However, even the latter case, there is some evidence
in humans and monkeys that the initial reaction to prediction er-
ror or surprise is generally negative (however short-lived) (Knight,
Klepac, & Kralik, 2013; Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013). We will
later argue that the potential for a positive reaction to surprise is in-
creased because the initial unexpectedness allows for a transition
from high to lower prediction error (Huron, 2006; Van de Cruys
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& Wagemans, 2011b). In brief, the agent-level emotion of surprise
encompasses more than a single, momentary informational event
(prediction error) at some level of the brain. As we will see, the
dynamics of the failures and successes in prediction are more im-
portant here.
There are good biological reasons for why prediction confirma-
tion should be good, while failures should be bad. A negative stim-
ulus has only really deleterious consequences for survival if the
system was not able to adequately prepare for it, by marshaling
the necessary compensatory mechanisms (if necessary by acting to
avoid it). Once this is taken care of, what could be a challenging or
even threatening stimulus for bodily integrity, becomes pretty harm-
less. In fact, even a beneficial stimulus such as food could, for an
unprepared body, be unpleasant. Conversely, predicting (and hence
preparing to) a future negative stimulus that turns out not to occur,
is often very wasteful for an organism. Hence, uncertainty or un-
predictability is at the core of what an emotion is (Anselme, 2010;
Bradford, Shapiro, & Curtin, 2013). The predictive machinery, while
evolved to meet these adaptive challenges, is exploited to cover
much more in humans. Here, pleasure for confirmation and displea-
sure for prediction violation can concern conceptual constructions
that may not have life threatening (or facilitating) consequences, as a
wealth of evidence in social psychology attests (reviewed in Heine,
Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). This spawned a multitude of models go-
ing from cognitive dissonance theory to ‘uncertainty management’
model, the ‘meaning maintenance’ model or the ‘system justifica-
tion’ model (Proulx et al., 2012).
In perception too, a positive appreciation for predictable stimuli is
regularly reported, for example concerning familiar configurations
(Ogawa & Watanabe, 2011), symmetric patterns (Evans et al., 2012;
Makin, Pecchinenda, & Bertamini, 2012), or by correctly recognized
objects (Chetverikov & Filippova, 2014; Jepma et al., 2012; Muth
& Carbon, 2013; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Cognitive con-
flicts (prediction errors), on the other hand, have been shown to be
aversive. A study by Dreisbach and Fischer (2012) showed that in-
congruent Stroop stimuli, as opposed to congruent ones, can prime
people to more quickly evaluate negative words or pictures than
positive ones (an indirect measure of negative affect; see also the
replication by Schouppe et al., 2014). Importantly, the mere pre-
sentation of these conflict stimuli is sufficient, as participants were
not instructed to actually perform the Stroop task. Neurally, percep-
tual prediction errors elicit activity in the habenula, a brain region
found to be involved in processing negatively valenced (‘worse than
expected reward’) prediction errors (Schiffer et al., 2012; Schiffer &
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Schubotz, 2011). Other studies show that (‘neutral’) perceptual pre-
diction errors also cause activity in striatal and midbrain regions,
usually connected to reward/punishment and motivational func-
tions (den Ouden et al., 2010; den Ouden, Friston, Daw, McIn-
tosh, & Stephan, 2009; Iglesias et al., 2013). Together, these studies
suggest that prediction error is never really neutral and that, as we
will argue, emotion and motivation are intrinsically dependent on
prediction errors.
But at this point one might object that positive emotion (or re-
ward) as defined so far is too ‘conservative’ a concept2: we basically
aim to return to familiar, overlearned states or situations and resist
anything that deviates from those expected states (the mismatch
or dissonance). This approach may explain the familiarity bias (the
mere exposure effect) that is often reported (Lauwereyns, 2010), but
it does not even remotely seem to capture our experience of reward
in general. We easily get bored (loss of reward value) with very fa-
miliar or repetitive stimuli. More so, we seem to actively explore de-
partures from well-trodden paths and expected situations. How do
we explain that our motivations often lie outside of predictable ruts?
And how can we more fully account for rewards as hedonic, plea-
surable experiences derived from these different situations? That is
what we will discuss next.
6.2.2 Prediction error dynamics and affect
Remember that we redefined drives as prediction errors (deviation
from expected or desired states). This suggests a new way to look
at rewards as well. Rewards are directly dependent on drives in the
sense that the reward value of, say, a drop of water depends on the
internal drive state of the organism (e. g., a thirsty rat). It is easy to
see that what is critical then is the change in prediction errors (drive
states). Rewards are given by a decrease of prediction errors, while
punishment can be equated with an increase in prediction errors.
We propose that the affective valence is determined by the change
in (or first derivative of) prediction error over time (Joffily & Cori-
celli, 2013; Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011b)3, with positive
valence linked to active reduction of prediction errors, and negative
to increasing prediction errors. This makes sense because these tem-
poral dynamics signal whether the organism is making progress (or
2 But it is far from a passive notion: to keep the organism within some expected
range of a variable often means elaborate and vigorous activity of an organism
(Egbert, 2013)
3 Note that the model by Joffily & Coricelli strictly speaking is not about prediction
errors but rather about the more general concept of (variational) free energy
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regress) in predicting its environment, which in the long term trans-
lates in proper functioning of the processes of life (fitness) (Damasio,
2003). The reward value of food evidently very much depends on
how large the prediction error initially (i. e., how hungry) was, and
hence how big a change the food consumption induced, but we pro-
pose this is a general pattern.
This goes beyond the simple view that prediction confirmation
results in positive affect, while violations of predictions are negative.
Once homeostasis, rather than being reactive, relies on predictive
models, errors often do not have direct effect on homeostasis (or
fitness). It becomes, then, equally important to monitor prediction
error dynamics, as it is to monitor the errors as such. Mere presence
of instantaneous prediction error does not seem to be an adequate
basis of emotional valence. Positive affect might still occur for a
large instantaneous error as long as this error is (or has been) in the
process of being reduced.
Importantly, emotional valence is not something added to these
error dynamics, it is those dynamics. They are a reflection of qual-
ity of processing, so they do not have to be evaluated in turn. As
we saw earlier, humans are able to explicitly represent valence, but
then this concept of valence obeys to predictive coding in the sense
that it is itself a prediction explaining patterns of input. Explicit rep-
resentation of valence may give these agents an edge in terms of
their ability to adapt to changing environments, but it is not needed
for an agent to have emotional valence. We connect positive and
negative affect here to general purpose processing characteristics,
detached from particular utility or motivations. They are purely de-
termined by how the organism interacts with its environment (see
also, Polani, 2009).
It is no stretch for humans to imagine that making progress in
predicting various sensorimotor domains can be very rewarding.
More challenging is to show those ‘informational’ rewards in non-
human animals. However, Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka (2011)
have managed to show that monkeys too, are prepared to work
to receive cues that reduce their uncertainty (reduce errors), even
though their choice had no influence whatsoever on the actual re-
ward subsequently received. The animals even chose the informa-
tion cue more consistently than they typically choose a high prob-
ability reward over a low probability reward (Niv & Chan, 2011).
Moreover, these informational gains elicited dopaminergic neural
activity in midbrain regions similar to that for conventional rewards.
Our account would predict that such effects generalize to other an-
imal species, but of course, for there to be changes in prediction
errors there need to be predictions formulated. Therefore, the spe-
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cific instances of predictive gain will depend on the kind of models
(predictions) an animal constructs about its world.
Even though the current view entails that emotions can arise
wherever errors are compared, there are good computational and
ecological reasons why change in errors is computed and compared
within the limits of one and the same input domain. Comparing er-
rors from very different perceptual levels or sensorimotor situations
would be very demanding to the system, and, more importantly,
unproductive. As Oudeyer et al. (2007) (p. 8) remark with regard
to an artificial agent, such a system may “attribute a high reward
to the transition between a situation in which a robot is trying to
predict the movement of a leaf in the wind (very unpredictable)
to a situation in which it just stares at a white wall trying to pre-
dict whether its color will change (very predictable).” Predictive
coding proposes that specialization (functional segregation) in the
brain stems from conditional independence of different representa-
tions —representations that have predictive relations organize into
domains with tight interconnections (Friston, Schwartenbeck, et al.,
2013; Stansbury, Naselaris, & Gallant, 2013). This architecture may
also be used to evaluate changes in errors relating to predictions
that are actually related.
The fact that these dynamics are subject to learning certainly
makes behavioral testing of these ideas challenging. But although
we cannot directly measure the predictions a participant’s brain for-
mulates for some presented perceptual input, we can either make
sure people acquire new predictions for given stimuli, or use de-
creases in prediction errors that can be reasonably expected to be
present and resolved by an experimenter’s intervention. Suggestive
evidence comes from a recent study looking at the affective conse-
quences of conflict resolution (Schouppe et al., 2014). These authors
build on the priming study by Dreisbach and Fischer (2012) dis-
cussed above, reporting that, while incongruent stimuli are aversive,
once they are successfully solved more positive affect will follow
than for congruent stimuli. The original prediction error (conflict)
seems conducive to later reward from resolution, consistent with
what we propose here.
Predictive progress has already been used to understand and im-
plement intrinsic rewards in the domain of artificial intelligence
(Oudeyer et al., 2007; Schmidhuber, 2010). More recently a de-
crease in prediction errors (or equivalently a predictive learning
gain) was assumed to underlie intrinsic rewards in humans as well
(F. Kaplan & Oudeyer, 2007). Agents that at each point try to max-
imize predictive progress, will avoid losing time in regions of sen-
sorimotor space that are too difficult to predict with the current
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capacities and regions that do not contain any learnable differences
anymore, either because the domain is known or because what is
left is noise variation. Hence, they will automatically focus on situa-
tions and stimuli that contain learnable differences, just above their
current state of predictive knowledge, where the largest gain can
be made. This guiding principle enables the agent to explore and
proceed through stages of increasing predictive difficulty (‘develop-
mental phases’). There is some debate about the extent to which
such an imperative to maximize prediction error reduction and PEM
are one and the same thing (Clark, 2013b; Froese & Ikegami, 2013;
Little & Sommer, 2013). Proponents of the ‘maximizing learning
gain’ position contend that an organism driven by PEM will seek a
dark room and stay there, because prediction error is maximally re-
duced there. However, as we elaborately discussed, a dark room
is not actually a maximally expected situation (or does not stay
so for long) in a generalized predictive coding framework. Predic-
tion errors are always computed relative to an agent’s possibly very
complex, embodied model, with its specific organism-defining ex-
pectations, quickly rendering the dark room unexpected. While this
seems to answer the ‘negative’ objection (why not stay in the dark
room), can PEM also fully account why we humans ‘positively’ seek
out prediction errors? This seems to depend on the kind of multi-
level and second-order predictions we generate. As an example, if,
at an abstract level, you expect yourself to be friendly, confirmation
of this prediction will sometimes entail prediction errors on other,
possibly lower levels. The key is to predict the violations as well,
such that their impact can be reduced (see discussion on precision
above). Similarly, if you expect to be a good darts player, you will
need to tolerate some lower level sensorimotor errors to get there,
usually because you can also (second order) reasonably expect the
errors encountered to be reducible, based on previous experience.
6.2.3 Non-conceptual metacognition
Any operation performed on the prediction errors can be consid-
ered a form of metacognition. Similar to precision, the temporal
comparison of prediction errors is a second-order operation. In the
first-order process, prediction errors are information in the system
(used to update predictions), while in the second-order process they
become information for the system (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994), infor-
mation that, we argue, is phenomenally experienced as valence and
that may become available for processes beyond the predictive chain
that created the errors. The result is a form of nonconceptual infor-
mation about uncertainty that increases or decreases in the current
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situation. It is not about the content but about the content-forming
processes. The thesis here is that emotions are the qualitative expe-
rience (quale) of this kind of nonconceptual information. A related
view is defended by Reisenzein (2009) in his belief-desire theory of
emotion. He argues that emotions non-conceptually convey impor-
tant changes in experiencer’s belief system:
“In representing these changes, emotional experiences in-
form us at the same time about the fate of our desires and
beliefs while we acquire new knowledge about the world,
and about the current state of the world-as-known in re-
lation to our preexisting beliefs and desires.” (Reisenzein,
2009, p. 221)
This nonconceptual information is available in terms of the af-
fective tone. Note the connection with the concept of cognitive or
perceptual fluency (Reber et al., 2004) as it pertains to liking and
disliking of stimuli. It indicates the ease with which stimulus mate-
rial is processed. Fluency should also be seen as a metarepresenta-
tion (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009) and is arguably well character-
ized as the experience of actively reducing prediction errors (and
disfluency as increases in prediction errors). If one identifies emo-
tion with the way of processing rather than end-products (content of
processing), perceptual (dis)pleasures and ‘proper’ emotions might
be subsumed under the same principles. Specifically, fluency with
regard to approaching high-level goals or biological concerns (bod-
ily expected states) is what we usually associate with emotions. This
idea is barely new. In a very influential control-theoretic approach to
emotions, Carver and Scheier (1990) linked dynamics in mismatch
between goals and perceptual inputs to dynamics in emotion. They
described how multi-level goals should be interpreted as hierarchi-
cal reference values, from abstract idealized goals (e. g., having a
self-image of a good person at the highest level), to more concrete
actionable expectations (e. g., shoveling snow off of walks). In pre-
dictive coding terms, actions have to make sure that the agent can
harvest the inputs that conform to ‘trickled down’ expectations. So,
analogously to predictive coding, these expected values can gener-
ate errors at every level. Our own actions (or external circumstances)
cause changes over time in discrepancies relative to these values.
Carver and Scheier already argued that emotion is about monitor-
ing the rate of discrepancy (prediction error) reduction, as we pro-
pose above. However, their analysis suggests a pertinent extension
of what we presented so far. They suggest that the rate of mismatch
reduction is in turn subject to a control loop, comparing actual with
expected rate of change. Only when the current rate of prediction
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error reductions deviates from the expected rate of reduction, so
Carver and Scheier argue, one experiences emotion. This will of
course be positive affect if the rate of progress to the goal is higher
than expected, negative if it is lower than expected. Based on predic-
tive coding, this makes a lot of sense. As we described, prediction
error minimization is the way we perceive, so we are reducing errors
all the time, e. g., when we successfully use our sensorimotor system
to walk the street. Generally, little positive or negative emotion is in-
volved despite these constant error reductions. This may mean that
these sensorimotor changes in errors are not large enough, but most
likely what rate is substantial depends on the expected rate of reduc-
tion for the current sensorimotor context. Where do the predictions
of rates come from? These might very well be contextually learned
through the same predictive machinery as for ‘first-order’ predic-
tions, but a genetic contribution is not unthinkable. Individual dif-
ferences in expected rates of error reduction, may account for certain
dispositional affective traits. Indeed if the predicted rate of progress
is set too high, an individual will tend to experience more negative
affect than positive, because the prediction will rarely be matched
(Carver & Scheier, 1990). This may happen, even if this person’s ac-
tual rate of progress is very high. Furthermore, if the expected rates
of progress are indeed at least partly learned specifically for differ-
ent sensorimotor situations, this may constitute a form of emotion
regulation. Specifically, the system may, through updating the ex-
pected rates, remain within a given range of emotional experience
by adapting this criterion of expected rate of change (the neutral
point).
Looking back, we have first encountered reasons to attribute emo-
tion to prediction errors (mismatch) or confirmation as such, then
we have shown it may be better attributed to changes over time
in prediction errors, and finally to errors about expected rates of
change. Importantly, these three can be independent. Borrowing
an analogy from Carver and Scheier (1990); if we make make the
parallel with distance, speed (first derivative of distance over time)
and acceleration (second derivative), we can see that any rate of
progress can be associated with any instantaneous prediction error,
and further any change in rate of progress can co-occur with any
instantaneous rate. The rate of error minimization seems to provide
the necessary signal for valence. However, in mammals, especially
humans, rate may be subjected to predictions of its own, moving im-
portant emotional dynamics to that level. Still, rate may determine
the hedonic tone of what could be called ‘background emotions’
(Damasio, 2000). A steady rate of progress may induce a diffuse
feeling of well-being, a sense of properly functioning bodily and
6.3 affect elicitors 149
sensorimotor systems, akin to what is sometimes described as expe-
rience of flow (Csikszentmihalyi & Csikzentmihaly, 1991). Salient
changes in emotions (i. e., emotions as commonly understood) on
the other hand, seem linked to changes in rate of progress.
Emotions are notoriously volatile, comparative, and subject to ha-
bituation (Frijda, 1988). These characteristics are of course easily
explained within the current framework. By definition, prediction
errors and their temporal dynamics are dependent on learning. Plea-
sures from increased rates of predictive progress only last as long
as this progress is possible. F. Kaplan and Oudeyer (2007) notes
that ‘progress niches are nonstationary’. Meanwhile, the contrastive
property of emotion entails that a suboptimal state (sizable predic-
tion error) may be pleasurable depending on the starting position,
the rate of error reduction and the expected rate of reduction. Emo-
tions emerge as perpetually moving targets in a system that grounds
them in predictive dynamics, but note that this system does not aim
to maximize the frequency of positive affect (nor would that be par-
ticularly adaptive) (Carver & Scheier, 1990). Rather, it may redis-
tribute frequencies of positive and negative affect so as to preserve
the range. Hence, one could loosely formulate a law of conservation
of emotional range, from its negative to its positive pole (though in-
dividual differences in this range exist, see above).
Once an agent can track and learn to expect certain rates of change
in prediction errors, it arguably will show a distinct propensity to
explore and learn (follow very itinerant paths in state space). As
such, this may form another counter-argument for the dark room
objection against the principle of PEM. There will never be a station-
ary stimulus or situation satisfactory for an agent that expects some
non-zero rate of prediction error minimization. We could even spec-
ulate that a high expected rate of error reduction may promote a
stronger reliance on learning and culture.
6.3 affect elicitors
One might object that the view we propose runs the risk of ‘intellec-
tualizing’ emotions. Indeed we essentially described affect as a spe-
cific form of cognition (see also Duncan & Barrett, 2007). But this
does not imply a cognitivistic theory of emotion. Error dynamics
are common to all processing, be it interoceptive, exteroceptive, ab-
stract goal-related or low-level sensorimotor. Errors are general pro-
cessing products, so they include but go beyond those that concern
fundamental homeostatic expected values. This may better account
for the very broad range of situations that can engender positive
or negative affects. For example, apart from biologically relevant
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things, positive emotions may be experienced from scary movies,
acquired tastes such as piquant foods (Rozin & Kennel, 1983) or
painful stimulation such as masochistic pleasures (C. Klein, 2014).
These instances may be difficult to explain from the viewpoint that
pleasure is only attached to biologically instrumental situations (or
appetitively conditioned stimuli). Below we review those emotions,
from subtle to intense, that are usually considered to be atypical,
for that reason. We try to show that, when taking into account the
error dynamics relative to (learned) expected states, they are very
representative emotions.
Development is a rich source of emotions. For example, the baby
that wants to keep on playing peek-a-boo (Parrott & Gleitman, 1989)
till predictions of object constancy are fully formed and the situation
contains virtually no dynamics in prediction errors anymore. Or the
child that is excited to hear the same bed-time story again and again,
until errors are driven down by learning its structure. This is not
just a matter of learning the plot until it is completely predictable,
toddlers may enjoy learning (error dynamics) of lower level sensory
regularities even more, as is for example clear from their preference
for repetitive rhymes.
Usually these and related emotions in human or animal develop-
ment are thought to be products of an evolved circuit for (emotion
of) play (e. g., Panksepp, 2005). The adaptive function of such a sys-
tem would be stimulating exploration of new, possibly more prof-
itable options, and rehearsing sensorimotor and cognitive abilities
that are vital in actual hazardous situations. Other emotion theorists
emphasize the centrality of the underappreciated emotion of inter-
est, for development and beyond (Izard, 2007; Silvia, 2001). The
two factors that have been shown to determine interest can easily be
translated to our approach, arguably gaining some specificity in the
process. First, only new, unexpected or complex stimuli (‘novelty-
complexity’ appraisal) can elicit interest (Silvia, 2008), implying
that prediction errors are required 4. The second factor is roughly
described as comprehensibility (Silvia, 2008), an appraisal of one’s
capacity to deal with or understand the unexpected stimulus. In
our terms, this would be an expectation of a positive rate of error
reduction for the current sensorimotor context. It should be clear
that, according to the predictive coding view, both appraisals can
be made automatically and implicitly, meaning that interests can de-
velop without much deliberate thought. In fact, we constantly make
minute decisions on what to look at and what to engage in —our
‘micro-interests’.
4 Note that complexity is also relative to the generated predictions
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One of the most influential views on this topic is Berlyne’s opti-
mal level account of curiosity and exploration (Berlyne, 1970). He
argued that organisms seek out stimuli with medium level com-
plexity or novelty, to keep their arousal at an optimal, pleasing level.
This preference for optimal level of complexity is corroborated in
experiments with infants that looked longer at stimulus items that
were neither very simple nor very complex (Kidd, Piantadosi, &
Aslin, 2012). Rats too, prefer to spend time in arms of a maze of
which the patterns on the walls were slightly more complex relative
to the walls they preferred earlier (Dember, Earl, & Paradise, 1957).
The latter studies emphasize the crucial role of experience, which
can lower complexity (increase predictability). We would argue that
organisms are very much tuned to reducible uncertainty in input.
They explore stimuli with medium levels of prediction errors, be-
cause they predict a positive rate of error reduction in these inputs.
Indeed, they have had experience of error reduction with slightly
simpler but similar inputs. In agreement with this, 18 month old
children already attend longer to learnable compared to unlearnable
linguistic grammar, strongly suggesting they make good estimates
of predictive (learning) progress they will be able to make (Gerken,
Balcomb, & Minton, 2011). In adults, through experience, these dy-
namics, and the pleasures or displeasures derived from them, are
not so much situated on the purely perceptual level, but rather on
the conceptual level, e. g., stories, jokes or soaps. Although a com-
plete treatment of social emotion will not be given here, observe
that they often involve as convergence or divergence in opinions
or ‘worldviews’ (expected states and beliefs). We make models of
ourselves and others, like we do for the rest of our environment
(Moutoussis et al., 2014), so similar error dynamics are at work in
this context.
This view is somewhat related to previous theories about the
‘need to resolve uncertainty’, most aptly formulated by Kagan (1972)
but going back to the writings of Festinger (1962) and Berlyne (1970).
More recently, Biederman and Vessel (2006) described humans as
‘infovores’, to highlight that we derive pleasure from gathering in-
formation. However, there are several differences worth emphasiz-
ing. First, prediction errors are well-defined concepts, computed at
different levels. Hence, this allows a more general formulation that
spans from mere perceptual prediction errors to discrepancies of
predictions on the level of (potentially conscious) goal and plans.
For example it accommodates subtle perceptual emotions linked to
discovery (or recovery) of organization or Gestalt where prediction
errors are actively explained away by new interpretations that ren-
der the input more predictable (see above). On the behavioral front,
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the rewarding sense of (em)power(ment) can be interpreted as the
result of actively bringing about anticipated sensory effects through
action execution (Herbart, 1891). Second, in contrast to previous re-
lated approaches, ours centers on prediction errors (rather than any
uncertainty), more specifically their dynamics (rather than static un-
certainty). Third, conceptualizing this drive as the ‘wish to know’
(Kagan, 1972) or the ‘need for cognition’ (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982)
seems to suggest that this capacity is exclusive to so-called higher
animals. Obviously, the more complex the predictive models an an-
imal can learn and generate, the more prediction error dynamics
matter. But as mentioned, we would object to an overly cognitivist
interpretation of this ‘drive’, let alone one that is aimed at find-
ing out some ‘ground truth’. Knowledge captured in the models
is always subjective, relative to predictions the system generates. It
is also inherently constructivist (Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001) —the
agent has no direct access to the ‘real’ world, but can only ‘negoti-
ate’ its conditions by actively predicting (constructing) its character-
istics.
Uncertainty and unpredictability have long been acknowledged
as important factors in emotion and motivation (Anselme, 2010;
Miller, 1981; Whalen, 2007). For example, rats seem more moti-
vated to work for a reward in conditioning experiments that intro-
duce some uncertainty in the predictive link between conditioned
stimulus and unconditioned stimulus (reward) (Anselme, Robin-
son, & Berridge, 2013; Robinson, Anselme, Fischer, & Berridge,
2014). This seems consistent with our idea that rewards derive their
rewarding capacity from reductions in (pre-existing) prediction er-
rors. Beneficial effects of a sense of control (‘mastery’) (D. C. Klein &
Seligman, 1976; Schulz, 1976; Turiano, Chapman, Agrigoroaei, In-
furna, & Lachman, 2014) may similarly be explained as positive af-
fect from a high expected rate of error reduction. Conversely, the ex-
acerbating effect of uncontrollability and unpredictability on stress
and anxiety is well-documented (Foa, Zinbarg, & Rothbaum, 1992;
Hirsh et al., 2012; Jackson, Nelson, & Proudfit, 2014; Sarinopoulos
et al., 2010). Evidently, this fits well with our emphasis on increas-
ing prediction errors (and higher than expected rates of prediction
error increases) as source of negative affect, although this hypoth-
esis can be more directly tested by more systematically manipulat-
ing increases in unpredictability. There is some discussion about
the extent to which (un)controllability effects can be explained by
(un)predictability (Mineka & Hendersen, 1985), but in the current
account the distinction largely dissolves —actions (to exercise con-
trol) are predictions as well, with concomitant expected levels of
prediction error decrease or increase.
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Typically, psychologists try to derive different particular rewards
and punishments, including intrinsic ones, from (organism-specific)
basic drives. However, it is hard to reduce intrinsic rewards or af-
fects related to uncertainty and information to these primitives, as
has already been remarked several decades ago (Kagan, 1972). The
error dynamics approach makes the reverse movement: a single
computational principle can be applied to organism-specific drives
and to learned predictions (explaining uncertainty related emotion,
including ‘high-end’ drives for knowledge). The need for coherent
meaning (‘epistemic coherence’) and uncertainty reduction is, ac-
cording to this approach, fundamental and emerges from biological
principles. But emotions are attached to the dynamics of attaining
this predictive coherence or error reduction.
In general, the positive emotional mark on unexpected progress
towards predicted states is stronger (than ‘just’ progress). This is
consistent with the view proposed here, that a higher than expected
rate of error reduction determines positive emotion. This is best
illustrated in laughter. In a poignant analysis, Sroufe and Waters
(1976) observe that laughter results when a rapid, maximal ten-
sion build-up is followed by a rapid ‘release’ or ‘recovery’. The ill-
defined term ‘tension’ was often used to denote some incongruity
in perceptual input, assumed to cause some negative arousal. Of
course, prediction error can take its place, again gaining not only
specificity, but also integration in a plausible theory of cognitive
processing. Still more important to stress is that a steep, sudden gra-
dient of prediction error will lead to a prediction of low rate of error
reduction. If errors can in fact be reduced, e. g. through an appeal
to different predictions (restructuring of input), the reduction rate
will be much higher than expected, resulting in intensely positive
affect (laughter). This is the typical processing profile, not only for
peek-a-boo-like fun in children, but for instances of humor in gen-
eral. For example, many jokes conform to an AAB pattern, with two
similar events followed by a dissimilar one (Rozin, Rozin, Appel, &
Wachtel, 2006). Evidently, one repetition is the minimum to set up
a prediction in the listener. Once this is violated in the third event,
this makes room for predictive progress that is unexpected. Consis-
tent with our approach, both the gradients and the unexpectedness
are crucial.
Emotions from music and arts comprise another area that is not
readily explained from the point of view of traditional ‘biologically-
relevant’ emotions. Rather, there is a very divided literature with
one group of studies stating that aesthetic emotions derive from
‘good Gestalts’, symmetry, simplicity and predictability, while for
the other group of studies these emotions stem from cognitive incon-
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gruity, the breaking of patterns and expectation violations (Gaver &
Mandler, 1987). We think this apparent contradiction can be re-
solved by realizing that the above described processes are at play
—that strongly positive aesthetic emotions involve a transition from
a state of higher to a state of lower prediction error (Van de Cruys
& Wagemans, 2011b). Artists can use existing (culturally dominant)
predictions or establish new predictions (e. g. rhythm or motif in
music). Expectancy violations that they subsequently add, may al-
low for higher, indeed unexpectedly high, rate of error reduction.
Another way to put this is that artists use errors to delay under-
standing, to allow their public to experience as if it is the first en-
counter with perceptual input, when the biggest progress could still
be made.
This game of reinforcing, breaking and resolving predictions is
more tractable in music, because phases are more clearly separable
in time. However, in static, visual art similar processes seem to take
place albeit largely ‘offline’, in the head of spectators. If the static
snapshot of the art work is considered, it makes sense to talk about
a kind of optimum level of perceptual or conceptual predictability
in the work, but this ignores the processing dynamics taking place
in the viewers. Also, note that artists mostly do not deliberately
search for this sweet spot. They often push the limits in terms of
unexpectedness, and then have to rely on a cultural learning process
to bring unpredictability to a level that is optimal with regard to
reducibility. Great artists are often not particularly popular in their
own time.
The concept of fluency, that we equated with positive error re-
duction rate, has been invoked to explain aesthetic appreciation of
visual art (Reber et al., 2004), but, according to our reasoning, unex-
pected fluency should be particularly potent (Topolinski, 2010). For
example, visual art goes beyond the purely perceptual character-
istics —often a ‘violation’ on the perceptual, stylistic level enables
unexpected error minimization on the content level (for examples,
see Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011b).
In a sense, even science is subject to these dynamics, for example
in the often criticized craze for (allegedly) counter-intuitive findings
in psychology, especially in top journals. These kinds of findings se-
duce, because they hold promise for great progress in understand-
ing, namely by reducing prediction errors that were created by the
findings. However, this also illustrates the fallibility of estimations
of predictive progress, based on superficial characteristics. Predic-
tive progress does not necessarily imply approaching the truth, it
is always about progress relative to some maintained prediction (or
set of interconnected predictions).
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In conclusion, the motivational system we propose is more gen-
eral than the accounts of play, interest, curiosity, humor or aesthetics
described above, but can encompass all of them. It does not set these
affects apart from other, allegedly more basic emotions (e. g., fear,
happiness, etc.), because the error dynamics determine valence in
both categories. Neither is more primary than the other. It should
not surprise us then that neuroimaging data shows that more ab-
stract stimuli (in interest, music, humor, etc.) still partly recruit the
same neural areas as those involved in biologically relevant stim-
uli (e. g., Blood & Zatorre, 2001). Rather than that, as is usually
argued, these stimuli somehow tap into the reward or emotion sys-
tems aimed at dealing with biologically relevant situations, the cur-
rent view suggests they may all rest on the same mechanism. It ex-
plains a form of striving, an actively approaching to expected states,
in all these activities, be it on a merely perceptual level, on a level
of learned goals and expectations or on a bodily, interoceptive level.
Impediments to this striving are apparent for the system as increas-
ing prediction errors, and for the agent as negative affect. Moreover,
the presence of these prediction errors will lower the expected fu-
ture progress rate, potentially facilitating subsequent higher than
expected progress rates. Attempts since Plato’s Philebus, to inter-
pret all pleasure as pleasure from relief from some unpleasantness
or pain (from error), can also be seen in this light.
So far, we emphasized the commonality in emotions to the extent
that they all have a valence component explained by error dynamics.
We still need to examine what predictive coding can say about how
emotions differentiate, for example into the various negative emo-
tions such as shame, anxiety, etc. But before we do so, we briefly
accentuate a few commonalities with the main currents in emotion
theorizing.
6.4 emotions and feelings
Current theorizing on emotions is dominated by three accounts
(each coming in various flavors). Several key ideas from these ac-
counts can be mapped onto predictive coding concepts.
We can be relatively brief about a first category of emotion the-
ories, often denoted as the ‘basic emotion view’. The central idea
here is that there is a limited set of evolutionarily defined funda-
mental emotions (such as fear, happiness, anger, etc.). Very scarce
evidence for these ‘natural kinds’ of emotions exists at behavioral,
physiological and neural levels. For example, most neural regions
seem not uniquely linked to emotion, let alone specific ‘basic’ emo-
tions (Barrett, 2006). More interestingly for our purposes, the brain
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does not even honor the classical strict boundary between emotion
and cognition. For example, where the amygdala was once argued
to be a fear module (basic emotion) (Öhman & Mineka, 2001), it
later became apparent that it is also involved in positive emotions
(E. A. Murray, 2007), and even more broadly in cognitive and at-
tentional tasks (Davis & J, 2001; Said, Dotsch, & Todorov, 2010).
Conversely, signals reflecting emotional relevance and value have
been found in primary sensory cortices (Serences, 2008; Stolarova,
Keil, & Moratti, 2006). This is at least consistent with an account,
such as the one proposed here, that does not separate emotions as
a strictly different kind of processing completely detached (anatom-
ically and functionally) from the rest of cognition.
A second main theory of emotions is the core affect theory. It
can be traced back to Wundt (1897) and holds that all emotions
have at their core only two fundamental (‘primitive’) dimensions,
namely valence (pleasure-displeasure) and activation (arousal) (Bar-
rett, 2006; Russell, 2003). This core affect compound is subse-
quently conceptualized (cognitively interpreted) to produce the mul-
tifarious feelings we experience. Core affect should be seen as an in-
cessant “neurophysiological barometer of the individual’s relation-
ship to an environment at a given point in time.” (Duncan & Barrett,
2007). Related to this conception, Frijda (2006, p. 82) notes: “pleasure
is the positive outcome of constantly monitoring one’s functioning”.
We can see a link here to prediction error dynamics, which are in-
deed a form of feedback on the system’s own functioning as it deals
with external and internal challenges. Proponents of the core af-
fect theory have been somewhat vague about what exactly elicits
or causes core affect. This is partly because core affect has no defi-
nite start, rather it is a continuous component of cognition. It is not
something that is ‘turned off’ outside of the overt, intense emotional
episodes to which emotions are often limited in everyday language.
Core affect is a kind of continuous commentary on the system’s
processing of internal and external milieu. Consistent with this, pre-
diction errors are assumed to be the general currency of processing
in the brain, so they appear on the different hierarchical levels for
different modalities and both for action and perception. Hence, tem-
poral progress in errors can be evaluated in all these levels and do-
mains. But even if affect is always present, it should be possible to
indicate what elicits major changes in core affect (Lindquist, 2013).
In our view, it is the change in rate of prediction errors reduction
that elicit changes in the valence component of emotions.
A third and last category of emotion theories consists of appraisal
theories (Arnold, 1960; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). In its
most basic form appraisal theories argue that emotions are formed
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when a certain stimulus or situation is cognitively appraised using
a series of ‘checks’. Appraisals are the causal connection between
stimuli and emotions, with similar appraisals causing similar emo-
tions. Some important appraisals that have been distinguished are
the appraisal of novelty (or unpredictability), pleasantness, goal rel-
evance, and coping potential (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Mark the
appearance of a pleasantness appraisal. While anyone would agree
this to be a central component of emotion, it cannot be used as an
explanans for emotion, precisely because it is an explanandum here.
One could say it is a hidden homunculus (an internal appraiser
or evaluator) in this theory of emotion (see above), only hidden
because such an operation seems unproblematic and self-evident
for us, proficient appraisers. The other appraisal dimensions are
more informative. That novelty or unpredictability appraisal is in-
trinsically linked to prediction errors needs no explanation. Goal
relevance appraisals can, to the extent that goals can be cast as pre-
dictions (see above), also be construed as prediction errors, i. e., de-
viations from expected states. Finally, coping potential has a close
connection with prediction errors and changes therein. The errors
are a direct measure of the adequacy of our model of the world
and the efficiency (cost) of processing. More specifically, we con-
tinually probe our coping potential by predicting performance (sen-
sory consequences of actions) and computing errors. In fact, making
progress (actively reducing errors) in predicting a certain activity
domain would be a good indicator of adequate coping potential in
this domain in the near future. Hence, the importance of expected
rates of progress.
Do we gain anything from rephrasing appraisals as prediction
errors? We think we do. Firstly, we can get rid of any lingering
homunculi remnants. Secondly, this reframing naturally accounts
for the multilevel character of appraisals (see discussion on multi-
level predictions), while keeping the cognitive operation involved
in appraisals simple enough to be executed quickly and automati-
cally. The latter defuses an important criticism to appraisal theories,
namely that the posited appraisal processes should be performed in-
stantly and automatically (unconsciously) to figure as causal prece-
dents of emotions (Moors, 2010). This seems far-fetched for some of
the elaborate appraisal dimensions proposed in this literature5. In
sum, the PEM view suggests that there may be an indefinite number
of appraisals (as also suggested by Frijda, 2013), indeed as many as
5 Surely, more complex evaluations (e. g., of coping potential) are possible for us
humans. However they are product of deliberate thought and hence not the most
common causes of emotions.
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there are predictions formed. But importantly, the error dynamics
provide the crucial element for it to become an emotion.
6.4.1 Constructing feelings
Up to now, emotions as we defined them here are still far removed
from the heterogeneous, object-directed, semantically and phenom-
enally rich, embodied feelings we usually experience. There is more
to emotions than valence and intensity of valence, of course. How-
ever, to the extent that valence is a necessary ingredient of all emo-
tions (we think it is, even for ‘surprise’), the error dynamics seems
to be at the core of all emotions. If we take for granted that predic-
tion error minimization is all the brain does, what can we say about
the rich distinctions between experienced feelings?
First, we have not said much about the embodied aspects of emo-
tions, namely arousal and action tendencies. Both are obviously
important components of emotion (Frijda, 1987), but rather than
causally constitutive, we would put them at the output side. If, as
we argued, emotions are caused by (unexpected) changes in predic-
tion errors, these computations indeed seem especially important in
tipping the balance from updating predictions —a strategy that may
be inadequate when confronted with increasing, precise errors— to
acting to change the things predicted. Arousal is then derived from
such action preparations. Sure, dynamics in autonomic and action-
related prediction errors can give rise to emotional valence as well,
given that they are, as we discussed, governed by the same predic-
tive coding principles. In fact, it seems that the closer to action or
autonomic responses these error dynamics are situated, the more
intensely negative or positive emotions induced by these dynamics
are. This may, however, have more to do with the precision of the
predictions than with discrete differences in weight or importance in
these predictive systems. The expected flexibility in autonomic refer-
ence values is less than the flexibility of learned perceptual represen-
tations (predictions). However, only very rarely will stimuli directly
violate expected autonomic values, rather they will violate predic-
tions derived from these expected autonomic states. Moreover, just
to avoid spending too much time in unexpected states, an organism
will move away from expected autonomic states if it predicts that
this will subsequently help a quicker return to expected state space
regions. For this to work, all perception and action predictions have
to be adequate and up-to-date. The counter-intuitive idea in this
proposal is the lack of distinction between core concerns or needs
of an organism versus just any predictions. But the main message
we want to convey is that this difference is one in degree rather
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than in kind. Also, note that in general much more uncertainty is
attached to core concerns or high-level goals (e. g., they span more
time than low-level perceptual predictions), so more possibility for
unexpected gains and hence emotions.
Prediction of external stimuli is used in service of the body. It al-
lows anticipation of what the body will need in terms of resources.
Hence, it is important to accurately represent bodily states and their
causes (Hohwy, 2011). However, just recruiting bodily resources,
or representing bodily states (and their causes) isn’t emotion. If the
body perfectly predicts the need for resources based on external in-
put and prior knowledge, there can be bodily activation (arousal)
without much emotion. Again, momentary prediction errors do not
imply much, it is the changes in (in this case somatovisceral) pre-
diction error, especially the unexpected ones, that should lead to
notable emotion. So, while we agree with the models by Seth (2013)
and Gu, Hof, Friston, and Fan (2013) that hold that emotions (can)
have to do with somatovisceral prediction errors, we stress that
those accounts may not sufficiently explain the causes of emotions.
The distinction should be clear: those accounts argue emotion is ex-
actly like perception except of somatovisceral instead of exterocep-
tive inputs. Emotion is then inference to causes that explain (gen-
erate) somatovisceral inputs. We do not deny that these somatovis-
ceral models are constructed, but focus on the dynamics in discrep-
ancies of bodily state as causes of emotions. The origin of emotion
lies not in being able to infer or predict (a cause of) bodily changes,
but rather in how we succeed or fail to do so over time (error dy-
namics).
This brings us to the ‘object-directedness’ that characterizes and
differentiates emotions. We inevitably attribute emotions to objects
and events in the external world. It is, however, long known that
this is a fallible process (e. g., Reisenzein, 1983; Schachter & Singer,
1962), in other words, misattribution is very common which may
completely change the course of an emotion. The prototypical ex-
ample is when negative arousal (e. g., of fear) can become posi-
tive if attributed to a positive event (e. g., an infatuation) (Dutton
& Aron, 1974). Our account does not situate the origin of emotion
in arousal, but it entails a different, more fundamental misattribu-
tion. Precisely the interpretation that emotions are entirely caused
by objects out there is misguided, because in fact they are linked to
processing characteristics (see also Reber et al., 2004) rather than
content of processing itself. The evaluation of error dynamics seems
to provide a parallel (affective) dimension to experience, that is not
strictly linked to the content (predictions) or particular prediction
errors taking part in those dynamics. Still, the specific and diverse
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forms emotions can take, seem largely dependent on the conceptual
context (sensorimotor or cognitive domain) in which the error dy-
namics appear. But such attributions are always constructions, they
will never be directly about what caused the emotions, the (changes
in) error reduction rates.
We can draw on the conceptual act theory of emotion for a very
related solution to this problem of diversity of emotions, within a
theory that only has few ‘primitive’ emotional ingredients. It holds
that emotions are conceptualizations or interpretations of interocep-
tive and exteroceptive states (Barrett, 2014; Lindquist, 2013; Rus-
sell, 2003). Emotions are the result of an act of making meaning of a
bodily state in the current conceptual context. Emotions do not have
essences but are predictable constellations of interoceptive and ex-
teroceptive stimuli that a child, during development, learns to label
as a discrete emotion. The different discrete emotions are ‘just’ the
result of categorizing one’s state (interoceptive and exteroceptive).
Barrett (2014) explains:
“To say that it is an ‘act’ does not mean it is deliberate,
but rather that it is not a passive event because the per-
ceiver is not merely detecting and experiencing what it
is out there in the world or what is going on inside his
or her body —prior experiences (i. e., knowledge) play a
role in directing sensory sampling, and in making mean-
ing of the sensory array to create momentary experiences,
whether or not they are creating an instance of emotion,
perception, or cognition. The word ‘act’ merely signals
that every mental event is, to a considerable extent, in-
fused with top-down (perceiver-based) input.” (Barrett,
2014, pp. 12-13)
Such a view is of course precisely what predictive coding at-
tempts to formalize, specifically when applied to the domain of in-
teroception (Seth, 2013). We would like to make a distinction here
between feelings and emotions. Feelings are indeed a form of mak-
ing sense of underlying emotions. This could already be seen as a
form of coping, a reaction to emotion: categorizing or labeling an
emotion to make it predictable (reducing errors). The underlying
emotion consists, in our reasoning, of the deviation (errors) from
expected error reduction rates. The first-order errors that determine
these dynamics can be multisensory (combined interoceptive and
exteroceptive). The feeling state will then be finding predictions that
best explains the co-occurrence (regularity) of situational context
(exteroceptive input) and bodily states, together with changes in
rates of error reduction (second-order). Hence, the intentional con-
tent of feelings is the product of inferences, but the generation of
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emotion lies in error dynamics. Differently put, if emotions are cat-
egorized, a kind of understanding is attained, which explains away
(part of) the unexpected changes in errors, hence removing (some
of) the emotionality (see also Wilson and Gilbert (2008) on ‘affective
adaptation’).
To give one simple example of how a similar emotion might re-
sult in different feelings: an unexpected increase of prediction errors
may be associated with both fear and shame (seeing that both are
negative emotions). But on the basis of the different conceptual, sit-
uational context (e. g., shame probably concerns internalized social
expectations, fear not necessarily so) they are differently interpreted
and experienced. Interestingly, just by conceptualizing it as shame,
we might activate coping strategies that in related situations helped
returning to more expected states. The shame prediction for this
constellation of inputs is predictive of certain actions or thought
strategies that are in turn predictive of a reduction of prediction
errors (e. g., actions to restore one’s reputation with others).
Humans seem able to take the predictive machinery offline, simu-
lating (counterfactual) predictions and running them against simu-
lated data. How this happens exactly is still largely unexplored (but
see Clark, 2013b; Hohwy, 2013). Given that powerful emotions can
spring from imagining and thinking about events (Carver & Scheier,
1990; Russell, 2003), our account postulates that error dynamics
similarly feature here. It even seems to allow us to experience a kind
of vicarious progress (regress), for our social partners. This needs to
be clarified in future work. In any case, the fact that changes in
errors can be monitored in different sensorimotor, conceptual and
even counter-factual domains could be key to understanding dif-
ferent forms of mixed and conflicting affects, or volatile emotions
based on currently dominant predictive activity in the brain. Tenta-
tively, this may go some way towards explaining the complexity of
emotions.
6.4.2 Function of affect
We have seen how emotionality is always to some extent part of cog-
nitive processing. It is a form of non-conceptual information that
nonetheless has clear phenomenological quality. So, for example,
positive affect is what it is like for the organism to make predictive
progress. We will not address the thorny question whether the con-
scious positive or negative experience is in any way instrumental or
just an epiphenomenon (Schultz, 2007). Could it be that pleasure is
just a by-product of successful PEM? Once a function receives a cir-
cumscribed computational form, it is hard to see why it could not be
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realized just as well without any phenomenal qualities. This is not
an issue specific to our account, nor to PEM in general. Setting aside
this ‘hard problem’, we should briefly discuss the possible functions
of the kind of computations that, according to our approach, under-
lie affect.
These computations should be understood as building a model
about how uncertainties evolve in the current context. It seems plau-
sible that these models could be crucial in guiding choices (implic-
itly or explicitly) about whether to continue to engage with the
current sensorimotor activities or whether to disengage and switch.
Specifically, (unexpected) decreases in prediction errors should raise
predictive engagement, in line with how emotion motivates us to re-
main involved in activities. Confidence, as a rather emotional form
of (meta)cognition (Chetverikov & Filippova, 2014), also seems to
stem from these processes. In contrast, (unexpected) increases of
prediction errors should induce disengagement from current pre-
dictive activity in order to move to a more predictable ‘set’. As we
proposed earlier, it may also change the balance in favor of action
to controlling input (conform to predictions; assimilation) instead
of a continued search for revised predictions (accommodation). An
action to avoid perceptual input (by averting the eyes), or even a
mental switch to leave a certain way of thinking can also be ways to
(temporarily) return to a more expected rate of error reduction. A
more speculative idea is that the negative affect of increasing rates
of prediction errors, motivates one to seek compensatory progress
and order. Preliminary evidence for this idea has come from studies
finding increased predictable pattern perception when confronted
with ambiguity or lack of control (van Harreveld, Rutjens, Schnei-
der, Nohlen, & Keskinis, 2014; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Present-
ing people with conceptual inconsistencies (‘meaning threats’) has
also been found to increase motivation to find predictable structure
in artificial grammar, and better learning of that grammar (Proulx
& Heine, 2009). The domain of uncertainty (prediction errors) was
always different from that of the newly found order, so it seems jus-
tified to call this ‘compensatory’. Greenaway, Louis, and Hornsey
(2013) found that the loss of control leads to more belief in paranor-
mal precognition, and suggest that the loss of predictive frame is
compensated by a belief in a predictable future. More broadly, un-
certainty or inconsistencies may lead people to reaffirm their own
(predictable) worldviews, such as nationality, ideology or religion
(Inzlicht, Tullett, & Good, 2011; Proulx et al., 2010; Valdesolo &
Graham, 2014). The negative affect thought to drive these effects
is, according to our theorizing, a direct reflection of the higher than
expected increase in prediction errors. These examples may then all
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boil down to efforts to return to an expected, positive rate of uncer-
tainty reduction.
Another function of these affective computations relates to learn-
ing and attention. Joffily and Coricelli (2013) formally show that
the first derivative over time of prediction errors can fulfill a sim-
ilar function as the one usually assigned to the precision mecha-
nism (see above). An increase in prediction errors (negative valence)
may indicate that actual, important changes in the world have taken
place, so input (incoming prediction errors) should be weighted
more heavily compared to top-down predictions (that apparently
need to be updated). In other words, the error rates can be used
as a meta-learning signal, tuning the learning rate for new inputs,
depending on whether there is much too learn (i. e., in a changing
world) or not. What we defined as expectations of error reduction
rates then take on the role of expectations on learnability of partic-
ular input domains. These are models about what we do not know
yet about the structure of the world (Joffily & Coricelli, 2013) and
how these uncertainties will evolve, i. e., to what extent we estimate
these uncertainties will be reducible. Joffily and Coricelli (2013) ar-
gue that a model that uses rate of change in errors is more parsi-
monious than one including precisions (a conventional PEM model),
but more work will be needed to clarify both differences in compu-
tational realizability and biological plausibility.
Note that we are concerned here with sub-personal models of un-
certainty. The fact that we maintain these stands in stark contrast to
our difficulty in deliberate, explicit reasoning about uncertainties. In
general, uncertainties in processing inputs seem shielded from our
awareness. Our account suggests that they may still have some phe-
nomenal characteristics, namely in the form of emotional valence.
This casts a different light on attention as well. It has always been
difficult to separate behavioral relevance or value from attention in
itself (Maunsell, 2004). Attention is about getting the reliable infor-
mation, given the ‘questions’ (i. e., predictions) you have (Gottlieb,
2012). That is why expected precisions of prediction errors are as-
sumed to underlie attention: expected precision can adapt the gain
of input such that we attend to precise information about our cur-
rent predictions. If instead of precision we use value as we defined
it here, we always attend to valuable input in the sense of stimuli
with high expected rate of error reduction. Such a treatment may
explain why reward and attention seem to have unified selection
mechanisms in primary visual cortex (Stanisor, van der Togt, Pen-
nartz, & Roelfsema, 2013).
In short, our view may permit a reinterpretation of the amply
documented effects of emotion on cognition, including perception,
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attention (Vuilleumier, 2005), learning and social cognition. Such
influences will need to be systematically explored in light of our hy-
pothesis. To give but one example, positive mood seems to induce
a greater reliance on prior or top-down knowledge, as indicated
by an increased influence of prior judgments, scripts or stereotypes
in event or person perception (Bless, 2000; Bodenhausen, Kramer,
& Süsser, 1994). This dovetails with the proposed view that posi-
tive mood is linked to high predictive progress, implying that the
models the organism has about its world have improved and so are
adequate. A rational conclusion for the system would then be to
increase reliance on these prior, top-down models (and reduce the
influence of prediction errors).
6.5 neural implications
So far, we have no direct neural evidence for the existence of the
proposed computational operations (or their products). In part, this
is probably due to the difficulty of the question. There is only very
preliminary and indirect evidence to date for the separable error
and prediction populations of neurons (de Gardelle et al., 2012),
as postulated by PEM. However, the general idea that there are dif-
ferent levels in the hierarchy, with separable prediction errors has
recently received support (Diuk et al., 2013; Wacongne et al., 2011).
Once we succeed in properly localizing those, on different hierarchi-
cal levels of processing, we can start looking for dynamics in these
errors and neural populations or regions that track these changes
and generate predictions of error reduction rates. It is likely that
these computations are performed distributed in the brain (similar
to first-order predictive coding), given the widely distributed encod-
ing of uncertainty in the brain depending on the domain concerned
(D. R. Bach & Dolan, 2012). But since we are talking about basic
emotional value, which is presumably highly conserved through-
out phylogenetic history, and shown to engage various subcortical
regions, we need to look to those regions (including others thought
to be involved in emotion processing) as well. In this regard, the
overlap in regions found to be important in processing uncertainty
and those active for emotional processing, is promising. Again, a
full exploration is beyond the scope of this chapter, but if we take
the insula for example, we find it to be engaged both in process-
ing of (bodily aspects of) feelings and more broadly in uncertainty
and risk processing (Preuschoff et al., 2008; Singer, Critchley, &
Preuschoff, 2009). In an interesting case study, Picard (2013) de-
scribes two patients with seizures originating in insular regions,
who experienced an exhilarating sense of bliss coinciding with a
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strange sense of certainty. One of them reported that what he felt
was “not unlike a continuous series of profound ‘a-ha!’ moments”
(Picard, 2013, p. 2496). Picard suggests this may be due to the in-
sula’s role in processing prediction errors and uncertainty. We hy-
pothesize more specifically that it may make temporal comparisons
of prediction errors (or contains the products of those operations)
such that it can represent predictive progress, and possibly expecta-
tions of such progress. One can then imagine that abnormal activity
in this region can give rise to a generalized feeling that the world is
infused with meaningfulness (value), because it is as if it perfectly
reflects the agent’s own beliefs about it, with complete confidence
that anything beyond immediate reach can be resolved.
The anterior cingulate cortex, too, is activated by behavioral con-
flicts, inconsistencies, performance errors, and negative affect (e. g.,
see Shackman et al., 2011), but may also track reliability (reducibil-
ity) of prediction errors (Behrens et al., 2007). Whether those re-
gions may actually estimate expected error increases or decreases,
and whether this may explain their role in affective cognition, re-
mains to be seen. It is a plausible hypothesis, especially given these
regions’ involvement in cognitive control (Mushtaq, Bland, & Schae-
fer, 2011), regulating (dis)engagement, switching, and attention as
we discussed in the previous section. Crucially, emotion in general
has a broad, diffuse impact on subsequent processing, and subcor-
tical nuclei are well placed and connected to ‘broadcast’ signals of
predictive progress or failure beyond their region of origin. Neuro-
modulators, such as norepinephrine, that seem to intervene in infer-
ence, as well as in emotion (Dayan, 2012b), may have an important
role here.
Finally, Verduzco-Flores and O’Reilly (2014) present a model of
the cerebellum functioning for motor control that computes increase
of error (error derivative), rather than instantaneous error, to adjust
reaching movements. Indeed, our account would predict that cere-
bellum, like the rest of the brain, would represent these changes,
specifically relative to predictions about sensory consequences of
one’s actions, that are assumed to be encoded there (Miall, Weir,
Wolpert, & Stein, 1993; Synofzik, Lindner, & Thier, 2008). Apart
from possible functional roles in learning or attention (such as that
described by Verduzco-Flores & O’Reilly, 2014), we contend that
such error increases and decreases contribute to emotional valence.
Incidentally, cerebellum damage leads to a particular cognitive-af-
fective syndrome, characterized by executive and sensorimotor def-
icits as well as depressive symptoms (lack of emotion) and/or anx-
iety (Wolf, Rapoport, & Schweizer, 2009). We are reminded here
that our approach may be able to shed new light on other psy-
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chiatric disorders that combine cognitive and emotional problems,
such as depression, autism, and schizophrenia. This seems a fruit-
ful avenue for future research, considering the recently emerging
predictive coding accounts of these mental illnesses (Adams et al.,
2013; Gradin et al., 2011; Van de Cruys et al., 2014). For example,
could depression be well-characterized as a generalized low expec-
tation of error reduction rates (see also Huys & Dayan, 2009)?
6.6 conclusions
Visual perception —the ‘noblest sense’— has a prominent place
in Western culture. Throughout our history, it was considered our
main route to find the ground truth about the world out there. Par-
ticularly in the history of science, scholars relied on this allegedly
direct connection to the material world, yet still keeping the proper
objective distance. It became the eye that objectifies and masters
(Jay, 1994), key to the Western world’s most important technologi-
cal breakthroughs. Note the voir (‘to see’) in the French pouvoir (‘to
be able to’; ‘power’) and savoir (‘to know’). With the hegemony of
the eye came the myth of the all seeing eye (Koenderink, 2014). The
idea, still pervading modern science, that there is a (quasi-godly)
vantage point from which one could see the objective, veridical
states of affairs —those that science will uncover. This is, as Koen-
derink (2014) forcefully argues, of course a fata morgana. As we saw,
physical differences in the world only become information (mean-
ing) by the way we probe them, with our (organism-specific) pre-
dictions. This means that value and information are intertwined by
construction —courtesy of our existence as biological organisms.
We have tried to present an account of emotional value starting
from the premise that all the brain is doing can be summarized
by generalized predictive coding and its PEM principle. Emotional
valence appears here as a particular informational process, but not
mere- ly Shannon-informational given the source of predictions and
the particular engagement they represent. It shows some promise
for the predictive coding framework to become a common, well-
specified language for psychology. Although our view builds on sev-
eral core ideas developed by prominent emotion theorists, reinter-
preting emotions in PEM terms led to notions that depart from con-
cepts originating in folk-psychology and sometimes carried through
in emotion theory. This should be welcomed, because it leads us to
question implicit assumptions in those concepts and it stresses that
familiar, intuitively clear concepts (such as reward) do not necessar-
ily correspond to unitary psychological and neural substrates.
6.6 conclusions 167
This is only a first exploration of how emotions and related di-
mensions or forms of experience can be reconceptualized within
predictive coding. We highlighted various aspects that deserve more
attention. Many challenges lie ahead, but the question of whether
the brain indeed tracks error increases and decreases and forms
predictions about those, is open to empirical and computational
investigation. Theoretically, there is a worry that PEM, as broadly
conceived as we have done here, will not sufficiently specify the
particular mechanisms of cognitive processing. The issue is even
more pressing with regard to emotions, often conceived of as ad
hoc, adaptive ‘hacks’ in the brain. Still, as we tried to make clear,
every ‘trick in the bag’ is the result of predictive matching to envi-
ronmental regularities. When such a quick-and-dirty, evolutionarily
prepared strategy should be applied, rather than the general pur-
pose, flexible —but costly— predictive system, is an arbitration that
may also be solvable in a Bayesian way (based on relative uncer-
tainties, Clark, 2013a). In reality, there will probably be a whole
continuum of predictive flexibility, as we saw.

We really do need structure, so we can see we are nowhere.
— J. Cage
7
Conclusions
A few common strands run through all chapters of this work. One
of them is that predictive coding is not nearly as new as one might
conclude reading recent articles about it. Important precursors of
the central ideas of predictive coding can be found in philosophy
(e. g., James, 1890; von Glasersfeld, 1991), cybernetics (e. g., Bate-
son, 1979), biology (Rosen, 2012[1985]), and psychology (e. g., Gre-
gory, 1980; Helmholtz, 1878; Köhler, 1920). This is a good thing
because it adds to the plausibility of the framework. It does not
mean that predictive coding is just old wine in new bags. Due to
the influence from artificial intelligence and computational neuro-
science, it has greater computational specificity (e. g., the precision
mechanism) than its precursors. The fact that it is more committed
to a particular architecture, makes it more amenable to empirical
tests and simulations. Hence, a second common strand is that we
could come up with new behavioral and modeling questions based
on the account. A third is that prediction errors are fruitful building
blocks to think about the pathological mind and about emotion. If
errors are our way of ‘meeting the world’, they are indeed bound
to determine our experience and our difficulties in interacting with
this world. A fourth and last common strand is that predictive cod-
ing as a form of anticipatory processing allows us to fully appreciate
the continuity of psychology with the rest of biology. This enabled
us to start to respond to the fundamental question of how some-
thing like value could appear in a world of mere matter and infor-
mation.
Three things remain for us here: taking stock of what we gained,
looking ahead at what might be in store for the PEM framework, and
briefly considering the recurrent concern about falsifiability of the
framework. We will start with the latter.
The worry about falsifiability is of course not specific to our pro-
posal, nor to predictive coding at large. For example, the larger fam-
ily of Bayesian approaches has been accused of being unfalsifiable
(Bowers & Davis, 2012). However, the argument seems mostly a
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red herring. It is true that to make a broad framework such as pre-
dictive coding falsifiable one always requires auxiliary assumptions
and initial conditions (Chalmers, 1999). This is no different for the
theory of natural selection or the second law of thermodynamics, to
give but a few examples of in principle unfalsifiable theories. Grif-
fiths, Chater, Norris, and Pouget (2012) make the useful distinction
between frameworks and models. Frameworks should be judged
based on how productive they are in generating specific models and
new empirical predictions (again, the pragmatic criterion rules), not
on how falsifiable they are. The concrete models derived from it,
however, are disprovable. They will be strengthened by empirical
success and weakened if they need ad hoc constructions to explain
data.
In the past chapters, we mainly used predictive coding as a gen-
eral framework but it should be apparent that specific testable com-
putational models derived from it can be and have been formulated
(e. g., Iglesias et al., 2013; Mathys et al., 2011; Rao & Ballard,
1999). We now need to investigate whether they can be extended to
cover the broad scope of tasks and faculties that predictive coding
claims to explain. In any way, the opportunity is unique in the sense
that psychologists, neuroscientists and computational modelers are
all examining different aspects of the same framework. We already
see this happening for predictive coding accounts of schizophrenia
(Adams et al., 2013; Schmack et al., 2013; Stephan, Friston, & Frith,
2009) and we hope we have helped start such movement for ASD.
For both ASD and affect we have seen that, although the concepts
are often compatible with existing theories, the advantage is that
they are more integrated and specific in cognitive, computational
and neural terms. Hence the ideas should in principle be more fal-
sifiable than earlier accounts. However, we will not know until we
have actually examined all its implications and assumptions. This
large enterprise has indeed been started in the literature and the
current work should be able to contribute to that discussion. Im-
portantly, the neural implementation can be tested — multiple re-
search groups (Bastos et al., 2012; Egner & Summerfield, 2013;
Muckli, Petro, & Smith, 2013) set out the lines along which to do
so. Similarly, the computational realizability can (and will need to)
be evaluated (Blokpoel, Kwisthout, & van Rooij, 2012).
Most importantly, there is a healthy discussion about which com-
putational scheme and information-theoretical objective the brain
actually follows (e. g., Clark, 2013b; Phillips, 2013; Spratling, 2010;
Thornton, 2014a), given that it performs some form of probabilistic,
predictive processing. These proposals of guiding principles include
regular PEM and maximization of predictive progress (Chapter 6),
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but also the principle of maximizing mutual information (proposed
by Little & Sommer, 2013), of maximizing the amount correctly
predicted (proposed by Phillips, 2012) or the infotropic principle
(proposed by Thornton, 2014a). Although all of these principles
seem to explicitly or implicitly reduce prediction errors, the actual,
full consequences of their application for perception and action can
be hard to predict. These are not just theoretical debates; they will
inform us about the need for explicit representation of prediction er-
rors in separate units (Phillips, 2013; Rasmussen & Eliasmith, 2013)
and about the possible architectures (e. g., do feedforward pathways
only signal prediction error?) that can be used to realize predictive
processing in the brain.
With that, we arrive at what we gained and what may still be in
store for the presented views.
Chapter 2 Concerning our HIPPEA proposal on autism (Chap-
ter 2), we tried to show that problems emerge throughout the be-
havioral literature in ASD when actual changes in input structure
are mixed with accidental variability (noise), presumably because
adaptive estimation of precision of input is missing. This is a more
subtle deficit than previous theories assume, but accounts better
for the mixed evidence of behavioral deficits in ASD. We have indi-
cated several new (multidisciplinary) empirical questions that need
no repeating. It is worth emphasizing that one of the most crucial
issues is to try to make a clearer, empirically informative distinction
between more precise prediction errors and less precise (weaker)
predictions (or priors). Although they may have similar effects in
some areas (e. g., a more heavy reliance on bottom-up evidence),
they seem at least in principle dissociable when considering the re-
sult of inference (higher posterior precision for high precision pre-
diction errors) and with regard to (meta)learning. This discussion
may superficially seem just a rehash of the controversy between
weak central coherence theory and enhanced perceptual function-
ing theory, but we gained a computational framework (predictive
coding/Bayesian inference) that promises better specification and
quantification of clinical alterations in cognitive tasks.
The approach provided fresh behavioral hypotheses, specifically
with regard to (lack of) context-dependent tuning of precision of
prediction errors. Sensorimotor or perceptual tasks manipulating
context uncertainty in ASD are already on the way and should prove
very informative for the validity of the approach. We cannot resist
giving two more empirical avenues. A first one would be to use a
visual search task, one of the clearest examples of enhanced perfor-
mance in ASD. However, Ma, Navalpakkam, Beck, Berg, and Pouget
(2011) showed an interesting variation of this task, using varying
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reliabilities on a trial by trial basis. According to their findings, hu-
mans perform near optimal taking into account these uncertainties.
HIPPEA would predict this would not hold for people with ASD,
even though they might be better in basic visual search. A second
research design concerns the problem in meta-learning —learning
where learnable differences are situated. Gerken et al. (2011) found
that TD infants of 17 months attend longer to learnable compared
to unlearnable linguistic patterns. HIPPEA predicts that infants with
ASD would not show this difference (or show it later for given ma-
terials), suggesting that this is an interesting candidate for an early
behavioral marker.
As we described, the theory still leaves plenty of room for phe-
notypical variability. One might, for example, imagine that what is
sometimes called ‘core autism’ is characterized by high and inflex-
ible precision, while other individuals on the spectrum may only
lack the context-dependent flexibility or, alternatively, only have ab-
normally high mean precision. These are clear hypotheses that lend
themselves to empirical refutation. On the neural front, it remains
to be clarified what the underpinnings of precision computations in
the brain may be (we identified candidates) and whether these can
eventually be correlated with symptom severity in ASD. Although
we think the account fares well in comparisons with more estab-
lished single deficit accounts, further discussions should shed light
on whether it can comply to the criteria for such accounts as iden-
tified throughout the literature (e.g. universal, specific, mechanistic,
consistent with neurobiological data, etc.; e. g., see Pellicano, 2011).
Overall, we think our cognitive account can help connect neurophys-
iology of ASD with the clinical, experiential level of description.
An interesting discussion will surely continue on Bayesian mod-
els for ASD and other mental disorders. Will these approaches have
the flexibility to adequately account for the different kinds of disor-
dered mind, while also limiting the amount of variation that can be
expected? We hope we have managed to highlight some pertinent
questions that have to be clarified theoretically to arrive at a specific
predictive coding or Bayesian account of ASD (and to make the dis-
tinction with schizophrenia). There is a sense in which any behav-
ioral profile can be modeled with Bayes if one only (ad lib) picks
the right priors, so a central question becomes whether there is in-
efficient model updating (‘broken inference’) or ‘just’ an abnormal
model (prior beliefs) (Moutoussis et al., 2014). This distinction is
further clouded by the fact that inefficient model updating will also
lead to deviant priors. Generally, one could say that the Bayesian
approach has too many degrees of freedom here. But as Griffiths et
al. (2012) point out, this is just because these are more transparent
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(hence salient) in this approach compared to other cognitive models.
Indeed, the Bayesian account forces the user to make these assump-
tions explicit. This brings up a final important challenge for the field:
bringing about close collaborations between researchers with strong
technical know-how in model building, and those skilled in work-
ing with clinical populations on cognitive and behavioral tasks.
Chapter 5 Our study with the point-light walkers still left at
least two possible interpretations open: people may differ in the
prior or prediction they apply based on the behavioral relevance
of the different priors. Or, they might differ in terms of the sensi-
tivity with which they process bottom-up (in our case perspective)
cues. Given what we saw about precision in Chapter 2, we could
rephrase the latter as heightened precision of incoming evidence for
people with high social anxiety. This may be a temporary, stimulus
or context-related, higher precision, rather than a higher precision
across the board as we suggested for ASD. There may be an impor-
tant link here given that (social) anxiety is also commonly reported
in ASD, as we discussed in Chapter 2. This idea is also compatible
with reports of better change detection and more bottom-up driven
attention for people with high trait social anxiety, as we already in-
dicated in Chapter 5 (Moriya & Sugiura, 2012; Moriya & Tanno,
2009). Interesting in this regard is that stress potentiates early (EEG)
stages of visual processing but attenuates later stages (Shackman et
al., 2011). It is not far-fetched to assume that people with high trait
social anxiety experienced more state anxiety in the social setting
of the experiment (e. g., because it requires interacting with the ex-
perimenter in a the performance context), which may for them gen-
erally cause a higher precision of bottom-up input. We deem such
general, stimulus-independent changes in input processing likely,
so future studies should in any case include a neutral, geometrical
(e. g., a structure-from-motion) bistable figure, and ideally an addi-
tional, lower level visual task. This would allow us to check whether
not the content (value) of the figures but rather the way (any) pre-
sented input is processed differs between people with anxiety and
without. Additionally, it would be important to verify whether state
anxiety induction (in non-trait-anxious people) has the same effects
as trait anxiety in these tasks. Inducing ecologically valid anxiety in
the lab (without resorting to shocks) is not trivial but a game context
with different threat levels seems promising (Mobbs et al., 2007).
Since we published our study, one related study (Heenan & Troje,
2014) appeared, also looking at the link between anxiety and the fac-
ing bias in bistable biological motion stimuli. These authors showed
that reducing anxiety (by ten minutes of physical exercise or by mus-
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cle relaxation) reduced the facing bias for biological walkers. They
propose that reducing anxiety reduces the threat value of the fac-
ing percept, hence rendering the percepts more equal. These results
seem inconsistent with ours, though note that they reduced (state)
anxiety rather than making use of high trait social anxiety as we did.
In their second experiment they did explicitly try to increase anxi-
ety (using an autobiographical anxiety induction method), but this
did not result in higher facing bias, as would be expected following
the socio-emotional relevance hypothesis. Importantly, their manip-
ulation worked fine (post-questionnaire showed increased anxiety),
it just did not cause the expected increase in facing bias. In fact, if
anything it seems to slightly reduce (non-significantly) it (see their
figure 4). Also puzzling is that the manipulation checks (heart rate
measurements and questionnaire before and after relaxation, induc-
tion or control) showed no reduction in anxiety in the relaxation
condition (where they did find an effect in their perceptual task)
but an increase in anxiety in the anxiety induction condition (where
they did not find an effect in the perceptual task). Although this
might be due to limitations of the measurements used, we should
remain open to the possibility that their effects were not caused
by differences in anxiety per se (this holds for our study as well).
Maybe a cleaner test of the affective relevance hypothesis —the idea
that the value of the prior biases perception— would be to use a
neutral bistable structure-from-motion stimulus, but aversively con-
dition one of the two percepts (counterbalanced). A bias towards or
away from the conditioned interpretation would speak to the rele-
vance hypothesis (a positivity or negativity bias), rather than one in
terms of sensitivity to inputs or another domain-general process.
Chapter 3 , 4 and 6 The three chapters left can be treated to-
gether because they all explore our hypothesis on the relation be-
tween emotion dynamics and error dynamics. These ideas and par-
ticularly the accompanying empirical test are very preliminary. But
much of the theoretical developments is compatible with existing
theories on psychoaesthetics and emotion. With regard to the lat-
ter, our reasoning brought non-mainstream emotion accounts to the
fore that, based on the logic of generalized predictive coding, de-
serve such prominent place. We foresee exciting work here, about
how varying predictability influences (subtle) emotion dynamics.
However, at least two obstacles may impede progress. The first is the
noted individualized, experience-dependent nature of predictability.
The second is that we are not (in the first place) concerned with
agent-level prediction errors (surprise or expectation violation), but
with sub-personal processing products. It means that we will even-
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tually need to rely on neural measures for tracking these dynamics.
Hence, the added value of our account largely depends on the suc-
cess of predictive coding proponents in pinning down the physio-
logical basis of the computational scheme.
There is another reason for optimism about these views. In a re-
cent symposium on probabilistic inference in the brain, philosopher
and predictive coding proponent Andy Clark made a plea for the
rise of the PEM robots. Indeed, we could envision artificial predic-
tion error minimizing agents, traversing their unique landscape of
prediction error, creating new valleys and descending new slopes.
One could test their ability to perceive, learn and execute adaptive
behavior in toy worlds, initially of low complexity. In the current
context it would additionally be interesting to see how animate and
intrinsically motivated these agents seem. What if we add the ca-
pacity to form expectations about error reduction rates? We know
from Heider and Simmel’s (1944) work that people readily ascribe
emotions and intentions to simple, moving stimuli, but the move-
ments of these PEM robots would not be preprogrammed, but de-
pend on internal dynamics. The agents would start with a set of ex-
pected states given some essential (homeostatic) variables and they
should develop the ability to generate useful habits matching the
structure of the environment. Some progress in this direction has
already been made by Egbert and Canamero (2014). They created
simple agents of the kind first proposed by Braitenberg (1986, hence
called Braitenberg vehicles) that learned predictable sensorimotor
sequences. These ‘habits’ could support staying within the viable
range of essential variables and hence are self-maintaining. The spe-
cific form of these habits are, however, not predefined but developed
autonomously and varied from agent to agent. Thornton (2014b),
on the other hand, implemented a very simple form of ‘seeking’ be-
havior in these Braitenberg vehicles, using a predictive processing
scheme. Note that both of these examples used a form of predic-
tive processing, but not predictive coding per se. It will be interest-
ing to see if one could build PEM vehicles, that incorporate home-
ostatic predictions but attain some independence in the kinds of
habits they develop. Such robotics experiments could also teach us
to what extent the different principles (see above) that could guide
predictive processing are equivalent or have practical, implementa-
tional (dis)advantages. More generally, creating PEM-based agents
could probably point us to shortcomings of the framework that we
might not notice otherwise (Thornton, 2014b). By doing this, we
would close the circle by applying the constructivist inspiration of
predictive coding to the theory of predictive coding itself: only by
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constructing PEM agents we can learn whether they could be viable
models of living, perceiving, behaving and learning organisms.
If an emotion theory along the lines presented in Chapter 6 is
right, we might be getting some formal grasp on affective value
and intrinsic motivation, key characteristics of proactive, living or-
ganisms. The convergence between computational neuroscience and
psychology as seen through this predictive coding account is en-
couraging. Although computational neuroscience largely leads the
way here, we should not overlook the role of experimental psychol-
ogists and systematic students of phenomenology as indispensable
sounding boards. Hopefully, the current work can serve as proof
that predictive coding provides a fruitful way to think about the
mind-brain, from low-level perceptual issues to emotional and exis-
tential issues. Because ultimately, PEM is about gathering evidence
for one’s own existence (Hohwy, 2014). This is the necessary cog-
nitive counterpart of an organism’s capacity to regenerate itself,
through metabolism, as a unit distinguished from its surroundings
(autopoiesis; Varela, Maturana, & Uribe, 1974).
I want to end this work on a word of humility. As scientists, we
are used to deal in uncertainties. But we want our piece of the pre-
dictive progress goodness as much as the next fellow, if we think
it is within reach. It can be hard not to be seduced by an orderly,
unified (predictable!) theory of the mind. However, the only way
of knowing whether our intuition is a rightful sense of predictive
progress, is to test the limits of the theory, and explore its implica-
tions to the fullest. We have done part of this work with regard to
affect and autism. If not true, one may hope that it will nonetheless
help sharpen our questions and specify the explananda. The most
we can hope for as scientists, is not to leave the field more cluttered
for those who come after us —anything extra is a bonus. It may give
intellectual pleasure to bring it all together in a few orderly princi-
ples, but we have to remind ourselves that nature, and especially
the mind, is more stubborn and messy than we might like or can
imagine.
Coda
If one were to devise some guidelines for well-being, based on the
principles of (dis)pleasure we put forward in Chapter 6, these could
go along the following lines. Find a cognitive niche where one can
enjoy the trajectory (error reduction) rather than the fleeting results.
This has its perils as well, as when people flee in video games,
because the rate of progress made there is often incomparable to
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daily life (because it is tailored to the current proficiency of the
player). Another strategy could be to attempt to silence the predic-
tions; because no errors without predictions. It is highly question-
able whether this is at all possible, given that any mental activity
is, according to PEM, predictive. Still, predictive activity may be fo-
cused to lower level perceptual ones, that can be confirmed more
easily. In fact, this is part of what Buddhism and related meditative
practices try to accomplish: focus on simple changes in interoceptive
and exteroceptive inputs, without activating higher level conceptual,
or even goal-related (cf. ‘nonjudgmental’) predictions about them.
One could look at repetitive rituals of other religions in a similar
way. They are not ways to avoid predictive activity (which would be
impossible), but rather efforts to move predictive activity to more
‘manageable’ areas. This aligns with what we described in Chap-
ter 6 with respect to religion as compensatory predictability. The
human ‘curse of cognition’ (Vaneechoutte, 1993) may actually be a
curse of prediction. Our explosive predictive capacity, pinnacling in
full-blown ‘foresight’, bore an inability to remain in the present.
We can find some light however, in the current ‘egalitarian’ the-
ory of pleasure. Pleasures come in various forms, but there are
no ‘higher’ ones and ‘lower’ ones according to this view. Consis-
tent with age-old wisdom, someone with objectively few (classical)
rewards, could still have an extremely satisfying (rewarding) life.
Conversely, someone with objectively lots of ‘rewards’ could have a
dreadful life. Finally, insights that are very bleak, but increase our
predictive grasp, can be deviously pleasurable.

Bibliography
Adams, R. A., Stephan, K. E., Brown, H. R., & Friston, K. J.
(2013). The computational anatomy of psychosis. Frontiers
in Schizophrenia, 4, 47. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00047
Albright, T. D. (2012). On the perception of probable things: Neu-
ral substrates of associative memory, imagery, and perception.
Neuron, 74(2), 227–245. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.001
Alderson-Day, B., & McGonigle-Chalmers, M. (2011). Is it a bird? is
it a plane? Category use in problem-solving in children with
autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 41(5), 555–565. doi: 10.1007/s10803-010-1077-9
Alink, A., Schwiedrzik, C. M., Kohler, A., Singer, W., & Muckli, L.
(2010). Stimulus predictability reduces responses in primary
visual cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30(8), 2960 –2966. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3730-10.2010
Allison, T., Puce, A., & McCarthy, G. (2000). Social perception from
visual cues: Role of the STS region. Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
4, 267–278. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01501-1
Alpers, G. W., & Gerdes, A. B. M. (2007). Here is looking at you:
emotional faces predominate in binocular rivalry. Emotion,
7(3), 495–506. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.7.3.495
Alter, A. L., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2009). Uniting the tribes
of fluency to form a metacognitive nation. Personality
and Social Psychology Review, 13(3), 219–235. doi: 10.1177/
1088868309341564
Amaral, D. G., Schumann, C. M., & Nordahl, C. W. (2008). Neu-
roanatomy of autism. Trends in Neurosciences, 31(3), 137–145.
doi: 10.1016/j.tins.2007.12.005
Amaral, J. L., Collins, S., Bohache, K. T., & Kloos, H. (2012). Beyond
the Black-and-White of autism: How cognitive performance
varies with context. In H. Kloos (Ed.), Current topics in chil-
dren’s learning and cognition. InTech.
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical
manual of mental disorders: DSM-5. Arlington, Va.: American
Psychiatric Association.
Anderson, C. J., & Colombo, J. (2009). Larger tonic pupil size in
young children with autism spectrum disorder. Developmental
Psychobiology, 51(2), 207–211. doi: 10.1002/dev.20352
Anselme, P. (2010). The uncertainty processing theory of motivation.
179
180 bibliography
Behavioural Brain Research, 208(2), 291–310. doi: 10.1016/j.bbr
.2009.12.020
Anselme, P., Robinson, M. J. F., & Berridge, K. C. (2013). Re-
ward uncertainty enhances incentive salience attribution as
sign-tracking. Behavioural Brain Research, 238, 53–61. doi:
10.1016/j.bbr.2012.10.006
Apps, M. A. J., & Tsakiris, M. (2014). The free-energy self: A predic-
tive coding account of self-recognition. Neuroscience & Biobe-
havioral Reviews, 41, 85–97. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.01
.029
Aragon. (1971). Henri Matisse: roman. Gallimard.
Arnal, L. H., & Giraud, A. (2012). Cortical oscillations and sensory
predictions. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(7), 390–398. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2012.05.003
Arnheim, R. (1974). Art and visual perception. Berkeley, CA: Univer-
sity of California Press.
Arnold, M. B. (1960). Emotion and personality.
Ashwin, E., Ashwin, C., Rhydderch, D., Howells, J., & Baron-Cohen,
S. (2009). Eagle-eyed visual acuity: an experimental investi-
gation of enhanced perception in autism. Biological Psychiatry,
65(1873-2402 (Electronic)), 17–21. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2008
.06.012
Asperger, H. (1944). Die "autistischen psychopathen" im kindesalter.
Archiv fur Psychiatrie und Nervenkrakheiten, 117, 76–136.
Aston-Jones, G., & Cohen, J. D. (2005). An integrative theory of
locus Coeruleus-Norepinephrine function: Adaptive gain and
optimal performance. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 28(1), 403–
450. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.28.061604.135709
Augustin, M. D., Carbon, C., & Wagemans, J. (2012). Artful terms:
A study on aesthetic word usage for visual art versus film and
music. i-Perception, 3(5), 319–337. doi: 10.1068/i0511aap
Aviezer, H., Trope, Y., & Todorov, A. (2012). Body cues, not facial
expressions, discriminate between intense positive and neg-
ative emotions. Science, 338(6111), 1225–1229. doi: 10.1126/
science.1224313
Bach, D. R., & Dolan, R. J. (2012). Knowing how much you don’t
know: a neural organization of uncertainty estimates. Nature
Reviews Neuroscience, 13(8), 572–586. doi: 10.1038/nrn3289
Bach, D. R., Hulme, O., Penny, W. D., & Dolan, R. J. (2011). The
known unknowns: Neural representation of Second-Order un-
certainty, and ambiguity. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(13), 4811–
4820. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1452-10.2011
Bach, M., & Dakin, S. C. (2009). Regarding “Eagle-Eyed visual
acuity: An experimental investigation of enhanced perception
bibliography 181
in autism”. Biological Psychiatry, 66(10), e19–e20. doi: 10.1016/
j.biopsych.2009.02.035
Baird, G., Simonoff, E., Pickles, A., Chandler, S., Loucas, T., Mel-
drum, D., & Charman, T. (2006). Prevalence of disorders of the
autism spectrum in a population cohort of children in south
thames: the special needs and autism project (SNAP). Lancet,
368(9531), 210–215. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(06)69041-7
Bakouie, F., Zendehrouh, S., & Gharibzadeh, S. (2009). Does a kind
of over-fitting occur in the brain of autistic patients? The Jour-
nal of neuropsychiatry and clinical neurosciences, 21(3), 343. doi:
10.1176/appi.neuropsych.21.3.343
Balcetis, E., & Dunning, D. (2010). Wishful seeing. Psychological
Science, 21(1), 147–152. doi: 10.1177/0956797609356283
Bar, M. (2007). The proactive brain: using analogies and associations
to generate predictions. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(7), 280–
9. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2007.05.005
Bar, M. (2009). The proactive brain: memory for predictions. Philo-
sophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
364(1521), 1235–1243. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0310
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J.,
& van IJzendoorn, M. H. (2007). Threat-related attentional bias
in anxious and nonanxious individuals: A meta-analytic study.
Psychological Bulletin, 133(1), 1–24. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.133
.1.1
Baron-Cohen, S. (2001). Theory of mind and autism: A review.
International Review of Research in Mental Retardation, Vol 23, 23,
169–184.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2006). The hyper-systemizing, assortative mating
theory of autism. Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Bio-
logical Psychiatry, 30(5), 865–872. doi: 10.1016/j.pnpbp.2006.01
.010
Baron-Cohen, S., Ashwin, E., Ashwin, C., Tavassoli, T., &
Chakrabarti, B. (2009). Talent in autism: hyper-systemizing,
hyper-attention to detail and sensory hypersensitivity. Philo-
sophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
364(1471-2970 (Electronic)), 1377–1383. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008
.0337
Baron-Cohen, S., Richler, J., Bisarya, D., Gurunathan, N., & Wheel-
wright, S. (2003). The systemizing quotient: an investigation
of adults with asperger syndrome or high–functioning autism,
and normal sex differences. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 358(1430),
361–374. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2002.1206
Baron-Cohen, S., Ring, H., Bullmore, E., Wheelwright, S., Ashwin,
182 bibliography
C., & Williams, S. (2000). The amygdala theory of autism.
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 24(3), 355–364. doi: 10
.1016/S0149-7634(00)00011-7
Barrett, L. F. (2006). Are emotions natural kinds? Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 1(1), 28 –58. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2006
.00003.x
Barrett, L. F. (2014). The conceptual act theory: A précis. Emotion
Review, 6(4), 292–297. doi: 10.1177/1754073914534479
Barrett, L. F., & Bar, M. (2009). See it with feeling: affective predic-
tions during object perception. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 364(1521),
1325–1334. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0312
Barrett, L. F., Mesquita, B., & Gendron, M. (2011). Context in
emotion perception. Current Directions in Psychological Science,
20(5), 286–290. doi: 10.1177/0963721411422522
Bartz, J. A., Zaki, J., Bolger, N., & Ochsner, K. N. (2011). So-
cial effects of oxytocin in humans: context and person mat-
ter. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(7), 301–309. doi: 10.1016/
j.tics.2011.05.002
Bastos, A. M., Usrey, W. M., Adams, R. A., Mangun, G. R., Fries, P.,
& Friston, K. J. (2012). Canonical microcircuits for predictive
coding. Neuron, 76(4), 695–711. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10
.038
Bates, D., Mächler, M., & Bolker, B. (2012). Fitting linear mixed-
effects models using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software (forth-
coming).
Bateson, G. (1979). Mind and nature: A necessary unity. Dutton New
York.
Bauman, M. L., & Kemper, T. L. (1994). Neuroanatomic observations
of the brain in autism. The neurobiology of autism, 119–145.
Bauman, M. L., & Kemper, T. L. (2005). The neurobiology of autism.
JHU Press.
Baxter, M. G., & Murray, E. A. (2002). The amygdala and reward. Na-
ture Reviews Neuroscience, 3(7), 563–573. doi: 10.1038/nrn875
Bechtel, W. (2009). Explanation: Mechanism, modularity, and sit-
uated cognition. The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition,
155–170.
Behrens, T. E. J., Woolrich, M. W., Walton, M. E., & Rushworth,
M. F. S. (2007). Learning the value of information in an
uncertain world. Nature Neuroscience, 10(9), 1214–1221. doi:
10.1038/nn1954
Behrmann, M., Peterson, M. A., Moscovitch, M., & Suzuki, S. (2006).
Independent representation of parts and the relations between
them: Evidence from integrative agnosia. Journal of Experimen-
bibliography 183
tal Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 32(5), 1169–
1184.
Bellon, M. L., Ogletree, B. T., & Harn, W. E. (2000). Repeated sto-
rybook reading as a language intervention for children with
autism: A case study on the application of scaffolding. Focus
on Autism and Other Developmental Disabilities, 15(1), 52–58. doi:
10.1177/108835760001500107
Belmonte, M. K., Cook, E. H., Anderson, G. M., Rubenstein, J. L. R.,
Greenough, W. T., Beckel-Mitchener, A., . . . Tierney, E. (2004).
Autism as a disorder of neural information processing: direc-
tions for research and targets for therapy*. Molecular Psychiatry,
9(7), 646–663. doi: 10.1038/sj.mp.4001499
Ben-Sasson, A., Hen, L., Fluss, R., Cermak, S., Engel-Yeger, B., & Gal,
E. (2009). A meta-analysis of sensory modulation symptoms in
individuals with autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism
and Developmental Disorders, 39(0162-3257 (Print)), 1–11. doi:
10.1007/s10803-008-0593-3
Berlyne, D. E. (1966). Curiosity and exploration. Science, 153(3731),
25–33. doi: 10.1126/science.153.3731.25
Berlyne, D. E. (1970). Novelty, complexity, and hedonic value.
Perception & Psychophysics, 8(5), 279–286. doi: 10.3758/
BF03212593
Bertone, A., Mottron, L., Jelenic, P., & Faubert, J. (2003). Mo-
tion perception in autism: a "complex" issue. Journal of Cogni-
tive Neuroscience, 15(0898-929X (Print)), 218–225. doi: 10.1162/
089892903321208150
Bertone, A., Mottron, L., Jelenic, P., & Faubert, J. (2005). En-
hanced and diminished visuo-spatial information processing
in autism depends on stimulus complexity. Brain, 128(10),
2430–2441. doi: 10.1093/brain/awh561
Bialek, W., Nemenman, I., & Tishby, N. (2001). Predictability, com-
plexity, and learning. Neural Computation, 13(11), 2409–2463.
doi: 10.1162/089976601753195969
Biederman, I., & Vessel, E. (2006). Perceptual pleasure and the brain.
American Scientist, 94(3), 247. doi: 10.1511/2006.3.247
Bird, G., Leighton, J., Press, C., & Heyes, C. (2007). Intact auto-
matic imitation of human and robot actions in autism spec-
trum disorders. Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sci-
ences, 274(1628), 3027–3031. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2007.1019
Bird, G., Silani, G., Brindley, R., White, S., Frith, U., & Singer, T.
(2010). Empathic brain responses in insula are modulated by
levels of alexithymia but not autism. Brain, 133(5), 1515–1525.
doi: 10.1093/brain/awq060
Bishop, D. V. M. (1989). Autism, asperger’s syndrome and semantic-
184 bibliography
pragmatic disorder: Where are the boundaries? International
Journal of Language & Communication Disorders, 24(2), 107–121.
doi: 10.3109/13682828909011951
Bitbol, M. (2007). Ontology, matter and emergence. Phenomenology
and the Cognitive Sciences, 6(3), 293–307. doi: 10.1007/s11097
-006-9041-z
Blackford, J. U., Allen, A. H., Cowan, R. L., & Avery, S. N. (2012).
Amygdala and hippocampus fail to habituate to faces in indi-
viduals with an inhibited temperament. Social Cognitive and
Affective Neuroscience. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsr078
Blake, R., & Shiffrar, M. (2007). Perception of human motion. Annual
Review of Psychology, 58(1), 47–73. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych
.57.102904.190152
Blakemore, S., Tavassoli, T., Calo, S., Thomas, R., Catmur, C., Frith,
U., & Haggard, P. (2006). Tactile sensitivity in asperger syn-
drome. Brain & Cognition, 61(0278-2626 (Print)), 5–13. doi:
10.1016/j.bandc.2005.12.013
Bless, H. (2000). The interplay of affect and cognition: The me-
diating role of general knowledge structures. In Feeling and
thinking: The role of affect in social cognition (pp. 201–222). New
York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press.
Blokpoel, M., Kwisthout, J., & van Rooij, I. (2012). When can pre-
dictive brains be truly Bayesian? Frontiers in Psychology, 3. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00406
Blood, A. J., & Zatorre, R. J. (2001). Intensely pleasurable responses
to music correlate with activity in brain regions implicated
in reward and emotion. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 98, 11818–11823.
Bodenhausen, G. V., Kramer, G. P., & Süsser, K. (1994). Happi-
ness and stereotypic thinking in social judgment. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 66(4), 621–632. doi: 10.1037/
0022-3514.66.4.621
Bögels, S. M., & Mansell, W. (2004). Attention processes in the
maintenance and treatment of social phobia: hypervigilance,
avoidance and self-focused attention. Clinical Psychology Re-
view, 24(7), 827–856. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2004.06.005
Boll, S., Gamer, M., Gluth, S., Finsterbusch, J., & Büchel, C. (2013).
Separate amygdala subregions signal surprise and predictive-
ness during associative fear learning in humans. The European
Journal of Neuroscience, 37(5), 758–767. doi: 10.1111/ejn.12094
Bölte, S., Holtmann, M., Poustka, F., Scheurich, A., & Schmidt, L.
(2007). Gestalt perception and Local-Global processing in
High-Functioning autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 37(8), 1493–1504. doi: 10.1007/s10803-006-0231-x
bibliography 185
Bölte, S., Hubl, D., Dierks, T., Holtmann, M., & Poustka, F. (2008).
An fMRI-study of locally oriented perception in autism: Al-
tered early visual processing of the block design test. Journal
of Neural Transmission, 115(3), 545–552. doi: 10.1007/s00702-007
-0850-1
Bölte, S., Schlitt, S., Gapp, V., Hainz, D., Schirman, S., Poustka, F.,
. . . Walter, H. (2012). A close eye on the eagle-eyed visual acu-
ity hypothesis of autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 42(5), 726–733. doi: 10.1007/s10803-011-1300-3
Bonnel, A., McAdams, S., Smith, B., Berthiaume, C., Bertone, A.,
Ciocca, V., . . . Mottron, L. (2010). Enhanced pure-tone pitch
discrimination among persons with autism but not asperger
syndrome. Neuropsychologia, 48(1873-3514 (Electronic)), 2465–
2475. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.04.020
Bonnel, A., Mottron, L., Peretz, I., Trudel, M., Gallun, E., & Bon-
nel, A. (2003). Enhanced pitch sensitivity in individuals
with autism: a signal detection analysis. Journal of Cogni-
tive Neuroscience, 15(0898-929X (Print)), 226–235. doi: 10.1162/
089892903321208169
Booth, R., Charlton, R., Hughes, C., & Happe, F. (2003). Dis-
entangling weak coherence and executive dysfunction: plan-
ning drawing in autism and attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Bio-
logical Sciences, 358(0962-8436 (Print)), 387–392. doi: 10.1098/
rstb.2002.1204
Bornstein, R. F. (1989). Exposure and affect: Overview and meta-
analysis of research, 1968–1987. Psychological Bulletin, 106(2),
265–289. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.106.2.265
Bornstein, R. F., Kale, A. R., & Cornell, K. R. (1990). Boredom as
a limiting condition on the mere exposure effect. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 58(5), 791–800. doi: 10.1037/
0022-3514.58.5.791
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that
eyes see. Nature, 391(6669), 756. doi: 10.1038/35784
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of
taste. Harvard University Press.
Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J. (2012). Bayesian just-so stories in psy-
chology and neuroscience. Psychological Bulletin, 138(3), 389–
414. doi: 10.1037/a0026450
Bradford, D. E., Shapiro, B. L., & Curtin, J. J. (2013). How bad could
it be? alcohol dampens stress responses to threat of uncertain
intensity. Psychological Science, 24(12), 2541–2549. doi: 10.1177/
0956797613499923
Braitenberg, V. (1986). Vehicles: Experiments in synthetic psychology.
186 bibliography
MIT Press.
Brincker, M., & Torres, E. B. (2013). Noise from the periphery in
autism. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 7. doi: 10.3389/
fnint.2013.00034
Brock, J. (2012). Alternative Bayesian accounts of autistic perception:
comment on Pellicano and Burr. Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
16(12), 573–574; author reply:574–575. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2012
.10.005
Bromberg-Martin, E. S., & Hikosaka, O. (2011). Lateral habenula
neurons signal errors in the prediction of reward information.
Nature Neuroscience, 14(9), 1209–1216. doi: 10.1038/nn.2902
Brooks, A., Schouten, B., Troje, N. F., Verfaillie, K., Blanke, O., &
van der Zwan, R. (2008). Correlated changes in perceptions
of the gender and orientation of ambiguous biological motion
figures. Current Biology, 18(17), 728–729. doi: 10.1016/j.cub
.2008.06.054
Brown, C., Gruber, T., Boucher, J., Rippon, G., & Brock, J. (2005).
Gamma abnormalities during perception of illusory figures in
autism. Cortex, 41(3), 364–376. doi: 10.1016/S0010-9452(08)
70273-9
Brown, J., Aczel, B., Jiménez, L., Kaufman, S. B., & Grant, K. P. (2010).
Intact implicit learning in autism spectrum conditions. Quar-
terly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63(9), 1789–1812. doi:
10.1080/17470210903536910
Brown, S., Gao, X., Tisdelle, L., Eickhoff, S. B., & Liotti, M. (2011).
Naturalizing aesthetics: Brain areas for aesthetic appraisal
across sensory modalities. NeuroImage, 58(1), 250–258. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.06.012
Burack, J. A. (1994). Selective attention deficits in persons with
autism: Preliminary evidence of an inefficient attentional lens.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103(3), 535–543. doi: 10.1037/
0021-843X.103.3.535
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 42(1), 116–131. doi: 10.1037/
0022-3514.42.1.116
Carroll, L. S., & Owen, M. J. (2009). Genetic overlap between autism,
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Genome Medicine, 1(10), 1–
7. doi: 10.1186/gm102
Carruthers, P. (2008). Meta-cognition in animals: A skeptical look.
Mind & Language, 23(1), 58–89. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007
.00329.x
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of pos-
itive and negative affect: A control-process view. Psychological
Review, 97(1), 19–35. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.1.19
bibliography 187
Cerra, P. L., & Bingham, R. (1998). The adaptive nature of the
human neurocognitive architecture: An alternative model. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 95(19), 11290 –11294.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.95.19.11290
Chalmers, A. F. (1999). What is this thing called science? (3edition ed.).
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
Chater, N. (1996). Reconciling simplicity and likelihood principles
in perceptual organization. Psychological Review, 103(3), 566–81.
doi: 8759047
Chater, N., & Vlaev, I. (2011). The instability of value. In M. Delgado,
E. A. Phelps, & T. W. Robbins (Eds.), Decision making: Attention
and performance XXIII (p. 81–100).
Chetverikov, A., & Filippova, M. (2014). How to tell a wife from
a hat: Affective feedback in perceptual categorization. Acta
Psychologica, 151, 206–213. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.06.012
Cheung, C., Yu, K., Fung, G., Leung, M., Wong, C., Li, Q., . . . McAlo-
nan, G. (2010). Autistic disorders and schizophrenia: Related
or remote? an anatomical likelihood estimation. PLoS ONE,
5(8), e12233. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0012233
Chevallier, C., Kohls, G., Troiani, V., Brodkin, E. S., & Schultz, R. T.
(2012). The social motivation theory of autism. Trends in Cog-
nitive Sciences, 16(4), 231–239. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.02.007
Chopin, A., & Mamassian, P. (2010). Task usefulness affects per-
ception of rivalrous images. Psychological Science, 21(12), 1886
–1893. doi: 10.1177/0956797610389190
Chopin, A., & Mamassian, P. (2011). Usefulness influences visual
appearance in motion transparency depth rivalry. Journal of
Vision, 11(7). doi: 10.1167/11.7.18
Clark, A. (2011). Predictive coding. Edge World Question Center
2011.
Clark, A. (2013a). The many faces of precision. Frontiers in Theoretical
and Philosophical Psychology, 4:, 270. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013
.00270
Clark, A. (2013b). Whatever next? predictive brains, situated agents,
and the future of cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sci-
ences, 36(03), 181–204. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X12000477
Conant, R. C., & Ashby, R. W. (1970). Every good regulator of a
system must be a model of that system. International Journal of
Systems Science, 1(2), 89–97. doi: 10.1080/00207727008920220
Connors, S. L., Crowell, D. E., Eberhart, C. G., Copeland, J.,
Newschaffer, C. J., Spence, S. J., & Zimmerman, A. W.
(2005). beta2-Adrenergic receptor activation and genetic poly-
morphisms in autism: Data from dizygotic twins. Jour-
nal of Child Neurology, 20(11), 876–884. doi: 10.1177/
188 bibliography
08830738050200110401
Constantino, J. N. (2002). The social responsiveness scale. Los Angelos:
Western Psychological Services.
Cook, R., Brewer, R., Shah, P., & Bird, G. (2013). Alexithymia, not
autism, predicts poor recognition of emotional facial expres-
sions. Psychological Science. doi: 10.1177/0956797612463582
Cooney, R. E., Atlas, L. Y., Joormann, J., Eugène, F., & Gotlib,
I. H. (2006). Amygdala activation in the processing of neu-
tral faces in social anxiety disorder: Is neutral really neu-
tral? Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 148(1), 55–59. doi:
10.1016/j.pscychresns.2006.05.003
Courville, A. C., Daw, N. D., & Touretzky, D. S. (2006). Bayesian the-
ories of conditioning in a changing world. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 10(7), 294–300. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.05.004
Craig, A. D. B. (2009). How do you feel - now? the anterior insula
and human awareness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10(1), 59–
70. doi: 10.1038/nrn2555
Crespi, B. (2013). Developmental heterochrony and the evolution
of autistic perception, cognition and behavior. BMC Medicine,
11(1741-7015 (Electronic)), 119. doi: 10.1186/1741-7015-11-119
Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Csikzentmihaly, M. (1991). Flow: The psy-
chology of optimal experience (Vol. 41). HarperPerennial New
York.
Dakin, S., & Frith, U. (2005). Vagaries of visual perception in autism.
Neuron, 48, 497–507.
Damasio, A. (2000). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in
the making of consciousness. Harvest Books.
Damasio, A. (2003). Looking for spinoza. joy, sorrow, and the feeling
brain. Orlando, Austin, New York, San Diego, Toronto, Lon-
don: Harcourt, Inc.
Darwin, C. (2011). Metaphysics, materialism, and the evolution of
mind: The early writings of charles darwin (Subsequent edition
ed.). Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
Davis, M., & J, P. (2001). The amygdala: Vigilance and emotion.
Molecular Psychiatry, 6(1), 13–34. doi: 10.1038/sj.mp.4000812
Daw, N. D., Niv, Y., & Dayan, P. (2005). Uncertainty-based compe-
tition between prefrontal and dorsolateral striatal systems for
behavioral control. Nature Neuroscience, 8(12), 1704–1711. doi:
10.1038/nn1560
Dawson, G. (2008). Early behavioral intervention, brain plasticity,
and the prevention of autism spectrum disorder. Developmen-
tal Psychopathology, 20(1469-2198 (Electronic)), 775–803. doi:
10.1017/S0954579408000370
Dawson, G., Finley, C., Phillips, S., Galpert, L., & Lewy, A. (1988).
bibliography 189
Reduced p3 amplitude of the event-related brain potential: its
relationship to language ability in autism. Journal of Autism
and Developmental Disorders, 18(0162-3257 (Print)), 493–504.
Dawson, M., Mottron, L., & Gernsbacher, M. A. (2008). Learning in
autism. In J. H. Byrne (Series Ed.) & H. Roediger (Vol. Ed.). Learn-
ing and memory: A comprehensive reference: Cognitive psychology
of memory (pp. 759–772). London: Elsevier.
Dayan, P. (2012a). How to set the switches on this thing. Current
Opinion in Neurobiology, 22(6), 1068–1074. doi: 10.1016/j.conb
.2012.05.011
Dayan, P. (2012b). Twenty-five lessons from computational neu-
romodulation. Neuron, 76(1), 240–256. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron
.2012.09.027
Dayan, P., Kakade, S., & Montague, P. R. (2000). Learning and
selective attention. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 1218–1223. doi: 10
.1038/81504
D’Cruz, A., Ragozzino, M. E., Mosconi, M. W., Shrestha, S., Cook,
E. H., & Sweeney, J. A. (2013). Reduced behavioral flexibility
in autism spectrum disorders. Neuropsychology, 27(2), 152–160.
doi: 10.1037/a0031721
de-Wit, L. H., Kubilius, J., Wagemans, J., & Beeck, H. P. O. d. (2012).
Bistable gestalts reduce activity in the whole of v1, not just the
retinotopically predicted parts. Journal of Vision, 12(11), 12. doi:
10.1167/12.11.12
de-Wit, L. H., Machilsen, B., & Putzeys, T. (2010). Predictive coding
and the neural response to predictable stimuli. Journal of Neu-
roscience, 30(26), 8702–8703. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2248-10
.2010
Deacon, T. W. (2010). What is missing from theories of information?
In P. Davies & N. H. Gregersen (Eds.), Information and the nature
of reality (p. 146). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Deacon, T. W. (2011). Incomplete nature: How mind emerged from
matter. W. W. Norton & Company.
de Gardelle, V., Waszczuk, M., Egner, T., & Summerfield, C.
(2012). Concurrent repetition enhancement and suppression
responses in extrastriate visual cortex. Cerebral Cortex. doi:
10.1093/cercor/bhs211
Dehaene, S., & Cohen, L. (2007). Cultural recycling of cortical maps.
Neuron, 56(2), 384–398. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2007.10.004
De Houwer, J., Hermans, D., Rothermund, K., & Wentura, D.
(2002). Affective priming of semantic categorisation re-
sponses. Cognition & Emotion, 16(5), 643–666. doi: 10.1080/
02699930143000419
de Jonge, M. V., Kemner, C., De Haan, E. H., Coppens, J. E., Van
190 bibliography
Den Berg, T. J. T. P., & Van Engeland, H. (2007). Visual
information processing in high-functioning individuals with
autism spectrum disorders and their parents. Neuropsychology,
21(1), 65–73. doi: 10.1037/0894-4105.21.1.65
Delorme, R., Ey, E., Toro, R., Leboyer, M., Gillberg, C., & Bourgeron,
T. (2013). Progress toward treatments for synaptic defects in
autism. Nature Medicine, 19(6), 685–694. doi: 10.1038/nm.3193
Del Viva, M. M., Igliozzi, R., Tancredi, R., & Brizzolara, D. (2006).
Spatial and motion integration in children with autism. Vision
Research, 46(8–9), 1242–1252. doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2005.10.018
Dember, W. N., Earl, R. W., & Paradise, N. (1957). Response by rats
to differential stimulus complexity. Journal of Comparative and
Physiological Psychology, 50(5), 514–518. doi: 10.1037/h0046780
den Ouden, H. E. M., Daunizeau, J., Roiser, J., Friston, K. J., &
Stephan, K. E. (2010). Striatal prediction error modulates corti-
cal coupling. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30(9), 3210 –3219. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4458-09.2010
den Ouden, H. E. M., Friston, K., Daw, N., McIntosh, A., & Stephan,
K. (2009). A dual role for prediction error in associative learn-
ing. Cerebral Cortex, 19(1460-2199 (Electronic)), 1175–1185. doi:
10.1093/cercor/bhn161
den Ouden, H. E. M., Kok, P., & Lange, F. P. d. (2012). How
prediction errors shape perception, attention, and motivation.
Frontiers in Perception Science, 3, 548. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012
.00548
Dewey, J. (2005). Art as experience. Penguin.
Dichter, G. S., Felder, J. N., & Bodfish, J. W. (2009). Autism is charac-
terized by dorsal anterior cingulate hyperactivation during so-
cial target detection. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience,
4(3), 215–226. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsp017
Dijksterhuis, A., & Aarts, H. (2003). On wildebeests and humans.
Psychological Science, 14(1), 14 –18. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.t01
-1-01412
Di Martino, A., Ross, K., Uddin, L. Q., Sklar, A. B., Castellanos, F. X.,
& Milham, M. P. (2009). Functional brain correlates of social
and nonsocial processes in autism spectrum disorders: an ac-
tivation likelihood estimation meta-analysis. Biological psychia-
try, 65(1), 63–74. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2008.09.022
Di Paolo, E. A. (2003). Organismically-inspired robotics: homeo-
static adaptation and teleology beyond the closed sensorimo-
tor loop. Dynamical systems approach to embodiment and sociality,
19–42.
Dissanayake, E. (2008). The arts after darwin: Does art have an ori-
gin and adaptive function. World art studies: Exploring concepts
bibliography 191
and approaches, 241–263.
Dissanayake, E. (2009). The artification hypothesis and its relevance
to cognitive science, evolutionary aesthetics, and neuroaesthet-
ics. Cognitive Semiotics, 9(5), 136–158.
Diuk, C., Tsai, K., Wallis, J., Botvinick, M., & Niv, Y. (2013). Hi-
erarchical learning induces two simultaneous, but separable,
prediction errors in human basal ganglia. The Journal of Neu-
roscience, 33(13), 5797–5805. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5445-12
.2013
Dodgson, N. (2009). Balancing the expected and the surprising in
geometric patterns. Computers & Graphics, 33(4), 475–483. doi:
10.1016/j.cag.2009.04.001
Dosenbach, N. U., Visscher, K. M., Palmer, E. D., Miezin, F. M.,
Wenger, K. K., Kang, H. C., . . . Petersen, S. E. (2006). A core
system for the implementation of task sets. Neuron, 50(5), 799–
812. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2006.04.031
Dreisbach, G., & Fischer, R. (2012). Conflicts as aversive signals.
Brain & Cognition, 78(2), 94–98. doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2011.12
.003
Duncan, S., & Barrett, L. F. (2007). Affect is a form of cognition: A
neurobiological analysis. Cognition & emotion, 21(6), 1184–1211.
doi: 10.1080/02699930701437931
Dunn, M., Gomes, H., & Gravel, J. (2008). Mismatch negativity
in children with autism and typical development. Journal of
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 38(0162-3257 (Print)), 52–
71. doi: 10.1007/s10803-007-0359-3
Dunning, D., & Balcetis, E. (2013). Wishful seeing: How preferences
shape visual perception. Current Directions in Psychological Sci-
ence, 22(1), 33–37. doi: 10.1177/0963721412463693
Dutton, D. G., & Aron, A. P. (1974). Some evidence for heightened
sexual attraction under conditions of high anxiety. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 30(4), 510–517. doi: 10.1037/
h0037031
Duzel, E., & Guitart-Masip, M. (2013). Not so uncertain at last:
Locus coeruleus and decision making. Neuron, 79(1), 9–11. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2013.06.023
Ebert, D. H., & Greenberg, M. E. (2013). Activity-dependent
neuronal signalling and autism spectrum disorder. Nature,
493(7432), 327–337. doi: 10.1038/nature11860
Edelson, S. M., Edelson, M. G., Kerr, D. C. R., & Grandin, T. (1999).
Behavioral and physiological effects of deep pressure on chil-
dren with autism: A pilot study evaluating the efficacy of
grandin’s hug machine. American Journal of Occupational Ther-
apy, 53(2), 145–152. doi: 10.5014/ajot.53.2.145
192 bibliography
Edwards, D. J., Perlman, A., & Reed, P. (2012). Unsupervised cate-
gorization in a sample of children with autism spectrum dis-
orders. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 33(4), 1264–1269.
doi: 10.1016/j.ridd.2012.02.021
Edwards, M. J., Adams, R. A., Brown, H., Pareés, I., & Friston, K. J.
(2012). A Bayesian account of ‘hysteria’. Brain, 135(11), 3495–
3512. doi: 10.1093/brain/aws129
Egbert, M. (2013). For biological systems, maintaining essential
variables within viability limits is not passive. Constructivist
Foundations, 9(1), 109–111.
Egbert, M., & Barandiaran, X. E. (2014). Modeling habits as self-
sustaining patterns of sensorimotor behavior. Frontiers in Hu-
man Neuroscience, 8. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00590
Egbert, M., & Canamero, L. (2014). Habit-based regulation of es-
sential variables. In H. Sayama, J. Rieffel, S. Risi, R. Doursat,
& H. Lipson (Eds.), Artificial life 14: Proceedings of the fourteenth
international conference on the synthesis and simulation of living
systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Egner, T., Monti, J. M., & Summerfield, C. (2010). Expectation and
surprise determine neural population responses in the ventral
visual stream. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30(49), 16601 –16608.
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2770-10.2010
Egner, T., & Summerfield, C. (2013). Grounding predictive
coding models in empirical neuroscience research. Be-
havioral and Brain Sciences, 36(03), 210–211. doi: 10.1017/
S0140525X1200218X
Elison, J. T., Paterson, S. J., Wolff, J. J., Reznick, J. S., Sasson, N. J.,
Gu, H., . . . Piven, J. (2013). White matter microstructure and
atypical visual orienting in 7-Month-Olds at risk for autism.
The American journal of psychiatry. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2012
.12091150
Elliott, R., Friston, K. J., & Dolan, R. J. (2000). Dissociable neural re-
sponses in human reward systems. The Journal of Neuroscience,
20(16), 6159–6165.
Ellsworth, P. C., & Scherer, K. R. (2003). Appraisal processes in
emotion. Handbook of affective sciences, 572.
Elsabbagh, M., Divan, G., Koh, Y., Kim, Y. S., Kauchali, S., Mar-
cín, C., . . . Fombonne, E. (2012). Global prevalence of autism
and other pervasive developmental disorders. Autism Research,
5(3), 160–179. doi: 10.1002/aur.239
Elsabbagh, M., Volein, A., Holmboe, K., Tucker, L., Csibra, G., Baron-
Cohen, S., . . . Johnson, M. H. (2009). Visual orienting in the
early broader autism phenotype: disengagement and facilita-
tion. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 50(5), 637–642.
bibliography 193
doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.2008.02051.x
Evans, D. W., Orr, P. T., Lazar, S. M., Breton, D., Gerard, J., Ledbet-
ter, D. H., . . . Batchelder, H. (2012). Human preferences for
symmetry: Subjective experience, cognitive conflict and cor-
tical brain activity. PLoS ONE, 7(6), e38966. doi: 10.1371/
journal.pone.0038966
Eysenck, H. (1942). The experimental study of the ’good gestalt’–
a new approach. Psychological Review, 49(4), 344–364. doi: 10
.1037/h0057013
Fairhall, S. L., & Ishai, A. (2008). Neural correlates of object indeter-
minacy in art compositions. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(3),
923–932. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.07.005
Falck-Ytter, T. (2008). Face inversion effects in autism: a combined
looking time and pupillometric study. Autism Research, 1(5),
297–306. doi: 10.1002/aur.45
Fan, X., Miles, J. H., Takahashi, N., & Yao, G. (2009). Abnormal
transient pupillary light reflex in individuals with autism spec-
trum disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders,
39(11), 1499–1508. doi: 10.1007/s10803-009-0767-7
Fang, F., Kersten, D., & Murray, S. O. (2008). Perceptual group-
ing and inverse fMRI activity patterns in human visual cortex.
Journal of Vision, 8(7), 1–9. doi: 10.1167/8.7.2
Fazio, R. H. (2001). On the automatic activation of associated evalu-
ations: An overview. Cognition & Emotion, 15(2), 115–141. doi:
10.1080/02699930125908
Feldman, H., & Friston, K. J. (2010). Attention, uncertainty, and
free-energy. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4.
Feldman, J. (2003). What is a visual object? Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 7(6), 252–256. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00111-6
Feldman, J. (2009). Bayes and the simplicity principle in perception.
Psychological Review, 116(4), 875–887. doi: 10.1037/a0017144
Feldman, J. (2013). Tuning your priors to the world. Topics in Cogni-
tive Science, 5(1), 13–34. doi: 10.1111/tops.12003
Ferri, R., Elia, M., Agarwal, N., Lanuzza, B., Musumeci, S. A., &
Pennisi, G. (2003). The mismatch negativity and the p3a
components of the auditory event-related potentials in autis-
tic low-functioning subjects. Clinical Neurophysiology, 114(9),
1671–1680. doi: 10.1016/S1388-2457(03)00153-6
Festinger, L. (1962). Cognitive dissonance. Scientific American, 207(4),
93–107. doi: 10.1038/scientificamerican1062-93
Fiorillo, C. D. (2010). A neurocentric approach to Bayesian inference.
Nature Reviews. Neuroscience. doi: 10.1038/nrn2787-c1
FitzGerald, T. H. B., Dolan, R. J., & Friston, K. J. (2014). Model
averaging, optimal inference, and habit formation. Frontiers in
194 bibliography
Human Neuroscience, 8, 457. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00457
Fleiss, J. L. (1971). Measuring nominal scale agreement among
many raters. Psychological Bulletin, 76(5), 378–382. doi: 10.1037/
h0031619
Fletcher, P. C., & Frith, C. D. (2009). Perceiving is believing: a
Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of
schizophrenia. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10(1), 48–58. doi:
10.1038/nrn2536
Foa, E. B., Zinbarg, R., & Rothbaum, B. O. (1992). Uncontrolla-
bility and unpredictability in post-traumatic stress disorder:
An animal model. Psychological Bulletin, 112(2), 218–238. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.112.2.218
Foss-Feig, J. H., Tadin, D., Schauder, K. B., & Cascio, C. J. (2013).
A substantial and unexpected enhancement of motion percep-
tion in autism. The Journal of Neuroscience, 33(19), 8243–8249.
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1608-12.2013
Fournier, K. A., Hass, C. J., Naik, S. K., Lodha, N., & Cauraugh,
J. H. (2010). Motor coordination in autism spectrum dis-
orders: A synthesis and Meta-Analysis. Journal of Autism
and Developmental Disorders, 40(10), 1227–1240. doi: 10.1007/
s10803-010-0981-3
Freddolino, P. L., & Tavazoie, S. (2012). Beyond homeostasis: a
predictive-dynamic framework for understanding cellular be-
havior. Annual Review of Cell and Developmental Biology, 28, 363–
384. doi: 10.1146/annurev-cellbio-092910-154129
Fresco, D. M., Coles, M. E., Heimberg, R. G., Liebowitz, M. R., Hami,
S., Stein, M. B., & Goetz, D. (2001). The Liebowitz social
anxiety scale: a comparison of the psychometric properties of
self-report and clinician-administered formats. Psychological
Medicine, 31(06), 1025–1035. doi: 10.1017/S0033291701004056
Frijda, N. H. (1987). Emotion, cognitive structure, and action
tendency. Cognition & Emotion, 1, 115–143. doi: 10.1080/
02699938708408043
Frijda, N. H. (1988). The laws of emotion. American Psychologist,
43(5), 349–358. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.43.5.349
Frijda, N. H. (2006). The laws of emotion (1edition ed.). Mahwah, N.J:
Psychology Press.
Frijda, N. H. (2013). Comment: The why, when, and how
of appraisal. Emotion Review, 5(2), 169–170. doi: 10.1177/
1754073912468905
Friston, K. J. (2003). Learning and inference in the brain. Neural
Networks, 16(9), 1325–1352. doi: 10.1016/j.neunet.2003.06.005
Friston, K. J. (2009). The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the
brain? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(7), 293–301. doi: 10.1016/
bibliography 195
j.tics.2009.04.005
Friston, K. J. (2010a). The free-energy principle: a unified brain
theory? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11(2), 127–138. doi: 10
.1038/nrn2787
Friston, K. J. (2010b). Is the free-energy principle neurocentric?
Nature Reviews Neuroscience. doi: 10.1038/nrn2787-c2
Friston, K. J., Adams, R. A., Perrinet, L., & Breakspear, M. (2012).
Perceptions as hypotheses: Saccades as experiments. Frontiers
in Psychology, 3. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00151
Friston, K. J., Daunizeau, J., & Kiebel, S. J. (2009). Reinforcement
learning or active inference? PLoS ONE, 4(7), e6421. doi: 10
.1371/journal.pone.0006421
Friston, K. J., Daunizeau, J., Kilner, J., & Kiebel, S. J. (2010). Action
and behavior: a free-energy formulation. Biological Cybernetics,
102(3), 227–260. doi: 10.1007/s00422-010-0364-z
Friston, K. J., Lawson, R., & Frith, C. D. (2013). On hyperpriors
and hypopriors: comment on pellicano and burr. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 17(1), 1. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.11.003
Friston, K. J., Schwartenbeck, P., Fitzgerald, T., Moutoussis, M.,
Behrens, T., & Dolan, R. J. (2013). The anatomy of choice:
active inference and agency. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7,
598. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00598
Friston, K. J., Shiner, T., FitzGerald, T., Galea, J. M., Adams, R.,
Brown, H., . . . Bestmann, S. (2012). Dopamine, affordance
and active inference. PLoS computational biology, 8(1), e1002327.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327
Friston, K. J., Thornton, C., & Clark, A. (2012). Free-Energy mini-
mization and the Dark-Room problem. Frontiers in Psychology,
3. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00130
Frith, U. (2003). Autism: Explaining the enigma (2nd ed.). Oxford:
Blackwell.
Frith, U., & Happé, F. (1994). Autism: beyond "theory of mind".
Cognition, 50(1-3), 115–132.
Froese, T., & Ikegami, T. (2013). The brain is not an isolated “black
box,” nor is its goal to become one. Behavioral and Brain Sci-
ences, 36(03), 213–214. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X12002348
Furmark, T., Tillfors, M., Everz, P., Marteinsdottir, I., Gefvert, O., &
Fredrikson, M. (1999). Social phobia in the general popula-
tion: prevalence and sociodemographic profile. Social Psychi-
atry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 34(8), 416–424. doi: 10.1007/
s001270050163
Gamer, M., Lemon, J., Fellows, I., & Singh, P. (2012). Irr: various
coefficients of interrater reliability and agreement (R package version
0.83).
196 bibliography
Gastgeb, H., Dundas, E. M., Minshew, N. J., & Strauss, M. S. (2012).
Category formation in autism: Can individuals with autism
form categories and prototypes of dot patterns? Journal of
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 42(8), 1694–1704. doi:
10.1007/s10803-011-1411-x
Gastgeb, H., Rump, K. M., Best, C. A., Minshew, N. J., & Strauss,
M. S. (2009). Prototype formation in autism: Can individuals
with autism abstract facial prototypes? Autism Research, 2(5),
279–284. doi: 10.1002/aur.93
Gastgeb, H., Wilkinson, D., Minshew, N., & Strauss, M. (2011). Can
individuals with autism abstract prototypes of natural faces?
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 41(12), 1609–1618.
doi: 10.1007/s10803-011-1190-4
Gaver, W., & Mandler, G. (1987). Play it again, sam: On lik-
ing music. Cognition & Emotion, 1(3), 259–282. doi: 10.1080/
02699938708408051
Gentili, C., Gobbini, M. I., Ricciardi, E., Vanello, N., Pietrini, P.,
Haxby, J. V., & Guazzelli, M. (2008). Differential modulation
of neural activity throughout the distributed neural system for
face perception in patients with social phobia and healthy sub-
jects. Brain Research Bulletin, 77(5), 286–292.
Gerken, L., Balcomb, F. K., & Minton, J. L. (2011). Infants avoid
‘labouring in vain’ by attending more to learnable than un-
learnable linguistic patterns. Developmental Science, 14(5), 972–
979. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01046.x
Gershman, S. J., & Daw, N. D. (2012). Perception, action and util-
ity: The tangled skein. Principles of brain dynamics: Global state
interactions, 293–312.
Geschwind, D. (2011). Genetics of autism spectrum disorders.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(1879-307X (Electronic)), 409–416.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.07.003
Geurts, H. M., Corbett, B., & Solomon, M. (2009). The paradox
of cognitive flexibility in autism. Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
13(2), 74–82. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.11.006
Gibson, E. (1969). Principles of perceptual learning and development.
East Norwalk, CT, US: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston,
MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Gioia, G. A., Isquith, P. K., Kenworthy, L., & Barton, R. M. (2002).
Profiles of everyday executive function in acquired and devel-
opmental disorders. Child Neuropsychology, 8(2), 121–137. doi:
10.1076/chin.8.2.121.8727
Gomot, M., Blanc, R., Clery, H., Roux, S., Barthelemy, C., & Bruneau,
N. (2011). Candidate electrophysiological endophenotypes of
bibliography 197
hyper-reactivity to change in autism. Journal of Autism and De-
velopmental Disorders, 41(1573-3432 (Electronic)), 705–714. doi:
10.1007/s10803-010-1091-y
Gomot, M., Giard, M., Adrien, J., Barthelemy, C., & Bruneau, N.
(2002). Hypersensitivity to acoustic change in children with
autism: electrophysiological evidence of left frontal corex dys-
functioning. Psychophysiology, 39(0048-5772 (Print)), 577–584.
Gomot, M., & Wicker, B. (2012). A challenging, unpredictable world
for people with autism spectrum disorder. International Journal
of Psychophysiology, 83(2), 240–247. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2011
.09.017
Gonzalez, C., Martin, J. M., Minshew, N. J., & Behrmann, M. (2013).
Practice makes improvement: How adults with autism Out-
Perform others in a naturalistic visual search task. Journal of
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 1–10. doi: 10.1007/s10803
-013-1772-4
Goris, R. L. T., Wagemans, J., & Wichmann, F. A. (2008). Modelling
contrast discrimination data suggest both the pedestal effect
and stochastic resonance to be caused by the same mechanism.
Journal of Vision, 8(15). doi: 10.1167/8.15.17
Gorlin, S., Meng, M., Sharma, J., Sugihara, H., Sur, M., & Sinha, P.
(2012). Imaging prior information in the brain. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(20), 7935–7940. doi: 10
.1073/pnas.1111224109
Gottlieb, J. (2012). Attention, learning, and the value of information.
Neuron, 76(2), 281–295. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2012.09.034
Gradin, V. B., Kumar, P., Waiter, G., Ahearn, T., Stickle, C., Milders,
M., . . . Steele, J. D. (2011). Expected value and prediction error
abnormalities in depression and schizophrenia. Brain, 134(6),
1751–1764. doi: 10.1093/brain/awr059
Grandin, T. (1992). Calming effects of deep touch pressure in
patients with autistic disorder, college students, and animals.
Journal of Child & Adolescent Psychopharmacology, 2(1044-5463
(Print)), 63–72. doi: 10.1089/cap.1992.2.63
Grandin, T. (1995). Thinking in pictures and other reports of my life with
autism. New York: Vintage Books Inc.
Gray, K. L. H., Adams, W. J., & Garner, M. (2009). The influence
of anxiety on the initial selection of emotional faces presented
in binocular rivalry. Cognition, 113(1), 105–110. doi: 10.1016/
j.cognition.2009.06.009
Greenaway, K. H., Louis, W. R., & Hornsey, M. J. (2013). Loss
of control increases belief in precognition and belief in pre-
cognition increases control. PLoS ONE, 8(8). doi: 10.1371/
journal.pone.0071327
198 bibliography
Gregory, R. L. (1980). Perceptions as hypotheses. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B, Biological Sciences,
290(1038), 181–197. doi: 10.1098/rstb.1980.0090
Griffiths, T. L., Chater, N., Norris, D., & Pouget, A. (2012). How the
Bayesians got their beliefs (and what those beliefs actually are):
Comment on Bowers and Davis (2012). Psychological Bulletin,
138(3), 415–422. doi: 10.1037/a0026884
Gu, X., Hof, P. R., Friston, K. J., & Fan, J. (2013). Anterior insular cor-
tex and emotional awareness. Journal of Comparative Neurology,
521(15), 3371–3388. doi: 10.1002/cne.23368
Haesen, B., Boets, B., & Wagemans, J. (2011). A review of be-
havioural and electrophysiological studies on auditory pro-
cessing and speech perception in autism spectrum disorders.
Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 5, 701–714.
Ham, T., Leff, A., Boissezon, X. d., Joffe, A., & Sharp, D. J. (2013).
Cognitive control and the salience network: An investigation
of error processing and effective connectivity. The Journal
of Neuroscience, 33(16), 7091–7098. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI
.4692-12.2013
Hamilton, A. F. d. C., Brindley, R. M., & Frith, U. (2007). Im-
itation and action understanding in autistic spectrum disor-
ders: How valid is the hypothesis of a deficit in the mir-
ror neuron system? Neuropsychologia, 45(8), 1859–1868. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.11.022
Happé, F., & Frith, U. (2006). The weak coherence account: Detail-
focused cognitive style in autism spectrum disorders. Journal
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 36(1), 5–25. doi: 10.1007/
s10803-005-0039-0
Happe, F., & Ronald, A. (2008). The ’fractionable autism triad’: a
review of evidence from behavioural, genetic, cognitive and
neural research. Neuropsychology Review, 18(1040-7308 (Print)),
287–304. doi: 10.1007/s11065-008-9076-8
Happé, F. G. E., & Booth, R. D. L. (2008). The power of the positive:
Revisiting weak coherence in autism spectrum disorders. The
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61(1), 50–63. doi:
10.1080/17470210701508731
Harms, M. B., Martin, A., & Wallace, G. L. (2010). Facial emotion
recognition in autism spectrum disorders: A review of behav-
ioral and neuroimaging studies. Neuropsychology Review, 20(3),
290–322. doi: 10.1007/s11065-010-9138-6
Hawkins, J., & Blakeslee, S. (2004). On intelligence (Adapted ed.).
Times Books.
Heaton, P. (2003). Pitch memory, labelling and disembedding in
autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 44(4), 543–
bibliography 199
551. doi: 10.1111/1469-7610.00143
Heaton, P., Hudry, K., Ludlow, A., & Hill, E. (2008). Supe-
rior discrimination of speech pitch and its relationship to
verbal ability in autism spectrum disorders. Cognitive Neu-
ropsychology, 25(1464-0627 (Electronic)), 771–782. doi: 10.1080/
02643290802336277
Heaton, P., Williams, K., Cummins, O., & Happe, F. (2008). Autism
and pitch processing splinter skills: a group and subgroup
analysis. Autism, 12(1362-3613 (Print)), 203–219. doi: 10.1177/
1362361307085270
Hebb, D. (1946). On the nature of fear. Psychological Review, 53(5),
259–276. doi: 10.1037/h0061690
Hebb, D. (1949). The organization of behavior. New York: John Wiley.
Heenan, A., & Troje, N. F. (2014). Both physical exercise and pro-
gressive muscle relaxation reduce the Facing-the-Viewer bias
in biological motion perception. PLoS ONE, 9(7), e99902. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0099902
Heider, F., & Simmel, M. (1944). An experimental study of apparent
behavior. The American Journal of Psychology, 57(2), 243. doi:
10.2307/1416950
Heine, S. J., Proulx, T., & Vohs, K. D. (2006). The meaning
maintenance model: On the coherence of social motivations.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(2), 88–110. doi:
10.1207/s15327957pspr1002_1
Helmholtz, H. v. (1878). The facts of perception. In R. Kahl (Ed.), Se-
lected writings of hermann helmholtz. Wesleyan University Press.
Helmholtz, H. v. (1962). Treatise on physiological optics. New York:
Dover.
Herbart, J. F. (1891). A text-book in psychology: An attempt to found the
science of psychology on experience, metaphysics, and mathematics
(Vol. 18). D. Appleton.
Hermans, D., & De Houwer, J. (1994). Affective and subjective
familiarity ratings of 740 dutch words. Psychologica Belgica,
34(2-3), 115–139.
Hermans, D., De Houwer, J., & Eelen, P. (2001). A time course
analysis of the affective priming effect. Cognition & Emotion,
15(2), 143–165. doi: 10.1080/02699930125768
Hermans, D., Spruyt, A., De Houwer, J., & Eelen, P. (2003). Affec-
tive priming with subliminally presented pictures. Canadian
Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue canadienne de psycholo-
gie expérimentale, 57(2), 97–114. doi: 10.1037/h0087416
Herry, C., Bach, D. R., Esposito, F., Di Salle, F., Perrig, W. J., Scheffler,
K., . . . Seifritz, E. (2007). Processing of temporal unpredictabil-
ity in human and animal amygdala. Journal of Neuroscience,
200 bibliography
27(22), 5958–5966. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5218-06.2007
Heylighen, F., & Joslyn, C. (2001). Cybernetics and second or-
der cybernetics. Encyclopedia of physical science & technology,
4, 155–170.
Hill, A. L. (1978). Savants: Mentally retarded individuals with spe-
cial skills. International Review of Research in Mental Retardation,
9, 277–298.
Hill, E. L. (2004). Executive dysfunction in autism. Trends in Cogni-
tive Sciences, 8(1), 26–32. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2003.11.003
Hillyard, S. A., Vogel, E. K., & Luck, S. J. (1998). Sensory gain
control (amplification) as a mechanism of selective attention:
electrophysiological and neuroimaging evidence. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 353(1373),
1257–1270. doi: 10.1098/rstb.1998.0281
Hirsh, J. B., Mar, R. A., & Peterson, J. B. (2012). Psychological
entropy: a framework for understanding uncertainty-related
anxiety. Psychological Review, 119(2), 304–320. doi: 10.1037/
a0026767
Hoffman, D. (2009). The interface theory of perception: Natural
selection drives true perception to swift extinction. In S. Dick-
inson, M. Tarr, A. Leonardis, & B. Schiele (Eds.), Object catego-
rization: Computer and human vision perspectives (pp. 148–165).
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Hoffmann, J. (2003). Anticipatory behavioral control. In M. V. Butz,
O. Sigaud, & P. Gérard (Eds.), Anticipatory behavior in adaptive
learning systems (pp. 44–65). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Hoge, E. A., Pollack, M. H., Kaufman, R. E., Zak, P. J., & Simon,
N. M. (2008). Oxytocin levels in social anxiety disorder. CNS
Neuroscience & Therapeutics, 14(3), 165–170. doi: 10.1111/j.1755
-5949.2008.00051.x
Hohwy, J. (2011). Phenomenal variability and introspective re-
liability. Mind & Language, 26(3), 261–286. doi: 10.1111/
j.1468-0017.2011.01418.x
Hohwy, J. (2013). The predictive mind. Oxford University Press.
Hohwy, J. (2014). The Self-Evidencing brain. Noûs. doi: 10.1111/
nous.12062
Hohwy, J., & Palmer, C. (2014). Social cognition as causal inference:
implications for common knowledge and autism. In M. Gal-
lotti & J. Michael (Eds.), Social ontology and social cognition (forth-
coming).
Hohwy, J., Roepstorff, A., & Friston, K. (2008). Predictive coding ex-
plains binocular rivalry: An epistemological review. Cognition,
108(3), 687–701. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.05.010
Honey, R. C., Watt, A., & Good, M. (1998). Hippocampal lesions
bibliography 201
disrupt an associative mismatch process. The Journal of Neuro-
science, 18(6), 2226–2230.
Horn, B. K. P. (1980). Derivation of invariant scene characteristics
from images. In Proceedings of the may 19-22, 1980, national
computer conference (p. 371–376). New York, NY, USA: ACM.
doi: 10.1145/1500518.1500579
Howlin, P., Goode, S., Hutton, J., & Rutter, M. (2009). Savant skills in
autism: psychometric approaches and parental reports. Philo-
sophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
364(1522), 1359–1367. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0328
Hsieh, P., Vul, E., & Kanwisher, N. (2010). Recognition alters the
spatial pattern of fMRI activation in early retinotopic cortex.
Journal of Neurophysiology, 103(3), 1501–1507. doi: 10.1152/jn
.00812.2009
Huang, Y., & Rao, R. P. N. (2011). Predictive coding. Wiley In-
terdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 2(5), 580–593. doi:
10.1002/wcs.142
Hughes, C. (1996). Brief report: Planning problems in autism at
the level of motor control. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 26(1), 99–107. doi: 10.1007/BF02276237
Hurley, M. M., Dennett, D. C., & Adams, J., Reginald B. (2011). Inside
jokes: Using humor to Reverse-Engineer the mind. MIT Press.
Huron, D. (2006). Sweet anticipation: Music and the psychology of
expectation (1st ed.). The MIT Press.
Hutsler, J. J., & Zhang, H. (2010). Increased dendritic spine densities
on cortical projection neurons in autism spectrum disorders.
Brain Research, 1309, 83–94. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2009.09.120
Huys, Q. J. M., & Dayan, P. (2009). A Bayesian formulation of
behavioral control. Cognition, 113(3), 314–328. doi: 10.1016/
j.cognition.2009.01.008
Hyman, J. (2010). Art and neuroscience. In R. Frigg & M. Hunter
(Eds.), Beyond mimesis and convention (Vol. 262, pp. 245–261).
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Iarocci, G., Burack, J. A., Shore, D. I., Mottron, L., & Enns, J. T.
(2006). Global–Local visual processing in high functioning
children with autism: Structural vs. implicit task biases. Jour-
nal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 36(1), 117–129. doi:
10.1007/s10803-005-0045-2
Ide, J. S., Shenoy, P., Yu, A. J., & Li, C.-s. R. (2013). Bayesian predic-
tion and evaluation in the anterior cingulate cortex. The Jour-
nal of Neuroscience, 33(5), 2039–2047. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI
.2201-12.2013
Iglesias, S., Mathys, C., Brodersen, K. H., Kasper, L., Piccirelli, M.,
den Ouden, H. E. M., & Stephan, K. E. (2013). Hierarchi-
202 bibliography
cal prediction errors in midbrain and basal forebrain dur-
ing sensory learning. Neuron, 80(2), 519–530. doi: 10.1016/
j.neuron.2013.09.009
Imamoglu, F., Kahnt, T., Koch, C., & Haynes, J. (2012). Changes in
functional connectivity support conscious object recognition.
NeuroImage, 63(4), 1909–1917. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012
.07.056
Inoue, W., Baimoukhametova, D. V., Füzesi, T., Cusulin, J. I. W.,
Koblinger, K., Whelan, P. J., . . . Bains, J. S. (2013). Nora-
drenaline is a stress-associated metaplastic signal at GABA
synapses. Nature Neuroscience, 16(5), 605–612. doi: 10.1038/
nn.3373
Inzlicht, M., Tullett, A. M., & Good, M. (2011). The need to be-
lieve: a neuroscience account of religion as a motivated pro-
cess. Religion, Brain & Behavior, 1(3), 192–212. doi: 10.1080/
2153599X.2011.647849
Ishai, A., Fairhall, S. L., & Pepperell, R. (2007). Perception, mem-
ory and aesthetics of indeterminate art. Brain Research Bulletin,
73(4-6), 319–324. doi: 10.1016/j.brainresbull.2007.04.009
Izard, C. E. (2007). Basic emotions, natural kinds, emotion schemas,
and a new paradigm. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2(3),
260–280. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00044.x
Jackendoff, R., & Lerdahl, F. (2006). The capacity for music: What
is it, and what’s special about it? Cognition, 100(1), 33–72. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2005.11.005
Jackson, F., Nelson, B. D., & Proudfit, G. H. (2014). In an uncer-
tain world, errors are more aversive: Evidence from the Error-
Related negativity. Emotion. doi: 10.1037/emo0000020
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. Harvard UP, Cam-
bridge, MA.
James, W. (2000). Pragmatism (1907). New York: Penguin Books.
Jarvinen-Pasley, A., Wallace, G., Ramus, F., Happe, F., & Heaton, P.
(2008). Enhanced perceptual processing of speech in autism.
Developmental Science, 11(1467-7687 (Electronic)), 109–121. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00644.x
Jay, M. (1994). Downcast eyes: The denigration of vision in Twentieth-
Century french thought (1ST edition ed.). Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Jepma, M., Verdonschot, R. G., van Steenbergen, H., Rombouts,
S. A. R. B., & Nieuwenhuis, S. (2012). Neural mechanisms
underlying the induction and relief of perceptual curiosity.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 6. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2012
.00005
Joffily, M., & Coricelli, G. (2013). Emotional valence and the Free-
bibliography 203
Energy principle. PLoS Computational Biology, 9(6), e1003094.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094
Johnson, A. W., & Gallagher, M. (2010). Greater effort boosts the
affective taste properties of food. Proceedings of the Royal Society
B: Biological Sciences. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2010.1581
Jones, C., Happe, F., Baird, G., Simonoff, E., Marsden, A., Tregay,
J., . . . Charman, T. (2009). Auditory discrimination and
auditory sensory behaviours in autism spectrum disorders.
Neuropsychologia, 47(1873-3514 (Electronic)), 2850–2858. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.06.015
Joseph, R. M., Keehn, B., Connolly, C., Wolfe, J. M., & Horowitz,
T. S. (2009). Why is visual search superior in autism spectrum
disorder? Developmental Science, 12(6), 1083–1096. doi: 10.1111/
j.1467-7687.2009.00855.x
Kagan, J. (1972). Motives and development. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 22(1), 51–66. doi: 10.1037/h0032356
Kagan, J. (2002). Surprise, uncertainty, and mental structures. Harvard
University Press.
Kanner, L. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous
Child, 2, 217–250.
Kaplan, F., & Oudeyer, P. (2007). In search of the neural circuits
of intrinsic motivation. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 1(1), 225–236.
doi: 10.3389/neuro.01.1.1.017.2007
Kaplan, H. R. (1987). Lottery winners: The myth and reality. Journal
of gambling behavior, 3(3), 168–178. doi: 10.1007/BF01367438
Kapp, B. S., Whalen, P. J., Supple, W. F., & Pascoe, J. P. (1992).
Amygdaloid contributions to conditioned arousal and sensory
information processing. In The amygdala: Neurobiological aspects
of emotion, memory, and mental dysfunction (pp. 229–254). New
York, NY, US: Wiley-Liss.
Karatsoreos, I. N., & McEwen, B. S. (2011). Psychobiological allosta-
sis: resistance, resilience and vulnerability. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 15(12), 576–584. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.10.005
Karlsson, M. P., Tervo, D. G. R., & Karpova, A. Y. (2012). Network
resets in medial prefrontal cortex mark the onset of behavioral
uncertainty. Science, 338(6103), 135–139. doi: 10.1126/science
.1226518
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1994). Précis of beyond modularity: A develop-
mental perspective on cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 17(04), 693–707. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00036621
Keehn, B., Müller, R., & Townsend, J. (2013). Atypical attentional
networks and the emergence of autism. Neuroscience & Biobe-
havioral Reviews, 37(2), 164–183. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012
.11.014
204 bibliography
Keita, L., Mottron, L., & Bertone, A. (2010). Far visual acuity
is unremarkable in autism: do we need to focus on crowd-
ing? Autism Research, 3(1939-3806 (Electronic)), 333–341. doi:
10.1002/aur.164
Kemner, C., Verbaten, M., Cuperus, J., Camfferman, G., & van En-
geland, H. (1995). Auditory event-related brain potentials
in autistic children and three different control groups. Bio-
logical Psychiatry, 38(0006-3223 (Print)), 150–165. doi: 10.1016/
0006-3223(94)00247-Z
Kenworthy, L., Yerys, B. E., Anthony, L. G., & Wallace, G. L. (2008).
Understanding executive control in autism spectrum disorders
in the lab and in the real world. Neuropsychology Review, 18(4),
320–338. doi: 10.1007/s11065-008-9077-7
Keramati, M., & Gutkin, B. S. (2011). A reinforcement learning
theory for homeostatic regulation. In NIPS (p. 82–90).
Kéri, S., & Benedek, G. (2009). Oxytocin enhances the perception of
biological motion in humans. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral
Neuroscience, 9(3), 237–241. doi: 10.3758/CABN.9.3.237
Kern, J. K., Miller, V. S., Cauller, L., Kendall, R., Mehta, J., & Dodd,
M. (2001). Effectiveness of N,N-Dimethylglycine in autism and
pervasive developmental disorder. Journal of Child Neurology,
16(3), 169–173. doi: 10.1177/088307380101600303
Kern, J. K., Trivedi, M., Garver, C., Grannemann, B., Andrews, A.,
Savla, J., . . . Schroeder, J. (2006). The pattern of sensory pro-
cessing abnormalities in autism. Autism, 10(1362-3613 (Print)),
480–494. doi: 10.1177/1362361306066564
Kersten, D., Mamassian, P., & Yuille, A. (2004). Object perception as
Bayesian inference. Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 271–304.
doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142005
Khalfa, S., Bruneau, N., Rogé, B., Georgieff, N., Veuillet, E., Adrien,
J., . . . Collet, L. (2004). Increased perception of loudness in
autism. Hearing Research, 198(1–2), 87–92. doi: 10.1016/j.heares
.2004.07.006
Kidd, C., Piantadosi, S. T., & Aslin, R. N. (2012). The goldilocks
effect: Human infants allocate attention to visual sequences
that are neither too simple nor too complex. PLoS ONE, 7(5),
e36399. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0036399
Kilner, J. M., Friston, K. J., & Frith, C. D. (2007). Predictive coding:
an account of the mirror neuron system. Cognitive Processing,
8(3), 159–166. doi: 10.1007/s10339-007-0170-2
Kim, J. A., Szatmari, P., Bryson, S. E., Streiner, D. L., & Wilson, F. J.
(2000). The prevalence of anxiety and mood problems among
children with autism and asperger syndrome. Autism, 4(2),
117–132. doi: 10.1177/1362361300004002002
bibliography 205
Kimura, M., Schröger, E., & Czigler, I. (2011). Visual mismatch nega-
tivity and its importance in visual cognitive sciences. NeuroRe-
port, 22, 669–673. doi: 10.1097/WNR.0b013e32834973ba
Klauer, K. C., & Musch, J. (2003). Affective priming: Findings and
theories. In J. Musch & K. C. Klauer (Eds.), The psychology of
evaluation: Affective processes in cognition and emotion (pp. 7–49).
Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Klein, C. (2014). The penumbral theory of masochistic pleasure.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5(1), 41–55. doi: 10.1007/
s13164-013-0169-9
Klein, D. C., & Seligman, M. E. (1976). Reversal of performance
deficits and perceptual deficits in learned helplessness and
depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 85(1), 11–26. doi:
10.1037/0021-843X.85.1.11
Klin, A. (1991). Young autistic childrens listening preferences in
regard to speech - a possible characterization of the symptom
of social withdrawal. Journal of Autism and Developmental Dis-
orders, 21(1), 29–42. doi: 10.1007/BF02206995
Klin, A. (1992). Listening preferences in regard to speech in 4 Chil-
dren with Developmental-Disabilities. Journal of Child Psychol-
ogy and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines, 33(4), 763–769. doi:
10.1111/j.1469-7610.1992.tb00911.x
Klin, A., Jones, W., Schultz, R., Volkmar, F., & Cohen, D. (2002).
Visual fixation patterns during viewing of naturalistic social
situations as predictors of social competence in individuals
with autism. Archives of General Psychiatry, 59, 809–816.
Klin, A., Lin, D., Gorrindo, P., Ramsay, G., & Jones, W. (2009). Two-
year-olds with autism orient to non-social contingencies rather
than biological motion. Nature, 459(7244), 257–U142. doi: 10
.1038/nature07868
Klinger, L. G., & Dawson, G. (2001). Prototype formation in autism.
Development and Psychopathology, null(01), 111–124. doi: null
Knight, E. J., Klepac, K. M., & Kralik, J. D. (2013). Too good to be
true: Rhesus monkeys react negatively to Better-than-Expected
offers. PLoS ONE, 8(10), e75768. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone
.0075768
Koegel, R. L., & Mentis, M. (1985). Motivation in childhood autism:
Can they or won’t they? Journal of Child Psychology and Psychi-
atry, 26(2), 185–191. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.1985.tb02259.x
Koenderink, J. (2010). Vision and information. In L. Albertazzi,
G. J. Van Tonder, & D. Vishwanath (Eds.), Perception beyond
inference: The information content of visual processes (p. 27). USA:
MIT Press.
Koenderink, J. (2014). The all seeing eye? Perception, 43(1), 1–6.
206 bibliography
Koenderink, J., van Doorn, A., & Wagemans, J. (2012). Picasso in
the mind’s eye of the beholder: Three-dimensional filling-in
of ambiguous line drawings. Cognition, 125(3), 394–412. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2012.07.019
Koffka, K. (1935). Principles of gestalt psychology. New York:
Harcourt- Brace.
Kohler, E., Keysers, C., Umiltà, M. A., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., &
Rizzolatti, G. (2002). Hearing sounds, understanding actions:
Action representation in mirror neurons. Science, 297(5582),
846–848. doi: 10.1126/science.1070311
Köhler, W. (1920). Die physischen gestalten in ruhe und im stationåren
zustand. Braunschweig, Germany: Vieweg.
Köhler, W. (1938). The place of value in a world of facts. New York::
Liveright.
Köhler, W. (1940). Dynamics in psychology. New York: Liveright.
Kootz, J. P., & Cohen, D. J. (1981). Modulation of sensory intake in
autistic children: Cardiovascular and behavioral indices. Jour-
nal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry, 20(4), 692–701.
doi: 10.1097/00004583-198102000-00002
Koster-Hale, J., & Saxe, R. (2013). Theory of mind: A neural
prediction problem. Neuron, 79(5), 836–848. doi: 10.1016/
j.neuron.2013.08.020
Krupinski, E., & Locher, P. (1988). Skin conductance and aesthetic
evaluative responses to nonrepresentational works of art vary-
ing in symmetry. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 26(4), 355–
358. doi: 10.3758/BF03337681
Kubovy, M. (1999). On the pleasures of the mind. In D. Kahneman,
E. Diener, & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Well-being: The foundations of
hedonic psychology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Kujala, T., Lepisto, T., Nieminen-von Wendt, T., Naatanen, P., &
Naatanen, R. (2005). Neurophysiological evidence for cor-
tical discrimination impairment of prosody in asperger syn-
drome. Neuroscience Letters, 383(0304-3940 (Print)), 260–265.
doi: 10.1016/j.neulet.2005.04.048
Kumar, S., Sedley, W., Nourski, K. V., Kawasaki, H., Oya, H., Patter-
son, R. D., . . . Griffiths, T. D. (2011). Predictive coding and
pitch processing in the auditory cortex. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00021
Lam, K. S., Aman, M. G., & Arnold, L. E. (2006). Neurochem-
ical correlates of autistic disorder: A review of the litera-
ture. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 27(3), 254–289. doi:
10.1016/j.ridd.2005.03.003
Landau, M. J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., &
Martens, A. (2006). Windows into nothingness: Terror man-
bibliography 207
agement, meaninglessness, and negative reactions to modern
art. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(6), 879–892.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.6.879
Lauwereyns, J. (2010). The anatomy of bias: how neural circuits weigh
the options. MIT Press.
Leder, H., Belke, B., Oeberst, A., & Augustin, D. (2004). A model of
aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic judgments. British Journal
of Psychology, 95(4), 489–508. doi: 10.1348/0007126042369811
Lee, T. S., & Mumford, D. (2003). Hierarchical Bayesian inference
in the visual cortex. Journal of the Optical Society of America A,
20(7), 1434–1448. doi: 10.1364/JOSAA.20.001434
Legare, C. H. (2012). Exploring explanation: Explaining inconsis-
tent evidence informs exploratory, Hypothesis-Testing behav-
ior in young children. Child Development, 83(1), 173–185. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01691.x
Lepisto, T., Kujala, T., Vanhala, R., Alku, P., Huotilainen, M., &
Naatanen, R. (2005). The discrimination of and orienting
to speech and non-speech sounds in children with autism.
Brain Research, 1066(0006-8993 (Print)), 147–157. doi: 10.1016/
j.brainres.2005.10.052
Lepisto, T., Silokallio, S., Nieminen-von Wendt, T., Alku, P., Naata-
nen, R., & Kujala, T. (2006). Auditory perception and attention
as reflected by the brain event-related potentials in children
with asperger syndrome. Clinical Neurophysiology, 117(1388-
2457 (Print)), 2161–2171. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2006.06.709
Lettvin, J. Y., Maturana, H. R., McCulloch, W. S., & Pitts, W. H.
(1959). What the frog’s eye tells the frog’s brain. Proceedings of
the IRE, 47(11), 1940–1951.
Liebowitz, M. R. (1987). Social phobia. Modern Problems of Pharma-
copsychiatry, 22, 141–173.
Limongi, R., Sutherland, S. C., Zhu, J., Young, M. E., & Habib, R.
(2013). Temporal prediction errors modulate cingulate–insular
coupling. NeuroImage, 71, 147–157. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage
.2012.12.078
Lindell, A., & Mueller, J. (2011). Can science account for taste?
psychological insights into art appreciation. Journal of Cognitive
Psychology, 23(4), 453–475. doi: 10.1080/20445911.2011.539556
Lindquist, K. A. (2013). Emotions emerge from more basic
psychological ingredients: A modern psychological construc-
tionist model. Emotion Review, 5(4), 356–368. doi: 10.1177/
1754073913489750
Little, D. Y., & Sommer, F. T. (2013). Maximal mutual infor-
mation, not minimal entropy, for escaping the “Dark room”.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(03), 220–221. doi: 10.1017/
208 bibliography
S0140525X12002415
López, B., Donnelly, N., Hadwin, J., & Leekam, S. (2004). Face pro-
cessing in high-functioning adolescents with autism: Evidence
for weak central coherence. Visual Cognition, 11(6), 673–688.
doi: 10.1080/13506280344000437
Lopez, B. R., Lincoln, A. J., Ozonoff, S., & Lai, Z. (2005). Ex-
amining the relationship between executive functions and
restricted, repetitive symptoms of autistic disorder. Journal
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 35(4), 445–460. doi:
10.1007/s10803-005-5035-x
Loth, E., Happe, F., & Gomez, J. (2010). Variety is not the spice of
life for people with autism spectrum disorders: frequency rat-
ings of central, variable and inappropriate aspects of common
real-life events. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders,
40(1573-3432 (Electronic)), 730–742. doi: 10.1007/s10803-009
-0929-7
Lovaas, O. I. (1987). Behavioral treatment and normal educational
and intellectual functioning in young autistic children. Journal
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 55(1), 3–9.
Lovaas, O. I., Koegel, R. L., & Schreibman, L. (1979). Stimulus
overselectivity in autism: a review of research. Psychological
bulletin, 86(6), 1236–1254. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.86.6.1236
Loveland, K. A., Tunali-Kotoski, B., Chen, R., Brelsford, K. A., Or-
tegon, J., & Pearson, D. A. (1995). Intermodal perception
of affect in persons with autism or down syndrome. De-
velopment and Psychopathology, 7(03), 409–418. doi: 10.1017/
S095457940000660X
Ludmer, R., Dudai, Y., & Rubin, N. (2011). Uncovering camouflage:
Amygdala activation predicts Long-Term memory of induced
perceptual insight. Neuron, 69(5), 1002–1014. doi: 10.1016/j
.neuron.2011.02.013
Ma, W. J., Navalpakkam, V., Beck, J. M., Berg, R. v. d., & Pouget, A.
(2011). Behavior and neural basis of near-optimal visual search.
Nature Neuroscience, 14(6), 783–790. doi: 10.1038/nn.2814
MacIver, M. A. (2009). Neuroethology: from morphological com-
putation to planning. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (Eds.), The
cambridge handbook of situated cognition (p. 480–504). New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press.
Mackinlay, R., Charman, T., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2006). High
functioning children with autism spectrum disorder: A novel
test of multitasking. Brain and Cognition, 61(1), 14–24. doi:
10.1016/j.bandc.2005.12.006
Maier, J. X., Neuhoff, J. G., Logothetis, N. K., & Ghazanfar, A. A.
(2004). Multisensory integration of looming signals by rhesus
bibliography 209
monkeys. Neuron, 43(2), 177–181. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2004
.06.027
Makin, A. D. J., Pecchinenda, A., & Bertamini, M. (2012). Implicit
affective evaluation of visual symmetry. Emotion, 12(5), 1021–
1030. doi: 10.1037/a0026924
Mamassian, P. (2008). Ambiguities and conventions in the per-
ception of visual art. Vision Research, 48(20), 2143–2153. doi:
10.1016/j.visres.2008.06.010
Mandler, G. (2003). Emotion. In D. K. Freedheim & I. B. Weiner
(Eds.), History of psychology (Vol. 1). John Wiley and Sons.
Mark, J. T., Marion, B. B., & Hoffman, D. D. (2010). Natural selection
and veridical perceptions. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 266(4),
504–515. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.07.020
Markram, K., & Markram, H. (2010). The intense world theory –
a unifying theory of the neurobiology of autism. Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience, 4. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2010.00224
Marti, S., Thibault, L., & Dehaene, S. (2014). How does the extraction
of local and global auditory regularities vary with context?
PLoS ONE, 9(9), e107227. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0107227
Mathys, C., Daunizeau, J., Friston, K. J., & Stephan, K. E. (2011). A
Bayesian foundation for individual learning under uncertainty.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2011
.00039
Matson, J. L., & Nebel-Schwalm, M. S. (2007). Comorbid psy-
chopathology with autism spectrum disorder in children: an
overview. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 28(4), 341–352.
doi: 10.1016/j.ridd.2005.12.004
Matson, M. L., Matson, J. L., & Beighley, J. S. (2011). Comorbidity of
physical and motor problems in children with autism. Research
in Developmental Disabilities, 32(6), 2304–2308. doi: 10.1016/j
.ridd.2011.07.036
Maunsell, J. H. R. (2004). Neuronal representations of cognitive
state: reward or attention? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(6),
261–265. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.04.003
May, P., & Tiitinen, H. (2010). Mismatch negativity (MMN), the
deviance-elicited auditory deflection, explained. Psychophysi-
ology, 47(1540-5958 (Electronic)), 66–122. doi: 10.1111/j.1469
-8986.2009.00856.x
McNally, G. P., Johansen, J. P., & Blair, H. T. (2011). Placing predic-
tion into the fear circuit. Trends in Neurosciences, 34(6), 283–292.
doi: 10.1016/j.tins.2011.03.005
McPartland, J., Dawson, G., Webb, S. J., Panagiotides, H., & Carver,
L. J. (2004). Event-related brain potentials reveal anomalies
in temporal processing of faces in autism spectrum disorder.
210 bibliography
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 45(7), 1235–1245. doi:
10.1111/j.1469-7610.2004.00318.x
Melcher, D. ., & Bacci, F. . (2008). The visual system as a constraint
on the survival and success of specific artworks. Spatial Vision,
21, 347–362. doi: 10.1163/156856808784532626
Metereau, E., & Dreher, J. (2013). Cerebral correlates of salient pre-
diction error for different rewards and punishments. Cerebral
Cortex, 23(2), 477–487. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhs037
Meyer. (1961). Emotion and meaning in music. University of Chicago
Press.
Miall, R. C., Weir, D. J., Wolpert, D. M., & Stein, J. F. (1993). Is the
cerebellum a smith predictor? Journal of Motor Behavior, 25(3),
203–216. doi: 10.1080/00222895.1993.9942050
Miller, S. M. (1981). Predictability and human stress: Toward a clari-
fication of evidence and theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances
in experimental social psychology (Vol. Volume 14, pp. 203–256).
Academic Press.
Milne, E., Swettenham, J., Hansen, P., Campbell, R., Jeffries, H., &
Plaisted, K. (2002). High motion coherence thresholds in chil-
dren with autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry,
43(2), 255–263. doi: 10.1111/1469-7610.00018
Mineka, S., & Hendersen, R. W. (1985). Controllability and pre-
dictability in acquired motivation. Annual Review of Psychology,
36(1), 495–529. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ps.36.020185.002431
Mitchell, P., Mottron, L., Soulieres, I., & Ropar, D. (2010). Susceptibil-
ity to the shepard illusion in participants with autism: reduced
top-down influences within perception? Autism Research,
3(1939-3806 (Electronic)), 113–119. doi: 10.1002/aur.130
Mobbs, D., Petrovic, P., Marchant, J. L., Hassabis, D., Weiskopf,
N., Seymour, B., . . . Frith, C. D. (2007). When fear is near:
threat imminence elicits prefrontal-periaqueductal gray shifts
in humans. Science, 317(5841), 1079–1083. doi: 10.1126/science
.1144298
Mongillo, E. A., Irwin, J. R., Whalen, D. H., Klaiman, C., Carter,
A. S., & Schultz, R. T. (2008). Audiovisual processing in chil-
dren with and without autism spectrum disorders. Journal
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 38(7), 1349–1358. doi:
10.1007/s10803-007-0521-y
Mooney, C. M. (1957). Age in the development of closure ability
in children. Canadian Journal of Psychology/Revue canadienne de
psychologie, 11(4), 219–226. doi: 10.1037/h0083717
Moors, A. (2010). Automatic constructive appraisal as a candidate
cause of emotion. Emotion Review, 2(2), 139–156. doi: 10.1177/
1754073909351755
bibliography 211
Moran, R. J., Campo, P., Symmonds, M., Stephan, K. E., Dolan, R. J.,
& Friston, K. J. (2013). Free energy, precision and learning:
The role of cholinergic neuromodulation. The Journal of Neu-
roscience, 33(19), 8227–8236. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4255-12
.2013
Morey, R. D. (2008). Confidence intervals from normalized data: A
correction to cousineau (2005). Tutorial in Quantitative Methods
for Psychology, 4(2), 61–64.
Moriya, J., & Sugiura, Y. (2012). High visual working memory ca-
pacity in trait social anxiety. PLoS ONE, 7(4), e34244. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0034244
Moriya, J., & Tanno, Y. (2009). Competition between endogenous
and exogenous attention to nonemotional stimuli in social anx-
iety. Emotion, 9(5), 739–743. doi: 10.1037/a0016817
Mottron, L., Bouvet, L., Bonnel, A., Samson, F., Burack, J. A., Daw-
son, M., & Heaton, P. (2013). Veridical mapping in the devel-
opment of exceptional autistic abilities. Neuroscience & Biobe-
havioral Reviews, 37(2), 209–228. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012
.11.016
Mottron, L., & Burack, J. A. (2001). Enhanced perceptual functioning
in the development of autism. In J. A. Burack, T. Charman,
N. Yirmiya, & P. R. Zelazo (Eds.), The development of autism:
Perspectives from theory and research (pp. 131–148). Mahwah, NJ,
US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Mottron, L., Dawson, M., Soulières, I., Hubert, B., & Burack, J. (2006).
Enhanced perceptual functioning in autism: An update, and
eight principles of autistic perception. Journal of Autism and
Developmental Disorders, 36(1), 27–43.
Mottron, L., Peretz, I., & Menard, E. (2000). Local and global pro-
cessing of music in high-functioning persons with autism: be-
yond central coherence? Journal of Child Psychology & Psychia-
try, 41(0021-9630 (Print)), 1057–1065.
Moutoussis, M., Fearon, P., El-Deredy, W., Dolan, R. J., & Friston,
K. J. (2014). Bayesian inferences about the self (and others):
A review. Consciousness and Cognition, 25, 67–76. doi: 10.1016/
j.concog.2014.01.009
Muckli, L., Petro, L. S., & Smith, F. W. (2013). Backwards is the
way forward: feedback in the cortical hierarchy predicts the
expected future. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(3), 221.
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X12002361
Murray, E. A. (2007). The amygdala, reward and emotion. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 11(11), 489–497. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2007.08
.013
Murray, S. O., Kersten, D., Olshausen, B. A., Schrater, P., & Woods,
212 bibliography
D. L. (2002). Shape perception reduces activity in human
primary visual cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 99(23), 15164–15169.
Mushtaq, F., Bland, A. R., & Schaefer, A. (2011). Uncertainty and
cognitive control. Frontiers in Psychology, 2. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg
.2011.00249
Muth, C., & Carbon, C. (2013). The aesthetic aha: On the pleasure
of having insights into gestalt. Acta Psychologica, 144(1), 25–30.
doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2013.05.001
Nackaerts, E., Wagemans, J., Helsen, W., Swinnen, S. P., Wenderoth,
N., & Alaerts, K. (2012). Recognizing biological motion and
emotions from Point-Light displays in autism spectrum dis-
orders. PLoS ONE, 7(9), e44473. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone
.0044473
Nassar, M. R., Rumsey, K. M., Wilson, R. C., Parikh, K., Heasly, B., &
Gold, J. I. (2012). Rational regulation of learning dynamics by
pupil-linked arousal systems. Nature Neuroscience, 15(7), 1040–
1046. doi: 10.1038/nn.3130
Nemeth, D., Janacsek, K., Balogh, V., Londe, Z., Mingesz, R.,
Fazekas, M., . . . Vetro, A. (2010). Learning in autism: implic-
itly superb. PloS one, 5(7), e11731. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone
.0011731
Newell, A. (1973). You can’t play 20 questions with nature and win:
Projective comments on the papers of this symposium.
Nieuwenhuis, S., Forstmann, B. U., & Wagenmakers, E. (2011). Er-
roneous analyses of interactions in neuroscience: a problem
of significance. Nature Neuroscience, 14(9), 1105–1107. doi:
10.1038/nn.2886
Nikolic´, D. (2010). The brain is a context machine. Review of Psychol-
ogy, 17(1), 33–38.
Niv, Y., & Chan, S. (2011). On the value of information and other
rewards. Nature Neuroscience, 14(9), 1095–1097. doi: 10.1038/
nn.2918
Noordewier, M. K., & Breugelmans, S. M. (2013). On the valence of
surprise. Cognition & Emotion, 27(7), 1326–1334. doi: 10.1080/
02699931.2013.777660
Norton, M. I., Mochon, D., & Ariely, D. (2012). The IKEA effect:
When labor leads to love. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 22(3),
453–460. doi: 10.1016/j.jcps.2011.08.002
Noyce, A., & Sekuler, R. (2011). Surprises are mistakes: An EEG
source localization study of prediction errors. Journal of Vision,
11(11), 182. doi: 10.1167/11.11.182
O’Connor, K. (2012). Auditory processing in autism spectrum disor-
der: a review. Neuroscience and Behavioral Reviews, 36(1873-7528
bibliography 213
(Electronic)), 836–854. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.11.008
Odom, S. L., Brown, W. H., Frey, T., Karasu, N., Smith-Canter, L. L.,
& Strain, P. S. (2003). Evidence-Based practices for young
children with autism contributions for Single-Subject design
research. Focus on Autism and Other Developmental Disabilities,
18(3), 166–175. doi: 10.1177/10883576030180030401
Ogawa, H., & Watanabe, K. (2011). Implicit learning increases pref-
erence for predictive visual display. Attention, Perception, &
Psychophysics, 73, 1815–1822. doi: 10.3758/s13414-010-0041-2
Öhman, A., & Mineka, S. (2001). Fears, phobias, and preparedness:
Toward an evolved module of fear and fear learning. Psycholog-
ical Review, 108(3), 483–522. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.108.3.483
O’Reilly, J. X. (2013). Making predictions in a changing
world—inference, uncertainty, and learning. Frontiers in De-
cision Neuroscience, 7, 105. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2013.00105
O’Riordan, M. A., Plaisted, K. C., Driver, J., & Baron-Cohen, S.
(2001). Superior visual search in autism. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27(3), 719–730.
doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.27.3.719
Ornitz, D. E. M. (1974). The modulation of sensory input and mo-
tor output in autistic children. Journal of autism and childhood
schizophrenia, 4(3), 197–215. doi: 10.1007/BF02115226
Oudeyer, P., Baranes, A., & Kaplan, F. (2010). Intrinsically moti-
vated exploration for developmental and active sensorimotor
learning. In O. Sigaud & J. Peters (Eds.), From motor learning
to interaction learning in robots (pp. 107–146). Springer Berlin
Heidelberg.
Oudeyer, P., Kaplan, F., & Hafner, V. (2007). Intrinsic motivation
systems for autonomous mental development. IEEE Transac-
tions on Evolutionary Computation, 11(2), 265–286. doi: 10.1109/
TEVC.2006.890271
Ozonoff, S., Macari, S., Young, G. S., Goldring, S., Thompson, M., &
Rogers, S. J. (2008). Atypical object exploration at 12 months of
age is associated with autism in a prospective sample. Autism,
12(5), 457–472. doi: 10.1177/1362361308096402
Palmer, C. J., Paton, B., Hohwy, J., & Enticott, P. G. (2013). Move-
ment under uncertainty: The effects of the rubber-hand illu-
sion vary along the nonclinical autism spectrum. Neuropsy-
chologia, 51(10), 1942–1951. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia
.2013.06.020
Panksepp, J. (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feel-
ings in animals and humans. Consciousness and Cognition, 14(1),
30–80. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2004.10.004
Parrott, W. G., & Gleitman, H. (1989). Infants’ expectations in play:
214 bibliography
The joy of peek-a-boo. Cognition & Emotion, 3(4), 291–311. doi:
10.1080/02699938908412710
Paton, B., Hohwy, J., & Enticott, P. G. (2012). The rubber hand
illusion reveals proprioceptive and sensorimotor differences in
autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 42(9), 1870–1883. doi: 10.1007/s10803-011-1430-7
Pavlova, M. A. (2012). Biological motion processing as a hallmark of
social cognition. Cerebral Cortex, 22(5), 981–995. doi: 10.1093/
cercor/bhr156
Payzan-LeNestour, E., Dunne, S., Bossaerts, P., & O’Doherty, J. P.
(2013). The neural representation of unexpected uncertainty
during Value-Based decision making. Neuron, 79(1), 191–201.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2013.04.037
Peirce, J. W. (2007). PsychoPy—Psychophysics software in python.
Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 162(1–2), 8–13. doi: 10.1016/
j.jneumeth.2006.11.017
Pellicano, E. (2011). Psychological models of autism: An overview.
In I. Roth & P. Rezaie (Eds.), Researching the autism spectrum:
Contemporary perspectives (pp. n–n). Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Pellicano, E., & Burr, D. (2012). When the world becomes ’too real’: a
Bayesian explanation of autistic perception. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 16(10), 504–510. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.009
Pellicano, E., Gibson, L., Maybery, M., Durkin, K., & Badcock,
D. R. (2005). Abnormal global processing along the dorsal
visual pathway in autism: a possible mechanism for weak vi-
suospatial coherence? Neuropsychologia, 43(7), 1044–1053. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.10.003
Pellicano, E., Jeffery, L., Burr, D., & Rhodes, G. (2007). Abnor-
mal adaptive face-coding mechanisms in children with autism
spectrum disorder. Current Biology, 17(0960-9822 (Print)), 1508–
1512. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2007.07.065
Pelowski, M., & Akiba, F. (2011). A model of art perception, evalua-
tion and emotion in transformative aesthetic experience. New
Ideas in Psychology, 29(2), 80–97. doi: 10.1016/j.newideapsych
.2010.04.001
Pepperell, R. (2011). Connecting art and the brain: An artist’s per-
spective on visual indeterminacy. Frontiers in Human Neuro-
science, 5. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2011.00084
Perry, E. K., Lee, M. L., Martin-Ruiz, C. M., Court, J. A., Volsen,
S. G., Merrit, J., . . . Wenk, G. L. (2001). Cholinergic activity
in autism: Abnormalities in the cerebral cortex and basal fore-
brain. American Journal of Psychiatry, 158(7), 1058–1066. doi:
10.1176/appi.ajp.158.7.1058
bibliography 215
Peterson, M. A. (1994). Object recognition processes can and do
operate before Figure-Ground organization. Current Directions
in Psychological Science, 3(4), 105–111. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8721
.1994.tb00156.x
Phaf, R. H., & Rotteveel, M. (2012). Affective monitoring: A generic
mechanism for affect elicitation. Frontiers in Psychology, 3. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00047
Phillips, W. A. (2012). Self-Organized complexity and coherent
infomax from the viewpoint of jaynes’s probability theory. In-
formation, 3(1), 1–15. doi: 10.3390/info3010001
Phillips, W. A. (2013). Neuronal inference must be local, selective,
and coordinated. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(03), 222–223.
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X12002257
Piaget, J. (1937). La construction du réel chez l’enfant. [The construction
of the real in the child.]. Oxford, England: Delachaux & Niestle.
Picard, F. (2013). State of belief, subjective certainty and bliss as a
product of cortical dysfunction. Cortex, 49(9), 2494–2500. doi:
10.1016/j.cortex.2013.01.006
Pierce, K., Glad, K. S., & Schreibman, L. (1997). Social perception in
children with autism: An attentional deficit? Journal of Autism
and Developmental Disorders, 27(3), 265–282. doi: 10.1023/A:
1025898314332
Pinborough-Zimmerman, J., Bakian, A. V., Fombonne, E., Bilder, D.,
Taylor, J., & McMahon, W. M. (2012). Changes in the ad-
ministrative prevalence of autism spectrum disorders: Contri-
bution of special education and health from 2002-2008. Jour-
nal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 42(4), 521–530. doi:
10.1007/s10803-011-1265-2
Pinker, S. (2003). The blank slate: The modern denial of human nature.
Penguin Books.
Pinna, B. (2010). New gestalt principles of perceptual organization:
an extension from grouping to shape and meaning. Gestalt
Theory, 32, 1–67.
Plaisted, K. C. (2001). Reduced generalization in autism: An alter-
native to weak central coherence. In J. A. Burack, T. Charman,
N. Yirmiya, & P. R. Zelazo (Eds.), The development of autism:
Perspectives from theory and research (pp. 149–169). Mahwah, NJ,
US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Plaisted, K. C., O’Riordan, M., & Baron-Cohen, S. (1998a). Enhanced
discrimination of novel, highly similar stimuli by adults with
autism during a perceptual learning task. Journal of Child Psy-
chology and Psychiatry, 39(5), 765–775. doi: 10.1111/1469-7610
.00375
Plaisted, K. C., O’Riordan, M., & Baron-Cohen, S. (1998b). Enhanced
216 bibliography
visual search for a conjunctive target in autism: A research
note. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 39(5), 777–783.
doi: 10.1111/1469-7610.00376
Polani, D. (2009). Information: Currency of life? HFSP Journal, 3(5),
307–316. doi: 10.2976/1.3171566
Poljac, E., & Bekkering, H. (2012). A review of intentional and
cognitive control in autism. Frontiers in Psychology, 3:436. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00436
Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior: The control of perception (Vol. xi).
Oxford, England: Aldine.
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a
theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(04), 515–526.
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00076512
Preuschoff, K., & Bossaerts, P. (2007). Adding prediction risk to the
theory of reward learning. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, 1104, 135–146. doi: 10.1196/annals.1390.005
Preuschoff, K., Quartz, S. R., & Bossaerts, P. (2008). Human in-
sula activation reflects risk prediction errors as well as risk.
The Journal of Neuroscience, 28(11), 2745 –2752. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.4286-07.2008
Proulx, T., & Heine, S. J. (2009). Connections from kafka exposure
to meaning threats improves implicit learning of an artificial
grammar. Psychological Science, 20(9), 1125–1131. doi: 10.1111/
j.1467-9280.2009.02414.x
Proulx, T., Heine, S. J., & Vohs, K. D. (2010). When is the unfamiliar
the uncanny? meaning affirmation after exposure to absurdist
literature, humor, and art. Personality and Social Psychology Bul-
letin, 36(6), 817 –829. doi: 10.1177/0146167210369896
Proulx, T., Inzlicht, M., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2012). Understanding
all inconsistency compensation as a palliative response to vio-
lated expectations. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(5), 285–291.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.04.002
Pruett, J., John R, LaMacchia, A., Hoertel, S., Squire, E., McVey, K.,
Todd, R. D., . . . Petersen, S. E. (2011). Social and non-social
cueing of visuospatial attention in autism and typical devel-
opment. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 41(6),
715–731. doi: 10.1007/s10803-010-1090-z
Purves, D., Wojtach, W. T., & Lotto, R. B. (2011). Understanding
vision in wholly empirical terms. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 108(Supplement_3), 15588–15595. doi: 10
.1073/pnas.1012178108
R Core Team. (2014). R: A language and environment for statistical
computing. Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Com-
puting.
bibliography 217
Rajkowski, J., Kubiak, P., & Aston-Jones, G. (1993). Correlations
between locus coeruleus (LC) neural activity, pupil diameter
and behavior in monkey support a role of LC in attention. In
Society for neuroscience abstracts (Vol. 19, p. 974).
Ramachandran, V. S., & Hirstein, W. (1999). The science of art:
a neurological theory of aesthetic experience. Journal of Con-
sciousness Studies, 6(6-7), 15–51.
Rao, R. P. N. (1999). An optimal estimation approach to visual per-
ception and learning. Vision Research, 39(11), 1963–1989. doi:
10.1016/S0042-6989(98)00279-X
Rao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1997). Dynamic model of visual
recognition predicts neural response properties in the visual
cortex. Neural Computation, 9(4), 721–763. doi: 10.1162/neco
.1997.9.4.721
Rao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1999). Predictive coding in the vi-
sual cortex: a functional interpretation of some extra-classical
receptive-field effects. Nature Neuroscience, 2(1), 79–87. doi:
10.1038/4580
Rasmussen, D., & Eliasmith, C. (2013). God, the devil, and
the details: Fleshing out the predictive processing framework.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(03), 223–224. doi: 10.1017/
S0140525X12002154
Reber, R., Schwarz, N., & Winkielman, P. (2004). Processing fluency
and aesthetic pleasure: is beauty in the perceiver’s processing
experience? Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8(4), 364–
82. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr0804_3
Reber, R., Winkielman, P., & Schwarz, N. (1998). Effects of percep-
tual fluency on affective judgments. Psychological Science, 9(1),
45–48. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00008
Redies, C. (2007). A universal model of esthetic perception based on
the sensory coding of natural stimuli. Spatial Vision, 21, 97–117.
doi: 10.1163/156856807782753886
Reinberg, A., & Smolensky, M. H. (1983). Introduction to chronobiol-
ogy. Springer.
Reisenzein, R. (1983). The schachter theory of emotion: Two decades
later. Psychological Bulletin, 94(2), 239–264. doi: 10.1037/0033
-2909.94.2.239
Reisenzein, R. (2009). Emotional experience in the computational
Belief–Desire theory of emotion. Emotion Review, 1(3), 214–222.
doi: 10.1177/1754073909103589
Reynhout, G., & Carter, M. (2011). Evaluation of the efficacy of
social stories (TM) using three single subject metrics. Research
in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 5(2), 885–900. doi: 10.1016/j.rasd
.2010.10.003
218 bibliography
Rice, K., Moriuchi, J. M., Jones, W., & Klin, A. (2012). Parsing het-
erogeneity in autism spectrum disorders: Visual scanning of
dynamic social scenes in school-aged children. Journal of the
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 51(3), 238–
248. doi: 10.1016/j.jaac.2011.12.017
Richler, J., Huerta, M., Bishop, S. L., & Lord, C. (2010). De-
velopmental trajectories of restricted and repetitive behav-
iors and interests in children with autism spectrum disor-
ders. Development and Psychopathology, 22(01), 55. doi: 10.1017/
S0954579409990265
Robertson, C. E., Kravitz, D. J., Freyberg, J., Baron-Cohen, S., &
Baker, C. I. (2013). Slower rate of binocular rivalry in autism.
The Journal of Neuroscience, 33(43), 16983–16991. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.0448-13.2013
Robertson, C. E., Martin, A., Baker, C. I., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2012).
Atypical integration of motion signals in autism spectrum con-
ditions. PLoS ONE, 7(11), e48173. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone
.0048173
Robinson, M. J. F., Anselme, P., Fischer, A. M., & Berridge, K. C.
(2014). Initial uncertainty in pavlovian reward prediction per-
sistently elevates incentive salience and extends sign-tracking
to normally unattractive cues. Behavioural Brain Research, 266,
119–130. doi: 10.1016/j.bbr.2014.03.004
Rogers, S. J., & Vismara, L. A. (2008). Evidence-Based com-
prehensive treatments for early autism. Journal of clinical
child and adolescent psychology, 37(1), 8–38. doi: 10.1080/
15374410701817808
Rommelse, N. N., Geurts, H. M., Franke, B., Buitelaar, J. K., & Hart-
man, C. A. (2011). A review on cognitive and brain endophe-
notypes that may be common in autism spectrum disorder
and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and facilitate the
search for pleiotropic genes. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Re-
views, 35(6), 1363–1396. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.02.015
Ropar, D., & Mitchell, P. (2001). Susceptibility to illusions and
performance on visuospatial tasks in individuals with autism.
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42(4), 539–549. doi:
10.1111/1469-7610.00748
Ropar, D., & Mitchell, P. (2002). Shape constancy in autism: the
role of prior knowledge and perspective cues. Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 43(5), 647–653. doi: 10.1111/1469
-7610.00053
Ropar, D., Mitchell, P., & Ackroyd, K. (2003). Do children with
autism find it difficult to offer alternative interpretations to
ambiguous figures? British Journal of Developmental Psychology,
bibliography 219
21(3), 387–395. doi: 10.1348/026151003322277766
Ropar, D., & Peebles, D. (2007). Sorting preference in children
with autism: The dominance of concrete features. Journal
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 37(2), 270–280. doi:
10.1007/s10803-006-0166-2
Rosen, R. (2012). Anticipatory systems: Philosophical, mathematical, and
methodological foundations. Springer Science & Business Media.
Rouse, H., Donnelly, N., Hadwin, J. A., & Brown, T. (2004). Do chil-
dren with autism perceive second-order relational features?
the case of the thatcher illusion. Journal of Child Psychology
and Psychiatry, 45(7), 1246–1257. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.2004
.00317.x
Rozin, P., & Kennel, K. (1983). Acquired preferences for piquant
foods by chimpanzees. Appetite, 4(2), 69–77. doi: 10.1016/
S0195-6663(83)80003-8
Rozin, P., Rozin, A., Appel, B., & Wachtel, C. (2006). Documenting
and explaining the common AAB pattern in music and humor:
Establishing and breaking expectations. Emotion, 6(3), 349–355.
doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.6.3.349
Rushworth, M., Behrens, T., Rudebeck, P., & Walton, M. (2007).
Contrasting roles for cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex in de-
cisions and social behaviour. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(4),
168–176. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2007.01.004
Russell, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction
of emotion. Psychological Review, 110(1), 145–172. doi: 10.1037/
0033-295X.110.1.145
Rutherford, M. D., Troubridge, E. K., & Walsh, J. (2012). Visual af-
terimages of emotional faces in high functioning autism. Jour-
nal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 42(2), 221–229. doi:
10.1007/s10803-011-1233-x
Said, C. P., Dotsch, R., & Todorov, A. (2010). The amygdala and FFA
track both social and non-social face dimensions. Neuropsy-
chologia, 48(12), 3596–3605. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia
.2010.08.009
Said, C. P., Egan, R. D., Minshew, N. J., Behrmann, M., & Heeger,
D. J. (2013). Normal binocular rivalry in autism: Implications
for the excitation/inhibition imbalance hypothesis. Vision Re-
search, 77, 59–66. doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2012.11.002
Sander, D., Grafman, J., & Zalla, T. (2003). The human amygdala:
an evolved system for relevance detection. Reviews in the neu-
rosciences, 14(4).
Sarinopoulos, I., Grupe, D. W., Mackiewicz, K. L., Herrington, J. D.,
Lor, M., Steege, E. E., & Nitschke, J. B. (2010). Uncertainty
during anticipation modulates neural responses to aversion in
220 bibliography
human insula and amygdala. Cerebral Cortex, 20(4), 929–940.
doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhp155
Sasson, N. J., Elison, J. T., Turner-Brown, L. M., Dichter, G. S., &
Bodfish, J. W. (2011). Brief report: Circumscribed attention in
young children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmen-
tal Disorders, 41(2), 242–247. doi: 10.1007/s10803-010-1038-3
Sasson, N. J., Turner-Brown, L. M., Holtzclaw, T. N., Lam, K. S., &
Bodfish, J. W. (2008). Children with autism demonstrate cir-
cumscribed attention during passive viewing of complex so-
cial and nonsocial picture arrays. Autism Research, 1(1), 31–42.
doi: 10.1002/aur.4
Saygin, A., Cook, J., & Blakemore, S. (2010). Unaffected perceptual
thresholds for biological and non-biological form-from-motion
perception in autism spectrum conditions. PLOS ONE, 5(10),
e13491. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0013491
Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962). Cognitive, social, and physiological
determinants of emotional state. Psychological Review, 69(5),
379–399. doi: 10.1037/h0046234
Schafer, R., & Murphy, G. (1943). The role of autism in a visual
figure-ground relationship. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
32(4), 335–343. doi: 10.1037/h0057755
Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A., & Johnstone, T. (2001). Appraisal processes
in emotion: Theory, methods, research (Series in affective science).
Oxford University Press, USA.
Schiff, W., Caviness, J. A., & Gibson, J. J. (1962). Persistent fear
responses in rhesus monkeys to the optical stimulus of "loom-
ing.". Science, 136, 982–983. doi: 10.1126/science.136.3520.982
Schiffer, A., Ahlheim, C., Wurm, M. F., & Schubotz, R. I. (2012). Sur-
prised at all the entropy: Hippocampal, caudate and midbrain
contributions to learning from prediction errors. PLoS ONE,
7(5), e36445. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0036445
Schiffer, A., & Schubotz, R. I. (2011). Caudate nucleus signals for
breaches of expectation in a movement observation paradigm.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2011
.00038
Schmack, K., Castro, A. G. d., Rothkirch, M., Sekutowicz, M.,
Rössler, H., Haynes, J., . . . Sterzer, P. (2013). Delusions and
the role of beliefs in perceptual inference. The Journal of Neu-
roscience, 33(34), 13701–13712. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1778
-13.2013
Schmidhuber, J. (2010). Formal theory of creativity, fun, and intrin-
sic motivation (1990–2010). Autonomous Mental Development,
IEEE Transactions on, 2(3), 230–247.
Scholl, B. J. (2005). Innateness and (Bayesian) visual perception. The
bibliography 221
innate mind: Structure and contents, 34.
Schouppe, N., Braem, S., Houwer, J. D., Silvetti, M., Verguts, T., Rid-
derinkhof, K. R., & Notebaert, W. (2014). No pain, no gain: the
affective valence of congruency conditions changes following
a successful response. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuro-
science, 1–11. doi: 10.3758/s13415-014-0318-3
Schouten, B., Troje, N. F., & Verfaillie, K. (2011). The facing bias in
biological motion perception: structure, kinematics, and body
parts. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 73(1), 130–143. doi:
10.3758/s13414-010-0018-1
Schouten, B., & Verfaillie, K. (2010). Determining the point of sub-
jective ambiguity of ambiguous biological-motion figures with
perspective cues. Behavior Research Methods, 42(1), 161–167. doi:
10.3758/BRM.42.1.161
Schultz, W. (2007). Reward. Scholarpedia, 2(3), 1652. doi: 10.4249/
scholarpedia.1652
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., & Montague, P. R. (1997). A neural substrate
of prediction and reward. Science, 275(5306), 1593–1599. doi:
10.1126/science.275.5306.1593
Schulz, R. (1976). Effects of control and predictability on the physi-
cal and psychological well-being of the institutionalized aged.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33(5), 563–573. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.33.5.563
Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T. H. B., Mathys, C., Dolan, R., &
Friston, K. (2014). The dopaminergic midbrain encodes the
expected certainty about desired outcomes. Cerebral Cortex,
bhu159. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhu159
Sengupta, B., Stemmler, M. B., & Friston, K. J. (2013). Informa-
tion and efficiency in the nervous System—A synthesis. PLoS
Computional Biology, 9(7), e1003157. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi
.1003157
Serences, J. T. (2008). Value-based modulations in human visual
cortex. Neuron, 60(6), 1169–81. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2008.10
.051
Serretti, A., & Fabbri, C. (2013). Shared genetics among ma-
jor psychiatric disorders. Lancet, 381(9875), 1339–1341. doi:
10.1016/S0140-6736(13)60223-8
Seth, A. K. (2013). Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the em-
bodied self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(11), 565–573. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007
Seth, A. K., Suzuki, K., & Critchley, H. D. (2012). An interoceptive
predictive coding model of conscious presence. Frontiers in
Psychology, 2. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00395
Shackman, A. J., Salomons, T. V., Slagter, H. A., Fox, A. S., Winter,
222 bibliography
J. J., & Davidson, R. J. (2011). The integration of negative af-
fect, pain and cognitive control in the cingulate cortex. Nature
Reviews Neuroscience, 12(3), 154–167. doi: 10.1038/nrn2994
Shah, A., & Frith, U. (1993). Why do autistic individuals show
superior performance on the block design task? Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 34(8), 1351–1364. doi: 10.1111/j.1469
-7610.1993.tb02095.x
Silverstein, S. M. (2013). Schizophrenia-related phenomena that
challenge prediction error as the basis of cognitive function-
ing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(03), 229–230. doi: 10.1017/
S0140525X12002221
Silvia, P. J. (2001). Interest and interests: The psychology of construc-
tive capriciousness. Review of General Psychology, 5(3), 270–290.
doi: 10.1037/1089-2680.5.3.270
Silvia, P. J. (2008). Interest—The curious emotion. Current Directions
in Psychological Science, 17(1), 57–60. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8721
.2008.00548.x
Simmons, D. R., Robertson, A. E., McKay, L. S., Toal, E., McAleer,
P., & Pollick, F. E. (2009). Vision in autism spectrum disorders.
Vision Research, 49(22), 2705–2739. doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2009.08
.005
Singer, T., Critchley, H. D., & Preuschoff, K. (2009). A common role
of insula in feelings, empathy and uncertainty. Trends in Cog-
nitive Sciences, 13(8), 334–340. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.05.001
Singh, S., Lewis, R. L., & Barto, A. G. (2009). Where do rewards
come from. In Proceedings of the annual conference of the cognitive
science society (p. 2601–2606).
Sloboda, J. A. (1991). Music structure and emotional response: Some
empirical findings. Psychology of Music, 19(2), 110 –120. doi:
10.1177/0305735691192002
Smith, E. G., & Bennetto, L. (2007). Audiovisual speech integration
and lipreading in autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psy-
chiatry, 48(8), 813–821. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.2007.01766.x
Smith, J. D. (2009). The study of animal metacognition. Trends
in Cognitive Sciences, 13(9), 389–396. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.06
.009
Smith, J. D., Coutinho, M. V. C., Church, B. A., & Beran, M. J.
(2013). Executive-attentional uncertainty responses by rhesus
macaques (Macaca mulatta). Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 142(2), 458–475. doi: 10.1037/a0029601
Solway, A., & Botvinick, M. M. (2012). Goal-directed decision mak-
ing as probabilistic inference: A computational framework and
potential neural correlates. Psychological Review, 119(1), 120–
154. doi: 10.1037/a0026435
bibliography 223
Soulieres, I., Mottron, L., Giguere, G., & Larochelle, S. (2011).
Category induction in autism: slower, perhaps different, but
certainly possible. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy, 64(1747-0226 (Electronic)), 311–327. doi: 10.1080/17470218
.2010.492994
Spencer, J., O’Brien, J., Riggs, K., Braddick, O., Atkinson, J., &
Wattam-Bell, J. (2000). Motion processing in autism: Evidence
for a dorsal stream deficiency. Neuroreport, 11(12), 2765–2767.
Spengler, S., Bird, G., & Brass, M. (2010). Hyperimitation of actions
is related to reduced understanding of others’ minds in autism
spectrum conditions. Biological Psychiatry, 68(12), 1148–1155.
doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.09.017
Sperber, D. (2005). Modularity and relevance: How can a massively
modular mind be flexible and context-sensitive? In P. Car-
ruthers & S. Laurence (Eds.), The innate mind: Structure and
contents. USA: Oxford University Press.
Sperber, D., & Hirschfeld, L. A. (2004). The cognitive foundations
of cultural stability and diversity. Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
8(1), 40–46. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2003.11.002
Spinoza, B. d. (2001). Ethics. Wordsworth Editions.
Spratling, M. W. (2010). Predictive coding as a model of response
properties in cortical area v1. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30(9),
3531–3543. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4911-09.2010
Spruyt, A., De Houwer, J., Hermans, D., & Eelen, P. (2007). Affective
priming of nonaffective semantic categorization responses. Ex-
perimental Psychology, 54(1), 44–53. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169.54
.1.44
Sroufe, L. A., & Waters, E. (1976). The ontogenesis of smiling and
laughter: A perspective on the organization of development
in infancy. Psychological Review, 83(3), 173–189. doi: 10.1037/
0033-295X.83.3.173
Stanisor, L., van der Togt, C., Pennartz, C. M. A., & Roelfsema, P. R.
(2013). A unified selection signal for attention and reward in
primary visual cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America, 110(22), 9136–9141. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1300117110
Stansbury, D. E., Naselaris, T., & Gallant, J. L. (2013). Natural scene
statistics account for the representation of scene categories in
human visual cortex. Neuron, 79(5), 1025–1034. doi: 10.1016/
j.neuron.2013.06.034
Stefanucci, J. K., Proffitt, D. R., Clore, G. L., & Parekh, N. (2008).
Skating down a steeper slope: Fear influences the perception
of geographical slant. Perception, 37(2), 321–323. doi: 10.1068/
p5796
224 bibliography
Stephan, K. E., Friston, K. J., & Frith, C. D. (2009). Dysconnection in
schizophrenia: From abnormal synaptic plasticity to failures
of self-monitoring. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 35(3), 509–527. doi:
10.1093/schbul/sbn176
Sterling, P. (2012). Allostasis: A model of predictive regulation. Phys-
iology & Behavior, 106(1), 5–15. doi: 10.1016/j.physbeh.2011.06
.004
Stewart, L. H., Ajina, S., Getov, S., Bahrami, B., Todorov, A., & Rees,
G. (2012). Unconscious evaluation of faces on social dimen-
sions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141(4), 715–
727. doi: 10.1037/a0027950
Stoet, G., & López, B. (2011). Task-switching abilities in children
with autism spectrum disorder. European Journal of Develop-
mental Psychology, 8(2), 244–260. doi: 10.1080/17405629.2010
.492000
Stolarova, M., Keil, A., & Moratti, S. (2006). Modulation of the
c1 visual event-related component by conditioned stimuli: evi-
dence for sensory plasticity in early affective perception. Cere-
bral Cortex, 16(6), 876–87. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhj031
Summerfield, C., Trittschuh, E. H., Monti, J. M., Mesulam, M., & Eg-
ner, T. (2008). Neural repetition suppression reflects fulfilled
perceptual expectations. Nature Neuroscience, 11(9), 1004–1006.
doi: 10.1038/nn.2163
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1981). Toward a modern theory of
adaptive networks: Expectation and prediction. Psychological
Review, 88(2), 135–170. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.88.2.135
Synofzik, M., Lindner, A., & Thier, P. (2008). The cerebellum up-
dates predictions about the visual consequences of one’s be-
havior. Current Biology, 18(11), 814–818. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2008
.04.071
Taatgen, N., & Anderson, J. R. (2010). The past, present, and future
of cognitive architectures. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2(4), 693–
704. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01063.x
Taylor, N., Isaac, C., & Milne, E. (2010). A comparison of the de-
velopment of audiovisual integration in children with autism
spectrum disorders and typically developing children. Journal
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 40(11), 1403–1411. doi:
10.1007/s10803-010-1000-4
Teufel, C., Subramaniam, N., & Fletcher, P. C. (2013). The role of
priors in Bayesian models of perception. Frontiers in Computa-
tional Neuroscience, 25. doi: 10.3389/fncom.2013.00025
Thompson, M. M., Naccarato, M. E., Parker, K. C., & Moskowitz,
G. B. (2001). The personal need for structure and personal
fear of invalidity measures: Historical perspectives, current ap-
bibliography 225
plications, and future directions. In Cognitive social psychology:
The princeton symposium on the legacy and future of social cognition
(p. 19–39).
Thornton, C. (2014a). Experiments in predictive coding [Unpublished
manuscript]. University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.
Thornton, C. (2014b). Experiments in sparse-coded predictive process-
ing [Unpublished manuscript]. University of Sussex, Brighton,
UK.
Tinbergen, N. (1951). The study of instinct. London, U.K.: Oxford
Clarendon Press.
Todorovic, A., & de Lange, F. (2012). Repetition suppression and
expectation suppression are dissociable in time in early audi-
tory evoked fields. Journal of Neuroscience, 32(1529-2401 (Elec-
tronic)), 13389–13395. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2227-12.2012
Todorovic, A., van Ede, F., Maris, E., & de Lange, F. (2011). Prior
expectation mediates neural adaptation to repeated sounds
in the auditory cortex: an MEG study. Journal of Neuro-
science, 31(1529-2401 (Electronic)), 9118–9123. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.1425-11.2011
Tomchek, S. D., & Dunn, W. (2007). Sensory processing in children
with and without autism: A comparative study using the short
sensory profile. American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 61(2),
190–200. doi: 10.5014/ajot.61.2.190
Topolinski, S. (2010). Moving the eye of the beholder. Psychological
Science, 21(9), 1220 –1224. doi: 10.1177/0956797610378308
Topolinski, S., & Reber, R. (2010). Gaining insight into the “Aha” ex-
perience. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 19(6), 402–
405. doi: 10.1177/0963721410388803
Treffert, D. A. (2009). The savant syndrome: an extraordinary condi-
tion. a synopsis: past, present, future. Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364(1522), 1351–1357.
doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0326
Troje, N. F. (2002). Decomposing biological motion: A framework
for analysis and synthesis of human gait patterns. Journal of
Vision, 2(5), 371–387. doi: 10.1167/2.5.2
Turiano, N. A., Chapman, B. P., Agrigoroaei, S., Infurna, F. J., &
Lachman, M. (2014). Perceived control reduces mortality risk
at low, not high, education levels. Health Psychology, 33(8), 883–
890. doi: 10.1037/hea0000022
Turner, M. (1999). Annotation: Repetitive behaviour in autism: A
review of psychological research. Journal of Child Psychology
and Psychiatry, 40(6), 839–849. doi: 10.1111/1469-7610.00502
Uddin, L. Q., & Menon, V. (2009). The anterior insula in autism:
Under-connected and under-examined. Neuroscience & Biobe-
226 bibliography
havioral Reviews, 33(8), 1198–1203. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev
.2009.06.002
Uljarevic, M., & Hamilton, A. (2013). Recognition of emotions in
autism: A formal Meta-Analysis. Journal of Autism and Devel-
opmental Disorders, 43(7), 1517–1526. doi: 10.1007/s10803-012
-1695-5
Valdesolo, P., & Graham, J. (2014). Awe, uncertainty, and agency
detection. Psychological Science, 25(1), 170–178. doi: 10.1177/
0956797613501884
Valentine, T. (1991). A unified account of the effects of distinc-
tiveness, inversion, and race. Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology Section a-Human Experimental Psychology, 43(2), 161–
204.
Van de Cruys, S., de-Wit, L., Evers, K., Boets, B., & Wagemans, J.
(2013). Weak priors versus overfitting of predictions in autism:
Reply to pellicano and burr (TICS, 2012). i-Perception, 4(2),
95–97.
van Boxtel, J. J. A., & Lu, H. (2012). Signature movements lead to
efficient search for threatening actions. PloS one, 7(5), e37085.
van Boxtel, J. J. A., & Lu, H. (2013). A predictive coding perspective
on autism spectrum disorders. Frontiers in Psychology, 4. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00019
Van de Cruys, S., Evers, K., Van der Hallen, R., Van Eylen, L., Boets,
B., de-Wit, L., & Wagemans, J. (2014). Precise minds in un-
certain worlds: Predictive coding in autism. Psychological Re-
view(In press).
Van de Cruys, S., & Wagemans, J. (2011a). Gestalts as Predic-
tions—Some reflections and an application to art. Gestalt The-
ory, 33(3), 325.
Van de Cruys, S., & Wagemans, J. (2011b). Putting reward in art:
A tentative prediction error account of visual art. i-Perception,
2(9), 1035–1062. doi: 10.1068/i0466aap
Vandenbroucke, M., Scholte, H., van Engeland, H., Lamme, V., &
Kemner, C. (2008). Coherent versus component motion per-
ception in autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism and
Developmental Disorders, 38(0162-3257 (Print)), 941–949. doi:
10.1007/s10803-007-0467-0
van der Geest, J. N., Kemner, C., Camfferman, G., Verbaten, M. N.,
& van Engeland, H. (2002). Looking at images with human fig-
ures: Comparison between autistic and normal children. Jour-
nal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 32(2), 69–75. doi:
10.1023/A:1014832420206
Van der Hallen, R., Evers, K., Brewaeys, K., Van den Noortgate, W.,
& Wagemans, J. (2014). Global processing takes time: A Meta-
bibliography 227
Analysis on Local-Global visual processing in ASD. Psycholog-
ical Bulletin.
van der Helm, P. A. (2000). Simplicity versus likelihood in visual
perception: From surprisals to precisals. Psychological Bulletin,
126(5), 770–800. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.126.5.770
Vaneechoutte, M. (1993). The memetic basis of religion. Nature,
365(6444), 290–290. doi: 10.1038/365290a0
Van Eylen, L., Boets, B., Steyaert, J., Evers, K., Wagemans, J., &
Noens, I. (2011). Cognitive flexibility in autism spectrum
disorder: Explaining the inconsistencies? Research in Autism
Spectrum Disorders, 5(4), 1390–1401. doi: 10.1016/j.rasd.2011.01
.025
van Harreveld, F., Rutjens, B. T., Schneider, I. K., Nohlen, H. U.,
& Keskinis, K. (2014). In doubt and disorderly: Ambiva-
lence promotes compensatory perceptions of order. Journal
of Experimental Psychology. General, 143(4), 1666–1676. doi:
10.1037/a0036099
van Leeuwen, C. (2007). What needs to emerge to make you con-
scious? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14(1-1), 115–136.
Vanrie, J., Dekeyser, M., & Verfaillie, K. (2004). Bistability and bias-
ing effects in the perception of ambiguous point-light walkers.
Perception, 33(5), 547–560. doi: 10.1068/p5004
Varela, F. G., Maturana, H. R., & Uribe, R. (1974). Autopoiesis:
The organization of living systems, its characterization and a
model. Biosystems, 5(4), 187–196. doi: 10.1016/0303-2647(74)
90031-8
Verduzco-Flores, S., & O’Reilly, R. C. (2014). The cerebellum as
a predictor of error increase in a controller. arXiv:1408.3444
[q-bio].
Verstijnen, I., van Leeuwen, C., Goldschmidt, G., Hamel, R., & Hen-
nessey, J. (1998). Sketching and creative discovery. Design
Studies, 19(4), 519–546. doi: 10.1016/S0142-694X(98)00017-9
Vessel, E. A. (2004). Behavioral and neural investigation of perceptual af-
fect Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Southern
California.
Vladusich, T., Olu-Lafe, O., Kim, D., Tager-Flusberg, H., & Gross-
berg, S. (2010). Prototypical category learning in high-
functioning autism. Autism Research, 3(5), 226–236. doi:
10.1002/aur.148
Volkmar, F., Chawarska, K., & Klin, A. (2005). Autism in infancy
and early childhood. Annual Review of Psychology, 56(1), 315–
336. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070159
von Glasersfeld, E. (1991). An exposition of constructivism: Why
some like it radical. In Facets of systems science (pp. 229–238).
228 bibliography
Springer US.
von Glasersfeld, E. (1995). Radical constructivism: A way of knowing
and learning. studies in mathematics education series: 6. Bristol,
PA: Falmer Press, Taylor & Francis Inc.
Voss, A., Rothermund, K., & Brandtstädter, J. (2008). Interpreting
ambiguous stimuli: Separating perceptual and judgmental bi-
ases. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(4), 1048–1056.
doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2007.10.009
Vossel, S., Mathys, C., Daunizeau, J., Bauer, M., Driver, J., Friston,
K. J., & Stephan, K. E. (2014). Spatial attention, precision,
and Bayesian inference: a study of saccadic response speed.
Cerebral Cortex, 24(6), 1436–1450. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhs418
Vuilleumier, P. (2005). How brains beware: neural mechanisms of
emotional attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(12), 585–594.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.011
Vygotsky, L. S. (1971). Psychology of art. MIT Press.
Wacongne, C., Changeux, J., & Dehaene, S. (2012). A neuronal
model of predictive coding accounting for the mismatch nega-
tivity. Journal of Neuroscience, 32(1529-2401 (Electronic)), 3665–
3678. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5003-11.2012
Wacongne, C., Labyt, E., Wassenhove, V. v., Bekinschtein, T., Nac-
cache, L., & Dehaene, S. (2011). Evidence for a hierarchy of
predictions and prediction errors in human cortex. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(51), 20754–20759. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1117807108
Wagemans, J., Elder, J., Kubovy, M., Palmer, S., Peterson, M., Singh,
M., & von der, H. R. (2012). A century of gestalt psychol-
ogy in visual perception: I. perceptual grouping and figure-
ground organization 6. Psychological Bulletin, 138(1939-1455
(Electronic)), 1172–1217. doi: 10.1037/a0029333
Wagemans, J., Feldman, J., Gepshtein, S., Kimchi, R., Pomerantz, J.,
van der Helm, P., & van, L. C. (2012). A century of gestalt
psychology in visual perception: II. conceptual and theoreti-
cal foundations 7. Psychological Bulletin, 138(1939-1455 (Elec-
tronic)), 1218–1252. doi: 10.1037/a0029334
Walther, D. B., Chai, B., Caddigan, E., Beck, D. M., & Fei-Fei, L.
(2011). Simple line drawings suffice for functional MRI de-
coding of natural scene categories. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1015666108
Webb, S. J., Merkle, K., Murias, M., Richards, T., Aylward, E., &
Dawson, G. (2012). ERP responses differentiate inverted but
not upright face processing in adults with ASD. Social Cogni-
tive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(5), 578–587. doi: 10.1093/scan/
nsp002
bibliography 229
Weber, A., & Varela, F. J. (2002). Life after kant: Natural pur-
poses and the autopoietic foundations of biological individ-
uality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1(2), 97–125.
doi: 10.1023/A:1020368120174
Weigelt, S., Koldewyn, K., & Kanwisher, N. (2012). Face identity
recognition in autism spectrum disorders: a review of behav-
ioral studies. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 36(1873-
7528 (Electronic)), 1060–1084. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.12
.008
Wertheimer, M. (1923). Untersuchungen zur lehre der gestalt, II.
Psychologische Forschung, 4, 301–350.
Whalen, P. J. (1998). Fear, vigilance, and ambiguity: Initial neu-
roimaging studies of the human amygdala. Current Directions
in Psychological Science, 7(6), 177–188. doi: 10.1111/1467-8721
.ep10836912
Whalen, P. J. (2007). The uncertainty of it all. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 11(12), 499–500. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2007.08.016
White, S. J. (2013). The triple i hypothesis: Taking another(’s) per-
spective on executive dysfunction in autism. Journal of Autism
and Developmental Disorders, 43(1), 114–121. doi: 10.1007/
s10803-012-1550-8
White, S. J., Burgess, P. W., & Hill, E. L. (2009). Impairments on
“open-ended” executive function tests in autism. Autism Re-
search, 2(3), 138–147. doi: 10.1002/aur.78
Whitson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Lacking control increases
illusory pattern perception. Science, 322(5898), 115–117. doi:
10.1126/science.1159845
Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2008). Explaining away: A model of
affective adaptation. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(5),
370–386. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00085.x
Winkielman, P., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2001). Mind at ease puts a smile
on the face: Psychophysiological evidence that processing fa-
cilitation elicits positive affect. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 81(6), 989–1000. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.81.6.989
Winkler, I., Denham, S. L., & Nelken, I. (2009). Modeling the au-
ditory scene: predictive regularity representations and percep-
tual objects. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(12), 532–540. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2009.09.003
Winstanley, C. A., Cocker, P. J., & Rogers, R. D. (2011). Dopamine
modulates reward expectancy during performance of a slot
machine task in rats: Evidence for a ‘Near-miss’ effect. Neu-
ropsychopharmacology, 36(5), 913–925. doi: 10.1038/npp.2010
.230
Witkin, H. A., & Goodenough, D. R. (1981). Cognitive styles: essence
230 bibliography
and origins. field dependence and field independence. Psycho-
logical Issues(51), 1–141.
Wolf, U., Rapoport, M. J., & Schweizer, T. A. (2009). Evaluating the
affective component of the cerebellar cognitive affective syn-
drome. The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences,
21(3), 245–253. doi: 10.1176/appi.neuropsych.21.3.245
Wood, W., & Neal, D. T. (2007). A new look at habits and the
habit-goal interface. Psychological Review, 114(4), 843–863. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.114.4.843
Wörgötter, F., & Porr, B. (2005). Temporal sequence learning, pre-
diction, and control: a review of different models and their
relation to biological mechanisms. Neural Computation, 17(2),
245–319. doi: 10.1162/0899766053011555
Wuerger, S. M., Crocker-Buque, A., & Meyer, G. F. (2012). Ev-
idence for auditory-visual processing specific to biological
motion. Seeing and perceiving, 25(1), 15–28. doi: 10.1163/
187847611X620892
Wundt, W. (1897). Outline of psychology (Vol. xviii; C. H. Judd,
Trans.). Leipzig, Germany: Wilhelm Engelmann.
Yang, E., Zald, D. H., & Blake, R. (2007). Fearful expressions gain
preferential access to awareness during continuous flash sup-
pression. Emotion, 7(4), 882–886. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.7.4
.882
Yarkoni, T., Poldrack, R. A., Nichols, T. E., Van Essen, D. C., & Wa-
ger, T. D. (2011). Large-scale automated synthesis of human
functional neuroimaging data. Nature Methods, 8(8), 665–670.
doi: 10.1038/nmeth.1635
Yerkes, R., & Dodson, J. (1908). The relation of strength of stimulus
to rapidity of habit formation. Journal of Comparative Neurology
& Psychology, 18, 459–482. doi: 10.1002/cne.920180503
Yu, A. J., & Dayan, P. (2005). Uncertainty, neuromodulation, and
attention. Neuron, 46(4), 681–692. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2005
.04.026
Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 9(2, Part 2), 1–27. doi: 10.1037/
h0025848
Zaki, J. (2013). Cue integration a common framework for social
cognition and physical perception. Perspectives on Psychological
Science, 8(3), 296–312. doi: 10.1177/1745691613475454
Zeki, S. (2004). The neurology of ambiguity. Consciousness and
Cognition, 13(1), 173–96. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2003.10.003
Zwaigenbaum, L., Bryson, S., Rogers, T., Roberts, W., Brian, J., &
Szatmari, P. (2005). Behavioral manifestations of autism in the
first year of life. International Journal of Developmental Neuro-
bibliography 231
science, 23(2–3), 143–152. doi: 10.1016/j.ijdevneu.2004.05.001
